Judge: Robert S. Draper, Case: 22STCV17377, Date: 2022-10-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV17377    Hearing Date: October 13, 2022    Dept: 78

Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles 

Department 78 

 

CHRISTOPHER JOSE ACOSTA,

Plaintiff,

vs. 

CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL, et al,

Defendants 

Case No.: 

22STCV17377

Hearing Date: 

October 13, 2022

[TENTATIVE] RULING RE:

Defendants california highway patrol and officer aaron gonzalez’s demurrer to the complaint.

Defendants California Highway Patrol and Officer Aaron Gonzalez’s Demurrer to the Complaint is OVERRULED.

Defendants have thirty days to answer.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This is an action for negligence. The Complaint alleges as follows.

Plaintiff Christopher Jose Acosta (“Plaintiff”) is a tow truck operator. (Compl. ¶ 9.) On February 2, 2022, Plaintiff was dispatched to the scene of a car collision after Plaintiff’s employer received a call from the responding officer, Defendant Aaron Gonzalez (“Gonzalez”). (Ibid.) Gonzalez was an employee of Defendant California Highway Patrol (“CHP” and with Gonzalez, “Defendants”). (Ibid)

Gonzalez made little effort to block or close off the left shoulder of the freeway, where the subject vehicle was located. (Compl. ¶ 12.) Gonzalez told Plaintiff to stand in the number one lane, close to the left shoulder. (Compl. ¶ 17.) Shortly thereafter, a vehicle traveling along the left shoulder struck Plaintiff. (Compl. ¶ 18.)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

On May 25, 2022, Plaintiff filed the Complaint asserting a single cause of action for Negligence.

On July 11, 2022, Defendants filed the instant Demurrer to the Complaint.

On September 12, 2022, Plaintiff filed an Opposition.

On October 4, 2022, Defendants filed a Reply. 

DISCUSSION 

I.              DEMURRER

Defendants demur to the single cause of action pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10(e).

A court should sustain a demurrer if a complaint does not allege facts that are legally sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (CCP § 430.10, subd. (e).) As the Supreme Court held in Blank v. Kirwan (1985) Cal.3d 311: “We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. . . . Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (Id. at p. 318; see also Hahn. v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747 [“A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. [Citation.]”)  

“In determining whether the complaint is sufficient as against the demurrer … if on consideration of all the facts stated it appears the plaintiff is entitled to any relief at the hands of the court against the defendants the complaint will be held good although the facts may not be clearly stated.”  (Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 639.) 

A demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend if the complaint, liberally construed, can state a cause of action under any theory or if there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by amendment. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1081.) The demurrer also may be sustained without leave to amend where the nature of the defects and previous unsuccessful attempts to plead render it probable plaintiff cannot state a cause of action. (Krawitz v. Rusch (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 957, 967.) 

A.  First Cause of Action - Negligence

Defendants demur to the first and only cause of action for negligence.

To plead a cause of action for negligence, one must allege (1) a legal duty owed to plaintiffs to use due care; (2) breach of duty; (3) causation; and (4) damage to plaintiff. (County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2006) 137 Cal. App. 4th 292, 318.) “In California, negligence may be pleaded in general terms. (Landeros v. Flood (1976) 17 Cal.3d 399, 407-408.) 

Here, Defendants argue that the Complaint fails to state facts alleging that Gonzalez owed a duty to Plaintiff. Defendants note that Gonzalez, like all CHP Officers, does not have an affirmative duty to make all accident locations entirely safe, just as he does not have an affirmative duty to affirmatively stop law-breaking drivers from speeding on a median next to an accident. (Davidson v. City of Westminster (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197, 209.)

Defendants note that the Complaint alleges a “special relationship,” but provides no facts to support it. Defendants contend that a special relationship can be established only where the officer creates, contributes to, or increases the risk of harm or harm presented. (Minch v. Department of California Highway Patrol (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 895, 904.) Defendants argue that the Complaint does not state any facts demonstrating that Gonzalez made Plaintiff’s situation worse, rather than failing to make it better.

In Opposition, Plaintiff argues that the Complaint alleges facts demonstrating that Gonzalez did, in fact, place Gonzalez in an unsafe position that resulted in his injury. Plaintiff argues that by asking Plaintiff to stand in Lane One, an unsecured lane close to the accident, Gonzalez increased the risk of harm to Plaintiff.

Indeed, the Complaint alleges that “Plaintiff was motioned by CHP Officer Gonzalez to stand in a specific location in the number one lane close to the shoulder by Officer Gonzalez”; that “immediately after Plaintiff moved to stand and wait at the location pursuant to Officer Gonzalez’ direction, a vehicle that was driving in the left shoulder at a high rate of speed slammed into vehicles at the scene and Plaintiff, himself, was struck”; and that by “voluntarily undertaking and specifically directing Plaintiff at the accident scene, and by inducing reliance upon the protection of Individual Defendants and lulling Plaintiff into a false sense of security, Individual Defendants created a special relationship and owed Plaintiff a legal duty to use reasonable care for the safety of Plaintiff. . .” (Compl. ¶¶ 17-18, 24.)

The Court finds that the Complaint alleges facts showing that Plaintiff’s injuries were not merely a result of Gonzalez’s inaction, but a result of his affirmative request that Plaintiff stand and wait in Lane One, where the accident occurred. Therefore, the Complaint alleges that Gonzalez had a special relationship with Plaintiff that created a duty of reasonable care.

Accordingly, Defendants’ Demurrer to the Complaint is OVERRULED.

 

DATED:  October 13, 2022             _______________________                  

Hon. Robert S. Draper 

Judge of the Superior Court