Judge Robert S. Draper, Case 20STCV12016 2023-03-06 Tentative Ruling

Defendants Fernando Gaytan and Angie Coello’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

This is an action for breach of contract. The operative Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) alleges as follows.

Plaintiff Dennis Luna (“Luna”) was deeded property located at 700 Keenan St., Montebello CA (the “Subject Property”) from his mother in April 2016. (TAC ¶ 1.) The Subject Property became a matter of dispute between Luna and his non-party sisters. (Ibid.) Luna hired non-party attorney Lawrence E. Clark (“Clark”) to settle the dispute. (Ibid.) Clark’s paralegal, defendant Diana Gaytan (“Diana”) repeatedly encouraged Luna to sell the Subject Property to her father, defendant Fernando Gaytan (“Fernando”[1]). (Ibid.)

Luna sold the Subject Property to Fernando and defendant Angie Coello (“Coello”, together with Fernando, “Movants”, and together with Diana and Fernando, “Defendants”) for $300,000 with the understanding that Luna’s daughter, plaintiff Vanessa Luna Bishop (“Bishop”) would receive a $150,000 promissory note on the Subject Property with a Deed of Trust and that Luna would have a life estate with respect to the Subject Property. (Ibid; Ex. A, B.)

Upon completion of the transaction, Luna received proceeds in the amount of $29,318.26. (Ibid.) Luna then transferred this amount to Fernando for the purpose of making improvements to the Subject Property to make it handicap accessible for Luna during his life estate. (Ibid.) Those improvements were never made. (TAC ¶ 2.)

On August 13, 2017, Luna was served with a 60 Day Notice to Terminate Tenancy, despite being granted a life estate in the Subject Property. (Ibid.) Plaintiffs allege that Diana abused her fiduciary relationship with Luna to induce Luna to enter into a sales contract of the Subject Property while misleading him about the contract’s contents. (TAC ¶ 21.)

On March 25, 2020, Plaintiffs filed the Complaint asserting five causes of action:

On August 14, 2021, Plaintiffs filed the First Amended Complaint, adding a Sixth Cause of Action for Violation of Civil Code § 3300.

On September 17, 2020, Defendants filed a Demurrer to the First Amended Complaint. That Demurrer was sustained in part and overruled in part.

Also on September 17, 2020, Defendants field an Anti-SLAPP Motion to Strike. That Motion was denied.

On March 8, 2021, Plaintiffs filed the Second Amended Complaint asserting four causes of action:

On July 23, 2021, Plaintiffs filed the operative Third Amended Complaint asserting the same four causes of action.

On July 30, 2021, Defendants filed a Demurrer to the Third Amended Complaint. That Demurrer was sustained without leave to amend as to the Fourth Cause of Action.

On February 14, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Substitution of Attorney. Plaintiffs now represent themselves pro per.

As of March 3, 2023, no Opposition has been filed. Any Opposition was due by February 14, 2023.

The court may take judicial notice of “official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state of the United States,” “[r]ecords of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record of the United States or of any state of the United States,” and “[f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.” (Evid. Code § 452, subds. (c), (d), and (h).)

Evidence Code Section 452 provides that judicial notice may be taken for facts and propositions that are “not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.” (Cal. Evid. Code § 452(h).) Further, “a court may take judicial notice of [recorded documents and] the fact of a document's recordation, the date the document was recorded and executed, the parties to the transaction reflected in a recorded document, and the document's legally operative language, assuming there is no genuine dispute regarding the document's authenticity. From this, the court may deduce and rely upon the legal effect of the recorded document, when that effect is clear from its face.” (Scott v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 743, 745-755.)

Taking judicial notice of a document is not the same as accepting the truth of its contents or accepting a particular interpretation of its meaning. (Fremont Indem. Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 113-14 (citations and internal quotations omitted).) In addition, judges “consider matters shown in exhibits attached to the complaint and incorporated by reference.” (Performance Plastering v. Richmond American Homes of California, Inc. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 659, 665.) However, “[w]hen judicial notice is taken of a document . . . the truthfulness and proper interpretation of the document are disputable.” (Aquila, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 556, 569 (quoting StorMedia Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 449, 457 n. 9).)

