Judge Robert C. Longstreth, Case Number: 37-2022-00047636-CU-BC-CTL, Date: 2024-05-03 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Robert C. Longstreth, Case: 37-2022-00047636-CU-BC-CTL, Date: 2024-05-03 Tentative Ruling

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

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HALL OF JUSTICE

TENTATIVE RULINGS - May 02, 2024

05/03/2024 08:30:00 AM C-65 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

JUDICIAL OFFICER:Robert Longstreth

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Civil - Unlimited Breach of Contract/Warranty Demurrer / Motion to Strike 37-2022-00047636-CU-BC-CTL PUENTES VS AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO INC [IMAGED] CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED: Demurrer, 09/08/2023

Defendant's Demurrer to Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint (ROA 40) is OVERRULED.

Defendant demurs to Plaintiffs' second cause of action for fraudulent inducement – concealment only.

Defendant first asserts Plaintiffs' fraud claim is impliedly preempted by federal law. 'Congress' implied intent to preempt is found (i) when it is clear that Congress intended, by comprehensive legislation, to occupy the entire field of regulation, leaving no room for the states to supplement federal law [citation]; (ii) when compliance with both federal and state regulations is an impossibility [citation]; or (iii) when state law 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.' [Citations.]' (Bronco Wine Co. v. Jolly (2004) 33 Cal.4th 943, 955.) While Defendant sets forth a general discussion of preemption law and the authority of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ('NHTSA'), it provides no authority holding that a common law claim is preempted by Congressional regulation of highway safety. It provides no authority for its counterintuitive argument that federal preemption of a common law claim should somehow turn on whether a state has legislated in the area. And the court finds unpersuasive Defendant's essentially ipse dixit argument that a jury's determination that it committed fraud in this action would frustrate Congressional purposes. Accordingly, the demurrer is overruled as to Defendant's argument that the fraud claim is preempted by federal law.

Defendant asserts Plaintiffs have not adequately alleged a transactional relationship between them and Defendant that would give rise to a duty to disclose. 'As a matter of common sense,' a relationship that gives rise to a duty to disclose 'can only come into being as a result of some transaction between the parties.' (LiMandri v. Judkins (1977) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 337.) Here, Plaintiffs have alleged Defendant's authorized dealer, DCH Honda of Mission Valley, was Defendant's agent for purposes of selling its vehicles to consumers. (Id. at ¶¶ 8-9.) This is sufficient to overcome demurrer.

Defendant asserts Plaintiffs have not adequately alleged the defect was within the exclusive knowledge of Defendant, asserting that Plaintiffs refer in the FAC to public disclosures Defendant made through the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ('NHTSA'), and asking the court to take judicial notice of various documents purportedly available on NHTSA's website. Defendant's requests for judicial notice of various documents it contends are available on NHTSA's website are denied. (See Jolley v. Chase Home Finance, LLC (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 872, 889, 'we know of no 'official Web site' provision for judicial notice in California.') Further, the court notes Plaintiffs' allegations draw a distinction in the FAC between information that Defendant should have known through publicly available consumer complaints and information that Defendant had that was not publicly available. (FAC ¶ 24.) As to these grounds, the demurrer is overruled.

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3041608 11 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE: PUENTES VS AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO INC [IMAGED] 37-2022-00047636-CU-BC-CTL Defendant asserts Plaintiffs' fraud claim is barred by the economic loss rule. The court finds the cause of action is sufficiently alleged to survive demurrer; it is not clear from the face of the pleadings that the claim is barred by the economic loss rule. (See Dhital v. Nissan North America, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828, 843, review granted, Dhital v. Nissan North America (2023) 523 P.3d 392; Rattagan v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (9th Cir. 2021) 19 F.4th 1188, 1193.) Defendant asserts the fraud claim lacks specificity. 'In California, fraud must be pled specifically; general and conclusory allegations do not suffice.' (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.) 'This particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.' (Ibid.) Defendant contends the Complaint does not allege specific facts of concealment, intent, or damages. However, Defendant failed to provide analysis as to why the allegations in the FAC regarding these elements of the claim are insufficient. (FAC at ¶¶ 39-40, 48-49.) Defendant also contends the element of reliance is not adequately pled. However, in a concealment case, a plaintiff need only plead that they would have 'behaved differently' if they had known of the concealed material facts. (See Mirkin v. Wasserman (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1082, 1093.) This is adequately alleged in the FAC; Plaintiffs allege they would not have purchased the vehicle if they had known of the alleged defect. (FAC ¶¶ 110, 116.) As to these grounds, the demurrer is overruled.

Plaintiffs' request for judicial notice of the second amended complaint filed in Dhital is denied. Plaintiffs do not refer to this exhibit in their opposing memorandum, and the court did not find it relevant to the court's determination of the demurrer.

The court notes that Defendant's request for judicial notice was accompanied by an unauthorized additional memorandum in support of the request, and that Defendant's memorandum in support of the demurrer exceeded the court's rules regarding page limits without leave of court. (Cal. R. Court, rule 3.1113(d).) Defendant is to comply with all applicable rules, including page limits, going forward.

Defendant's Motion to Strike the First Amended Complaint is ordered OFF CALENDAR. No moving papers were ever filed.

Counsel should have called the department and taken the motion off calendar so the court could have accommodated other litigants on this law and motion calendar in compliance with the local rules. (San Diego Superior Court Local Rule 2.1.20.) Once confirmed, this ruling shall be the final ruling of the court and no further written order is required.

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