Judge: Robert S. Draper, Case: 20STCV45681, Date: 2023-03-16 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV45681    Hearing Date: March 16, 2023    Dept: 78

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 78

Plaintiff’s Motion for Final Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement is GRANTED.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This is an action for workplace wage and hour violations. The Complaint alleges as follows.

Plaintiff Rosa Guardado (“Plaintiff”) was employed by Defendants Multi-Pak Corporation (“Multi-Pak”) and Staffmark Investment LLC (“Staffmark” and together with Multi-Pak, “Defendants” from February 2016 through February 2020. (Compl. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff was scheduled to work Monday through Thursday and was required to work between eight and ten hours per day. (Compl. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff and other similarly aggrieved employees were required to work more than five hours without being provided a meal period and to work ten hours without being provided with a second meal period. (Compl. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff was never able to take an uninterrupted ten-minute rest break. (Compl. ¶ 14.) Defendants employed a time rounding policy that routinely round time in Defendants’ favor such that Plaintiff and other aggrieved employees were not paid for all time worked. (Compl. ¶ 17.) Defendants failed to give Plaintiff and aggrieved employees complete and accurate wage statements. (Compl. ¶ 21.)

Plaintiff complained to Defendants regarding these violations, and in retaliation, Defendants terminated Plaintiff’s employment. (Compl. ¶ 23.) Plaintiff never received the missing waged earned upon termination of her employment. (Compl. ¶ 24.)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 25, 2020, Plaintiff filed the Complaint asserting eleven causes of action:

1.    Retaliation;

2.    Wrongful Termination;

3.    Violation of California Labor Code §§ 510 and 1198;

4.    Violation of California Labor Code §§ 1194, 1197 and 1197.1;

5.    Violation of California Labor Code § 226.7;

6.    Violation of California Labor Code § 226.7 and 512(a);

7.    Violation of California Labor Code § 226(a);

8.    Violation of California Labor Code §§ 201, 202, and 203;

9.    Violation of California Labor Code § 1198.5;

10.                   Violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200, et seq.

11.                   Private Attorney General Act, Labor Code § 2698, et seq.

On January 12, 2021, Multi-Pak filed an Answer.

On January 14, 2021, Staffmark filed an Answer.

On April 4, 2022, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint asserting the same eleven causes of action.

On April 28, 2022, Multi-Pak filed an Answer.

On May 3, 2022, Staffmark filed an Answer.

On August 17, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Preliminary Approval of Settlement.

On September 29, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of Settlement.

On December 28, 2022, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Final Approval of Settlement.

No Opposition has been filed.

DISCUSSION

      I.          APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT 

Plaintiff seeks final approval of the Settlement Agreement. (Payne Decl., Ex. 1.)

California Rules of Court, rule 3.769, subdivision (g) provides that the court must conduct an inquiry into the fairness of a proposed class action settlement prior to final approval. The trial court has broad powers to determine whether a proposed settlement is fair. (Mallick v. Superior Court (1979) 89 Cal. App. 3d 434, 438.) The standard for approval of class settlements in California is that the settlement be fair, reasonable, and adequate for class members overall. (Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal. App. 4th 1794, 1801.) 

To determine the fairness of a settlement, the court must consider certain factors, as set forth in Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 244-45 (Wershba), disapproved on other grounds as stated in Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 260, 270). “[A] presumption of fairness exists where: (1) the settlement is reached through arm’s-length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small.” (Id. at p. 245.) “[T]he test is not the maximum amount plaintiffs might have obtained at trial on the complaint but, rather, whether the settlement is reasonable under all of the circumstances.” (Id. at p. 250; see also City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp. (2d Cir. 1974) 495 F.2d 448, 455 (City of Detroit) [stating that a proposed settlement that amounts to a fraction of the potential recovery does not in itself render the proposed settlement grossly inadequate].)   

In making this determination, the court considers all relevant factors, including “the strength of [the] plaintiffs’ case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, the presence of a governmental participant, and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.’” (Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 128 (Kullar).) The recovery should represent a “reasonable compromise, given the magnitude and apparent merit of the claims being released, discounted by the risks and expenses of attempting to establish and collect on those claims by pursuing the litigation.” (Id. at p. 129.) Nevertheless, the strength of the case on the merits for the plaintiff is the most important factor, balanced against the amount offered in settlement. (Id. at p. 130.) 

In granting the preliminary approval of class and PAGA settlement, the Court has already considered and determined that many of the factors establish that the settlement is fair. (See September 9, 2022 Order.)

As to factors that the Court could not consider at that time, Plaintiff asserts that of the 145 Class Members, none have objected or asked to be excluded from the proposed settlement. (Phoenix Decl. ¶¶ 8-9.) Plaintiff attests that notice packets were sent to 145 identified Class Members on October 11, 2022. (Payne Decl. ¶¶ 26-27.; Phoenix Decl. ¶¶ 5-7.) Two packets were returned to Plaintiff’s Settlement Administrator without a forwarding address. (Ibid.) Plaintiff’s Settlement Administrator performed a computerized skip trace to obtain those Class Members’ updated addresses and was able to successfully deliver those two returned notice packets. (Ibid.) The Court previously approved the form of notice, dates selected for mailing and distribution, method of giving notice to class members, and the procedures for class members to opt out of or object to the settlement.