The party requesting judicial notice must (a) give each adverse party sufficient notice of the request to enable the adverse party to prepare to meet the request and (b) provide the court with sufficient information to enable it to take judicial notice of the matter. (Cal. Evid. Code § 453.)

2. Court Order in instant LASC Case No. 20STCV12016 filed September 2, 2021. (Ex. B.)

3. Dennis Luna’s Real Estate Broker’s License Information taken from Records of the State of California Department of Real Estate. (Ex. C.)
Original Civil Complaint filed in instant action LASC Case No. 20STCV12016 on March 25, 2020. (Ex. D.)

4. Grant Deed signed by Lorraine Luna Cano on March 13, 2017, and recorded on April 4, 2017. (Ex. E.)

5. Grant Deed signed by Dennis Luna on March 301, 2017, and recorded on May 24, 2017. (Ex. F.)

Movants move for summary judgment on all causes of action, or in the alternative, summary adjudication of each cause of action.

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial.¿(Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843). In analyzing such motions, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent's claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.”¿(Hinesley¿v.¿Oakshade¿Town Center¿(2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294). Thus, summary judgment or summary adjudication is granted when, after the Court’s consideration of the evidence set forth in the papers and all reasonable inferences accordingly, no triable issues of fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.¿(CCP § 437c(c);¿Villa v.¿McFarren¿(1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 733, 741).¿

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the party¿moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element.¿(Scalf¿v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc.¿(2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520). Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.”¿(Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc.¿(2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389). A motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication must be denied where the moving party's evidence does not prove all material facts, even in the absence of any opposition or where the opposition is weak.¿(See¿Leyva v. Superior Court (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 462, 475;¿Salesguevara¿v. Wyeth Labs., Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 379, 384, 387.¿¿¿

Once the¿moving¿party has met the burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party¿to show via specific facts that a triable issue of material facts exists as to a cause of action or a defense thereto.¿(CCP § 437c(o)(2)).¿When¿a¿party¿cannot¿establish an essential element or defense, a court must grant a motion for summary adjudication.¿(CCP § 437c(o)(1)-(2)).

Movants move for Summary Judgment of the First Cause of Action as to the Ancillary Agreement that allegedly granted Luna a life estate in the Subject Property, and as to the Promissory Note that allegedly granted Bishop a promissory note in the amount of $150,000.

Movants argue that there is no triable issue of material fact showing that the Ancillary Agreement grants Luna a life estate in the Subject Property.

I, A B, grant to C D all that real property situated in (insert name of county) County, State of California, bounded (or described) as follows: (here insert property description, or if the land sought to be conveyed has a descriptive name, it may be described by the name, as for instance, The Norris Ranch.) Witness my hand this (insert day) day of (insert month), 20___. (Civ. Code § 1092.)

Conveyances need only use the word “grant” to convey an estate. (Schlageter v. Cutting (1931) 116 Cal.App.489, 498.)

Here, the language in the Ancillary Agreement that Plaintiffs contend grants Luna a life estate in the Subject Property states:

b. The Buyers agree to execute a Promissory Note secured by a Deed of Trust in the amount of $150,000 payable to Vanessa Luna Bishop. The promissory note will become due and payable:

ii. If Dennis Luna so chooses to reside in the Subject Property, then upon Dennis Luna’s demise. (UMF No. 4.)

As Movants note, nowhere in the Ancillary Agreement do Movants grant Luna a life estate in the Subject Property. (UMF No. 9.) Additionally, at the close of escrow, Luna transferred title to the Subject Property to Movants as joint tenants and did not give himself a life estate in the Subject Property. (UMF No. 10.)

The Court finds that Movants have met their initial burden of showing the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact demonstrating that the Ancillary Agreement granted Luna a life estate in the Subject Property. The burden now shifts to Plaintiffs to demonstrate the existence of such triable issue of material fact. As Plaintiffs have not filed an Opposition or any admissible evidence supporting their position, they cannot meet this burden.

Accordingly, Movants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to the First Cause of Action for Breach of Contract as to the Ancillary Agreement.

Next, Defendants move for Summary Adjudication of the First Cause of Action for Breach of Contract as to the Promissory Note.

