Judge: Robert S. Draper, Case: 22STCV09490, Date: 2022-12-20 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV09490    Hearing Date: December 20, 2022    Dept: 78

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 78

Defendants’ Demurrer to the Complaint is OVERRULED. Defendants have thirty days to file a responsive pleading.

Defendants’ Motion to Strike is DENIED.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This is an action for a home improvement project gone bad. The Complaint alleges as follows.

Defendant L.A. Handymann (“L.A. Handymann”) responded to Plaintiff Sarah Nazari’s (“Nazari”) request for electrical repair work and lighting installation. (Compl. ¶ 11.) Defendant Majid Rahimi Agahi (“Agahi”) visited Plaintiff’s home and quoted her $1,900 for the work. (Compl. ¶ 13.) Nazari declined that bid. (Ibid.) Shortly thereafter, Defendant Rojin Sabahi (“Sabahi”) told Nazari that L.A. Handymann would be able to do the work for $1,374, including labor and materials. (Ibid.) Nazari accepted that bid. (Ibid.)

L.A. Handymann performed the work inadequately and caused further damage to Plaintiff’s home in the process. (Compl. ¶ 15.) When Nazari complained to L.A. Handymann, Sabahi said he would not return to the property until Plaintiff paid $2,095. (Compl. ¶ 17.)

The operative First Amended Cross-Complaint (“FAXC”) alleges as follows.

On or about November 1, 2021, Cross-Complainant L.A. Handymann entered into an oral contract with Cross-Defendant Sarah Nazari by which L.A. Handymann agreed to provide all labor and materials to Nazari for electrical work for a total sum of $2,095.22. (FAXC ¶ 4.)

L.A. Handymann has performed all conditions under that oral contract. (FAXC ¶ 6.) Nonetheless, Nazari has refused to pay L.A. Handymann for its performance. (FAXC ¶ 7.)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 17, 2022, Plaintiff filed the Complaint.

On April 22, 2022, Defendants filed a Demurrer and Motion to Strike.

On June 20, 2022, the Court overruled that Demurrer and denied the Motion to Strike.

On July 20, 2022, Defendants filed an Answer.

Also on July 20, 2022, Defendants filed a Cross-Complaint asserting two causes of action:

1.    Breach of Contract; and,

2.    Quantum Meruit.

On September 6, 2022, Nazari filed a Demurrer to the Cross-Complaint.

On October 19, 2022, Defendants filed the operative First Amended Cross-Complaint asserting the same two causes of action.

On November 28, 2022, Nazari filed the instant Demurrer to the First Amended Cross-Complaint.

On December 7, 2022, Defendants filed an Opposition.

On December 13, 2022, Nazari filed a Reply.

DISCUSSION

I.                REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

In ruling upon demurrers, courts may consider matters that are proper for judicial notice.  (ABF Capital Corp. v. Berglass (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 825, 834.)  

The court may take judicial notice of “official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state of the United States,” “[r]ecords of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record of the United States or of any state of the United States,” and “[f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.” (Evid. Code § 452, subds. (c), (d), and (h).)  

Evidence Code Section 452 provides that judicial notice may be taken for facts and propositions that are “not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.” (Cal. Evid. Code § 452(h).) Further, “a court may take judicial notice of [recorded documents and] the fact of a document's recordation, the date the document was recorded and executed, the parties to the transaction reflected in a recorded document, and the document's legally operative language, assuming there is no genuine dispute regarding the document's authenticity. From this, the court may deduce and rely upon the legal effect of the recorded document, when that effect is clear from its face.” (Scott v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 743, 745-755.)  

Taking judicial notice of a document is not the same as accepting the truth of its contents or accepting a particular interpretation of its meaning. (Fremont Indem. Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 113-14 (citations and internal quotations omitted).) In addition, judges “consider matters shown in exhibits attached to the complaint and incorporated by reference.”  (Performance Plastering v. Richmond American Homes of California, Inc. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 659, 665.)  However, “[w]hen judicial notice is taken of a document . . . the truthfulness and proper interpretation of the document are disputable.” (Aquila, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 556, 569 (quoting StorMedia Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 449, 457 n. 9).) 

The party requesting judicial notice must (a) give each adverse party sufficient notice of the request to enable the adverse party to prepare to meet the request and (b) provide the court with sufficient information to enable it to take judicial notice of the matter. (Cal. Evid. Code § 453.) 

Nazari requests judicial notice of the following:

    1.          The entire Case File in the instant action, including the Complaint / Exhibits filed on March 17, 2022. (Exh. 1.)

    2.          The text message communications produced by L.A. Handymann in response to Moving Party’s document production request. (Ex. 2.)

Nazaris’ Requests for Judicial Notice are GRANTED.

II.              DEMURRER

Nazari demurs to both causes of action in the First Amended Cross-Complaint.

A demurrer should be sustained only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Code Civ. Pro., §§ 430.30, et seq.) As is relevant here, a court should sustain a demurrer if a complaint does not allege facts that are legally sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (See id. § 430.10, subd. (e).) As the Supreme Court held in Blank v. Kirwan (1985) Cal.3d 311: “We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. . . . Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (Id. at p. 318; see also Hahn. v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747 [“A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. [Citation.]”)  

