Judge: Robert B. Broadbelt, Case: BC710724, Date: 2025-04-23 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: BC710724 Hearing Date: April 23, 2025 Dept: 53
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles – central district
Department
53
|
NOUBAR
ISHAK, et al., vs. |
Case
No. |
BC710724 |
|
|
|
|
|
Hearing
Date: |
April
23, 2025 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
[Tentative]
Order RE: mOTIONs in limine |
||
The court rules on plaintiffs’ and defendants’
motions in limine as follows.
Plaintiff Noubar Ishak’s Motion in
Limine No. 1
The court grants plaintiff Noubar
Ishak’s motion in limine no. 1 (joined in by plaintiff Jessica Layne Neumeyer) as
set forth below because (1) the subject evidence is not relevant (Evid. Code, §
350), and (2) the court exercises its discretion to exclude such evidence
because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that
its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time and (b) create
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of
misleading the jury (Evid. Code, § 352).
The court orders that defendants shall not make arguments, make reference
to, or introduce evidence of, plaintiffs’ health insurance, that plaintiffs have
had health insurance, that plaintiffs should have treated through health
insurance, what plaintiffs’ health insurance might have paid for past treatment,
and that plaintiffs failed to mitigate their damages by treating on a lien as
opposed to treating through health insurance or MediCal.
Plaintiff Noubar Ishak’s Motion in
Limine No. 2
The court denies plaintiff Noubar
Ishak’s motion in limine no. 2 (joined in by plaintiff Jessica Layne Neumeyer)
for the reasons set forth in the court’s order denying plaintiff Noubar Ishak’s
motion in limine no. 7, below.
Plaintiff Noubar Ishak’s Motion in
Limine No. 3
The court denies plaintiff Noubar
Ishak’s motion in limine no. 3 (joined in by plaintiff Jessica Layne
Neumeyer).
In both plaintiff Noubar Ishak’s and
plaintiff Jessica Layne Neumeyer’s memoranda of points and authorities filed in
support of this motion, they state: “the
Court in Qaadir v. Figueroa explicitly upheld the trial court’s decision
to exclude testimony that Qaadir’s attorney referred him to doctors treating on
a lien, holding it was not prejudicial to exclude such evidence.” (Plaintiff Noubar Ishak’s motion in limine no.
3, April 25, 2022, p. 4:26-28; plaintiff Jessica Layne Neumeyer’s motion in
limine no. 3, filed July 12, 2022, p. 4:14-16.)
But plaintiffs’ statements that, in Qaadir v. Figueroa (2021) 67
Cal.App.5th 790, the Court of Appeal “explicitly upheld the trial
court’s decision to exclude testimony that Qaadir’s attorney referred him to doctors
treating on a lien” are not correct.
In Qaadir, the Court of Appeal addressed this issue by
stating: “We agree the referral evidence
was relevant to the question of the reasonable value of the lien-physicians’
medical care because it may show bias or financial incentives on the part of
the lien-physicians. If a lien-physician
wants future referrals from a lawyer and understands that the lawyer benefits
from inflating a client’s medical bills, that incentive might encourage the
lien-physician to inflate its current bill to please the lawyer and win future
referrals. (Evid. Code, §§ 210,
350.)” (Id. at p. 808.) The Court of Appeal found that the trial
court erred by sustaining the plaintiff’s objection on relevance grounds to the
defense counsel’s questions asking plaintiff’s billing expert and plaintiff
himself whether his attorney referred him to the lien-physicians, but the Court
of Appeal held that defendants failed to demonstrate prejudice resulted from
the error. (Id. at p. 808.)
Plaintiff Noubar Ishak’s Motion in
Limine No. 4
Plaintiff Noubar Ishak has withdrawn
his motion in limine no. 4 (joined in by plaintiff Jessica Layne Neumeyer). (Plaintiff Noubar Ishak’s Withdrawal of
Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine No. 4, filed April 14, 2025.)
Plaintiff Noubar Ishak’s Motion in
Limine No. 5
The court denies plaintiff Noubar
Ishak’s motion in limine no. 5 (joined in by plaintiff Jessica Layne Neumeyer) because
defendants have represented to the court in their opposition that “the sub rosa
investigation of August 30, 2019, has been provided to Plaintiffs in the spirit
of discovery.” (Defendants’ opposition
to motion in limine no. 5, filed May 18, 2022, pp. 1:28-22:7.)
