Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: BC696666, Date: 2025-06-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: BC696666    Hearing Date: June 5, 2025    Dept: 53

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles – Central District

Department 53

MOVING PARTY:                Defendant Maria Sandoval    

RESPONDING PARTY:       Plaintiffs AWI Builders, Inc., Construction Contractors Corporation, Zhirayr “Robert” Mekikyan, and Anna Mekikyan

Motion for Summary Judgment

The court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers filed in connection with this motion.

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

The court grants defendant Maria Sandoval’s request for judicial notice.  (Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (c), (d).)   The court notes that it does not take judicial notice of the truth of the matters stated therein.  (Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1375 [“While courts take judicial notice of public records, they do not take notice of the truth of the matters stated therein”] [internal citation omitted].)

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS 

The court overrules plaintiffs AWI Builders, Inc., Construction Contractors Corporation, Zhirayr “Robert” Mekikyan, and Anna Mekikyan’s evidentiary objections, filed on May 16, 2025, to defendant Maria Sandoval’s request for judicial notice.

The court has not ruled on the evidentiary objections set forth in the separate statement because “[a]ll written objections to evidence must be served and filed separately from other papers in support of or in opposition to the motion” and must be formatted in the manner set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 3.1354.  (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.1354, subd. (b).)

The court declines to rule on defendant Maria Sandoval’s objections because they are directed to evidence that is not material to the court’s disposition of this motion.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (q).) 

LEGAL STANDARD

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.”  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)  “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.”  (Scalf v. D.B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.)  A defendant or cross-defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)  “Once the defendant or cross-defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff or cross-complainant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)  “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.”  (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)  “When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.”  (Id. at p. 467; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)

DISCUSSION

The operative Third Amended Complaint was filed in this action by plaintiffs AWI Builders, Inc. (“AWI”), Construction Contractors Corporation (“CCC”), and Zhirayr “Robert” Mekikyan and Anna Mekikyan (the “Individual Plaintiffs”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) on October 16, 2020.  Individual Plaintiffs allege one cause of action against defendant Maria Sandoval (“Defendant”) for violation of civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983.[1]

As to the cause of action against Defendant, the Third Amended Complaint alleges that (1) the Department of Labor and Standards Enforcement (“DLSE”) filed various Labor Code administrative claims against AWI and CCC in 2015 (TAC ¶ 64), (2) Defendant, an investigator with the DLSE, “spearheaded the DLSE investigations against AWI and CCC” (TAC ¶ 64), and (3) after counsel for AWI and CCC made requests for documents from DLSE in 2014, Defendant was instructed not to turn over those documents (TAC ¶ 66).  Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant withheld documents that AWI and CCC requested in 2015 “in violation of due process protections afforded the accused in administrative hearings” (TAC ¶ 68).  Thus, Individual Plaintiffs’ action against Defendant is based on the theory that Defendant withheld documents from AWI and CCC and that such withholding is a violation of their right to due process.

Defendant now moves the court for an order granting summary judgment in her favor and against Individual Plaintiffs.

“To state a claim under [section] 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.”  (Julian v. Mission Community Hospital (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 360, 384 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted].)

The court finds that Defendant has met her burden of showing that the first cause of action for violation of civil rights has no merit because Defendant has shown that (1) Individual Plaintiffs do not have standing to allege this cause of action, (2) the element of deprivation of a right, privilege, or immunity secured to Individual Plaintiffs cannot be established, and (3) the element of inadequate state remedies cannot be established.

First, the court finds that Defendant has shown that Individual Plaintiffs do not have standing to allege this cause of action.

“In general, shareholders lack standing to assert an individual § 1983 claim based on harm to the corporation in which they own shares.  [Citation.]  ‘[I]njury to the corporation is not as cognizable as injury to the shareholders, for purposes of the standing requirements.’  [Citations.]”  (RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle (9th Cir. 2002) 307 F.3d 1045, 1057 [internal citations omitted].)  “A shareholder does have standing, however, when he or she has been ‘injured directly and independently from the corporation.’”  (Ibid. [internal citation omitted].)

