Judge: Robert S. Draper, Case: 21STCV40074, Date: 2023-05-08 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV40074 Hearing Date: May 8, 2023 Dept: 78
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles
Department 78
JAMON BROWN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ELEANOR AVENUE PROPERTIES LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No.: 21STCV40074
Hearing Date: May 8, 2023
[TENTATIVE] RULING RE:
PLAINTIFF JAMON BROWN’S MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANTS SAN MARINO STREET PROPERTIES AND ELEANOR AVENUE PROPERTIES, LLC’S ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT.
Plaintiff Jamon Brown’s Demurrer to the Verified Answer is SUSTAINED as to the following affirmative defenses: 1st, 4th, 5th 6th, 7th, 12th, 20th, 21st, 33rd, 39th and 46th.
The demurrer is DENIED as to the following affirmative defenses: 11th, 17th, 31st, 36th, 40th, 41st and 44th.
At hearing, the Court will hear Defendants’ arguments as to leave to amend.
Moving party to provide notice and to file proof of service of such notice within five court days after the date of this order.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This is an uninhabitability action. The Complaint alleges as follows.
Plaintiff Jamon Brown (“Plaintiff”) rented residential property located at 1025 North Serrano Ave., Los Angeles CA (the “Subject Property”). (Compl. ¶ 1.) Defendants San Marino Street Properties and Eleanor Avenue Properties LLC (“Defendants”) were landlords of the Subject Property. (Compl. ¶ 7.) While Plaintiff was a tenant there, the Subject Property suffered a number of habitability defects including pest infestation, mold contamination, defective plumbing systems, inoperable electrical systems, inadequate ventilation and accumulations of filth. (Compl. ¶ 18.) Despite numerous complaints, Defendants failed to remedy these issues. (Compl. ¶ 27.)
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 1, 2021, Plaintiff filed the Complaint asserting seven causes of action:
1. Violation of California Civil Code § 1942.4;
2. Tortious Breach of the Warranty of Habitability;
3. Private Nuisance;
4. Business and Professions Code § 17200, et seq.;
5. Negligence;
6. Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment; and,
7. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.
On June 24, 2022, Defendants filed a Motion to Strike.
On October 6, 2022, the Court denied Defendants’ Motion to Strike.
On November 2, 2022, Defendants filed an Answer.
On November 22, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike the Unverified Answer.
On March 8, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike the Unverified Answer and granted Defendants leave to file a verified Answer.
On March 9, 2023, Defendants filed the operative Verified Answer (the “Answer”).
On March 21, 2023, Plaintiff filed the instant Demurrer to Defendants’ Answer.
On April 25, 2023, Defendants filed an Opposition.
As of May 4, 2023, no Reply has been filed.
DISCUSSION
I. MOTION TO STRIKE THE ANSWER
Plaintiff demurs to Defendants’ Answer on the grounds that many of Defendants’ affirmative defenses are insufficiently plead or fatally uncertain.
A party against whom an answer has been filed may object thereto by general demurrer within 10 days of the answer’s filing where the answer does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense, is uncertainly pled, or does not sufficiently plead the oral or written nature of a contract. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.20, subds. (a)-(c), 430.40, subd. (b).) A demurrer to an answer may be taken to the whole answer or to any one or more of the several defenses set up in the answer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.50, subd. (b).)
The same pleading of “ultimate facts” rather than evidentiary matter or legal conclusions is required as in pleading a complaint. The answer must aver facts as carefully and with as much detail as the facts which constitute the cause of action and which are alleged in the complaint. (FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashimi (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 384.) The various affirmative defenses must be separately stated and must refer to the causes of action to which they relate “in a manner by which they may be intelligently distinguished.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.30(g).) Defenses must be pleaded in the nature of “yes, the allegations [of the complaint] are true, but . . .” (FPI Development, Inc., supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 383.)
A. Insufficiently Pleaded Affirmative Defenses
First, Plaintiff demurs to several affirmative defenses contending that they are insufficiently pleaded.
A general demurrer to an answer can be based on the ground that the answer does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.20, subd. (a); Timberidge Enters. v. City of Santa Rosa (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 873, 880; see e.g., Richard B. Levine v. Higashi (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 566, 573 n. 4 [answer that pled statute of limitations as defense but did not comply with pleading requirement in Code of Civil Procedure section 458 was subject to demurrer]; Universal Land Co. v. All Persons (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 739, 741-43 [demurrer to answer appropriate where defense is barred by statute of limitations or laches].)
