Judge: Robert S. Draper, Case: BC680322, Date: 2023-02-14 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: BC680322    Hearing Date: February 14, 2023    Dept: 78

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 78

 

ARTHUR TSATRYAN,

Plaintiff,

          vs.

POLINA TSATRYAN, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.:

BC680322

Hearing Date:

February 14, 2023

[TENTATIVE] RULING RE:

plaintiff arthur tsatryan’s motion to continue trial.  

Plaintiff Arthur Tsatryan’s Motion to Continue Trial is DENIED.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This is an action for fraud, defamation, and wrongful eviction arising out of a family dissolution matter. The Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) alleges as follows.

On June 20, 2017, Defendant Polina Tsatryan (“Defendant”) filed a Complaint in Family Court alleging that Plaintiff Arthur Tsatryan (“Plaintiff”) fraudulently transferred property. (SAC ¶ 6.) Despite lacking jurisdiction to hear Defendant’s Fraud Cause of Action, the Family Court ruled in Defendant’s favor and ordered Plaintiff to pay Defendant’s legal fees. (SAC ¶ 7.) Because Plaintiff did not have the funds to cover Defendant’s legal expenses, Defendant conspired with co-defendants to fraudulently obtain the money from Plaintiff’s family and friends. (Ibid.) Additionally, Defendants conspired to defame Plaintiff and to cause him severe emotional damage. (SAC ¶ 8.)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 20, 2017, Plaintiff filed the original Complaint.

On March 20, 2018, Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint asserting six causes of action:

1.    Fraud;

2.    Libel Per Se;

3.    Defamation;

4.    Conspiracy;

5.    Wrongful Eviction; and

6.    Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.

On October 9, 2018, Plaintiff filed the operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) alleging nine causes of action:

1.    Fraud;

2.    Libel per se;

3.    Defamation;

4.    Conspiracy;

5.    Wrongful Eviction;

6.    Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress;

7.    Punitive Damages;

8.    Equitable relief; and

9.    Declaratory Relief.

On February 16, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.

On November 3, 2022, the Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

On December 27, 2022, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Continue Trial Date.

No Opposition has been filed.

DISCUSSION

      I.          MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL DATE

Plaintiff Arthur Tsatryan moves to continue the trial date; trial is currently set for February 27, 2023.

Trial dates are firm to ensure prompt disposition of civil cases. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(a).) Continuances are thus generally disfavored. (See Id. rule 3.1332(b).) Nevertheless, the trial court has discretion to continue trial dates. (Hernandez v. Superior Court (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1246.) Each request for continuance must be considered on its own merits and is granted upon an affirmative showing of good cause. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(c); Hernandez, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at 1246.) Circumstances that may indicate good cause include: (1) the unavailability of an essential lay or expert witness due to death, illness, or other excusable circumstances; (2) the unavailability of a party due to death, illness, or other excusable circumstances; (3) the unavailability of trial counsel due to death, illness, or other excusable circumstances; (4) the substitution of trial counsel where there is an affirmative showing that the substitution is required in the interests of justice; (5) the addition of a new party if (A) the new party has not had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery and prepare for trial, or (B) the other parties have not had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery and prepare for trial in regard to the new party’s involvement in the case; (6) a party’s excused inability to obtain essential testimony, documents, or other material evidence despite diligent efforts; or (7) a significant, unanticipated change in the status of the case as a result of which the case is not ready for trial. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(c).) 

The court must also consider such relevant factors as: (1) the proximity of the trial date; (2) whether there was any previous continuance, extension of time, or delay of trial caused by any party; (3) the length of the continuance requested; (4) the availability of alternative means to address the problem that gave rise to the motion or application for a continuance; (5) the prejudice that parties or witnesses will suffer as a result of the continuance; (6) if the case is entitled to a preferential trial setting, the reasons for that status and whether the need for a continuance outweighs the need to avoid delay; (7) the court’s calendar and the impact of granting a continuance on other pending trials; (8) whether trial counsel is engaged in another trial; (9) whether all parties have stipulated to a continuance; (10) whether the interests of justice are best served by a continuance, by the trial of the matter, or by imposing conditions on the continuance; and (11) any other fact or circumstance relevant to the fair determination of the motion or application. (Id. rule 1.1332(d).) 

