Judge: Robert S. Draper, Case: 19TCV33384, Date: 2023-02-14 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 19TCV33384    Hearing Date: February 14, 2023    Dept: 78

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 78

Defendant Kia Motors America, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to the Third Cause of Action.

Defendant Kia Motors America, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED as to all other issues.   

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This is an action brought under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“SBA”). The operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleges as follows.

On February 9, 2012, Plaintiff Albert Addis (“Plaintiff”) purchased a new 2012 Kia Sportage (the Subject Vehicle”) from Defendant Kia Motors America, Inc.’s (“Kia”) authorized retailer, First Kia. (FAC ¶ 10.) In connection with the purchase, Plaintiff received an express 5-year/60,000 mile bumper to bumper warranty, and a 10-year/100,000 mile powertrain warranty. (FAC ¶ 11.) During the express warranty period, the Subject Vehicle developed various defects that rendered the Subject Vehicle inoperable. (FAC ¶ 15.) Defendant and its authorized dealer failed to conform the Subject Vehicle despite a reasonable number of opportunities. (FAC ¶ 28.) Additionally, Defendant failed to offer restitution as required by the SBA. (Ibid.)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 19, 2019, Plaintiff filed the Complaint asserting six causes of action:

1.    Violation of Subdivision (D) of Civil Code Section 1793.2;

2.    Violation of Subdivision (B) of Civil Code Section 1793.2;

3.    Violation of Subdivision (A)(3) of Civil Code Section 1793.2;

4.    Breach of Express Written Warranty;

5.    Breach of the Implied Warranty of Merchantability; and,

6.    Fraud by Omission.

On July 27, 2020, Kia filed a Demurrer to the Complaint.

On December 3, 2020, the Court sustained that Demurrer as to all causes of action with leave to amend.

On December 14, 2020, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint asserting the same six causes of action.

On February 16, 2021, Kia filed a Demurrer to the First Amended Complaint.

On June 21, 2021, the Court sustained the Demurrer as to the Fifth Cause of Action and overruled the Demurrer as to the First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Sixth cause of action.

On June 30, 2022, Kia filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.

On August 31, 2022, Kia filed the instant Amended Motion for Summary Judgment.

On October 31, 2022, Plaintiff filed an Opposition.

On November 10, 2022, Kia filed a Reply. This Reply was untimely by four days.

On November 14, 2022, the matter came for hearing. Kia argued that the hearing should be continued such that the Court could consider Kia’s Reply and evidentiary objections. The Court agreed to this continuance because the purpose of hearings in Department 78 is to obtain the right result, not to enforce procedural rules when the breach of such rules is not intentional, and allowing further briefing would not prejudice any party substantively. The Court therefore continued the hearing, agreed to consider the reply and, and allowed Plaintiff to file a supplemental briefing responding to Kia’s Reply and evidentiary objections, should he choose to do so.

On December 21, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Response to Kia’s Reply indicating that he stood on his Opposition and did not need further briefing.

DISCUSSION

      I.          ADDENDUM FOR FEBRUARY 14, 2023 HEARING

At the hearing on this matter held on November 14, 2022, Kia’s Counsel represented to the Court that Kia had timely filed a Reply and Evidentiary Objections that the Court failed to consider in its tentative.

A Reply to a noticed motion is due five court days before hearing. (CCP § 1005(b).) Here, Kia’s Reply was filed on Thursday, November 10, 2022. Friday, November 11, 2022, was Veterans Day, a Court holiday. The hearing was held on Monday, November 14, 2022. Accordingly, Kia’s Reply and Evidentiary Objections were filed one court day before hearing. Contrary to Kia’s representations, the Reply was extremely untimely.

Nonetheless, for the reasons set forth above, the Court has considered the Reply

    II.          EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

Plaintiff’s Objections to the Declaration of Nicolas Mojica:

Plaintiff’s Objection Numbers 1-4 are OVERRULED.

Kia’s Objections to the Declaration of Albert Addis:

Kia’s Objection Numbers 17 and 18 are SUSTAINED.

The remaining objections are OVERRULED.

Kia’s Objections to the Declaration of Matthew Pardo:

Kia’s Objection Numbers 2, 4, 6, and 8 are SUSTAINED.

The remaining objections are OVERRULED.

  III.          REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

The court may take judicial notice of “official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state of the United States,” “[r]ecords of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record of the United States or of any state of the United States,” and “[f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.” (Evid. Code § 452, subds. (c), (d), and (h).)  

