Judge: Robert S. Draper, Case: 18STCV04109, Date: 2023-05-05 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 18STCV04109 Hearing Date: May 5, 2023 Dept: 78
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles
Department 78
SUSANA DE LOERA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ARTURO VASQUEZ, et al.,
Defendants. Case No.: 18STCV04109
Hearing Date: May 5, 2023
[TENTATIVE] RULING RE:
DEFENDANT ARTURO VASQUEZ’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Defendant Arturo Vasquez’s Motion for Summary Adjudication is GRANTED as to the First and Fourth Causes of Action.
Defendant Arturo Vasquez’s Motion for Summary Adjudication is DENIED as to the Second, Third and Fifth Causes of Action.
Moving party to provide notice and to file proof of service of such notice within five court days after the date of this order.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This is an action for Quiet Title. The Complaint alleges as follows.
Plaintiff Susana de Loera (“Plaintiff”) has been living at 14936 Aztec Street, Sylmar, CA 91342 (the “Subject Property”) since 1990. (Compl. ¶ 5.) In 1993, Plaintiff entered into an agreement (the “Agreement”) with her brother, defendant Arturo Vasquez (“Vasquez”), by which Plaintiff would pay the mortgage on the Subject Property, and in return, Vasquez would convey the Subject Property to Plaintiff upon full payment of the mortgage. (Compl. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff completed payment on the full amount of the mortgage in 2013. (Compl. ¶ 7.)
On January 12, 2018, Vasquez transferred title to the Subject Property to Plaintiff and to Plaintiff’s husband, defendant Marcial Maldonado, as joint tenants. (Compl. ¶ 9.) This was contrary to the Agreement, under which Plaintiff was to receive full interest in the Subject Property. (Ibid.)
The grant deed (the “Deed”) documenting the transfer was recorded on February 6, 2018. (Compl. ¶ 10; Exh. 2.)
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 7, 2018, Plaintiff filed the Complaint asserting five causes of action:
1. Quiet Title;
2. Declaratory Relief;
3. Breach of Contract;
4. Cancellation of Deed; and,
5. Slander of Title.
On January 16, 2019, Vasquez filed an Answer.
On February 13, 2019, Maldonado filed an Answer.
On July 13, 2021, the Court stayed proceedings in this matter as the issue of ownership of the Subject Property was central to a dissolution of marriage proceeding between Plaintiff and Maldonado.
On August 10, 2022, the Court held a Status Conference Re: Family Law Case. At that hearing, the Court lifted the stay as to the instant Motion for Summary Judgment only.
On February 15, 2023, Vasquez filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment.
On April 17, 2023, Plaintiff filed an Opposition.
On April 20, 2023, Vasquez filed a Reply.
DISCUSSION
I. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Vasquez moves for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication of each cause of action.
A party may move for summary judgment “if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (a).) “[I]f all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” the moving party will be entitled to summary judgment. (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)
The moving party bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact, and if he does so, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850; accord Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)
Neither a moving nor responding party may rely on the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings. A moving party must submit specific admissible evidence showing that the responding party cannot establish at least one element of his, her or its cause of action or defense. The responding party, to defeat the motion, must submit specific admissible evidence showing that a triable issue of material fact does exist as to that element of the cause of action or defense. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)
“The “Golden Rule” on a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication is that “if [a fact] is not set forth in the separate statement, it does not exist.” (Zimmerman, Rosenfeld, Gersh & Leeds LLP v. Larson (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1477, citing United Community Church v. Garcin (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 327, 337.)
A. Stay
As an initial matter, Plaintiff argues that the Court should not hear the instant motion as the entirety of the action has been stayed since July 13, 2021. (Agege Decl., ¶ 4.)
However, at an August 10, 2022, status conference, the Court lifted the stay as to Vasquez’s Motion for Summary Judgment and authorized Vasquez to file the instant motion. (See August 10, 2022 Minute Order.)
Accordingly, the stay has been lifted as to the instant Motion and the Court will consider it in full.
B. First Cause of Action – Quiet Title
Vasquez moves for summary adjudication of the First Cause of Action for Quiet Title.
To maintain an action for quiet title, a plaintiff must allege:
(a) A description of the property that is the subject of the action.