Plaintiff Noubar Ishak’s Motion in
Limine No. 6
The court grants plaintiff Noubar
Ishak’s motion in limine no. 6 because (1) evidence of plaintiff Noubar Ishak’s misdemeanor charge and
conviction in Case No. LAVLA083240-01 is not admissible (Evid. Code, § 788),
and (2) the court exercises its discretion to exclude such evidence because its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its
admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time and (b) create
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of
misleading the jury (Evid. Code, § 352).
The court orders that defendants
shall not make reference to, or introduce evidence of, plaintiff Noubar Ishak’s
misdemeanor charge and conviction in Case No. LAVLA083240-01.
Plaintiff Noubar Ishak’s Motion in
Limine No. 7
In his motion in limine no. 7 (joined in by
plaintiff Jessica Layne Neumeyer), plaintiff Noubar Ishak requests an order
excluding (1) any testimony from defendants’ expert, Henry Lubow, M.D., for
improper medical billing methodology, and (2) any testimony from Dr. Lubow
regarding reasonable and customary costs of future medical care. (Plaintiff Noubar Ishak’s motion in limine
no. 7, filed January 18, 2023, pp. 1:25-2:3.)
The court denies plaintiff’s motion in limine no. 7 because the expert
opinion testimony of Dr. Lubow is relevant to establishing the reasonable value
of the services rendered by health care providers to plaintiffs. “In a tort action for economic damages, the
California Supreme Court has held an award of past medical expenses is limited
to the lesser of (1) the amount paid or incurred and (2) the reasonable value
of the services rendered. (Howell v.
Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 541, 556
. . . .)” (Qaadir v. Figueroa (2021)
67 Cal.App.5th 790, 797.)
However, as set forth in the court’s order on plaintiff Noubar Ishak’s
motion in limine no. 1, above, Dr. Lubow is prohibited from mentioning
plaintiffs’ health insurance, or stating that plaintiffs have had health
insurance, that plaintiffs should have treated through health insurance, what
plaintiffs’ health insurance might have paid for past treatment, and that
plaintiffs failed to mitigate their damages by treating on a lien as opposed to
treating through health insurance or MediCal.
Plaintiff Noubar Ishak’s Motion in
Limine No. 8
In his motion in limine no. 8, plaintiff Noubar Ishak requests an
order excluding evidence regarding “Plaintiff’s subsequent collision or the
idea that a subsequent incident caused or contributed to Plaintiff’s injuries .
. . .” (Plaintiff Noubar Ishak’s motion
in limine no. 8, filed January 18, 2023, p. 2:1-4.) Plaintiff Noubar Ishak states that (1) the
vehicle collision on which this action is based occurred on March 5, 2017, and
(2) he was involved in a subsequent vehicle collision that occurred on January
14, 2022.
Evidence Code section 801.1,
subdivision (a) states that, in a general civil case, “where the party bearing
the burden of proof proffers expert testimony regarding medical causation and
where that party’s expert is required as a condition of testifying to opine
that causation exists to a reasonable medical probability, the party not
bearing the burden of proof may offer a contrary expert only if its expert is
able to opine that the proffered alternative cause or causes each exists to a
reasonable medical probability, except as provided in subdivision (b).” Subdivision (b) provides that “[s]ubdivision
(a) does not preclude a witness testifying as an expert from testifying that a
matter cannot meet a reasonable degree of probability in the applicable field,
and providing the basis for that opinion.”
Based on plaintiff’s representation that he is going to proffer expert
testimony regarding medical causation for his injuries resulting from the March
5, 2017 collision, and the fact that defendants have not presented any evidence
that they are able to offer expert testimony to opine that plaintiff Noubar
Ishak’s vehicle collision that occurred on January 14, 2022, is an alternative
cause of plaintiff’s injuries to a reasonable medical probability, the court
grants plaintiff’s motion in limine no. 8 as set forth below. The court also excludes evidence of plaintiff
Noubar Ishak’s subsequent vehicle collision that occurred on January 14, 2022,
because (1) the subject evidence is not relevant (Evid. Code, § 350), and (2)
the court exercises its discretion to exclude such evidence because its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its
admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time and (b) create
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading
the jury (Evid. Code, § 352).
