Judge Ronald F. Frank, Case 20TRCV00959 2023-01-11 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Ronald F. Frank, Case: 20TRCV00959, Date: 2023-01-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20TRCV00959 Hearing Date: January 11, 2023 Dept: 8

Tentative Ruling

HEARING DATE: January 11, 2023¿

CASE NUMBER: 20TRCV00959

CASE NAME: Rockhill Insurance Company v. HH Drywall, Inc., et al .

MOVING PARTY: Defendants Westwood Building Materials Co. and Clinch-On Cornerbead Company

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant, HH Drywall, Inc.

TRIAL DATE: May 3, 2023

MOTION:¿ (1) Defendant, Westwood Building Materials Co.’s Application for Order Determining Good Faith Settlement

(2) Defendant/Cross-Complainant, Clinch-On Cornerbead Company’s Application for Determination of Good Faith Settlement

Tentative Rulings: (1) GRANTED

(2) GRANTED

I. BACKGROUND¿

A. Factual¿

On December 31, 2020, Plaintiff, Rockhill Insurance Company (“Rockhill”) filed an insurance subrogation complaint seeking to recover the $355,000 it paid on behalf of general contractor South Swell to its homeowner. The Suit is brought against Defendants HH Drywall, Inc. (“HH Drywall”), Clinch on Cornerbead Company (“Clinch On”), Westwood Building Materials Co. (“Westwood”), and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive. Plaintiff, Rockhill, insured the general contractor, Cross-Defendant Design + Build by South Swell, Inc. (“South Swell”). South Swell thereafter contracted with Defendant/Cross-Defendant HH Drywall to provide materials and installation of the drywall system at the Harris residence. HH Drywall purchased materials used in the construction from Cross-Defendant Westwood, including the galvanized steel cornerbeads which were ultimately installed in this case. The galvanized steel cornerbeads purchased from Westwood were produced by Defendant/Cross Defendant Clinch On.

HH Drywall installed drywall and galvanized steel cornerbeads on the property. The operative theory of Plaintiff’s subrogation case is that there is corrosion (rusting) of a majority of the corner beads. The corrosion caused the metal to expand, resulting in cracked and peeling paint throughout the property. Repairs were made throughout all levels of the home to the paint and cornerbeads. Rockhill seeks contribution and reimbursement from HH Drywall in this action because the homeowners sued the GC for construction defects allegedly caused by HH Drywall. Rockhill alleges that the drywall system installed by HH Drywall was defective and caused damage to the interior walls of the property.

Plaintiff Rockwell, Defendant Westwood, and Defendant Clinch entered into a settlement agreement on September 23, 2022. (Declaration of Peter M. Hughes “Hughes Decl.”, ¶ 2.) Defendant Westwood agreed to pay Plaintiff $20,000 and Defendant Clinch agreed to pay plaintiff $30,000. (Hughes Decl., ¶ 3.) Plaintiff agreed to settle all claims against Defendant Westwood and Defendant Clinch and to dismiss both Defendants from this action. (Hughes Decl. ¶ 3.) At issue in these motions is whether the $50,000 worth of settlement money meets the parameters for a determination of good faith settlement, absolving the two settling parties from the indemnity and contribution cross-complaints by the non-settling parties.

B. Procedural

1. Westwood Building Materials Co.’s Application for Order Determining Good Faith Settlement

On September 27, 2022, Defendant Westwood filed an application for Determination of Good Faith Settlement of Defendant Westwood. On October 14, 2022, Defendant HH Drywall filed its opposition to the application with a supporting expert declaration. On November 2, 2022, Defendant Westwood filed a reply brief with a declaration of its expert.

On November 9, 2022, this Court continued this Motion, encouraging the parties to file additional briefings regarding Westwood’s Good Faith of a Settlement. In response, on November 30, 2022, Defendant Westwood Building Materials Company filed a Supplemental Brief in support of the Application for Good Faith Settlement.

On November 30, 2022, Plaintiff Rockhill filed a reply brief opposing Defendant HH Drywall, Inc’s Motion to Contest Defendant Westwood Building Materials Company’s Application for Determination of Good Faith Settlement. Also on November 30, 2022, HH Drywall, Inc. filed a supplemental opposition to Westwood Building Materials Company’s Application for Determination of Good Faith Settlement.