Plaintiffs do not dispute that (1) AWI and CCC (which are not named as plaintiffs in this cause of action) are California corporations, and (2) Individual Plaintiffs own AWI and CCC.  (Undisputed Material Fact Nos. 1-2, 5-8.)  Defendant has submitted evidence to show that she issued wage and penalty assessments not to Individual Plaintiffs, but to AWI and/or CCC.  (Sandoval Decl., Exs. 1 [Civil Wage and Penalty Assessment to AWI dated February 11, 2015], 2 [Civil Wage and Penalty Assessment to AWI dated July 7, 2015], 3 [Civil Wage and Penalty Assessment to AWI dated June 9, 2015], 4 [Civil Wage and Penalty Assessment to AWI and CCC dated June 9, 2015], 5 [Civil Wage and Penalty Assessment to AWI dated September 17, 2015], 6 [Civil Wage and Penalty Assessment to AWI and CCC dated October 7, 2015].) 

The court finds, based on (1) the evidence presented by Defendant establishing that the wage and penalty assessments were issued to AWI and CCC and not Individual Plaintiffs and  (2) Defendant’s argument that those assessments are not sufficient to allow Plaintiffs to maintain this action under section 1983, that Defendant has shown that Individual Plaintiffs do not have standing to allege this cause of action against her since Defendant has shown that the entities harmed by the issuances of the assessments and, relatedly, Defendant’s alleged withholding of documents regarding those assessments (which is alleged to be the due process violation) are AWI and CCC, not Individual Plaintiffs.  (RK Ventures, Inc., supra, 307 F.3d at p. 1057.)  

Second, the court finds that Defendant has shown, based on the evidence and argument discussed above, that Defendant did not deprive Individual Plaintiffs of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States to them since Defendant issued the subject assessments, and allegedly failed to produce documents relating thereto, to AWI and CCC, not Individual Plaintiffs.  (McAllister v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1198, 1207; Julian, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 384; Sandoval Decl., Exs. 1-6; Mot., p. 15:1-3.)

            Third, the court finds that Defendant has shown that the element of inadequate state remedies cannot be established.

“When state remedies are adequate to protect an individual’s procedural due process rights, a section 1983 action alleging a violation of those rights will not stand.”  (Brogan v. San Mateo County (9th Cir. 1990) 901 F.2d 762, 764; Marino v. Ameruso (2nd Cir. 1988) 837 F.2d 45, 47 [“Although one need not exhaust state remedies before bringing a Section 1983 action claiming a violation of procedural due process, one must nevertheless prove as an element of that claim that state procedural remedies are inadequate”].)

Defendant has met her burden to show that state procedural remedies exist that are adequate to address Individual Plaintiffs’ due process rights as they relate to Defendant’s alleged withholding of documents.  (TAC ¶¶ 66, 68.)  Defendant has shown that, in the statutory scheme regarding appeals of civil wage and penalty assessments, an agency such as DLSE is precluded from introducing evidence in proceedings if it has failed to make evidence available for review.  (8 C.C.R. § 17224, subd. (d) [“The Enforcing Agency shall make evidence available for review as specified . . . .  The Enforcing Agency’s failure to make evidence available for review as required by Labor Code section 1742(b) and this Rule, shall preclude the Enforcing Agency from introducing such evidence in proceedings before the Hearing Officer or the Director”].)  Thus, Defendant has shown that an adequate state procedural remedy exists to address a failure to make evidence available for review and to protect a contractor’s associated due process rights, which is adequate to remedy the claim asserted against Defendant based on her alleged withholding of requested documents.[2]

The court finds that Individual Plaintiffs have not met their burden to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to (1) their standing to bring this cause of action, and (2) the elements of (i) the deprivation of a right, privilege, or immunity secured to them, and (ii) an inadequate state remedy to protect their procedural due process rights.

First, the court finds that Individual Plaintiffs have not shown that a triable issue of material fact exists as to their standing to bring this cause of action as owners of corporate plaintiffs AWI and CCC. 