The court orders that defendants shall not make reference to, or
introduce evidence of, plaintiff Noubar Ishak’s subsequent vehicle collision
that occurred on January 14, 2022.
However, this order does not preclude defendants from offering opinion
testimony from an expert that a matter cannot meet a reasonable degree of probability
in the applicable field and providing the basis for that opinion. (Evid. Code, § 801.1, subd. (b).)
Plaintiff Noubar
Ishak’s Motion in Limine No. 9
In his motion in limine no.
9, plaintiff Noubar Ishak requests an order excluding evidence regarding
“Plaintiff’s prior February 2015 accident or the idea that the prior accident
caused or contributed to Plaintiff’s injuries . . . .” (Plaintiff Noubar Ishak’s motion in limine
no. 9, filed September 3, 2024, p. 2:5-8.)
Plaintiff Noubar Ishak states that (1) the vehicle collision on which
this action is based occurred on March 5, 2017, and (2) he was involved in a prior
vehicle accident that occurred on February 22, 2015.
Evidence
Code section 801.1, subdivision (a) states that, in a general civil case,
“where the party bearing the burden of proof proffers expert testimony
regarding medical causation and where that party’s expert is required as a
condition of testifying to opine that causation exists to a reasonable medical
probability, the party not bearing the burden of proof may offer a contrary
expert only if its expert is able to opine that the proffered alternative cause
or causes each exists to a reasonable medical probability, except as provided
in subdivision (b).” Subdivision (b)
provides that “[s]ubdivision (a) does not preclude a witness testifying as an
expert from testifying that a matter cannot meet a reasonable degree of
probability in the applicable field, and providing the basis for that
opinion.”
Based on plaintiff’s
representation that he is going to proffer expert testimony regarding medical
causation for his injuries resulting from the March 5, 2017 collision, and the
fact that defendants have not presented any evidence that they are able to offer
expert testimony to opine that plaintiff Noubar Ishak’s vehicle accident that
occurred on February 22, 2015, is an alternative cause of plaintiff’s injuries
to a reasonable medical probability, the court grants plaintiff’s motion in
limine no. 9 as set forth below. The
court also excludes evidence of plaintiff Noubar Ishak’s prior vehicle
collision that occurred on February 22, 2015, because (1) the subject evidence
is not relevant (Evid. Code, § 350), and (2) the court exercises its discretion
to exclude such evidence because its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue
consumption of time and (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of
confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury (Evid. Code, § 352).
The court orders that
defendants shall not make reference to, or introduce evidence of, plaintiff
Noubar Ishak’s prior vehicle collision that occurred on February 22, 2015. However, this order does not preclude
defendants from offering opinion testimony from an expert that a matter cannot
meet a reasonable degree of probability in the applicable field and providing
the basis for that opinion. (Evid. Code,
§ 801.1, subd. (b).)
Plaintiff
Jessica Layne Neumeyer’s Motion in Limine No. 1
The
court grants plaintiff Jessica Layne Neumeyer’s motion in limine no. 1 because defendants
have withdrawn their opposition to that motion.
The
court orders that defendants shall not make reference to, or introduce evidence
of, plaintiff Jessica Layne Neumeyer’s charge and conviction for DUI.
Defendants’
Motion in Limine No. 1
The court grants in part, and denies in part, defendants’ motion in
limine no. 1 as follows.
In their motion in limine no. 1, defendants request “an order
excluding any and all evidence that was not timely disclosed in response to
discovery requests served by Defendants.”
(Defendants’ motion in limine no. 1, filed April 20, 2022, p. 1:24-26.) The only specific evidence that defendants
appear to seek to exclude is evidence that supports plaintiffs’ claims for past
and future loss of earnings incurred as a result of the subject incident. Both plaintiffs’ oppositions state that they
do not have loss of earnings claims, and that they therefore do not oppose
defendants’ motion to the extent it seeks to exclude evidence of loss of
earnings.
The court orders that plaintiffs shall not make reference to, or
introduce evidence of, loss of earnings they incurred as result of the subject
incident.
The court denies defendant’s motion to the extent it seeks to exclude
any other evidence.
Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 2
The court grants defendants’ motion in limine no. 2 because (1)
evidence of defendants’ not accepting responsibility for the incident on which
plaintiffs’ complaint is based is not relevant (Evid. Code, § 350), and (2) the
court exercises its discretion to exclude such evidence because its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will
(a) necessitate undue consumption of time and (b) create substantial danger of
undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury (Evid.
Code, § 352).
The court orders that plaintiffs shall not make reference to, or
introduce evidence of, defendants’ not accepting responsibility for the
incident on which plaintiffs’ complaint is based.
Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 3
The court denies defendants’ motion in limine no. 3, which requests
“an order precluding Plaintiffs’ attorney from making any reference to specific
dollar figures during voir dire and during Plaintiffs’ opening statement
to the jury.” (Defendants’ motion in
limine no. 3, filed April 20, 2022, p. 1:25-27.)
In Fernandez v. Jimenez (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 482, during
voir dire, the plaintiffs’ counsel “told the jury that plaintiffs may be asking
for ‘hundreds of millions of dollars collectively for four of them’ . . .
.” (Id. at p. 493.) The Court of Appeal held that “this was not
improper preconditioning.” (Id.
at p. 494.)
Similarly, a leading California practice treatise states that
“[p]laintiff’s attorneys are usually permitted to question prospective jurors
as to their ability to return a large verdict if supported by the evidence.” (W. Wegner, et al, California Practice Guide:
Civil Trials and Evidence (Rutter Group 2024) § 5:312.) “For example, in a case involving a $1
million damage claim, plaintiffs’ counsel may ask: -- ‘Assuming liability is
established in this case, would you be able to return a verdict for $1 million?’” (Id. at § 5:312.) “While plaintiff’s counsel may ask
prospective jurors if they are able to return a verdict in a certain amount
if supported by the evidence . . . , it is not proper to ask for their
commitment to do so. (‘Do you agree $1
million is line if the facts stated are proved?’)” (Id. at § 5:326.)
Therefore, the court will permit the parties’ counsel to ask
prospective jurors during voir dire if they would be able to return a verdict awarding
damages in a certain amount or not awarding damages, if supported by the
evidence.
Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 4
The court grants defendants’ motion in limine no. 4.
The court orders that plaintiffs shall not present testimony as to
opinions stating that (1) defendants violated any statute or legal duty, (2)
defendants did not act with reasonable care, or (3) defendants were
negligent.
Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 5
Defendants’ motion in limine no. 5 requests “an order precluding
Plaintiffs from introducing evidence of the charged amounts for medical bills
as opposed to paid amounts.”
(Defendants’ motion in limine no. 5, filed April 20, 2022, p. 1:25-26.)
In Qaadir v. Figueroa (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 790, 797
(Qaadir), the Court of Appeal noted that, “[i]n a tort action for
economic damages, the California Supreme Court has held an award of past
medical expenses is limited to the lesser of (1) the amount paid or incurred
and (2) the reasonable value of the services rendered. (Howell v. Hamilton Meats &
Provisions, Inc. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 541, 556 . . . .)” After reviewing previously decided cases, the
Qaadir Court found that “evidence of unpaid medical bills may be
relevant to prove or disprove both prongs of the medical damages calculation if
it can be shown the bills were incurred.”
(Qaadir, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 804.) The Qaadir Court stated that “[o]ur
conclusion comports with Pebley [v. Santa Clara Organics, LLC
(2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1266], which held an unpaid medical bill is
relevant to prove economic damages for medical services when: (1) the plaintiff
is ‘uninsured,’ and (2) the ‘uninsured’ plaintiff is obligated to pay the
medical bill. (Pebley, supra, 22
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1275-1278 . . . .)” In Qaadir, the Court “agree[d] with Pebley
that an insured plaintiff who opts to receive medical treatment from outside of
his insurance plan should be considered uninsured for purposes of proving past
and future medical damages.” (Qaadir,
supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 804.)
In Qaadir, “[d]efendants filed a motion in limine to exclude
evidence of [plaintiff’s] unpaid medical bills (MIL No. 6), which was
denied.” (Qaadir, supra,
67 Cal.App.5th at p. 796.) The
Court of Appeal stated: “[T]he trial
court neither asked nor determined whether [plaintiff] incurred the unpaid
medical bills. The trial court thus
abused its discretion when it denied MIL No. 6 and allowed evidence of the
unpaid medical bills to be admitted without first requiring [plaintiff] to
proffer evidence of its admissibility: that [plaintiff] was liable for that
amount.” (Id. at p. 805.)