“In determining whether the complaint is sufficient as against the demurrer … if on consideration of all the facts stated it appears the plaintiff is entitled to any relief at the hands of the court against the defendants the complaint will be held good although the facts may not be clearly stated.”  (Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 639.) 

A demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend if the complaint, liberally construed, can state a cause of action under any theory or if there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by amendment. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1081.) The demurrer also may be sustained without leave to amend where the nature of the defects and previous unsuccessful attempts to plead render it probable plaintiff cannot state a cause of action. (Krawitz v. Rusch (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 957, 967.)

A.   First Cause of Action – Breach of Contract

Nazari demurs to the First Cause of Action for Breach of Contract.

“The standard elements of a claim for breach of contract are: ‘(1) the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) damage to plaintiff therefrom.’” (Wall Street Network, Ltd. v. New York Times Co. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1178.) 

Here, Nazari makes several arguments as to why Plaintiff fails to state facts sufficient to support a cause of action for breach of contract.

No Mutual Assent

First, Nazari argues that the First Amended Cross-Complaint fails to allege the existence of a valid oral contract, as the purported terms of that contract do not match the written contractual terms proffered in Nazari’s Complaint, and by Defendants in their response to Nazari’s Document Production Requests.

The text messages provided by L.A. Handymann in response to Nazari’s discovery request indicate that Sabahi informed Nazari that “the total for wiring and 15 lights installation will be $1374!” This contradicts the First Amended Cross-Complaint, which alleges that on November 1, 2022, the parties agreed to do the subject work for $2,095.22.

While there does appear to be a contradiction between the terms of the alleged oral agreement and the information exchanged in the texts between Sabahi and Nazari, it would be improper of the Court to hold that this means, as a matter of law, that the parties did not enter into the oral agreement as alleged on November 1st. The text messages could just as easily indicate a modification to a portion of the agreement, or a misunderstanding that was later remedied.

At the pleading stage, the Court is bound to accept the allegations of the Complaint as true. Absent judicially noticeable evidence indicating, clearly and dispositively, that the allegations cannot be true, the Court will accept the allegations as true. The text messages provided by Nazari do not provide such clear and dispositive evidence.

Failure to Perform

Next, Nazari contends that L.A. Handymann cannot state a cause of action for breach of contract because L.A. Handymann failed to perform on that contract by causing damage to Nazari’s home in the course of installing the subject lights.

L.A. Handymann’s failure to perform is the subject of Nazari’s Complaint. The Court cannot hold as empirically true at the pleading stage the very matter that is being litigated.

Statute of Frauds

Next, Nazari argues that L.A. Handymann’s oral contract is precluded by the statute of frauds, as over $500 dollars of goods was exchanged in the contract.

However, as Defendants note, the Statute of Frauds does not contain a provision for the sale of goods over $500. The Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) does address this issue. The UCC requires that “a contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way of action or defense” unless supported by a writing. (UCC § 2-201.)

Nazari contends that, as L.A. Handymann claims to have spent more than $500 dollars purchasing goods for the project, the UCC applies. This is not how California courts determine whether the UCC applies.

“The test for inclusion or exclusion is not whether [goods and services] are mixed, but, granting that they are mixed, whether their predominant factor, their thrust, their purpose, reasonably stated, is the rendition of service, with goods incidentally involved (e.g., contract with artist for painting) or is a transaction of sale, with labor incidentally involved (e.g., installation of a water heater in a bathroom).” (C9 Ventures v. SVC-West, L.P (2012) 202 Cal.App.4^th 1483, 1493.)

Here, Nazari obtained the services of an electrician, who then purchased the lights from a third party for installation. The bulk of the contract price was dedicated to the installation process.

Accordingly, the UCC does not apply, and a writing is not required to act upon the alleged contract.

B.   Second Cause of Action – Quantum Meruit

Nazari demurs to the Second Cause of Action for Quantum Meruit.

“Quantum meruit refers to the well-established principle that ‘the law implies a promise to pay for services performed under circumstances disclosing that they were not gratuitously rendered.’” (Chodos v. Borman (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 76, 96 (quoting Huskinson & Brown v. Wolf (2004) 32 Cal.4th 453, 458).) “To recover in quantum meruit, a party need not prove the existence of a contract [citations], but it must show the circumstances were such that ‘the services were rendered under some understanding or expectation of both parties that compensation therefor was to be made [citations].’” (Id.)

Here, Nazari again argues that L.A. Handymann cannot state a cause of action for quantum meruit as Nazari received no benefit from the alleged oral contract. Nazari argues that L.A. Handymann caused more damage to her property than benefit, and accordingly, cannot plead quantum meruit.

Again, the Court cannot rule at the pleading stage that L.A. Handymann caused more damage than benefit to Nazari’s home. That is the subject of the instant litigation and will be properly determined by a trier of fact after all relevant evidence is exchanged.

Accordingly, Nazari’s Demurrer to the First Amended Cross-Complaint is OVERRULED.

DATED:  December 20, 2022

__________________________

Hon. Robert S. Draper

Judge of the Superior Court