Judge: Robert S. Draper, Case: 22STCV17377, Date: 2022-10-13 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV17377 Hearing Date: October 13, 2022 Dept: 78
Superior Court of
California
County of Los Angeles
Department 78
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CHRISTOPHER JOSE ACOSTA, Plaintiff, vs. CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL, et al, Defendants |
Case
No.: |
22STCV17377 |
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Hearing
Date: |
October
13, 2022 |
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[TENTATIVE]
RULING RE: Defendants california highway
patrol and officer aaron gonzalez’s demurrer to the complaint. |
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Defendants California Highway Patrol and Officer Aaron
Gonzalez’s Demurrer to the Complaint is OVERRULED.
Defendants have thirty days to answer.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This is an action for negligence. The Complaint alleges as
follows.
Plaintiff Christopher Jose Acosta (“Plaintiff”) is a tow
truck operator. (Compl. ¶ 9.) On February 2, 2022, Plaintiff was dispatched to
the scene of a car collision after Plaintiff’s employer received a call from
the responding officer, Defendant Aaron Gonzalez (“Gonzalez”). (Ibid.) Gonzalez
was an employee of Defendant California Highway Patrol (“CHP” and with
Gonzalez, “Defendants”). (Ibid)
Gonzalez made little effort to block or close off the left
shoulder of the freeway, where the subject vehicle was located. (Compl. ¶ 12.)
Gonzalez told Plaintiff to stand in the number one lane, close to the left
shoulder. (Compl. ¶ 17.) Shortly thereafter, a vehicle traveling along the left
shoulder struck Plaintiff. (Compl. ¶ 18.)
PROCEDURAL
HISTORY
On May 25, 2022, Plaintiff filed the Complaint asserting a
single cause of action for Negligence.
On July 11, 2022, Defendants filed the instant Demurrer to
the Complaint.
On September 12, 2022, Plaintiff filed an Opposition.
On October 4, 2022, Defendants filed a Reply.
DISCUSSION
I.
DEMURRER
Defendants demur to the
single cause of action pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10(e).
A court should sustain a demurrer
if a complaint does not allege facts that are legally sufficient to constitute
a cause of action. (CCP § 430.10, subd. (e).) As the Supreme Court
held in Blank v. Kirwan (1985) Cal.3d 311: “We treat the
demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions,
deductions or conclusions of fact or law. . . . Further, we give the
complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in
their context.” (Id. at p. 318; see also Hahn. v. Mirda (2007)
147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747 [“A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the
evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects
appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.
[Citation.]”)
“In determining whether the
complaint is sufficient as against the demurrer … if on consideration of all
the facts stated it appears the plaintiff is entitled to any relief at the
hands of the court against the defendants the complaint will be held good
although the facts may not be clearly stated.” (Gressley v. Williams (1961)
193 Cal.App.2d 636, 639.)
A demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend
if the complaint, liberally construed, can state a cause of action under any
theory or if there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by
amendment. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 31 Cal.4th at
p. 1081.) The demurrer also may be sustained without leave to amend where the
nature of the defects and previous unsuccessful attempts to plead
render it probable plaintiff cannot state a cause of action. (Krawitz
v. Rusch (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 957, 967.)
A.
First
Cause of Action - Negligence
Defendants demur to the first and only cause of action for
negligence.
To plead a cause of action for negligence, one must allege (1) a legal
duty owed to plaintiffs to use due care; (2) breach of duty; (3) causation; and
(4) damage to plaintiff. (County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
(2006) 137 Cal. App. 4th 292, 318.) “In California, negligence may be pleaded
in general terms. (Landeros v. Flood (1976) 17 Cal.3d 399, 407-408.)
Here, Defendants argue that the Complaint fails to state facts alleging
that Gonzalez owed a duty to Plaintiff. Defendants note that Gonzalez, like all
CHP Officers, does not have an affirmative duty to make all accident locations
entirely safe, just as he does not have an affirmative duty to affirmatively
stop law-breaking drivers from speeding on a median next to an accident. (Davidson
v. City of Westminster (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197, 209.)
Defendants note that the Complaint alleges a “special relationship,” but
provides no facts to support it. Defendants contend that a special relationship
can be established only where the officer creates, contributes to, or increases
the risk of harm or harm presented. (Minch v. Department of California
Highway Patrol (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 895, 904.) Defendants
argue that the Complaint does not state any facts demonstrating that Gonzalez
made Plaintiff’s situation worse, rather than failing to make it better.
In Opposition, Plaintiff argues that the Complaint alleges facts
demonstrating that Gonzalez did, in fact, place Gonzalez in an unsafe position that
resulted in his injury. Plaintiff argues that by asking Plaintiff to stand in
Lane One, an unsecured lane close to the accident, Gonzalez increased the risk
of harm to Plaintiff.
Indeed, the Complaint alleges that “Plaintiff was motioned by CHP
Officer Gonzalez to stand in a specific location in the number one lane close
to the shoulder by Officer Gonzalez”; that “immediately after Plaintiff moved
to stand and wait at the location pursuant to Officer Gonzalez’ direction, a
vehicle that was driving in the left shoulder at a high rate of speed slammed
into vehicles at the scene and Plaintiff, himself, was struck”; and that by
“voluntarily undertaking and specifically directing Plaintiff at the accident
scene, and by inducing reliance upon the protection of Individual Defendants
and lulling Plaintiff into a false sense of security, Individual Defendants
created a special relationship and owed Plaintiff a legal duty to use
reasonable care for the safety of Plaintiff. . .” (Compl. ¶¶ 17-18, 24.)
The Court finds that the Complaint alleges facts showing that
Plaintiff’s injuries were not merely a result of Gonzalez’s inaction, but a
result of his affirmative request that Plaintiff stand and wait in Lane One,
where the accident occurred. Therefore, the Complaint alleges that Gonzalez had
a special relationship with Plaintiff that created a duty of reasonable care.
Accordingly, Defendants’ Demurrer to the Complaint is OVERRULED.
DATED: October 13, 2022 _______________________
Hon. Robert S. Draper
Judge of the Superior Court