Judge: Robert S. Draper, Case: BC672825, Date: 2022-08-02 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: BC672825 Hearing Date: August 2, 2022 Dept: 78
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles
Department 78
JEE
HOON CHOI, Plaintiff, vs. ROMY TIFFANIE HAN, et al. Defendants. |
Case
No.: |
BC672825 |
Hearing
Date: |
August 2,
2022 |
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[TENTATIVE] RULING RE: CROSS-DEFENDANT JEE JOON CHOI’S
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS. |
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ROMY TIFFANIE HAN, an individual, Cross-Complainant, vs. JEE JOON CHOI, et al. Cross-Defendants. |
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Cross-Defendant
Jee Joon Choi’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED.
Cross-Complainant is granted thirty days leave to file a First Amended
Cross-Complaint.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This
is an action for fraud. The First Amended Complaint alleges as follows. Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant
Jee Hoon Choi (“Choi”) is the brother of the late Jee Hyun Han (“Decedent”),
who died in October 2016 with assets. (FAC ¶¶ 8-10.) Choi owns and operates a
company in Hong Kong and formed a company in Korea named Dong In Ga. (FAC ¶
13.) Defendant/Cross-Complainant Romy Tiffanie Han (“Han”) has filed numerous
lawsuits in Korea attempting to take control of Choi’s company and has created
a fraudulent will and living trust on Decedent’s behalf to try to take Choi’s
company assets in Korea. (FAC ¶¶ 11-12.) The Complaint alleges that Han is
using the fraudulent will and living trust in the US probate court system to
influence the courts in Korea and take Choi’s corporate interests. (FAC ¶ 16.)
The
Cross-Complaint alleges that Choi is working with Non-Party Young Eun Choi
(“Young”) to divert funds away from Han for their own benefit. (XC ¶ 8.) Jee
and Young have “engaged in specific actions to interfere with [Han’s] efforts
to marshal [Decedent’s] assets in Korea, and receive all income derived
therefrom, as she is obligated to do and report in the Probate Matter.” (XC ¶
9.)
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 18, 2017, Choi filed the original
Complaint alleging a single cause of action for fraud.
On September 8, 2017, Choi filed the First Amended
Complaint alleging the same cause of action for fraud.
On November 29, 2017, Han filed the
Cross-Complaint asserting fifteen causes of action:
1.
Fraud;
2.
Conversion;
3.
Conspiracy to Commit Fraud;
4.
Prima Facie Tort;
5.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress;
6.
Intentional Interference with
Contract;
7.
Intentional Interference with
Prospective Economic Advantage;
8.
Negligent Interference with
Prospective Economic Advantage;
9.
Unfair Competition;
10. Unjust Enrichment;
11. Imposition of Constructive Trust;
12. Accounting;
13. Negligence;
14. Breach of Fiduciary Duty; and
15. Tortious Interference with Expected Inheritance.
On February 1, 2018, Choi filed an Answer to the
XC.
On December 11, 2018, Han filed an Answer to the
Complaint.
On May 19, 2021, this Court granted Han’s Motion
for Summary Judgment.
On June 15, 2021, this Court entered judgment.
On August 12, 2021, Choi filed a Notice of Appeal.
On July 11, 2022, Choi filed the instant Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings.
On July 20, 2022, Han filed an Opposition.
On July 26, 2022, Choi filed a Reply.
DISCUSSION
I.
MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
A
defendant may file a motion for judgment on the pleadings after filing an
answer and the time to demur has expired. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438(f)(2).) A
defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the
“complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action
against that defendant.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438(c)(1)(B)(ii).)
Thus,
the standard for ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings is
essentially the same as that applicable to a general demurrer, that is, under
the state of the pleadings, together with matters that may be judicially
noticed, it appears that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Bezirdjian v.
O'Reilly (2010) 183
Cal.App.4th 316, 321-322.) Matters which are subject to mandatory judicial
notice may be treated as part of the complaint and may be considered without
notice to the parties. Matters which are subject to permissive judicial notice
must be specified in the notice of motion, the supporting points and
authorities, or as the court otherwise permits. (Ibid.)
Judgment
on the pleadings must be denied where there are material factual issues that
require evidentiary resolution. The judge hearing the motion cannot consider
discovery admissions or other evidence controverting the pleadings. Rather, the
pleading under attack must be accepted as true. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438(d); Gerawan
Farming, Inc. v. Lyons (2000) 24 Cal.4th 468, 515-516; Lance Camper Mfg.
Corp. v. Republic Indem. Co. of America (1996)
44 Cal.App.4th 194, 198; Cloud v. Northrop Grumman. Corp. (1998) 67
Cal.App.4th 995, 999.)
A
motion for judgment on the pleadings may be granted with or without leave to
file an amended complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438(h)(1).) If the former, the
court shall grant 30 days to the party against whom the motion was granted to
file an amended complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438(h)(2).) Leave to amend
should be granted if there is any reasonable possibility that plaintiff can
state good cause of action. (Eckler v. Neutrogena Corporation (2015) 238
Cal.App.4th 433.) Leave to amend a complaint is entrusted to the sound
discretion of the trial court. (Haley v. Dow Lewis Motors, Inc. (1999)
72 Cal.App.4th 497.)
Similar
to where a demurrer is sustained, the
plaintiff “has the burden of proving the possibility of cure by amendment.” (Czajkowski
v. Haskell & White, LLP (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 166, 173, quoting Grinzi v.
