Judge: Robert S. Draper, Case: BC711352, Date: 2022-10-18 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: BC711352 Hearing Date: October 18, 2022 Dept: 78
Superior
Court of California
County
of Los Angeles
Department
78
|
DELINDA W.
SMITH, Plaintiff; vs. KIA MOTORS AMERICA INC, Defendant. |
Case No.: |
BC711352 |
|
Hearing
Date: |
October
18, 2022 |
|
|
[TENTATIVE]
RULING RE: Plaintiff
delinda w. smith’s motion for leave to amend complaint; plaintiff delinda w.
smith’s motion to tax costs. |
||
Plaintiff Delinda W. Smith’s Motion for Leave
to File a First Amended Complaint is GRANTED. Plaintiff has thirty days
to file the First Amended Complaint.
Plaintiff Delinda W. Smith’s Motion to Tax
Costs is GRANTED as final judgment has not been entered.
FACTUAL
BACKGROUND
This is an action under the Song-Beverly Act.
The Complaint alleges as follows. In October 2015, Plaintiff Delinda W. Smith
(“Smith”) purchased a used KIA Rio (“Subject Vehicle”) that had a balance
remaining on its express written warranty. (Compl. ¶¶ 6-7.) The Subject Vehicle
had 20,744 miles on its odometer at the time of purchase. (Defendant KIA
America, Inc.’s Statement of Stipulated Facts, ¶ 2.) At the time of the initial
sale, KIA sold the Subject Vehicle with a 5-year, 60,000 mile warranty, and a
Limited Powertrain Warranty that also lasted for 5 years, and 60,000 miles.
(Id., ¶¶ 4-6.) During the warranty period, the vehicle developed several
defects, which Defendant KIA Motors America Inc. (“KIA”) was unable to repair.
(Compl. ¶ 8.)
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 22, 2018, Smith filed the Complaint
asserting five causes of action:
1.
Violation of Subdivision
(D) of Civil Code Section 1793.2;
2.
Violation of
Subdivision (B) of Civil Code Section 1793.2;
3.
Violation of
Subdivision (A)(3) of Civil Code Section 1793.2;
4.
Breach of
Express Written Warranty; and,
5.
Breach of the
Implied Warranty of Merchantability
On April 29, 2022, KIA filed a Brief Regarding
Used Car Remedies Under the Beverly-Song Act (“Motion for Non-Suit” or
“Motion”). The Motion discusses the recent Rodriguez decision, which KIA argues
precludes Smith’s claim.
On May 4, 2022, the Court held the Final Status
Conference. At this hearing, the Court recognized that KIA’s Brief essentially
operated as a Motion for Non-Suit and ordered the parties to file a timely
Opposition and Reply for the Court’s consideration.
On May 18, 2022, Smith filed the instant Motion
for Leave to File a First Amended Complaint.
On June 20, 2022, the Court granted KIA’s
Motion for Non-Suit as to all claims brought under the Song-Beverly Act but
recognized that Smith still had the instant Motion for Leave to Amend pending,
and therefore judgment was not entered.
On July 1, 2022, KIA filed a Memorandum of
Costs.
On July 20, 2022, Smith filed the instant
Motion to Tax Costs.
On October 5, 2022, KIA filed an Opposition to
Smith’s Motion to Tax Costs.
On October 11, 2022, Smith filed a Reply.
DISCUSSION
I.
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT
Smith moves for leave to file a First Amended Complaint.
When a party moves to amend a pleading, “courts generally should
permit amendment to the complaint at any stage of the proceedings, up to and
including trial. [Citations.]” (Melican v. Regents of University of
California (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 168, 175.) In ruling on this type of
motion, prejudice to another party is the main concern. (Hirsa v. Superior
Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486.) The type of
prejudice the court is to be concerned with should be something beyond simply
having to cope with a potentially successful new legal theory of recovery that
has been revealed during discovery. (Ibid.) Instead, the court should
look for delays in the trial date, loss of critical evidence, extensive
increase in the costs of preparation and other similar circumstances that
create prejudice to another party. (Melican, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at
p. 176.)
Here, Smith seeks to add a cause of
action under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (“MMWA”). (Tomas Decl. ¶ 14.) Smith
argues that the amendment is necessary, as, when the Motion was filed, KIA’s
Motion for Nonsuit regarding Rodriguez’s affect on used car sales under
the Song-Beverly Act was pending and was potentially fatal to their claim.
Smith contends that the Rodriguez decision represents new and
unforeseeable facts, as it clarified that used cars sold with a balance
remaining on their original warranties, such as Smith’s, do not qualify for
remedy under the Song-Beverly Act.
Smith contends that this same issue
was addressed in Dagher v. Ford Motor Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th
905. In Dagher, plaintiff brought a claim against defendant dealership
under the Song-Beverly Act. The trial court granted summary judgment as to the
Song-Beverly Act claims, as plaintiff’s vehicle was used and purchased from a
private retailer. However, the Dagher Court reversed the trial court’s
denial of plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend the complaint to add a cause of
action under MMWA, finding that “Plaintiff admittedly has some viable cause of
action under Magnuson-Moss, and this record supports a conclusion that the
trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to amend the current
complaint.” (Dagher at p. 928.)
In Opposition, KIA argues first
that the instant Motion is untimely, as it was filed years into litigation, and
just before a hearing on a dispositive motion. However, Smith filed the motion
days after KIA filed its bench brief regarding Rodriguez, and months
after the Rodriguez decision was issued. Accordingly, the motion is not
untimely.
Next, KIA argues that Plaintiff’s
reliance on Dagher is unavailing, as Dagher should have put
Plaintiff on notice that the MMWA claims were available to be plead from the
beginning. However, the Court finds that the situation in Dagher is
substantially similar to here, and that Plaintiff’s delay in including the MMWA
claim in the initial Complaint has already been addressed above.
Finally, KIA argues that the MMWA
causes are futile, as they are predicated on the Song Beverly Act causes that
have already been dismissed. Additionally, KIA objects to the new cause on
privity grounds, and argues that Plaintiff fails to state a cause of action
under MMWA.
While these are compelling
arguments, California Courts’ preferred practice is to permit the amendment and
allow the parties to test its legal sufficiency by demurrer, motion for judgment
on the pleadings, or other appropriate proceedings. (Kittredge Sports Co. v.
Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1048.)
The Court finds that the delay in
making the proposed amendments is justified due to the Rodriguez decision.
Additionally, as the MMWA causes are brought under the same facts as the
initial Song-Beverly causes, there will not need to be extensive discovery and
prejudice to KIA is minimal. Because of this, and because of the Court’s
obligation to grant leave to amend liberally, Smith’s Motion for Leave to File
a First Amended Complaint is GRANTED.
Smith is to file the First Amended
Complaint within thirty days.
II.
MOTION TO TAX COSTS
As no final judgment has been
entered, and the case proceeds with the Second Amended Complaint, KIA’s
Memorandum of Costs is moot. Accordingly, Smith’s Motion to Strike Costs is GRANTED.
DATED: October 18, 2022
___________________________
Hon.
Robert S. Draper
Judge
of the Superior Court