Evidence Code Section 452 provides that judicial notice may be taken for facts and propositions that are “not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.” (Cal. Evid. Code § 452(h).) Further, “a court may take judicial notice of [recorded documents and] the fact of a document's recordation, the date the document was recorded and executed, the parties to the transaction reflected in a recorded document, and the document's legally operative language, assuming there is no genuine dispute regarding the document's authenticity. From this, the court may deduce and rely upon the legal effect of the recorded document, when that effect is clear from its face.” (Scott v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 743, 745-755.)  

Taking judicial notice of a document is not the same as accepting the truth of its contents or accepting a particular interpretation of its meaning. (Fremont Indem. Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 113-14 (citations and internal quotations omitted).) In addition, judges “consider matters shown in exhibits attached to the complaint and incorporated by reference.”  (Performance Plastering v. Richmond American Homes of California, Inc. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 659, 665.)  However, “[w]hen judicial notice is taken of a document . . . the truthfulness and proper interpretation of the document are disputable.” (Aquila, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 556, 569 (quoting StorMedia Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 449, 457 n. 9).) 

The party requesting judicial notice must (a) give each adverse party sufficient notice of the request to enable the adverse party to prepare to meet the request and (b) provide the court with sufficient information to enable it to take judicial notice of the matter. (Cal. Evid. Code § 453.) 

Plaintiff requests judicial notice of the following:

1.    Los Angeles Superior Court Order denying Kia Motors America, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Adjudication of plaintiff’s 6th cause of action for fraud by omission concerning Theta II engine defects in the matter of Maria I. Torres v. Kia Motors America, Inc., No. 18STCV00967 (order filed May 17, 2021). (Ex. 1.)

2.    This Court’s June 21, 2019, Order Denying Defendant’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint. (Ex. 2.)

Plaintiff’s Requests for Judicial Notice are GRANTED. The Court will give the appropriate weight to these pleadings according the law.

 IV.          MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants move for Summary Judgment of the First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Sixth Causes of Action.[1]

A party may move for summary judgment “if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (a).) “[I]f all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” the moving party will be entitled to summary judgment. (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

The moving party bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact, and if he does so, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850; accord Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence.  (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

Neither a moving nor responding party may rely on the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings. A moving party must submit specific admissible evidence showing that the responding party cannot establish at least one element of his, her or its cause of action or defense. The responding party, to defeat the motion, must submit specific admissible evidence showing that a triable issue of material fact does exist as to that element of the cause of action or defense. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

“The “Golden Rule” on a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication is that “if [a fact] is not set forth in the separate statement, it does not exist.” (Zimmerman, Rosenfeld, Gersh & Leeds LLP v. Larson (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1477, citing United Community Church v. Garcin (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 327, 337.)

A.   Lack of Warrantied Repairs

First, Kia moves for summary adjudication of the first four causes of action, all of which allege that Kia failed to repair the Subject Vehicle in a reasonably timely fashion such that it conformed to the express warranties. 

To recover under the SBA, a plaintiff must show that “(1) the vehicle had a nonconformity covered by the express warranty that substantially impaired the use, value or safety of the vehicle (the nonconformity element); (2) the vehicle was presented to an authorized representative of the manufacturer of the vehicle for repair (the presentation element); and (3) the manufacturer or his representative did not repair the nonconformity after a reasonable number of repair attempts (the failure to repair element). [Citations.]”¿¿(Oregel v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc.¿(2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1101.)

Here, Kia argues that Plaintiff has failed to present a nonconformity covered by an express warranty. Kia notes that the Subject Vehicle was sold with two express warranties: the standard 5-year/60,000 mile warranty, and the 10-year/100,000 mile powertrain limited warranty. (UMF No. 9.) Kia argues that none of the presentations of the Subject Vehicle to an authorized repair facilities constituted a customer concern that was covered under Kia’s warranty within the first 10 years/100,000 miles. (UMF Nos. 14, 15-28.) Although the vehicle was brought in for service thirteen times, all these visits occurred after expiration of the standard warranty and were classified as not covered by the still existing limited powertrain warranty. (UMF Nos. 15-18.)

Accordingly, Kia has met its initial burden of showing the nonexistence of a triable material fact regarding the nonconformity element of Plaintiff’s SBA claim. The burden now shifts to Plaintiff to show the existence of such a triable material fact.

