Judge Robert S. Draper, Case 20STCV03517 2022-09-28 Tentative Ruling

This is a habitability action. The Complaint alleges as follows. Plaintiffs Sandy Peacock (“Peacock”), Cesar Esparza (“Esparza”), Stella Peacock-Bernadini (“Stella”), Joaquin Peacock-Esparza (“Joaquin”), and Benecio Peacock-Esparza (“Benecio”) resided in the subject property (the “Property”) from January 15, 2016 to July 1, 2019, pursuant to a lease agreement. (Compl. ¶¶ 1-2.) During the lease period the Property had numerous defects and dangerous conditions including substantial leaking and mold, damaged flooring, substandard plumbing pipes and fixtures, defective and unsafe electrical wiring, lack of security doors and smoke detectors, unpermitted construction and repairs, lack of insulation, lead exposure, and lack of heating unit. (Compl. ¶ 10.) Plaintiffs filed numerous complaints but Defendant Arturo Solis (“Solis”), the landlord, refused to make any permanent repairs and failed to act promptly. (Compl. §§ 21-25.) Plaintiffs eventually moved out on July 1, 2019, due to poor living conditions. (Compl. § 23.)

On January 28, 2020, Plaintiffs filed the Complaint asserting six causes of action:

On September 19, 2021, Plaintiffs filed an Opposition. The Opposition was not timely.

Solis moves to bifurcate the liability and punitive damage proceedings, thereby precluding evidence of Defendant’s financial condition unless/until the jury determines he is liable.

Civil Code section 3295(d) provides that “[t]he court shall, on application of any defendant, preclude the admission of evidence of that defendant’s profits or financial condition until after the trier of fact returns a verdict for plaintiff awarding actual damages and finds that a defendant is guilty of malice, oppression, or fraud in accordance with Section 3294.” (Civ. Code, § 3295(d).) “Evidence of profit and financial condition shall be admissible only as to the defendant or defendants found to be liable to the plaintiff and to be guilty of malice, oppression, or fraud.” (Id.)

“Section 3295 was enacted in 1979 to protect against the premature disclosure of a defendant's financial condition when punitive damages are sought. (Medo v. Superior Court (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 64, 67, 251; Stats.1979, ch. 778, § 1, p. 2662.) Since 1987, section 3295 has established rules for bifurcating the punitive damages portion of a trial. These restrictions safeguard defendants in two ways: “[t]he pretrial discovery limits ensure that defendants are not coerced into settling suits solely to avoid unwarranted intrusions into their private financial affairs, while the evidentiary restrictions minimize potential prejudice to the defense in front of a jury.” (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 712, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 898, 882 P.2d 894.)” Torres v. Automobile Club of So. California (1997) 15 Cal.4th 771, 777, as modified on denial of reh'g (July 16, 1997)

In Opposition[1], Plaintiffs argue that it is necessary to consider Solis’s oppressive and fraudulent behavior to prove their case for Constructive Eviction and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. However, evidence of Solis’s intent will be admissible in the initial trial; only evidence of his financial status will be inadmissible in the first phase of the trial. Accordingly, this argument is irrelevant.

Second, Plaintiffs argue that a bifurcated trial should not be granted as it would require a duplication of facts and evidence. Plaintiffs state that “Due to the common nucleus of operative facts and evidence, Ms. Liu [sic] will be forced to present the same facts and evidence for a Phase Two trial to prosecute her claims for punitive damages.” (Opposition at p. 6.)

The Opposition does not clarify what witnesses would be necessary to prove both Solis’s liability, and the proper amount of punitive damages pursuant to that liability.

Simply put, Solis’s motion is a textbook request under Civil Code section 3295(d), and absent extenuating circumstances, the Court is statutorily obligated to grant it. As no such circumstances exist, Solis’s Motion to Bifurcate Trial is GRANTED.

[1] The Court notes that Plaintiffs’ Opposition was filed five days late, the day before Solis’s Reply was due. This delay is likely to cause Plaintiff prejudice and is good cause for the Court to not consider the Opposition. However, as the outcome remains the same, the Court will address the arguments on their merits.

SANDY PEACKCOCK, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. ARTURO SOLIS, et al., Defendants.	Case No.:	20STCV03517
	Hearing Date:	September 28, 2022

	[TENTATIVE] RULING RE: Defendant Arturo solis’s motion to bifurcate.