Judge: Ronald F. Frank, Case: 19STCV27545, Date: 2023-04-27 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 19STCV27545 Hearing Date: April 27, 2023 Dept: 8
Tentative Ruling¿¿
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HEARING DATE: April 27, 2023¿¿
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CASE NUMBER: 19STCV27545
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CASE NAME: Mihwa Kim, et
al. v. Prime Pan-Pacific Co., et al.
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MOVING PARTY: Defendant, Prime Pan-Pacific C
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RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs,
Wihwa Kim, Kwangwoo Kim, and Kwang Hee Kim
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TRIAL DATE: July 31, 2023
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MOTION:¿ (1) Motion to Compel Further
Responses to Requests for Production, Set One
(2)
Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set One
Tentative Rulings: (1) Defendant’s
Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production, Set One is
DENIED
(2)
Defendant’s Motion to Compel Special Interrogatories, Set One is GRANTED
in part, DENIED in part
(3)
The motions for monetary sanction are denied
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I. BACKGROUND¿¿¿
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A. Factual¿¿¿
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On
August 6, 2019, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint. Plaintiffs’ operative First
Amended Complaint (“FAC”) was filed on January 5, 2021. Plaintiffs allege the
following facts. Plaintiffs’ decedent was a pedestrian operating a wheelchair.
On December 13, 2017, Plaintiffs’ decedent was killed when a semi-trailer truck
ran him over in the street. Defendant, Prime Pan-Pacific Company illegally
blocked the sidewalk with a customer’s vehicle, which forced Plaintiffs’
decedent onto the downward slope of the driveway apron where he lost control
and ended up in the street. The original Complaint alleged two causes of action
for General Negligence and Motor Vehicle Negligence. In the FAC, Plaintiffs
alleges the following causes of action: (1) Negligence; (2) Premises Liability;
(3) Wrongful Death; and (4) Discrimination in Violation of Civil Code § 52.
Defendant’s
motions state that on January 20, 2023, Defendant served Plaintiff with
Requests for Production (Set One), and Special Interrogatories, Set One.
Defendant further notes it gave an extension to Plaintiffs to provide responses
on February 28, 2023, but Plaintiff failed to serve a timely response and
served their responses to the discovery requests on March 1, 2023, the next
morning after the extended deadline. As such, Defendant contends that
Plaintiffs waived their objections and must provide full and complete responses
to the written discovery sets.
Based
on the above, Defendant has brought this Motion to Compel Further Responses to
Requests for Production, Set One and Special Interrogatories, Set One.
B. Procedural¿¿¿
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On March 23, 2023, Defendant filed these Motion to Compel
Further Responses to Requests for Production, Set One and Special
Interrogatories, Set One. On April 14, 2023, Plaintiffs filed oppositions. On
April 20, 2023, Defendant filed a reply brief.
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¿II. MEET AND CONFER ¿¿¿
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Defendant notes that on March 8, 2023, it sent Plaintiffs a
Meet and Confer letter, detailing Defendant’s position regarding Plaintiffs’
deficient responses and requesting Plaintiffs’ position regarding their decision
to supplement the responses. Defendant further notes that after several email
exchanges, the parties were unable to come to an agreement as of March 21,
2023.
¿III. ANALYSIS¿¿
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A.
Legal
Standard
“Unless otherwise limited by order
of the court in accordance with this title, any party may obtain discovery
regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter
involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in
that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code
of Civ. Proc. § 2017.010.) For discovery purposes, information is regarded as
relevant “if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case,
preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement thereof.” (City of Los
Angeles v. Superior Court (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 272, 288.)
A motion to compel further
responses to a demand for inspection or production of documents (“RFP”) may be
brought based on: (1) incomplete statements of compliance; (2) inadequate,
evasive, or incomplete claims of inability to comply; or (3) unmerited or
overly generalized objections. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(c).) A
motion to compel further production must set forth specific facts showing good
cause justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand. (See Code Civ.
Proc., § 2031.310(b)(1).) In Digital Music News LLC v Superior Court
(2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 216 at 224, the Court defined “good cause” as a showing
that there “a disputed fact that is of consequence in the action and the
discovery sought will tend in reason to prove or disprove that fact or lead to
other evidence that will tend to prove or disprove the fact.” If the
moving party has shown good cause for the requests for production, the burden
is on the objecting party to justify the objections. (Kirkland v. Sup.Ct
(2002) 95 Cal. App.4th 92, 98.)