In Opposition, Plaintiff argues that the car was brought to Kia for service twelve times while the emission and limited powertrain warranties were still in effect. (PSSMF Nos. 12-18.) Plaintiff contends that, though the dealership classified these repairs as not covered by the warranty, it is a question of fact whether they were covered. Additionally, Plaintiff notes that the only evidence Kia presents demonstrating the unwarrantability of these issues is the deposition of Nicolas Mojica (“Mojica”), an Escalated Case Administrator within the Consumer Affairs department at Kia. In same deposition, Mojica states that he did not have the requisite technical expertise to address the warrantability of the repairs, that he was not familiar with the repairing dealership’s diagnostics, and that if the issues were engine or emission related, they should have been covered by the extended warranties. (PSSUMF No. 75.)

The Court finds that a triable issue off material fact exists as to whether Plaintiff’s repeated service visits were properly covered under the limited powertrain warranty or the emission warranty. Accordingly, Kia’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED on this ground. As this is the only argument Kia raises regarding the First, Second and Fourth Causes of Action, the Court will not address these causes of action further.

B.   Third Cause of Action – Violation of Civil Code Section 1793.2(a)(3)

Kia moves for summary adjudication of the Third Cause of Action for Violation of Civil Code section 1793.2(a)(3)

Under section 1793.2, subdivision (a)(3), a manufacturer must “[m]ake available to authorized service and repair facilities sufficient service literature and replacement parts to effect repairs during the express warranty period.”

Here, Kia argues that Plaintiff has presented no evidence showing the absence of such literature and replacement parts. Kia contends that Plaintiff’s discovery responses regarding such allegations are deficient. (UMF No. 151.)

In Opposition, Plaintiff contends that Mojica stated in his deposition that Kia does not make literature available regarding odd engine noise. However, the cited evidence does not contain such a statement and does not address available literature. (Pardo Decl., Ex. 25 at 135:12-14.) 

Accordingly, Kia’s Motion for Summary Adjudication of the Third Cause of Action is GRANTED.

C.   Sixth Cause of Action – Fraud by Omission

Next, Kia moves for summary adjudication of the Sixth Cause of Action for Fraud by Omission.

The elements of fraud are: “(a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or ‘scienter’); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.” (Charnay v. Cobert (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 170, 184.) In California, fraud, including negligent misrepresentation, must be pled with specificity. (Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 184.) “The particularity demands that a plaintiff plead facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.” (Cansino v. Bank of America (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1469.)  

Nondisclosure or concealment may constitute actionable fraud when: (1) there is a fiduciary relationship between the parties; (2) the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material facts. (See id.) 

1.    No Direct Dealing

First, Kia argues that Plaintiff’s Sixth Cause of Action fails as Kia was under no duty to disclose the alleged defect in the Subject Vehicle to Plaintiff as Plaintiff did not directly deal with Kia.

Kia notes that Plaintiff purchased the vehicle from First Kia, an independent third-party dealer that is not affiliated with Kia. (UMF No. 5.) Additionally, Kia argues that Plaintiff does not allege he relied on any marketing by Kia in purchasing the Subject Vehicle.  

Kia’s argument is unavailing. In Varwig v. Anderson-Behel Porsche/Audi, Inc. (1997) 74 Cal.App.3d 578, plaintiff purchased a vehicle from a wholesaler who claimed the vehicle had clear title. The wholesaler acquired it from defendant car dealership, who had misrepresented the state of title to the wholesaler. When the car was repossessed, plaintiff filed suit against the dealership for fraud. The trial court granted summary judgment on the basis that plaintiff had no direct dealings with defendant dealership. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding that defendant was on notice that the wholesaler intended to sell the car to the consuming public and thus his representation regarding title was an “indirect misrepresentation to plaintiff, who purchased the car in reliance upon [the wholesaler’s] repetition of the representation.” (Varwig at pp. 581-82.)

Accordingly, a reasonable trier of fact could find that Kia sold the Subject Vehicle to First Kia with the knowledge that First Kia would sell that vehicle to the consuming public, and therefore any concealment or misrepresentation can be actionable on Plaintiff’s part.

2.    Knowledge of Defect in Subject Vehicle

Next, Kia argues that Plaintiff has failed to show that Kia had actual knowledge of a defect in the Subject Vehicle prior to Plaintiff’s purchase. Kia notes that the recall campaign that the First Amended Complaint focuses on was for the Theta II GDI engine. Kia contends that, as the Subject Vehicle had a 2.4L MPI engine, the recall is irrelevant to the Subject Vehicle and Plaintiff has shown no evidence of Kia’s knowledge of a defect present in the Subject Vehicle. (UMF No. 3.)

