Judge Ronald F. Frank, Case Number: 20TRCV00847, Date: 2025-01-21 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Ronald F. Frank, Case: 20TRCV00847, Date: 2025-01-21 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20TRCV00847 Hearing Date: January 21, 2025 Dept: 8

Tentative Ruling

HEARING DATE: January 21, 2025

CASE NUMBER: 20TRCV00847

CASE NAME: DRAKK Holdings, LLC v. PSIP SN Vermont, LLC

MOVING PARTY: (1) Defendant, PSIP SN Vermont LLC

(2) Plaintiff, DRAKK Holdings, LLC

¿¿

RESPONDING PARTY: (1) Plaintiff, DRAKK Holdings, LLC

(2) Defendant, PSIP SN Vermont LLC

DISPOSED OF DATE: December 5, 2024 – Judgment on the Pleadings

MOTION:¿ (1) Defendant’s Motion for Award of Attorney Fees

(2) Plaintiff’s Motion to Tax Costs

Tentative Rulings: (1) GRANTED in reduced amounts after argument. The Court may need to take the fee motion under submission to perform calculations, but the tentative is to reduce the total fees to be awarded in the areas discussed below. The Court will also reduce the fee award by the amount previously awarded on the expungement motion.

(2) Plaintiff’s Motion to Tax Costs in the amount of $5,239.09 is granted; Defendant is ordered to submit a proposed order with the reduced total of costs to be awarded.

I. BACKGROUND¿

A. Factual

On November 17, 2020, Plaintiff DRAKK Holdings, LLC (“DRAKK”) filed this action against Defendant, PSIP SN Vermont, LLC (“PSIP”). On September 29, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint. On November 30, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) alleging cases of action for: (1) Specific Performance/Express Written Contract; (2) Specific Performance/Promissory Estoppel; (3) Specific Performance/Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (4) Promissory Estoppel and Money Damages; (5) Fraud & Deceit; and (6) Negligent Misrepresentation.¿

This case involves a dispute between Plaintiff DRAKK (buyer) and Defendant PSIP (seller), regarding a purchase and sale agreement (“PSA”) for real property. Plaintiff claims in its complaint that Defendant failed to complete the sale of its subdivided parcel under its PSA. Defendant asserts DRAKK failed to complete the purchase of the subdivided property because it did not have the funds in hand to pay the purchase price by the closing date, and that DRAKK’s claims to “financial ability” to borrow or sell assets to get the funds at some future time is not legal sufficient to prove DRAKK was “ready and able” to purchase on time.

On September 12, 2024, this Court heard Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, which had been scheduled and continued several times at DRAKK’s request. The Court signed the formal order granting the defense MSJ on November 13, 2024. On December 5, 2024, this Court entered judgment for Defendant. Now, Defendant files Motion for Attorney’s Fees. Additionally, Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Tax Costs.

B. Procedural

On December 16, 2024, Defendant filed a Motion for an Award of Attorney’s Fees. On January 7, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition brief. On January 13, 2025, Defendant filed a reply brief.

On January 3, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Tax Costs. On January 7, 2025, Defendant filed an opposition brief. On January 13, 2025, Plaintiff filed a reply brief.

¿II. ANALYSIS

A. Motion for Attorney’s Fees

i. Legal Standard

Attorney’s fees are recoverable when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10).)

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (a)(10), attorney fees when authorized by contract, statute or law are allowable as costs and may be awarded upon a noticed motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (c)(5).

Where a contract specifically provides for attorney’s fees and costs incurred to enforce the contract, attorney’s fees and costs must be awarded to the party who is determined to be the prevailing party on the contract. (Civ. Code., § 1717, subd. (a).) “Reasonable attorney’s fees shall be fixed by the court and shall be an element of the costs of suit.” (Ibid.)

