Judge Robert C. Longstreth, Case 37-2021-00013887-CU-PA-CTL 2024-03-29 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Robert C. Longstreth, Case: 37-2021-00013887-CU-PA-CTL, Date: 2024-03-29 Tentative Ruling

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

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HALL OF JUSTICE

TENTATIVE RULINGS - March 28, 2024

03/29/2024 08:30:00 AM C-65 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

JUDICIAL OFFICER:Robert Longstreth

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Civil - Unlimited PI/PD/WD - Auto Summary Judgment / Summary Adjudication (Civil) 37-2021-00013887-CU-PA-CTL BOYAJIAN VS KHALIQ [IMAGED] CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED: Motion for Summary Judgment and/or Adjudication, 01/10/2024

Defendant Delphinus Engineering's Motion for Summary Judgment (ROA 131) is GRANTED.

Plaintiff Christian James Boyajian's Motion for Summary Adjudication (ROA 78) is DENIED.

As to Plaintiffs' first and third causes of action, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Delphinus Engineering is vicariously liable for Defendant Khaliq Tyron Bryant's actions as Mr. Bryant's employer. The parties dispute whether Mr. Bryant was within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the subject accident.

The relevant facts are undisputed. 'Whether an employee was acting within the course and scope of his employment is generally a question of fact, but if the facts are undisputed and no conflicting inferences are possible, the question is one of law.' (Jeewarat v. Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 427, 434.) Mr. Bryant was hired by Defendant Delphinus as a shipfitter for a specific assignment located in California. (Pltf. Resp. Sep. Stmt. at ¶¶ 3, 5.) The assignment was for the period of July 2019 to February 2020. (Id. at ¶ 5.) Mr. Bryant was a Virginia resident, so he had to travel to California for the assignment. (Ibid., and id. at ¶ 1.) Delphinus paid for Mr. Bryant's hotel room and rental car while he was on assignment, as well as a per diem. (Id. at ¶ 6.) Delphinus made the rental car reservations and paid for the rental car through Budget Rent a Car. (Id. at ¶ 7.) At all relevant times, Mr. Bryant had a valid driver's license issued by the state of Virginia. (Id. at ¶ 2.) While on assignment in California, Mr.

Bryant had set hours (Mondays to Saturdays 6:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.) at a set location. (Id. at ¶¶ 12-13.) Mr. Bryant was paid hourly, and was not compensated for time before or after his shift. (Id. at ¶ 13.) On the date of the incident, Mr. Bryant left work around 4:30 p.m. with the intention of driving from work to his dinner plans before driving home. (Id. at ¶¶ 14-15.) While on the way to dinner, Mr. Bryant's rental car collided with Plaintiff's motorcycle. (Id. at ¶ 16.) Under the going and coming rule, 'an employee is not regarded as acting within the scope of employment while going to or coming from the workplace.' (Jeewarat at p. 435 (citation omitted).) Here, it is undisputed Mr. Bryant had left work for the day and was on his way to dinner before heading home.

Plaintiff's attempts to distinguish this case from Sunderland v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautical Systems Support Co. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1 are unavailing. Although Plaintiff correctly asserts there was not 'an intervening half-day of time between leaving work and the Collision' and a 'series of intervening personal activities,' the going and coming rule does not require this. Nor does Lazar v. Thermal Equipment Corp. (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 458 apply here. Unlike the employee in Lazar, Mr. Bryant was Calendar No.: Event ID: TENTATIVE RULINGS

3046208 2 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE: BOYAJIAN VS KHALIQ [IMAGED] 37-2021-00013887-CU-PA-CTL not driving his employer's vehicle for his employer's special benefit, conducting a mere 'minor and foreseeable deviation.' Sunderland confirms that the court should conduct a 'going and coming' analysis even though Mr. Bryant was in California solely for work purposes; this fact does not place him constantly within the scope of employment during the entire eight month period he was working here.

'When an employee is engaged in a 'special errand' or a 'special mission' for the employer it will negate the 'going and coming rule.'' (Jeewarat, supra, at p. 436.) Here, there is no evidence Mr. Bryant was engaged in a special errand for his employer. Accordingly, the special errand exception to the going and coming rule does not apply.

The required vehicle exception applies where an employer either itself furnishes or requires an employee 'to furnish a vehicle as an express or implied condition of employment.' (Pierson v. Hemlerich & Payne International Drilling Co. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 608, 625, quoting Felix v. Asai (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 926, 932; see also Moradi v. Marsh USA, Inc. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 886, 890-91.) Here, there is no evidence the rental car was given to Mr. Bryant as a condition of his employment, or that Defendant obtained some incidental benefit. The rental car was made available to Mr. Bryant while he was on assignment, but there is no evidence it was a requirement of his employment. The required vehicle exception to the going and coming rule does not apply.

The incidental benefit exception applies 'where the trip involves an incidental benefit to the employer, not common to commute trips by ordinary members of the work force.' (Hinman v. Westinghouse Elec.

Co. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 956, 962 (en banc).) 'In other words, the employer, having found it desirable in the interests of his enterprise to pay for travel time and for travel expenses and to go beyond the normal labor market or to have located his enterprise at a place remote from the labor market, should be required to pay for the risks inherent in his decision.' (Ibid.) Here, there is evidence Defendant paid Mr.

Bryant's travel expenses, but Mr. Bryant was not compensated for the time he spent commuting to and from work, and again, there is no evidence Defendant obtained some incidental benefit. (Def. Sep.

Stmt. at ¶ 13.) The incidental benefit exception to the going and coming rule does not apply.

The court concludes Mr. Bryant was not acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the subject accident and Plaintiffs' motion for summary adjudication is denied on these grounds.

As to Plaintiff's fourth cause of action, Plaintiff asserts this claim, which is labeled one for 'General Negligence' in his First Amended Complaint, encompasses both a negligent entrustment claim and a negligent hiring, supervision, and retention claim. In most cases, such claims are McKenna v. Beesley (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 552, 567, quoting Diaz v. Carcamo (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1148, 1157.) In either event, it is undisputed Defendant is not the owner of the rental car; the car was rented by Defendant for Mr. Bryant's use. (Pltf. Resp. Sep. Stmt. at ¶¶ 6, 8.) Although Plaintiff argues Defendant 'permitted' Mr. Bryant to use the rental car and should have made Plaintiff aware that California law allows motorcycles to 'lane split,' the court is not persuaded. The court does not believe that the authority Plaintiff cites supports the assertion that Defendant was required to train Mr. Bryant on California law before operating the rental car, and the court does not believe that imposing such a duty is reasonable.

Once confirmed, this ruling shall be the final ruling of the court and no further written order is required.

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