Considering the above factors and the Court’s previous finding of fairness, the Court finds Plaintiff has established that the settlement is fair, adequate, and reached in arms-length bargaining. Considering the lack of objections and requests for exclusion, Plaintiff’s Motion for Approval of Plaintiff’s Class Action and PAGA Settlement is GRANTED. 

    II.          ATTORNEY’S FEES

Plaintiff also seeks attorneys’ fees for Class Counsel, Payne Nguyen, LLP. in the amount of $113,220.00. This number represents 33 1/3% of the maximum settlement amount

The award of attorney fees is made by the court at the fairness hearing using the lodestar method with a multiplier, if appropriate. (Ketchum III v. Moses (2000) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132-36.) Despite any agreement by the parties to the contrary, the court has an independent responsibility to review the attorney fee provision of the settlement agreement and award an amount that it determines to be reasonable. (Garabedian v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 123, 128.) 

“[T]he fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. … The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work. The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.” (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 [internal citations omitted].) The primary factor for determining the fairness of fees is “whether the fees bear a reasonable relationship to the value of the attorneys’ work.” (Robbins v. Alibrandi (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 438, 451.) Courts have adopted a practice of cross-checking the lodestar against the value of the class recovery because the award is then “anchored” in the time spent by counsel. (Lealao v. Beneficial California, Inc. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 19, 45.)

Here, the Settlement Agreement allows for 33 1/3% of the maximum settlement amount to be designated as attorneys’ fees. (Payne Decl., ¶ 37.) Class Counsel contends this amount is commensurate with the economic risk Class Counsel took in commencing this action on a contingency basis, the time, effort, and expense dedicated to the cases, the skill and determination required, the results achieved throughout litigation, and the value of the settlement for the class members. (Ibid.)

Additionally, Class Counsel argues that the requested attorneys’ fees are justified under the lodestar method. (Payne Decl. ¶ 44.) Class Counsel notes that he bills at an hourly rate of $550 per hour, while his partner, Kim Nguyen, bills at $500 per hour. (Payne Decl. ¶ 45.) Class Counsel has spent a total of 208.40 hours litigating this case. (Payne Decl. ¶ 48; Ex. 3.) At the blended rate of $525 per hour, this would result in an initial lodestar of $109,410. (Payne Decl. ¶ 49.) The requested attorneys’ fees would constitute a 1.03 multiplier using the lodestar enhancement method.

As Class Counsel’s requested attorneys’ fees are reasonable under both a contingent and lodestar analysis, and as no class members objected to the proposed fees, the Court finds that the requested attorneys’ fees are reasonable considering the skill of Class Counsel, the difficulty of the litigation, and the amount of time and effort Class Counsel expended in obtaining a beneficial result for the class members.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for approval of attorneys’ fees is GRANTED in the amount of $113,220.00.

  III.          CLASS COUNSEL’S COSTS

Class Counsel requests the reimbursement of the costs incurred in litigating this case in the amount of $8,329.33. (Payne Decl. ¶ 54.) This amount is less than the $15,000 contemplated under the settlement agreement, meaning an additional $6,670.67 will be distributed to the Class. (Ibid.)

Class Counsel provides a costs sheet detailing the costs incurred by Class Counsel in this matter. (Payne Decl., Ex 4.)

The Court finds that the provided costs sheet justifies the listed costs, and that all the costs incurred were reasonable.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for litigation costs is GRANTED in the amount of $8,329.33.

 IV.          SERVICE AWARD

Plaintiff seeks a Class Representative Service Award of $5,000.00 to Plaintiff Rosa Guardado.

Named plaintiffs in class action lawsuits are eligible for reasonable service awards as compensation for the expense and risk they incur in conferring a benefit on other members of the class. (Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4^th 399, 412.)

Here, Class Counsel notes that Plaintiff has been intimately involved in the prosecution of this matter since the beginning. (Payne Decl. ¶ 55.) The information and documentation provided by Plaintiff was instrumental in establishing the wage and hour violations. (Ibid.) Additionally, Plaintiff faces actual risks with her future employment as class representative, as a future employer might search for her litigation history. (Payne Decl. ¶ 56.)

The Court finds that it is reasonable for Plaintiff to obtain an enhancement award due to her dedication to the instant action, and the risk she faces moving forward.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for a Class Representative Service Award of $5,000 is GRANTED.

   V.          PAYMENT TO SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATOR

Finally, Plaintiff seeks an $8,000 payment for its Settlement Administrator, Phoenix Settlement Administrator. Plaintiff notes that the settlement contemplated a $10,000 payment. Phoenix attaches a copy of the invoice to the Declaration of Kevin Lee. (Lee Decl., Ex. B.)

The Court finds that the payment to the Settlement Administrator is reasonable and is below that contemplated by the settlement agreement.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for approval of a Settlement Administrator fee is GRANTED in the amount of $8,000.

As the Court previously determined that the proposed settlement was fair, and as no class members have objected to or requested to be excluded from that settlement, Plaintiff’s Motion for Final Approval of the Settlement Agreement is GRANTED. 

DATED: March 16, 2023

___________________________

Hon. Robert S. Draper

Judge of the Superior Court