(b) The title of the plaintiff as to which a determination under this chapter is sought and the basis of the title. If the title is based upon adverse possession, the complaint shall allege the specific facts constituting the adverse possession.
(c) The adverse claims to the title of the plaintiff against which a determination is sought.
(d) The date as of which the determination is sought. If the determination is sought as of a date other than the date the complaint is filed, the complaint shall include a statement of the reasons why a determination as of that date is sought.
(e) A prayer for the determination of the title of the plaintiff against the adverse claims.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 761.020.)
Here, Vasquez contends that Plaintiff cannot show that Vasquez has any adverse claim to the title of the Subject Property, and therefore cannot assert a claim for Quiet Title against Vasquez.
Vasquez notes that the title to the Subject Property is in Plaintiff’s and Maldonado’s names only. (UMF 1.) Additionally, Vasquez attests that he claims no interest in the Subject Property, and has no adverse claim to the Subject Property. (UMF 2-3.)
Vasquez has introduced admissible evidence demonstrating that Plaintiff cannot show that Vasquez has an adverse claim to the title of the Subject Property. The burden now shifts to Plaintiff to show the existence of a triable issue of material fact demonstrating such an adverse claim.
In Opposition, Plaintiff contends that “Plaintiff seeks a declaratory relief that voids the deed as joint tenants and instead declares Plaintiff as the sole owner of the Subject Property. This is due to Defendant VASQUEZ’s failure to properly transfer the Subject Property to Plaintiff only per their agreement.”
This argument does not address the lack of evidence demonstrating that Vasquez maintains adverse interest in the Subject Property. While Plaintiff contests that Vasquez improperly transferred the Subject Property to both Plaintiff and Maldonado, Plaintiff does not contend that Vasquez has any present adverse interest in the Subject Property. Additionally, Plaintiff cites no authority stating that a quiet title cause of action can be properly asserted against a defendant who once did, but no longer does, have an interest in the subject property.
Accordingly, Vasquez’s Motion for Summary Adjudication of the First Cause of Action for Quiet Title is GRANTED.
C. Second Cause of Action – Declaratory Relief
Vasquez moves for summary adjudication of the Second Cause of Action for Declaratory Relief.
CCP section 1060 provides that a person may bring an action for declaratory relief if he or she “desires a declaration of his or her rights or duties with respect to another, or in respect to, in, over or upon property . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1060.) A request for declaratory relief may be brought alone or with other relief. (See id.)
To state a declaratory relief claim, the plaintiff must allege a proper subject of declaratory relief and an actual controversy involving justiciable questions relating to the party’s rights or obligations. (See Jolley v. Chase Home Finance, LLC (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 872, 909.) The validity of a contract is a proper subject of declaratory relief. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1060.)
While declaratory relief operates prospectively, a proper action for declaratory relief can redress past wrongs. (See Travers v. Louden (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 926, 931.)
Here, Vasquez argues that there is no actual controversy relating to the rights and obligations of Plaintiff and Vasquez as Vasquez presently maintains no interest in the Subject Property. (UMF 1-4.)
However, declaratory relief can be used to redress past wrongs.
Plaintiff alleges that Vasquez improperly transferred title to the Subject Property to both Plaintiff and Maldonado, thereby creating a present and actual controversy regarding proper ownership of the Subject Property.
Under this theory, a reasonable trier of fact could find that the transfer of the Subject Property was in breach of Plaintiff’s legal rights, and lead to an actual and justiciable controversy regarding Plaintiff’s interest in the Subject Property.
As a triable issue of material fact exists regarding Vasquez’s obligations under the Agreement, and as an actual controversy exists regarding proper ownership of the Subject Property, Vasquez’s Motion for Summary Adjudication of the Second Cause of Action is DENIED.
D. Third Cause of Action – Breach of Contract
Vasquez moves for summary adjudication of the Third Cause of Action for Breach of Contract.
Vasquez contends that this cause of action is barred by the statute of frauds.
Civil Code section 1624(a) states that contracts for the sale of real property “are invalid unless they, or some note or memorandum thereof, are in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or by the party’s agent.”
Here, Vasquez contends that there was no written agreement between Plaintiff and Vasquez in regard to the transfer of the Subject Property. (UMF 8.)