2. Clinch-On Cornerbead Company’s Application for Determination of Good Faith Settlement

On November 3, 2022, Defendant/Cross-Complainant, Clinch-On Cornerbead Company filed an Application for Determination of Good Faith Settlement. On December 28, 2022 Defendant HH Drywall, Inc. filed an Opposition to Clinch-On Cornerbead Company’s Application for Determination of Good Faith Settlement. While arguably tardy, the opposition is considered nonetheless as providing further information for the Court to consider.

Collectively, the parties have filed at least a half-dozen declaration supporting their positions and opposing other parties’ positions. The Court has read and considered each declaration to be included in the good faith settlement analysis even though it has not parsed out each declaration or cited to specific paragraphs for the opinions or references each expert made.

¿II. MOVING PARTY’S GROUNDS FOR MOTION

Defendant, Westwood applies for an order determining good faith settlement of Defendant Westwood the grounds that Plaintiff Rockhill has settled its claims against this Defendant Westwood and the settlement was made in good faith at an arm’s length with the assistance of the mediator and there was no collusion between the parties. Westwood did not provide its detailed factual basis for the application initially, consistent with the short-form procedure recognized by City of Grand View Terrace. Instead, Westwood awaited receipt of a challenge to its application and then filed a brief, and declarations of counsel and its construction expert, responding to HH Drywall’s brief and expert declaration

¿III. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Defendant, Westwood has requested that this Court take judicial notice of the Complaint in this action under Evidence Code § 452(d)(1). This Court GRANTS Defendant Westwood’s Request for Judicial Notice, particularly the dollar amount claimed by Westwood as having been paid to or on behalf of its insureds.

IV. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

On December 20, 2022, Rockwell Insurance Objected to Evidence in Support of Reply Brief Opposing Defendant HH Drywall, Inc.’s motion to Contest Defendant Westwood Building Materials Company’s Application for Determination of Good Faith Settlement.

Sustained: none.

Overruled: 1-27. The Court overrules the objections for purposes of evaluating the Tech-Bilt factors, without prejudice to the objections being reasserted at a later evidentiary proceeding such as MSJ or trial. The Court instead in its discretion has used the grounds for objections as a basis for giving less or little weight to many of the statements made. For example, the Court gives very little weight to opinions such as “could have been caused by multiple contributing factors.”

V. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

California Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6(a)(1), provides, in relevant part, that, on noticed motion, “[a]ny party to an action wherein it is alleged that two or more parties are joint tortfeasors or co-obligors on a contract debt shall be entitled to a hearing on the issue of the good faith of a settlement entered into by the plaintiff . . . and one or more alleged tortfeasors or co-obligors . . . .” “A determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith shall bar any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor or co-obligor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 877.6(c).) Although a determination that a settlement was in good faith does not discharge any other party from liability, “it shall reduce the claims against the others in the amount stipulated” by the settlement. (Code Civ. Proc. § 877(a).)

“The party asserting the lack of good faith shall have the burden of proof on that issue.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 877.6(d).) On Westwood’s application, that places the burden on HH Drywall to show a lack of good faith.

In Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499, the California Supreme Court identified the following nonexclusive factors courts are to consider in determining if a settlement is in good faith under section 877.6: “a rough approximation of plaintiffs' total recovery and the settlor's proportionate liability, the amount paid in settlement, the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs, and a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial. Other relevant considerations include the financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants, as well as the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of nonsettling defendants.”

In City of Grand View Terrace v. Superior Court (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1261, the court provided the following guidance regarding a motion for a good faith settlement determination:

This court notes that of the hundreds of motions for good faith determination presented for trial court approval each year, the overwhelming majority are unopposed and granted summarily by the trial court. At the time of filing in many cases, the moving party does not know if a contest will develop. If each motion required a full recital by declaration or affidavit setting forth a complete factual response to all of the Tech-Bilt factors, literally thousands of attorney hours would be consumed and inch-thick motions would have to be read and considered by trial courts in an exercise which would waste valuable judicial and legal time and clients’ resources. . . . That is to say, when no one objects, the barebones motion which sets forth the ground of good faith, accompanied by a declaration which sets forth a brief background of the case is sufficient.

If the good faith settlement is contested, section 877.6, subdivision (d), sets forth a workable ground rule for the hearing by placing the burden of proving the lack of good faith on the contesting party. Once there is a showing made by the settlor of the settlement, the burden of proof on the issue of good faith shifts to the nonsettlor who asserts that the settlement was not made in good faith. If contested, declarations by the nonsettlor should be filed which in many cases could require the moving party to file responsive counter declarations to negate the lack of good faith asserted by the nonsettling contesting party.

