II. ANALYSIS

Although continuances of trials are disfavored, each request for a continuance must be considered on its own merits.¿ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332, subd. (c).)¿ The Court may grant a continuance only on an affirmative showing of good cause requiring the continuance.¿ (Id.) The Court may look to the following factors in determining whether a trial continuance is warranted: (1) proximity of the trial date; (2) whether there was any previous continuance of trial due to any party; (3) the length of the continuance requested; (4) the availability of alternative means to address the problem that gave rise to the motion; (5) the prejudice that parties or witnesses will suffer as a result of the continuance; and (6) whether trial counsel is engaged in another trial.¿ (See generally, Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332, subd. (d)(1)-(11).)¿ Additionally, factors for the Court to consider include: a party’s excused inability to obtain essential testimony, documents, or other material evidence despite diligent efforts; the proximity of the trial date; whether all parties have stipulated to a continuance; and any other fact or circumstance relevant to the fair determination of the motion or application.¿ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(c), (d).)¿ 

 Nickell’s Motion to Continue Trial argues that he has recently added several subcontractors to the case, which the moving party claims were identified and named only after learning about them in discovery. Nickell also notes that one subcontractor (Fireplace Guys, which filed its Answer less than a week before this motion is being heard) has only just recently appeared. As such, Nickell contends that more time is needed to prepare for trial. Nickell further contends that two of the three attorneys have already stipulated to continue trial, but because Andrews has not stipulated, Nickell has filed this motion arguing that there is good cause to warrant a continuance of the trial date. Along with the above information, Nickell also argues that depositions that have been scheduled have not been completed, including the deposition of Plaintiff. Further, the depositions of Toby Andrews and Dominic Rouzaud were continued to March 2024 and Andrews is in the process of scheduling the deposition of Nickell which would not commence until April due to counsel’s schedule. Thus, Nickell contends good cause exists to grant his motion.  

In opposition, Cross-Defendant, Charles Toby Andrews dba Andrews General Construction (“Andrews”) files an opposition arguing that there is not good cause to grant this extension. First, Andrews argues that the “recently added” parties were already known by Fabian at least two years ago when they were identified in verified discovery responses. Andrews argues that Fabian’s delay in filing indemnity claims against these subcontractors does not justify a trial continuance by Nickell or Fabian, the two parties who have stipulated to yet another trial continuance. Andrews also argues that the moving papers do not provide any explanation as to why the parties need to prepare for trial as the  parties have already exchanged numerous sets of written discovery responses, filed dispositive motions, which the Court has ruled on, and taken key depositions with additional deposition noticed to take place in the near future.  

Second, Andrews argues that he will suffer prejudice as a result of any further continuance as he claims to have been wrongly implicated in this action and subjected to unnecessary financial burden and stress in having to defend the “sham” claims against him. Andrews further notes that despite the overwhelming evidence that Andrews never performed any work on Nickell’s home, was never paid by anyone in connection with any such work, and did not authorize any other persons to perform work under his license, Nickell refuses to dismiss Andrews. As such, Andrews argues that a further trial continuance will subject him to additional, unnecessary financial burden and stress.  

Third, Andrews asserts that the trial in this action has already been continued three times and thus already extensively delayed. Fourth, Andrews argues that no aspect of this case warrants four years of litigation and multiple trial continuances. Fifth, Andrews asserts that there are alternative means to address the purported issues by Nickell’s motions, such as severing Fabian’s cross-claims against various subcontractors for indemnity, contribution and declaratory relief. Sixth, Andrews argues that a forth continuance will only further frustrate judicial economy and efficiency and result in a further backlog of the Court’s calendar. Seventh, all parties have not stipulated to a continuance. Andrews highlights that the moving papers indicate that Andrews is the sole party that has not stipulated. However, Andrews clarifies that Nickell and Fabian are the only parties who have stipulated to a further continuance.  

As noted above, when deciding on whether to grant a trial continuance, California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1332 informs this Court that it may look at the following factors: (1) proximity of the trial date; (2) whether there was any previous continuance of trial due to any party; (3) the length of the continuance requested; (4) the availability of alternative means to address the problem that gave rise to the motion; (5) the prejudice that parties or witnesses will suffer as a result of the continuance; and (6) whether trial counsel is engaged in another trial. First, this motion is being heard three (3) months prior to the trial date on calendar. Second, there have already been three prior continuances. Third, Nickell’s request seeks a continuance of seven more months from June 24, 2024 to January 2025 without any detailed explanation as to why so long a fourth continuance is needed given the depositions being scheduled to be completed this Spring and this being the fourth requested trial continuance in a case filed 3-1/2 years ago.  

 Fourth, while Andrews argues that the issues in the cross-complaint can easily be severable, Nickell’s reply argues that severing the claims of Fabian does not address all of the issues requiring the continuance because the two added parties, Terry Huff and Bruce Huff were added as parties and the pleading is out for service. As such, Nickell contends that these two have nothing to do with the indemnity claims of Fabian and thus, Andrews’ proposal would not remedy all of the needs for the requested postponement. The Court notes that the Second Amended Cross-Complaint asserts a cause of action against Terry Huff for fraudulent inducement, and a claim for unjust enrichment against Bruce Huff.  There is not much detail as to why it has taken so long to identify the Huffs and add claims against them so late in the litigation, nor why they have not been served or appeared yet even though the latest cross-complaint was filed in November of 2023.