Individual Plaintiffs argue that they suffered personal injuries distinct and independent from those experienced by AWI and CCC that were caused by Defendant’s allegedly wrongful issuance of penalties on the ground that the issuance of those penalties “directly resulted in illegal search warrants being executed at [their] personal residence, causing indisputable harm to” Individual Plaintiffs.  (Opp., p. 7:24-27.)  However, Individual Plaintiffs have not presented adequate authority, argument, and analysis to establish how Defendant’s conduct in allegedly withholding documents from AWI and CCC, thereby depriving them of their due process rights, resulted in Individual Plaintiffs’ home being searched.  Further, Individual Plaintiffs did not present evidence of that search and the emotional injuries described in their opposition papers, and have only cited allegations in the Third Amended Complaint, which are insufficient to show the existence of a triable issue of material fact.  (Roman v. BRE Properties, Inc. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1040, 1054 [“It is fundamental that to defeat summary judgment a plaintiff must show ‘specific facts’ and cannot rely on allegations of the complaint”] [internal citations omitted].)

The court notes that Plaintiffs have also argued that Defendant is improperly challenging the sufficiency of the pleadings on this motion.  The court is not ruling on Defendant’s motion on the ground that the Third Amended Complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.  Instead, as set forth above, the court has considered the evidence presented by Defendant (i.e., the evidence that the penalty assessments were issued not to Individual Plaintiffs but to AWI and CCC) and the legal arguments presented in the moving papers to determine whether Defendant met her burden to show that Individual Plaintiffs (1) do not have standing to bring this cause of action and (2) cannot establish the element of the deprivation of a right, privilege, or immunity secured to them.[3]

Even if the court were to agree, and grant Defendant’s motion on the ground that, the Third Amended Complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action on the ground that Plaintiffs have not pleaded certain elements, rather than ruling that they have not met their burden to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to whether they can establish those elements with evidence, Plaintiffs have not cited authority establishing that the court is precluded from doing so.  At most, the court would then consider whether Plaintiffs have shown that they could amend the pleading to render it legally sufficient.[4]  (Prue v. Brady Co./San Diego, Inc. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1384 [“if summary judgment is granted on the ground that the complaint is legally insufficient, but it appears from the materials submitted in opposition to the motion that the plaintiff could state a cause of action, the trial court should give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend the complaint before entry of judgment”] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted].) 

Second, the court finds that Individual Plaintiffs have not met their burden to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to whether Defendant deprived Individual Plaintiffs of a right, privilege, or immunity secured to Individual Plaintiffs, rather than AWI and CCC, by withholding from AWI and CCC the subject documents.  In their opposition papers and response separate statement, Plaintiffs have focused on Defendant’s conduct in reviewing and withholding documents from AWI.  (Opp., pp. 5:22-6:3; Pl. Additional Material Fact Nos. 36 [Defendant “testified to reviewing stolen AWI records”], 40 [Nakagama instructed Defendant to withhold evidence and information from AWI], 42 [Defendant “confessed to withholding all worker questionnaires from AWI”].)  This argument and evidence, however, does not show that Defendant deprived Individual Plaintiffs of their due process rights.

Third, the court finds that Individual Plaintiffs have not met their burden to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to whether the remedy set forth in the California Code of Regulations is an inadequate state remedy because Individual Plaintiffs did not address that point in their opposition papers.  Thus, Individual Plaintiffs have not met their burden to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the inadequacy of that remedy with adequate argument, analysis, authority, and evidence.

For the reasons set forth above, the court finds that (1) Defendant has met her burden to show that the first cause of action for violation of civil rights has no merit, and (2) Individual Plaintiffs have not met their burden to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the merits of that cause of action.

Thus, the court finds that all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)  The court therefore grants Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

ORDER

            The court grants defendant Maria Sandoval’s motion for summary judgment

The court orders defendant Maria Sandoval to prepare, serve, and file with the court a proposed judgment within 10 days of the date of this order.

The court orders that the Final Status Conference, set for January 29, 2026, is vacated.

The court orders that trial, set for February 11, 2026, is vacated.

The court sets for hearing an Order to Show Cause re entry of judgment after granting summary judgment on August 13, 2025, at 8:30 a.m., in Department 53.

The court orders defendant Maria Sandoval to give notice of this ruling.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:  June 5, 2025

_____________________________

Robert B. Broadbelt III

Judge of the Superior Court