(192 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1260-61 (citation omitted).)

The evaluation of whether a settlement was made in good faith is required to “be made on the basis of information available at the time of settlement.” (Tech-Bilt, Inc., supra, 38 Cal.3d at 499.) “‘[A] defendant’s settlement figure must not be grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person, at the time of the settlement, would estimate the settling defendant’s liability to be.’ [Citation.]” (Id.)

“The party asserting the lack of good faith, who has the burden of proof on that issue (§ 877.6, subd. (d)), should be permitted to demonstrate, if he can, that the settlement is so far ‘out of the ballpark’ in relation to these factors as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of the statute. Such a demonstration would establish that the proposed settlement was not a ‘settlement made in good faith’ within the terms of section 877.6.” (Id. at 499-500.)

“[A] court not only looks at the alleged tortfeasor's potential liability to the plaintiff, but it must also consider the culpability of the tortfeasor vis-à-vis other parties alleged to be responsible for the same injury. Potential liability for indemnity to a nonsettling defendant is an important consideration for the trial court in determining whether to approve a settlement by an alleged tortfeasor. [Citation.]” (TSI Seismic Tenant Space, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 159, 166.)

B. Westwood Building Materials Co.’s Application for Order Determining Good Faith Settlement

Defendant HH Drywall asserts that Westwood failed to meet its statutory burden under § 877.6 to show the basis on which its motion for determination of good faith settlement is made. HH Drywall asserts that Westwood filed concurrently with its Application for Determination of Good Faith Settlement only the “Declaration of Peter M. Hughes, Esq. in Support of Defendant Westwood Building Materials Co.’s Application for Determination of Good Faith Settlement,” which merely requests judicial notice of the Complaint and offers no other facts in support of the motion. Defendant further alleges that Westwood’s application includes no evidence, citations, or analysis in support of the motion. Defendant contends that, there is no basis from which it can be said to have met its factual burden under Cal. Civ. Code §877 since Westwood failed to introduce any evidence that would give the trial court a reasonable basis upon which to make any findings as to any settling or non-settling party’s proportionate liability, let alone whether the amounts identified to each settling party are “within the ballpark” of that liability. (Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior Ct. (1987) 43 Cal. 3d 858, 874.)

In reply, Westwood has presented the factual basis for this settlement as well as the terms of the settlement. In Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499, the California Supreme Court identified the following nonexclusive factors courts are to consider in determining if a settlement is in good faith under section 877.6: “a rough approximation of plaintiffs' total recovery and the settlor's proportionate liability, the amount paid in settlement, the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs, and a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial. Other relevant considerations include the financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants, as well as the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of nonsettling defendants.”

Here, Westwood first asserts that the only cause of action brought against Westwood was for product liability. Westwood argues that in light of Defendant’s factual and legal defenses, and each party’s share of fault, Defendant’s potential liability is minimal at best. (See Hughes Decl. at ¶ 3.) Nonetheless, Defendant Westwood notes that it has agreed to pay Plaintiff twenty thousand dollars for a full settlement and general release of any and all claims Plaintiff has or might have against Defendant at the time the settlement takes effect. (Id.) Westwood notes that Mr. Morgan has opined that Defendant Westwood paid a reasonable settlement amount considering all of the facts presented. (Morgan Decl. at ¶ 14.) Therefore, Defendant Westwood argues that the dollar value of the settlement at issue is well within the reasonable range of Defendant’s proportionate share of liability.

Further, Defendant Westwood asserts that the settlement was reached with each settling party represented by his or its own, competent counsel as applicable. (See Hughes Decl. at ¶ 4.) Defendant Westwood argues that the settlement was reached at an arm’s length with the assistance of the mediator, and that there is no evidence or indication of collusion. (Id.) Defendant Westwood asserts that the settlement was not structured in a manner so as to defraud any nonsettling parties. Lastly, Defendant Westwood acknowledges that although Defendant HH Drywall rejects the proposition that liability would be found at time of trial, the total consideration outlined above is within the ballpark set forth in Tech-Bilt.