Further,
“Any party may obtain
discovery . . . by propounding to any other party to the action written
interrogatories to be answered under oath.”¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.010,
subd. (a).)¿¿ “The party to whom
interrogatories have been propounded shall respond in writing under oath
separately to each interrogatory by any of the following: (1) An answer
containing the information sought to be discovered[;] (2) An exercise of the
party's option to produce writings[;] (3) An objection to the particular
interrogatory.”¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.210, subd. (a).)¿“On receipt of a
response to interrogatories, the propounding party may move for an order
compelling a further response if the propounding party deems that any of the
following apply: (1) An answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or
incomplete[;] (2) An exercise of the option to produce documents under Section
2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is
inadequate[;] (3) An objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too
general.”¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (a).)¿
"The court shall limit the scope
of discovery if it determines that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of
that discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought
will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." (Cal. Code of Civ.
Proc. § 2017.020(a).) Generally, objections on the ground of burden require the
objecting party to produce evidence of (a) the propounding party's subjective
intent to create burden or (b) the amount of time and effort it would take to
respond. (See West Pico Furniture Co. of Los Angeles v. Superior Court In
and For Los Angeles County (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417.) However, no such
evidence is necessary where discovery is obviously overbroad on its face. (See Obregon
v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 431.)
B.
Discussion
Here, Defendant notes that Plaintiffs have
answered several responses with meritless objections (SROGs 10-12; 40-48; and
49-51; and RFPs 17-18, and 20.) Defendant notes the discovery requests were
objected to on the basis that disclosure of any expert witness prior to any
demand for exchange of expert witness material is premature. Although Defendant
notes that normally, expert witness material may generally not be disclosed
before an expert witness exchange demand is propounded, since the work-product
doctrine protects such material, here the work-product doctrine cannot apply to
the expert witness’s report or site inspection – to which Plaintiffs
have referred in their Opposition to our Demurrer and Motion to Strike—since
the content of this report is at issue and relevant to the statute of
limitations issue and there is no other way of obtaining such information.
Specifically,
Defendant notes that according to the previous litigation on the demurrer and
motion to strike, the date at which Plaintiffs allegedly first became aware of
the basis for Defendants’ alleged liability is a key question for the statute
of limitations issue. As such, Defendant argues that it is impossible to
litigate this issue without at least some disclosure of the expert witness
material, including at least: information on the date the expert report was
delivered to Plaintiffs (with documents confirming this) and the expert
report’s conclusion regarding Defendants’ liability.
Motion
to Compel re Special Interrogatories: GRANTED in part, DENIED in part
In regards
to the Special Interrogatories, Set One, Plaintiff argues that further
responses to Special Interrogatories 10-12 should be denied because the
originals were sufficient and Defendant now only seeks premature disclosure of
expert discovery. Plaintiff notes that in Interrogatories 10-12, Defendant
asked for all facts (10), persons (11) and documents (12) that “in photographs
and video footage, the sidewalk apron and darkened with what appears to be oil
or grease or other contaminants.” Plaintiffs
further note that they responded that the only knowledge they have comes from the
police report and the accompanying footage (bodycam and a traffic light camera,
all of which they produced to Defendant. But that argument which paraphrased
the plaintiff’s discovery responses (subject to objection) is not sufficient as
a discovery response. “Answers must be
complete and responsive. Thus, it is not proper to answer by stating, “See my
deposition,” “See my pleading,” or “See the financial statement.” (Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84
Cal.App.3d 771, 783–784.) Here,
plaintiff’s response essentially says “see the police report” and “see the videos.” A more proper response would reference the
location and color of the stains on the apron, the proximity of a repair shop
and other vehicles, and the like. The further
response can be given without disclosing expert opinions or reports. The Court
GRANTS the motion to compel a further response to Rogs 10-12.
Next,
Plaintiffs argue in their oppositions, that further responses to special
interrogatories 47-51 should be denied because they were not supported by a
declaration for additional discovery. Plaintiffs note that Defendant’s
declaration only provided for special interrogatories to reach No. 46. In
reply, Defendant notes this was a typo, and his declaration meant to cover the
entire set of discovery. The Court
accepts defense counsel’s candid admission of a mistake or careless
typographical error, and finds given the context of the declaration for
additional discovery that counsel’s declaration was intended to cover the
entire set.