Plaintiffs allege that the Promissory Note grants Luna “a Promissory Note in the amount of one Hundred and Fifty Thousand U.S. Dollars ($150,000.00) payable to the Plaintiff’s daughter, Plaintiff Bishop, within five (5) years from the date of the sale or if Plaintiff resided in the Property, upon his demise.” (TAC ¶ 26.)

“FOR GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, the undersigned maker(s) promise(s) to pay to VANESSA LUNA BISHOP, or order, at A PLACE TO BE DESIGNATED BY BENEFICIARY the sum of $150,000 ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY THOUSAND DOLLARS, with interest from APRIL 7, 2022 on the unpaid principal at the rate of ONE (1%) per cent per annum: principal and interest payable in a single installment of ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY THOUSAND DOLLARS within thirty (30) days of April 7 2022, or within ninety (90) days of Dennis Luna’s Demise.” (UMF No. 51)

As Movants note, payment on the Promissory Note is not due, as Luna is still alive. (UMF No. 55.) Additionally, Luna attested that payment on the Promissory Note is not yet due. (Ibid.)

Movants have met their initial burden of showing the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact demonstrating that Movants are in breach of the Promissory Note as payment on that note is not yet due. The burden now shifts to Plaintiffs to show the existence of such triable issue of material fact. As Plaintiffs have not opposed this motion and have not submitted any admissible evidence in support of their position, they fail to meet this burden.

Accordingly, Movants’ Motion for Summary Adjudication of the First Cause of Action for Breach of Contract as to the Promissory Note is GRANTED.

Next, Movants move for summary adjudication of Plaintiffs’ Second Cause of Action for Intentional Misrepresentation.

To establish a claim for deceit based on intentional misrepresentation, the plaintiff must prove seven essential elements: (1) the defendant represented to the plaintiff that an important fact was true; (2) that representation was false; (3) the defendant knew that the representation was false when the defendant made it, or the defendant made the representation recklessly and without regard for its truth; (4) the defendant intended that the plaintiff rely on the representation; (5) the plaintiff reasonably relied on the representation; (6) the plaintiff was harmed; and (7) the plaintiff's reliance on the defendant's representation was a substantial factor in causing that harm to the plaintiff. (Manderville v. PCG & S Group, Inc. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1486, 1498.)

The Third Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiffs “misled Plaintiff Luna by falsely assuring that a life estate existed for Plaintiff Luna in the Property which ultimately induced Plaintiff Luna to enter into the Agreement.” (UMF No. 74.)

However, in deposition Luna conceded that neither Gaytan nor Coello represented to him that he would be granted a life estate in the Subject Property. (UMF Nos. 79-81.)

Movants have met their initial burden of showing the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact demonstrating that Movants made any misrepresentation regarding the Subject Property to Luna. The burden now shifts to Luna to show the existence of such triable issue of material fact. As Luna has neither opposed the instant motion nor submitted any admissible evidence in support of his opposition, he cannot meet this burden.

Accordingly, Movants’ Motion for Summary Adjudication of the Second Cause of Action for Intentional Misrepresentation is GRANTED.

Finally, Movants move for summary adjudication of the Third Cause of Action for Unjust Enrichment.

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have been unjustly enriched by deriving “a financial benefit from their failure to comply with the terms of the Agreement. Defendants are under an obligation to pay Plaintiffs forthwith all amounts by which they have been unjustly enriched, which sum is not less than Three Hundred Thousand U.S. Dollars ($300,000).” (TAC ¶ 44.)

However, as addressed above, Luna does not maintain a life estate in the Subject Property, and payment of the Promissory Note is not yet due.

Accordingly, Movants’ Motion for Summary Adjudication of the Third Cause of Action for Unjust Enrichment is GRANTED.

[1] “The parties and relevant individuals share a last name. For clarity, convenience, and in order to avoid confusion, we refer to them by their first names and intend no disrespect.” (Cruz v. Superior Court (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 175, 188, fn. 13.)

Dennis luna, Plaintiff; vs. fernando gaytan, et al., Defendants.	Case No: 20STCV12016
	Hearing Date: March 6, 2023

	[TENTATIVE] RULING RE: Defendants fernando gaytan and angie coello’s motion for summary judgment.