In its supplemental briefing, Westwood emphasized that it had complied with the requirements set forth in the City of Grand Terrace v. Superior Court (“City of Grand Terrace”) case and the Tech-Bilt factors. In City of Grand Terrace, the Court provided additional guidance with respect to the moving settlor’s evidentiary burden under section 877.6. (City of Grand Terrace v. Superior Court (1987) Cal.App.3d 1251.) The Court explained that when the claimed good faith nature of a settlement is contested, subdivision (d) of section 877.6 provides a “workable ground rule” for the hearing on a motion for a good faith settlement determination (Id. at 1261.) Section 877.6(d) provides: “The party asserting the lack of god faith shall have the burden of proof on that issue.”

The court explained that in contested cases, the moving settlor has the initial burden of only “showing…the settlement.” (Ibid.) The court reasoned that in many cases the moving party does not know at the time of the filing whether a contest will develop because the overwhelming majority of motions for good faith determination are unopposed and summarily granted. (Ibid.) “If each motion required a full recital by declaration or affidavit setting forth a complete factual response to all of the Tech-Bilt factors,” the court explained, :literally thousands of attorney hours would be consumed and inch-thick motions would have to be read and considered by trial courts in an exercise which would waste valuable judicial and legal time and clients’ resources.” (Ibid.) Noting that Tech-Bilt was decided on a “contested basis,” the Court of Appeal in City of grand Terrace concluded that a trial court is required to consider and weigh the Tech-Bilt factors “only when the good faith nature of a settlement is disputed,” and “brief background of the case,” is sufficient. (Ibid.)

Once the moving settlor has met its initial burden of making a prima facie showing that the settlement is in good faith, under section 877.6(d) the burden of proof on the issue of good faith shifts to the nonsettling party contesting the proposed settlement to prove that the proposed settlement is so far “out of the ballpark” in relation to the Tech-Bilt factors as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of section 877.6(d). (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d 499-500; City of Grand Terrace, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d at 1261-1262.)

Here, Westwood asserts that it met the requirements set forth by City of Grand Terrace by submitting sufficient evidence to support its application and a declaration outlining a brief background of the case and the settlement. Additionally, Westwood contends that it filed the reply brief to negate the lack of good faith arguments asserted by HH Drywall. Westwood also asserts that it has met the Tech-Bilt factors in its supplemental brief.

In HH Drywall’s supplemental opposition to Westwood’s reply brief in support of its application for determination of good faith settlement, HH Drywall asserts that It is clear that this is a product defect case and not an improper installation case. HH Drywall notes that it did not store any Drywall Products Prior to Installation, its installation of steel cornerbead materials in Coastal Home is in conformity with Drywall Industry Standards, Similar Clinch-On Product Defects Existed at other properties, and that their expert found that 100% of the damages in this case are attributable to Clinch-On Cornerbead Company and/or Westwood Building Materials Company. As such, HH Drywall contends that Clinch-on and Westwood’s combined settlement of $50,000 is inadequate and fails to satisfy the requirements of the California Code of Civil Procedure, section 877 and Tech-Bilt factors.

Additionally, Plaintiff Rockhill Insurance Company filed a reply brief opposing Defendant HH Drywall, Inc.’s Motion to Contest Defendant Westwood Building Materials Company’s Application for Determination of Good Faith Settlement. Rockhill asserts that the settlement was made in good faith because: (1) the amount to be paid in settlement by Westwood fairly approximates Westwood’s proportion of potential liability in this matter; (2) the settlement amount is fully allocated to Rockhill’s total damages arising out of the cornerbead corrosion at the subject property; (3) there is no need for allocation proceeds among multiple plaintiffs; (4) there is no need to prove that Westwood’s settlement is equal to or more than the amount I would pay should a jury find it guilty at trial; (5) Rockhill knows of no known financial hardships or insurance policy limit issue for Westwood; and (6) Westwood and Rockhill did not engage in collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of nonsettling defendants. As such, Rockhill requests that this Court determine the settlement to be made in good faith pursuant to section 877.6 and the Tech-Bilt factors.

C. Clinch-On Cornerbead Company’s Application for Determination of Good Faith Settlement

On November 3, 2022, Clinch-On filed an Application for Determination of Good Faith Settlement. Clinch-On requests that this Court determine that the settlement is in good faith in accordance with the provisions of Code of Civil procedure section 877.6(a)(2) and for an order barring any and all other joint tortfeasors and co-obligors from any further claims against Clinch-On, for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.