A prevailing party is defined as follows:

(4) “Prevailing party” includes the party with a net monetary recovery, a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered, a defendant where neither plaintiff nor defendant obtains any relief, and a defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that defendant. If any party recovers other than monetary relief and in situations other than as specified, the “prevailing party” shall be as determined by the court, and under those circumstances, the court, in its discretion, may allow costs or not and, if allowed, may apportion costs between the parties on the same or adverse sides pursuant to rules adopted under Section 1034.

(Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (a)(4).)

In determining what fees are reasonable, California courts apply the “lodestar” approach. (See, e.g., Holguin v. DISH Network LLC (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1332.) This inquiry “begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (See PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) From there, the “[t]he lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.” (Ibid.) Relevant factors include: “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, [and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)

The party seeking fees has the burden of documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates. (City of Colton v. Singletary (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 751, 784.) This burden requires competent evidence as to the nature and value of the services rendered. (Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559.) A plaintiff’s verified billing invoices are prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses, and services listed were necessarily incurred. (Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682.)

ii. Discussion

Here, Defendant has filed a Motion for Attorney’s Fees seeking fees in the total amount of $861,612.70. Defendant contends that this total includes $849,612.70 in recoverable fees that Defendant incurred from the inception of this case, as well as, an estimated $12,000 in fees associated with the completion and filing of this motion and the fees associated with Plaintiff’s anticipated motion to tax costs. Defendant maintains that during litigation, primary counsel, Alan J. Droste (“Droste”) headed the defense effort supported by Michael A. Hill (“Hill”) and Brent D. Weiss (“Weiss”).. Further, Defendant and Droste assert that since early 2021, they relied on in-house legal representation by Jeffrey P. Matrullo (“Matrullo”). Moreover, in March 2024, PSIP and Droste also engaged Michael J. Sachs (“Sachs”) and Callahan & Blaine LLP to associate as co-counsel, in light of the then-continued date for trial and the prior continuances of the summary judgment.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Defendant over litigated the case, that Defendant’s fee request is unreasonable given the simple nature of the case, that duplicative and premature efforts among multiple attorneys inflated costs, and that previously adjudicated fees should be excluded. The Court discusses each below.

1. Litigation of the Case

Plaintiff first asserts that extensive time was spent in the pleading stage citing meritless motions and duplicative demurrers. Plaintiff notes that Defendant filed its first demurrer, which was overruled, on January 19, 2021. Plaintiff then explains that Defendant filed a motion to expunge lis pendens, for which PSIP claims 82.3 hours of work, despite reusing Defendant’s arguments from its first demurrer. Although Plaintiff concedes that the lis pendens motion was ultimately resolved in favor of Defendant, it did not resolve the case. Of course, motion practice does not need to resolve the case or even be successful to be the proper subject of a fee motion when that party prevails.

Defendant filed its second demurrer, claiming to have spent approximately 34.6 hours of attorney work on it. However, Plaintiff argues that the second demurrer was largely duplicative of the first. Defendant allegedly spent approximately 43.7 hours on a third demurrer, and ultimately filed a fourth demurrer. Plaintiff asserts that each of these filings revisited similar arguments and ultimately filed. Altogether, Plaintiff states that Defendant’s conduct during the initial pleading stage resulting in approximately 296 hours of attorney work.

While several demurrers and the expungement motion were successful, the successive demurrers present very similar arguments, suggestive that some of the work may have been duplicative or that the amounts sought appear to be excessive given the similarities between Plaintiff’s causes of action and Defendant’s arguments on demurrer as to those causes of action.

Next, Plaintiff argues that Defendant over-litigated this case through allegedly unnecessary discovery disputes. Plaintiff explains that Defendant’s alleged obstruction of legitimate discovery began with its refusal to provide dates for the deposition of its PMK, despite Plaintiff’s efforts to schedule the deposition. Plaintiff maintains that claimed obstruction necessitated Plaintiff in filing a successful ex parte application on July 22, 2021, to continue the hearing on Defendant’s motion to expunge lis pendens and necessitated an additional 10.2 hours from Defendant’s counsel in reviewing Plaintiff’s filing, drafting the opposition, attending the hearing, and ultimately compliance with the Court’s order requiring Defendant to comply with scheduling depositions. Plaintiff also takes issue with Defendant’s discovery practices in responding to Plaintiff’s propounded discovery. In Defendant’s reply brief, they assert that it was Plaintiff that failed to act appropriately during the discovery process.