In Opposition, Plaintiff contends that the vehicle came equipped with the Theta II GDI engine that was subject to the recall in question. (PRUMF No. 3.) Accordingly, there is a triable issue of material fact as to whether the Subject Vehicle came equipped with the engine that was subject to the recall.

3.    Evidence of Damages 

Next, Kia argues that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the value of the subject vehicle was diminished by Kia’s alleged fraud.

However, Plaintiff alleges that the Subject Vehicle was worth substantially less than what Plaintiff paid for it due to the unknown engine defects. (PSSUMF No. 25.) That a defective vehicle is worth less than a fully operational vehicle is common sense, and should Plaintiff need to obtain specific evidence evincing such, the Court is certain Plaintiff would have no difficulty doing so.

4.    Economic Loss Rule

Next, Kia argues that Plaintiff’s fraud cause of action is barred by the economic loss rule.

However, in the recently decided Dhital v. Nissan North America, Inc. (October 26, 2022) 2022 WL 14772909, the California Court of Appeal held, in facts substantially similar to those here, that “under California law, the economic loss rule does not bar plaintiffs’ claim here for fraudulent inducement by concealment. Fraudulent inducement claims fall within an exception to the economic loss rule recognized by our Supreme Court [Citation], and plaintiffs allege fraudulent conduct that is independent of [defendant’s] alleged warranty breaches.”

The Court finds that the ruling in Dhital is on-point here, and therefore Kia’s argument is unavailing.

5.    Statute of Limitations

Next, Kia contends that Plaintiff’s fraud cause of action is barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations. (Civil Code § 338(d).) Kia argues that the statute of limitations began accruing when Plaintiff purchased the vehicle on February 9, 2022. (UMF No. 1.) Kia contends that the delayed discovery rule is unsubstantiated by the evidence.

“The discovery rule only delays accrual until the plaintiff has, or should have, inquiry notice of the cause of action.” (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 807 (Fox); Nelson v. Indevus Pharms, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1206 (Nelson).) “A plaintiff whose complaint shows on its face that his claim would be barred without the benefit of the discovery rule must specifically plead facts to show (1) the time and manner of discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence. The burden is on the plaintiff to show diligence, and conclusory allegations will not withstand demurrer.” (McKelvey v. Boeing N. Am. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 151, 160 (McKelvey), superseded by statute on unrelated grounds as stated in Grisham v. Philip Morris U.S.A., Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 623, 637 (Grisham).) 

Here, Plaintiff has presented evidence that Kia affirmatively concealed the defect present in the Subject Vehicle, and that Plaintiff only discovered that defect after repeatedly bringing the car in for repair. This is the textbook situation where the delayed discovery rule applies.

Accordingly, Kia’s Motion for Summary Adjudication of the Sixth Cause of Action for Fraud by Concealment is DENIED. 

D.   Punitive Damages

Finally, Kia moves for summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages.

California Civil Code section 3294 authorizes the recovery of punitive damages in non-contract cases where “the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice . . . .” (Civ. Code § 3294(a).) “‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Id. § 3294(c)(1).) Punitive damages thus require more than the mere commission of a tort. (See Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 894-95.) Specific facts must be pleaded in support of punitive damages. (See Hillard v. A.H. Robins Co. (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 374, 391-92.)

When the defendant is a corporation, “the oppression, fraud, or malice must be perpetrated, authorized, or knowingly ratified by an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.” (Wilson v. Southern California Edison Company (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 123, 164; see Civ. Code § 3294(b).)  

Here, Kia argues first that Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that anyone at Kia has acted with malice, fraud, or oppression. However, as Plaintiff has presented a viable fraud cause of action, this argument is unavailing.

Second, Kia argues that Plaintiff has presented no evidence showing that the alleged fraudulent conduct was ratified by a Kia officer, director, or managing agent.

However, Plaintiff has presented evidence that Kia had knowledge of the Theta II GDI engine defects prior to Plaintiff’s purchase of the subject vehicle but did nothing to remedy or disclose the issue. A reasonable trier of fact could find that such corporate action required the ratification of Kia’s directors, and accordingly, Kia’s Motion for Summary Adjudication of Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages is DENIED.

DATED: February 14, 2023

______________________________

Hon. Robert S. Draper

Judge of the Superior Court