At the hearing on motions in limine, the court expects plaintiffs’ and
defendants’ counsel to address the issues of whether (1) plaintiffs incurred
the unpaid medical bills they seek to introduce into evidence, (2) whether
plaintiffs are liable for those amounts, and (3) whether plaintiffs are going
to present evidence to establish those facts at trial.
The court grants in part, and denies in part, defendants’ motion in
limine no. 5 as follows.
The court orders that evidence of plaintiffs’ unpaid medical bills will
not be admitted into evidence unless plaintiffs first proffer evidence that
plaintiffs actually incurred those unpaid medical bills and are liable for
those amounts. (Qaadir, supra,
67 Cal.App.5th at pp. 797, 805.)
If plaintiffs proffer evidence that plaintiffs actually incurred the
unpaid medical bills and are liable for those amounts, then those unpaid
medical bills may be admitted into evidence.
Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 6
The court grants in part, and denies in part,
defendants’ motion in limine no. 6 as follows.
“A ‘golden rule’ argument indicates to the jury that it would be
proper in calculating damages to place themselves in the plaintiff’s shoes and
award the amount they would ‘charge’ to undergo equivalent disability, pain and
suffering.” (Nishihama v. City and
County of San Francisco (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 298, 305.) “This so-called ‘golden rule’ argument
[citation] is impermissible. [Citation.]”
(Brokopp v. Ford Motor Co. (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 841, 860.)
“Any suggestion that the jury should ‘send a message’ by inflating its
award of damages . . . would be improper
where . . . punitive damages may not be awarded. (Nishihama, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th
at p. 305.) (Regalado v. Callaghn (2016)
3 Cal.App.5th 582, 599 [“remarks from [plaintiff’s] counsel telling
the jury that its verdict had an impact on the community and that it was acting
to keep the community safe were improper”].)
The court orders that plaintiffs shall not make reference to, present
argument concerning, or introduce evidence that (1) the jury’s verdict will
have an impact on the community and that it is acting to keep the community
safe, or (2) in calculating damages, the jury should place themselves in the
plaintiff’s shoes and award the amount they would “charge” to undergo
equivalent disability, pain and suffering.
The court denies defendant’s motion to the extent it seeks to exclude
any other argument or evidence, without prejudice to asserting appropriate
objections to specific questions, testimony, or arguments at trial.
Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 7
Defendants’ motion in limine no. 7 requests
“an order that Plaintiffs’ experts are barred from testifying regarding
Plaintiffs’ past medical bills and future costs related to future medical
care.” (Defendants’ motion in limine no.
7, filed April 20, 2022, p. 1:26-28.)
The court denies defendants’ motion in limine no. 7, subject to the
court’s order on defendants’ motion in limine no. 5, above.
Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 8
The court denies
defendants’ motion in limine no. 8, without prejudice to asserting appropriate
objections to specific questions or testimony at trial.
Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 9
Defendants’ motion in limine no. 9 requests an order excluding “the
opinions and conclusions of the investigating officer regarding the cause of
the incident, and the fact that the Traffic Collision Report lists a primary
collision factor and cause of the incident.”
(Defendants’ motion in limine no. 9, filed April 20, 2022, pp.
1:26-2:2.)
The court grants defendants’ motion in limine no. 9 as follows.
The court orders that
plaintiffs shall not make reference to, or introduce evidence of, the opinions
and conclusions of the investigating officer regarding the cause of the
incident. But this order does not
prohibit plaintiffs from introducing admissible testimony as to observations, opinions,
and conclusions of the investigating officer regarding other matters for which
they are qualified to testify.
In their oppositions, plaintiffs state that they have no intention of
moving the traffic collision report into evidence. The court orders that plaintiffs shall not
make reference to, or introduce evidence of, the fact that the Traffic
Collision Report states a primary collision factor and cause of the incident.
Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 10
The court denies defendants’ motion in limine no. 10.
Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 11
Defendants’ motion in limine no. 11 requests “an order precluding the
use of any electronic presentation, including but not limited to PowerPoint
visual aids and/or the videotaped depositions in Plaintiffs’ opening
statements.” (Defendants’ motion in
limine no. 11, filed April 20, 2022, p. 1:25-27.)