The Court need not determine the Parties’ proper or improper uses of discovery but does review the hours spent on discovery, and the hourly rates sought during the discovery process. For example, Plaintiff emphasizes that Defendant is claiming 19.1 hours of attorney time in Defendant’s Motion to Quash Third-Party Subpoenas and 12.4 hours of attorney time in opposing Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel the Deposition of its PMK. While this Court does not believe that this case is straightforward or generic, the Court nonetheless finds that some of the claimed account of hours spent on discovery, discovery motions, and/or responsive discovery motions seems excessive.

2. Efforts among Multiple Attorneys

In Plaintiff’s opposition brief, Plaintiff states that Defendant’s claim for attorneys’ fees includes duplicative and premature efforts among multiple attorneys for Defendant.

Weiss and Hill

As to Mr. Weiss and Mr. Hill, Plaintiff argues that their fees should be discounted because they were not hired to enforce the contract. Plaintiff contends that Mr. Weiss and Mr. Hill identify themselves as working with Defendant on all transactional matters. (Weiss Decl., ¶ 1; Droste Decl., ¶ 8.) Plaintiff further explains that both the declarations of Mr. Droste and Mr. Weiss assert that they provided “litigation” support in this matter. However, Plaintiff argues that Mr. Weiss and Mr. Hill essentially acted as percipient witnesses to the original contract drafted by them, for and between Plaintiff and Defendant, with Mr. Weiss even charging for his time to attend his own deposition as a witness in August 2021. (Weiss Decl., ¶ 4; Droste Decl., ¶ 8; Aguirre Decl., ¶ 11, Exhibit 8.) Plaintiff argues that Mr. Weiss and Mr. Hill’s review of filings and correspondence in the case should not be awarded because Mr. Weiss and Mr. Hill were witnesses to the negotiations and the drafting of the contract, not defense counsel regarding the enforcement of the contract. Plaintiff argues that the fact that Mr. Weiss and Mr. Hill both happen to also be attorneys, in addition to witnesses, does not justify $28,346 in fees incurred to enforce a contract and, as such, should be discounted accordingly. (Aguirre Decl., ¶ 11.)

In Defendant’s reply brief, Defendant states that as the attorneys for Defendant responsible for the transaction with Plaintiff and other adjacent buyers, the “litigation” support by Mr. Weiss and Mr. Hill was invaluable for Defendant’s strategy in defending against Plaintiff’s suit. Defendant states that Mr. Weiss and Mr. Hill’s intimate knowledge of the PSA and their involvement with Defendant’s counsel, Kenneally, and the other buyers, also resulted in affording great efficiency and time saving for Droste and in-house counsel, Matrullo. Defendant emphasizes that Mr. Weiss and Mr. Hill’s time entries, for a limited amount of work, are directly related only to litigation support to enforce Defendant’s rights and Plaintiff’s obligations under the PSA only, and their submissions excludes their much greater billings for transactional matters.