Lastly,
in opposition, Plaintiffs argue that further responses to interrogatories 40-48
should be denied because they invade the attorney-client privilege, attorney
work product, ask for premature disclosure of expert discovery and two are
unsupported by a declaration for additional discovery. Rogs 40-42 reference a
contention in a legal brief, not in a pleading or exhibit. Plaintiffs claim that they all share a “peculiar
phrasing” which does not simply seek information from Plaintiffs, but instead,
seek information from an opposition to a demurrer prepared, signed, and filed
by Plaintiffs’ counsel. Specifically: information that “support YOUR allegation
in the OPPOSITION that PLAINTIFFS did not know the DECEDENT ran over by a
semi-trailer truck was because DEFENDANT’S negligent, at the time of filing.”
Plaintiffs claim they objected in response and during the meet and confer
process because they argue the interrogatories seek the disclosure of
attorney-client communications and/or attorney work-product. The Court
concurs. A legal brief is not verified
by a party, sometimes contains hyperbole or argument, and cannot be the source of
a “contention” interrogatory the way that allegations in the Complaint or in an
Answer may permissibly inquire about. The
Court DENIES the motion to compel a further response to Rogs 40-42. Rogs 43-45 seeks facts, witnesses, and documents
pertaining to the police obtaining a report, audio, video, and related
materials from the Defendant. While the verified discovery response references
the documents produced, it misses the mark by failing to explain why Plaintiff contends
these materials were all obtained “from the Defendant.” The motion to compel a further response to Rogs
43-45 is GRANTED.
Rogs
46-51 seek the content of an expert report and other work product privileged information,
which is not discoverable at this point for the reasons discussed above. The mention of an expert report in a legal
brief is not tantamount to a waiver of the content of the report, at least not
prior to the time for expert designations.
The Motion to Compel as to those interrogatories is DENIED.
The
Motion to Compel Documents: DENIED.
In regard
to the Requests for Production, Set One, Plaintiff argues in opposition that
Request 17 and 18 should be denied because the originals were sufficient and
Defendants now only seek premature disclosure of expert discovery in violation
of CCP §2034.210(c). RFP 17 seeks production of the expert report,
which implicitly seeks the report of a consultant retained by counsel who may or
may not in the future be designated as an expert. The objection is proper as the RFP
specifically asks for premature disclosure of expert witness information, and
the defense has failed to carry its burden of invading the work product privilege
nor the privilege of delaying expert discovery until demand for exchange and disclosure
occur. Documents privileged under the attorney work product doctrine are exempt
for disclosure under the Discovery Act.
(League of Cal. Cities v. Superior Court (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th
976, 993.) CCP § 2034.230(b) permits a motion to order an
expert witness exchange on an earlier date, for good cause shown; such a motion
has not been filed as of yet.
California's
civil work product privilege is codified in section 2018.030. Derivative or interpretive material, such as
what is created by or derived from an attorney's work in evaluating the law or
facts—"constitutes work product. Examples of such material include ‘diagrams
prepared for trial, audit reports, appraisals, and other expert opinions,
developed as a result of the initiative of counsel in preparing for trial.’” (Coito v. Superior Court (2012) 54
Cal.4th 480, 488, quoting Mack v Superior Court (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 7,
10 [emphasis added].) Coito held that
“a witness statement obtained through an attorney-directed interview is, as a
matter of law, entitled to at least qualified work product protection.” (Coito, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 497.) When an attorney hires a consultant to attend
a site inspection and provide a report or statement as to what was observed or
measured or tested, the consultant’s report is work product subject to being
waived if and when the consultant is designated as an expert. The defense’s assertion that the consultant
report would reveal whether Does were timely added or not is speculative and by
itself does not show good cause for invading the qualified work product privilege.
RFP 18
seeks documents and communication relating to the site inspection conducted by
the expert. In Defendant’s reply brief,
it argues that there is no adequate substitution for the Expert Report and
Related Documents being sought in response to No. 17 and 18, again using its
good faith argument. The Court finds Defendant has failed to carry its burden
of demonstrating good cause to invade the work product protection given the expert
and consultant reports, pending the designation of experts.
Plaintiffs
further argue that Request 20 should be denied because Plaintiff already
responded that it would (and did) produce all documents in their possession,
custody and control. Defendant did not address this in its reply brief. RFP 20 seeks production of any documents, photographs
and the like produced to Plaintiff in response to subpoena. The Reply did not respond to Plaintiff’s
assertion that Plaintiff agreed to supplement and provide copies of the subpoenaed
documents.
C. Sanctions
Defendant requested sanctions in the sum of $750 against Plaintiffs
for each of the two motions. Sanctions are denied at this time. Each side had
substantial justification for its position.