Vasquez has introduced admissible evidence demonstrating that Plaintiff cannot show the Agreement to transfer title to the Subject Property was in writing and is therefore barred by the statute of frauds. The burden now shifts to Plaintiff to show the existence of a triable issue of material fact demonstrating that the Agreement was not barred by the statute of frauds.
In Opposition, Plaintiff contends that Plaintiff’s conduct of living at the Subject Property, and of making mortgage payments in accordance with the Agreement, constitute part performance, thereby exempting the Agreement from the statute of frauds.
[W]here assertion of the statute of frauds would cause unconscionable injury, part performance allows specific enforcement of a contract that lacks the requisite writing. (Earhart v. William Low Co. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 503, 514.) The doctrine most commonly applies in actions involving transfers of real property. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1972, subd. (a) [part performance available to enforce agreement to convey real property absent writing required under § 1971 of same code].) To constitute part performance, the relevant acts either must “unequivocally refer[]” to the contract, or “clearly relate” to its terms. (Paul v. Layne & Bowler Corp. (1937) 9 Cal.2d 561, 564.) Such conduct satisfies the evidentiary function of the statute of frauds by confirming that a bargain was in fact reached. (See Casa Herrera, Inc. v. Beydoun (2004) 32 Cal.4th 336, 345.)
Here, Plaintiff notes that in accordance with the Agreement, she paid off the mortgage in full with her separate funds. (De Leora Decl. ¶ 5.)
As Plaintiff alleges that the Agreement required that title be passed to her in full, that she received only half interest in the Subject Property may constitute an unconscionable injury.
Accordingly, a triable issue of material fact exists as to whether Plaintiff’s part performance exempts the Agreement from the Statute of Frauds.
Vasquez’s Motion for Summary Adjudication of the Third Cause of Action is DENIED.
E. Fourth Cause of Action – Cancellation of Deed
Vasquez moves for summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action for Cancellation of Deed.
To state a cause of action for cancellation of deed, a plaintiff must show that the instrument is void or voidable due to, for example, fraud, and (2) there is a reasonable apprehension of serious injury including pecuniary loss or the prejudicial alternation of one’s position. (U.S. Bank Nat. Assn. v. Naifeh (2016) 1 C.A. 4th 767, 778, see Civil Code, §3412.)
Here, Vasquez argues that should the deed be cancelled, Vasquez would obtain full possession of the Subject Property. Accordingly, Vasquez contends, a cancellation of deed would ironically place Plaintiff in a reasonable apprehension of serious pecuniary loss.
In Opposition, Plaintiff states only that she wishes to cancel the deed as to Maldonado only. (Opposition at p. 6.)
Plaintiff cites no authorities stating that a deed may be cancelled in part. It appears that what Plaintiff seeks by this cause of action is declaratory relief as to the proper title of the Subject Property; however, her declaratory relief cause of action survives summary judgment.
Accordingly, as cancellation of deed would place Plaintiff in greater risk of pecuniary loss than her current status, Vasquez’s motion for summary adjudication of the Fourth Cause of Action for Cancellation of Deed is GRANTED.
F. Fifth Cause of Action – Slander of Title
Finally, Vasquez moves for summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s Fifth Cause of Action for Slander of Title.
“The elements of a cause of action for slander of title are (1) a publication, which is (2) without privilege or justification, (3) false, and (4) causes pecuniary loss.” (La Jolla Group II v. Bruce (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 461, 472.)
Here, Vasquez contends that the Deed did not cause pecuniary loss, as it granted Plaintiff interest in the Subject Property rather than removing it.
In Opposition, Plaintiff argues that by transferring the Subject Property to both Plaintiff and Maldonado, Vasquez has cast doubt on the marketability and value of the Subject Property. (De Leora Decl. ¶ 6.)
The Court agrees. Title to the property is now clouded based on Vasquez’s alleged improper actions in placing De Leora’s husband on the title. This is enough to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of a pecuniary loss.
Accordingly, Vasquez’s Motion for Summary Adjudication of the Fifth Cause of Action is DENIED..
CONCLUSION
Defendant Arturo Vasquez’s Motion for Summary Adjudication is GRANTED as to the First and Fourth Causes of Action.
Defendant Arturo Vasquez’s Motion for Summary Adjudication is DENIED as to the Second, Third and Fifth Causes of Action.
DATED: May 5, 2023
______________________________
Hon. Jill T. Feeney
Judge of the Superior Court