Sachs

As to Michael Sachs, Plaintiff questions why Sachs was necessary to be brought into this litigation, and that duplicative efforts were made by him despite a stipulation for trial continuance. For example, Plaintiff states that on April 10, 2024, Plaintiff’s counsel and Defendant’s counsel agreed via email to continue trial while Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment was pending. (Aguirre Decl., ¶ 17, Exhibit 12.) Thereafter, on August 1, 2024, after a July 2024 hearing to continue the trial pending hearing and judgment on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the Parties executed a stipulation agreeing to the trial continuance with the explicit intent to “allow the parties to avoid the expense of discovery and case preparation.” (Aguirre Decl., ¶ 17, Exhibit 14) However, Plaintiff explains that despite the agreed-upon trial continuances, and the express language of the Parties’ stipulation, Sachs billed approximately 48.1 hours for work completed after the parties’ stipulation, including for Defendant’s Motion to Compel Plaintiff’s responses to the discovery requests propounded by Defendant in March 2024, nearly six (6) months after Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. (Aguirre Decl., ¶ 11, 15, Exhibits 3, 9) Plaintiff asserts that the same is true for Defendant’s Motion to Quash Plaintiff’s deposition of the PMK from Zion Bank.

Plaintiff argues that Sachs’ work on said discovery motions was unnecessary and duplicative of the work that Droste completed. (Aguirre Decl., ¶ 17, Exhibits 1, 3.) For example, Plaintiff explains that on Defendant’s Motion to Compel Plaintiff’s responses to discovery, Sachs and his support staff logged approximately 21.8 hours in preparing the motions, while Droste billed approximately 18.1 hours on the same. (Aguirre Decl., ¶ 17, Exhibits 1, 3.) Plaintiff asserts that this included both counsel completing review of the same documents, communications, and pleadings, as well as time apparently spent by two senior counsels preparing the same documents. (Aguirre Decl., Exhibit 3.) Plaintiff illustrates that the same can be said for duplicative work completed by both counsel with respect to reviewing for, preparing, and replying to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Quash the subpoena to Zion Bank’s person most qualified. (Aguirre Decl., Exhibits 1-3). Ultimately, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s decision to engage Sachs for months of claimed redundant preparation undercuts the reasonableness of the fees requested, particularly as trial preparation should have aligned with the actual trial timeline.

In Defendant’s reply brief, Defendant states that Sachs was not brought in until late March 2024, specifically for assistance with the identification and designation of expert witnesses. Defendant also explains that Sachs assisted in trial preparation, with discovery, both in setting depositions and in enforcing written discovery, which Defendant concedes it deferred until March 2024. Based on this, Defendant claims that contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, Sachs was brought in prior to the parties stipulating to continue trial. In addition to handling the identification and designation of experts, Defendant states Sachs focused on significant pre-trial matters, including pre-trial motions and discovery motions. However, Defendant explains that once both the summary judgment motion and trial were being continued, Sachs held off on significant work until closer to the summary judgment hearing, and then post-judgment work, including PSIP’s Motion for Attorney Fees.

Matrullo

Plaintiff argues that efforts by Jeffery Matrullo resulted in inflated costs and redundant efforts by in-house counsel. Both parties agree with California precedent, that while fees for both in-house counsel and private counsel may be recovered, they can only be recovered so long as their efforts are not duplicative. Plaintiff states that billing separately for litigation-related tasks, such as reviewing discovery responses or coordinating with Droste, are effectively double-billing, as these duties fall squarely within his salaried responsibilities as in-house counsel. Plaintiff explains that for Matrullo’s work, Defendant seeks about $147,955 in attorney’s fees, but that around 80% of those fees are for reviewing and approving Droste’s work and being updated on the case. After removing the 80% of work identified by Plaintiff, Plaintiff contends $42,975 is what remains for Matrullo’s bills after cancelling all the other fees Plaintiff has contested. (Aguirre Decl., ¶ 16, Exhibit 2.) Plaintiff contends that Matrullo’s work added little substantive value to the case preparation, as it primarily duplicated efforts already undertaken by Droste and his team. Instead, Plaintiff asserts that Matrullo also engaged in duplicative efforts and did not enhance the litigation or enforcement of the contract.