The general demurrer to an answer admits all facts well pleaded in the answer, including denials. (Warren v. Harootunian (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 546, 548.) For purposes of a demurrer, each defense in the answer must be considered separately without regard to any other defense, and thus, a separately stated defense that is sufficient in form and substance when viewed in isolation does not become insufficient when, on looking at the answer as a whole, that defense appears inconsistent with other parts of the answer. (South Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 734.) As a result, if one of the defenses or counterclaims is free from the objections urged by demurrer, then a demurrer to the entire answer must be overruled. (Id. at p. 734; see Eich v. Greely (1896) 112 Cal. 171, 172-73.) Further, a demurrer may not be made to only part of a defense. (Reed v. Drais (1885) 67 Cal 491, 491.) Instead, to determine the sufficiency of a defense, the individual defense must be considered as a whole. (Ferrier v. Ferrier (1883) 64 Cal 23, 23.)
Plaintiff demurs to the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Twelfth, Twentieth, Twenty-First, Thirty-First, Thirty-Third, Thirty-Sixth, Thirty-Ninth, and Forty-Sixth affirmative defenses on this ground.
In Opposition, Defendants state that “[i]n reading and construing the Answer as a whole, including with regarding to the Complaint and Defendants’ response to each and every allegation therein, each affirmative defense is pled with enough detail to put Plaintiff on notice of the ultimate facts that are the basis for Defendants’ affirmative defenses.” (Opposition at p. 3.) Defendants make no effort to tie the affirmative defenses to any allegation of the Complaint, or to substantively oppose Plaintiff’s Demurrer as to any individual affirmative defense.
Upon review of the Answer, the Court finds that these affirmative defenses are pleaded as terse legal conclusions and make no effort to tie the affirmative defenses to any corresponding facts.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Demurrer to the above affirmative defenses is SUSTAINED.
B. Uncertain Affirmative Defenses
Next, Plaintiff demurs to several affirmative defenses contending that they are fatally uncertain.
A plaintiff can file a special demurrer to an answer on the ground that it is uncertain, ambiguous, or unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.20, subd. (b).) “A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) From precedent involving demurrers to operative pleadings based on uncertainty, it is clear that where an answer is sufficient to apprise the plaintiff or cross-complainant of defenses he is to meet, the answer is not properly subject to a special demurrer for uncertainty. (See ibid. [uncertainty demurrer to operative pleading]; see also Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 643 [“[a] special demurrer [for uncertainty] should be overruled where the allegations of the complaint are sufficiently clear to apprise the defendant of the issues which he is to meet”].) A demurrer to an answer on the grounds of uncertainty must specific the uncertain, ambiguous, or unintelligible parts of the answer. (Coons v. Thompson (1946) 75 Cal.App.2d 687, 690.)
Plaintiff demurs to the Eleventh, Twelfth, Seventeenth, Twentieth, Twenty-Fifth, Thirty-First, Thirty-Sixth, Fortieth, Forty-First, and Forty-Fourth Affirmative Defenses on this basis.
In Opposition, Defendants state only that “any uncertainties as to affirmative defenses may be resolved through discovery and discovery is the appropriate method to pursue the details of Defendants’ allegations regarding its affirmative defenses.” (Opposition at p. 5.)
While this argument may be proper where there are some factual allegations supporting the affirmative defenses, the above listed affirmative defenses are based on legal conclusions and are framed in such a manner that no plaintiff could be aware of what affirmative defenses he must meet for trial.
For instance, the Twelfth Affirmative Defense states only that “Plaintiff suppressed that which was true and had knowledge and belief of that fact.” (Answer ¶ 97.)
This affirmative defense provides Plaintiff no indication of what he is alleged to have suppressed, or what “that fact” is. Defendants cannot contend that the matter will be clarified in discovery where Plaintiff cannot ascertain what facts or information Defendants would need to discover to successfully allege the affirmative defense.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Demurrer is sustained on this ground with respect to the affirmative defense that also fail to state a claim.
DATED: May 8, 2023
____________________________
Hon. Jill T. Feeney
Judge of the Superior Court