The court grants in part, and denies in part, defendants’ motion in
limine no. 11 as follows.
The court denies defendants’ request for an order precluding plaintiffs
from using a PowerPoint presentation in their opening statements.
The court orders plaintiffs not to show any videotaped deposition
testimony of any witnesses, except for videotaped testimony of defendants, to
the jury in opening statements without obtaining the stipulation of defendants
or order of the court. In their
oppositions to this motion, plaintiffs have not identified any specific deposition
testimony of any witnesses that they wish to show to the jury in their opening
statements.
Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 12
The court denies defendants’ motion in limine no. 12.
Defendants’ motion does not include specific identification of the
matter alleged to be inadmissible and prejudicial, as required by Los Angeles
County Superior Court Rules, Rule 3.57(a)(1).
Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 13
The court denies defendants’ motion in limine no. 13.
Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 14
The court grants defendants’ motion in limine no. 14 because (1)
evidence of plaintiffs’ communications with defendants’ retained expert
witness, Henry W. Lubow, M.D., including the letter from plaintiffs to Henry W.
Lubow, M.D., dated May 10, 2022, is not relevant (Evid. Code, § 350), and (2)
the court exercises its discretion to exclude such evidence because its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its
admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time and (b) create substantial
danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury
(Evid. Code, § 352).
The court orders that
plaintiffs shall not make reference to, or introduce evidence of, plaintiffs’
communications with defendants’ retained expert witness, Henry W. Lubow, M.D.,
including the letter from plaintiffs to Henry W. Lubow, M.D., dated May 10,
2022.
Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 15
The court grants in part, and denies in part, defendants’ motion in
limine no. 15 as follows.
The court denies defendants’ request to exclude the testimony of
plaintiffs’ retained expert witness, Andrew Morris, D.C., without prejudice to
renewing its motion to exclude that witness’s testimony if plaintiffs do not produce
the expert for another session of deposition as set forth below.
The court orders plaintiffs to produce their retained expert witness,
Andrew Morris, D.C., for another session of deposition to be taken by
defendants’ counsel no later than two court days before plaintiffs call him to
testify at trial. Defendants shall pay the
balance of the expert’s fee within five days of receipt of an itemized
statement from the expert pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.450,
subdivision (c).
Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 16
The court denies defendants’ motion in limine no. 16.
Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 17
Defendants filed a tentative withdrawal of their motion in limine no.
17, which states that, if Dr. Malekmehr testifies live, the live testimony
would render defendants’ motion in limine no. 17 moot. The court denies defendants’ motion in limine
no. 17 without prejudice.
Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 18
The court grants defendants’ motion in limine no. 18.
The court orders that plaintiffs are precluded from calling Hagop
Jamgochian and Gina Lafrenaye to testify as witnesses at trial.
Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 19
The court denies defendants’ motion in limine no. 19.
Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 20
The court grants defendants’ motion in limine no. 20 because (1)
evidence of defendants’ retained expert, Ted D. Evans’s article entitled
“Homosexuality: Christian Ethics and Psychological Research” and his statements
about homosexuality in that article are not relevant (Evid. Code, § 350), and
(2) the court exercises its discretion to exclude such evidence because its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its
admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time and (b) create
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of
misleading the jury (Evid. Code, § 352).
“[A] witness testifying as an expert may be cross-examined to the same
extent as any other witness and, in addition, may be fully cross-examined as to
(1) his or her qualifications, (2) the subject to which his or her expert
testimony relates, and (3) the matter upon which his or her opinion is based
and the reasons for his or her opinion.”
(Evid. Code, § 721, subd. (a); People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502,
532 [“An expert may be cross-examined regarding the subject to which his
testimony relates, the matter on which he bases his opinion, and the reasons
for his opinion. [Citation.]”].)
The court orders that plaintiffs shall not make reference to, or
introduce evidence of, defendants’ retained expert, Ted D. Evans’s article
entitled “Homosexuality: Christian Ethics and Psychological Research” and his statements
about homosexuality in that article.
Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 21
The court denies defendants’ motion in limine no. 21.
Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 22
The court denies defendants’ motion in limine no. 22.
IT
IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:
_____________________________
Robert B. Broadbelt III
Judge of the Superior Court