In Defendant’s reply brief, Defendant emphasizes that Matrullo was integral to the strategic defense of the lawsuit, and he was careful to record time for only his work in the litigation against Plaintiff, to enforce the subject contract, and did not submit time for other work related to Plaintiff. Defendant argues Plaintiff’s claim that Matrullo merely “reviewed” Droste’s work underscores the time entries showing his substantive participation in all filings and discovery. The Court would appreciate pointed oral argument from both sides as to the claimed duplication of effort by in-house counsel, which at first blush seemed concerning to the Court. These arguably are examples of “inefficient or duplicative effort” such as “attorney stacking” without a demonstrated need for multiple attorneys reviewing the same materials, or attending the same hearing or deposition (Donahue v. Donahue (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 259, 271). Since the Court had over 3 decades of personal experience in litigation in Southern California and in working with in-house and national coordinating counsel on protracted litigation before being appointed to the bench 9-1/2 years ago, the Court has direct knowledge of what a reasonable amount of hours for a reasonably experienced attorney would take to perform similar tasks. (See Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of North America LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240),

3. Previously Adjudicated Fees

The Court acknowledges that on Mach 6, 2023, it awarded Defendant attorneys’ fees in addition to the granting of the motion to expunge lis pendens. However, Plaintiff concedes that these fees remain unpaid. Plaintiff nonetheless argues that including these fees in the current motion risks double recovery and improperly conflates distinct awards. The Court will exclude this previously adjudicated amount but clarifies that the previously awarded and unpaid expungement fees are in addition to the fees awarded on this motion. Plaintiff’s counsel should be prepared at oral argument to explain the exact amount of claimed double recovery as well as why the fees ordered nearly two yeas ago have not been paid.

B. Plaintiff’s Motion to Tax Costs

i. Legal Standard

Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Tax Costs. “Any notice of motion to strike or to tax costs must be served and filed 15 days after service of the costs memorandum. If the cost memorandum was served by mail, the period is extended as provided in Code of Civil Procedure section 1013.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1700(b)(1).) The failure to timely file a motion to tax or strike costs constitutes a waiver of the right to object to costs, unless the Court in its discretion grants relief under Code of Civil Procedure Section 473, such as based upon a finding of excusable neglect. (Douglas v. Willis (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 287, 289; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1700(b)(3) [“The party claiming costs and the party contesting costs may agree to extend the time for serving and filing the cost memorandum and a motion to strike or tax costs. This agreement must be confirmed in writing, specify the extended date for service, and be filed with the clerk. In the absence of an agreement, the court may extend the times for serving and filing the cost memorandum or the notice of motion to strike or tax costs for a period not to exceed 30 days.”].)

A prevailing party claiming costs must file and serve a memorandum of costs either (1) within 15 days after the date of service of a notice of entry of judgment or dismissal by the clerk under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.5, (2) 15 days after the service of written notice of entry of judgment or dismissal, or (3) within 180 days after entry of judgment, whichever is first. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1700, subd. (a).) Any motion to strike or tax costs must be served and filed 15 days after service of the memorandum, plus an additional 5 days if served by mail or 2 days if served electronically. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1700, subd. (b)(1).) “Unless objection is made to the entire cost memorandum, the motion to strike or tax costs must refer to each item objected to by the same number and appear in the same order as the corresponding cost item claimed on the memorandum of costs and must state why the item is objectionable.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1700, subd. (b)(2).)

California Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (a), sets forth items allowable as costs. And section 1033.5, subdivision (b) lists the items that are not allowable as costs. The court has discretion to allow costs that are not barred by subdivision (b), but are not listed under subdivision (a). (Science Applications International Corporation v. Superior Court (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1103.) If an item of costs is expressly allowed by statute and if items appear on their face to be proper, the verified memorandum of costs is prima facie evidence of their propriety, shifting the burden of proof to the objecting party to show that the items are not “reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation” or “reasonable in amount.” (Benach v. County of L. A. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 855,)

ii. Discussion

Plaintiff has moved on a Motion to Tax cost, seeking to tax about $13,670.44 of the claimed costs in Defendant’s memorandum of costs filed on December 16, 2024. The Court will address each section Plaintiff takes issue with, in turn, below:

1. Section 5 – Services of Process

Plaintiff states that Defendant, without asking Plaintiff for dates, unilaterally noticed Rabenold’s and O’Donnell’s depositions on April 3, 2024, and noticed Kenneally’s deposition on April 8, 2024. Based on the memorandum of cots, Defendant allegedly incurred $7,177.70 in serving the declarants. Plaintiff argues this cost is unreasonable on its own and even more unreasonable because Defendant had the simple alternative of asking Plaintiff to assist with scheduling the depositions of Plaintiff’s declarants. Plaintiff explains that at a March 27, 2024 hearing before this Court, the Parties had already stated on the record that they would be willing to continue trial and discovery dates to accommodate the continuance of the Motion for Summary Judgment proceedings. Thus, Plaintiff asserts there was no urgency to unilaterally schedule the depositions.

In Defendant’s opposition, Defendant submits that, at the time, the trial date was set for May 28, 2024, and the discovery cutoff date was April 20, 2024. During that period, Defendant states that it was not able to find a good address online for Kenneally or O’Donnell, and believed that any request to Plaintiff to arrange their voluntary appearances for deposition would have resulted in sandbagging and in the deponents being alerted to evade service. Defendant asserts that Kenneally, a licensed attorney, failed to list a valid current business address with the State Bar, and that Defendant could not find a good address for O’Donnell online. Because of Defendant’s alleged difficulty of finding and serving both Kenneally and O’Donnell, Defendant hired a private investigator. Defendant believes it was warranted in hiring a private investigator to effectuate service on the grounds that it had concerns Plaintiff would obstruct discovery.

The Court points the parties to Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (b)(2)(4)(D). “When service is by a means other than that set forth in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C), the recoverable cost is the lesser of the sum actually incurred, or the amount allowed to a public officer in this state for that service, except that the court may allow the sum actually incurred in effecting service upon application pursuant to paragraph (4) of subdivision (c).” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (b)(2)(4)(D).) Paragraph (4) of subdivision (c) states, “[i]tems not mentioned in this section and items assessed upon application may be allowed or denied in the court’s discretion.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (c)(4).)

The Court’s first impression is that the amount claimed for these service attempts seem excessive, but when looked at from the perspective of the lack of cooperation between counsel at the time the hindsight analysis argued by Plaintiff will need to be tempered. The Court’s tentive is to tax $3,000 of these expenses from Defendant’s cost bill.

2. Section 14 – One Legal Fees

Next, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants seek $4,253.38 for fees it allegedly incurred for electronic service through One Legal. Plaintiff argues the Court never required or ordered electronic service and emphasizes that it served everything to Defendant through email using its own staff.

The cost of service is an allowable cost. When service is by a public officer, the recoverable cost is the fee authorized by law at the time of service. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(4)(A).) If service is by a registered process server, “the recoverable cost is the amount actually incurred in effecting service, including, but not limited to, the cost of a stakeout or other means used in locating the person to be served, unless those charges are successfully challenged by a party to the action.” (Id., 1033.5, subd. (a)(4)(B).) Nothing in the Code disallows Defendant from using a service company to serve documents versus Defendant’s staff doing it on their own. Thus, Plaintiff’s Motion to Tax Costs in this section is DENIED.

3. Section 16 – Other Fees

Lastly, Plaintiff states that Defendant is seeking a total of $2,239.06 for $1,395.23 in hotel costs (the Holiday Inn fees), $54 in parking fees, and $789.83 in the “Attorney Service”. Plaintiff asserts that hotel fees are fees for conveniency only, parking is not listed under Section 1033.5, and that the category for “Attorney Service” is too vague.

In Defendant’s opposition brief, Defenant has agreed to withdraw the $2,239.06 in “other fees”. Thus, this portion of Plaintiff’s brief is moot. $2,239.06 will be taxed from the total costs awarded to Defendant.