Here, Plaintiff makes two arguments as to why the trial date should be continued.

First, Plaintiff contends that it is an abuse of this Court’s discretion to set trial before the termination of the five-year limitation provided by Code of Civil Procedure section 583.310.

Section 583.310 provides that “[a]n action shall be brought to trial within five years after the action is commenced against the defendant.” Section 583.360 states that “[a]n action shall be dismissed by the court on its own motion or on motion of the defendant, after notice to the parties, if the action is not brought to trial within the time prescribed in this article.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 583.360(a).)  

 

“In computing the time within which an action must be brought to trial pursuant to this article, there shall be excluded the time during which any of the following conditions existed: (a) The jurisdiction of the court to try the action was suspended [;] (b) Prosecution or trial of the action was stayed or enjoined[;] [or] (c) Bringing the action to trial, for any other reason, was impossible, impracticable, or futile. (Code Civ. Proc., § 583.340.) 

Plaintiff argues that, as the instant action was stayed between January 19, 2019, and November 17, 2021, Plaintiff has only been prosecuting the action for roughly 1.5 years under section 583.310. Accordingly, Plaintiff, contends, the Court is powerless to set the action for trial prior to the termination of that five-year date.

Plaintiff’s argument is incorrect. Section 583.310 requires that a plaintiff bring a case to trial within five years of the filing of the Complaint, not that a Court must allow a plaintiff all five years before it sets trial.

Indeed, as California courts have repeatedly noted, “a trial court must be accorded wide latitude in the exercise of discretion to control and regulate its own calendar.” (Maximum Technology v. Superior Court (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 935, 937.) “The Trial Court Delay Reduction Act mandates trial courts to resolve matters before them as expeditiously as possible, in recognition that delay reduces the chance that justice will in fact be done and often imposes severe emotional and financial hardship on the litigants.” (Moyal v. Lanphear (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 491, 497.)

While the Court acknowledges and agrees that Plaintiff has not exceeded the five-year limitation mandated by section 583.310, this fact does not render the Court powerless to set trial for an earlier date in the interest of justice and judicial efficiency.

Next, Plaintiff contends that the trial date should be continued as Defendant has been dilatory or outright refused to respond to discovery requests, and the Court has insufficiently considered Plaintiff’s attempts to compel Defendant’s responses.

However, Plaintiff fails to assert what diligent efforts Plaintiff made to obtain the subject discovery in the 510[1] days that the action has been pending. Moreover, Plaintiff fails to acknowledge the other factors that the Court is obligated to consider when ruling on a Motion to Continue Trial Date.

Here, there is 1) no evidence of the unavailability of an essential lay or expert witness; 2) a substantial delay in prosecution of the instant action due to the simultaneous prosecution of a related manner in Family Court; 3) no specific length of continuance requested; 4) extreme prejudice to the parties involved should a continuance be granted, as the two parties have been locked in litigation of some manner for over a decade; 5) backlogs in this Court’s docket due to the COVID-19 pandemic; 6) no evidence that either party is involved in simultaneous active litigation; 7) no stipulation from Defendant that a continuance is proper or preferred; and, 8) no other facts demonstrating that a continuance is warranted or necessary.

Simply put, the Court has discretion to maintain its calendar, and is obligated to do so with judicial efficiency and fairness to all parties in mind. The Court will not further continue a trial and extend a dispute that has been in active litigation for over a decade simply because Plaintiff wishes to exhaust the entirety of his five-year limitation in bringing the action to trial.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Continue Trial Date is DENIED.

 

 

 

DATED: February 14, 2023            

______________________________

Hon. Robert S. Draper

Judge of the Superior Court



[1] The 510-day calculation is provided by Plaintiff as of December 28, 2022.