San Diego Hospice Corp.
(2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 72, 78-79, internal quotations omitted.)
Here,
Choi moves for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Han does not have
standing to bring the action in her individual capacity. Choi notes that upon a
decedent’s death, the right to bring a claim or an action lies with the
personal representative. (Holland v. Knight (1917) 177 Cal. 507.) Choi
contends that, though the Cross-Complaint alleges that Han has been appointed
as the sole executor of Decedent’s will in the probate matter (XC at p.2), the
action was brought by Han in her individual capacity. Accordingly, Choi argues,
Han does not have standing to bring the Cross-Complaint, and his Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings must be granted.
In
opposition, Han makes two arguments.
1. Individual Harm
First,
Han argues that the Motion should be denied, as the Cross-Complaint repeatedly
alleges harm caused to Han as an individual, not just to the Estate. However,
as Choi notes in the Reply, while the Complaint does allege damage to Han as an
individual, the factual allegations preceding those individual damage claims
clearly indicate that the harm caused to Han is related to disputes over the
Estate, not to her as an individual.
Moreover,
the Cross-Complaint alleges that this “matter arises out of a deceptive,
shameful, and manipulative scheme by cross-defendant, who are aunt and uncle of
[Han], to deprive [Han] of her inheritance from her biological mother in the
approximate sum of $61,000,000 and to divert such assets for their own benefit.
(XC at p. 2.) Accordingly, it is clear that the gravamen of the Cross-Complaint
relates to harm caused to Decedent’s estate, rather than to Han as an
individual.
2. Probate Code Section 850
Next,
Han argues that she has standing to bring the Cross-Complaint pursuant to Probate
Code Section 850.
Probate Code sections 850 to 859,
of division 2, part 19, govern conveyances or transfers of property claimed to
belong to a decedent or other person. (Estate of Kraus (2010) 184
Cal.App.4th 103, 110.) In other words, Prob C § 850, et seq., provides a mechanism
for court determination of rights in property claimed to belong to a decedent
or another person. (Estate of Young (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 62, 75.)
Probate Code section 850 permits, for example, the personal representative or
any interested person to file a petition in probate requesting a court order
when a decedent died in possession of, or holding title to, real or personal
property, and the property or some interest therein is claimed to belong to
another. (Prob C § 850(a)(2)(C); Estate of Yool (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th
867, 873 – 874.)
As Choi notes in his reply, Han is not
petitioning the Court for adjudication of adverse claims to Decedent’s
property, but rather alleging that Choi is interfering with her role as
executor of Decedent’s estate, so section 850 does not apply.
3.
Leave to Amend
Finally,
Han asks that, should the instant motion be granted, she is granted leave to
amend to bring the Cross-Complaint as the representative for Decedent’s estate.
In
response, Choi argues that leave to amend is improper. Choi contends that the
statute of limitations has run, and that adding Han as a representative of the
estate would “seek to enforce an independent right or impose greater liability
upon the defendant,” therefore not relating back to the original
Cross-Complaint. (Reply at p. 6; quoting Bartalo v. Sup.Ct (1975) 51
Cal.App.3d 526, 533.)
However,
Cox v. San Joaquin Light & Power Corp. ((1917) 33 Cal.App. 522), is
on point here.
In Cox,
plaintiff brought a wrongful death claim against her former husband’s employer
as an individual. Two years later, she sought leave to amend the Complaint,
seeking only to set forth that plaintiff was the administratix of her former
husband’s complaint, and that she brought suit in that capacity. (Cox,
33 Cal.App, 523.) Defendant opposed, arguing that the amendment would be a
fundamental change of the cause of action. The trial court granted leave to
amend. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding:
[T]he
change effected by the amendment is obviously in no just sense the bringing of
a new action. It is one of form rather than of substance, and in the interests
of justice is to be treated as such, rather than to adopt a view which would
result in an irretrievable bar to all remedy. Under the modern doctrine, the
discretionary power of the court to such end is to be liberally exerted in
favor of, rather than against, the disposition of a case upon its merits; and
[the court] is entirely satisfied after further examination of the question
induced by the reargument that. . . the defect involved is one which may be
cured by amendment. (Cox, 33 Cal.App, 527.)
Here,
as in Cox, amending the Cross-Complaint to be brought by Han in her
representative capacity is a question of form that in no way affects Choi’s legal
rights. Forbidding that amendment due to procedural questions would be contrary
to the interests of justice.
Finally,
the Court notes that, even were Cox not directly on point, Choi’s
invocation of the statute of limitations nearly four years after he filed an
Answer to the same pleading clearly constitutes good cause for equitable
estoppel. As such, leave to amend would be granted even without Cox.
Accordingly,
Cross-Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED.
Cross-Complainant is granted thirty days to file a First Amended
Cross-Complaint brought in her representative capacity.
DATED: August 2, 2022 ________________________
Hon. Robert S. Draper
Judge
of the Superior Court