Clinch-On asserts that Rockhill Insurance Company has agreed to accept $30,000.00 in exchange for a full and final release of any and all claims, known or unknown, against clinch-On in this lawsuit as alleged by Rockhill in the cross-complaint in the above-entitled action. This settlement is contingent upon this Court’s order that the settlement is in good faith and barring all claims and cross-complaints for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault, for damages arising out of the incident which is the subject of the instant lawsuit.

On December 28, 2022, Defendant HH Drywall, Inc. filed an opposition. In its opposition, HH Drywall claims that Clinch-On failed to make a sufficient evidentiary showing to satisfy its burden under section 877. HH Drywall asserts that clinch-on failed to introduce any evidence that would give the trial court a reasonable basis upon which to make any findings as to any settling of non-settling party’s proportionate liability, let alone whether the amounts identified to each settling party are “within the ballpark” of the liability. Thus, HH Drywall claims it is impossible for a court to exercise its discretion in an appropriate fashion, and Clinch-o’s motion must be denied.

HH Drywall also contends that Clinch-On failed to provide Plaintiff’s probable recovery and the settling of Defendant’s proportional liability. HH Drywall asserts that while Clinch-on stated that it has reached settlement with Plaintiff in this case for the sum of $30,00, it has made no attempt to place this proposed settlement within the context of Plaintiff’s total claimed damages, it has not alleged any facts regarding how this figure was reached, nor has it made any assertions as to Plaintiff’s likely recovery at trial. HH Drywall also argues that Clinch-On failed to provide evidence of its financial condition and insurance policy. HH Drywall notes that under Tech-Bilt, Clinch-on’s financial condition and insurance policy limits are relevant and critical to the court’s inquiry as to the reasonableness, and thus the good faith, of the proffered settlement.

Further, HH Drywall contends that the settlement is outside the “Ball Park” of reasonableness and must be denied. HH Drywall argues that there is substantial evidence that the conduct of HH Drywall did not contribute to Plaintiff’s damages. HH Drywall has offered the declaration of HH Drywall’s experts, Paul Russel of Axis Consulting and the Declaration of corrosion and material expert, Gerald F. Zamiski, of Vollmer-Gray Engineering. Lastly, HH Drywall assert that Clinch-On’s “Declaration of Josiah Boggs” lacks foundation and is inadmissible with respect to its assertions regarding the manufacture of the clinch-on materials.

VI. CONCLUSION

¿¿

At a hearing on a Good Faith Settlement Motion, the Court is placed in a position of anticipating what a jury might ultimately decide at trial, but without all of the parties spending a week or more presenting expert opinions and cross-examination of that testimony in a multiple defendant construction defect and product liability trial. Here, the first Tech-Bilt factor, a rough approximation of the Plaintiff’s total recovery is $355,000 and the two settling parties collectively have agreed to pay $50,000, contingent on the Court finding the settlements were in good faith thereby extricating them from the trial and cross-complaint exposure. The rough approximation of the settlors’ proportionate liability is vigorously disputed and will be the subject of conflicting expert testimony at trial. Is 14% a reasonable or “rough” approximation of what the seller and manufacturer of the galvanized cornerbead materials might be found as their combined proportionate share of liability in a special verdict at trial? Or put another way, has the party opposing the good faith determination carried of burden of proving that the pre-trial settlement is not in good faith? The Court weighs these elements in the Tech-Bilt calculus. There is no dispute that the cornerbeads were galvanized, and that the inclusion of zinc on a steel construction material product is the standard of care for a steel cornerbead manufacturer. If the jury finds the cornerbeads to have been properly galvanized, rejects the warning label contention, and accepts expert testimony that a properly installed galvanized steel product does not rust in the short period of time the cornerbeads were in use in this newly constructed house, then Clinch-On and Westwood will have a 0% responsibility on the jury special verdict form. 14% is considerably more than 0%.

Factor 2 is the amount paid in settlement. The manufacturer paid $30,000 or 8.45% , which was $10,000 more than the retailer of the claimed defective product who is paying 5.6%, of the plaintiff’s potential total recovery. Of course, if the jury were to allocate 25% responsibility to the homeowner for failing to provide adequate ventilation or for having unanticipated excessively moist conditions as compared to other coastline properties where galvanized cornerbeads have been used for years without product failure, then the collective percentage of the pre-trials settlement rises to nearly 19%, and if the jury were to determine the amounts Plaintiff paid should be discounted for failure to mitigate, the settlors’ collective contribution might be much higher. On the other hand, if admissible evidence were presented at trial of failures of other Clinch-On galvanized products in the absence of claimed saltwater contamination, then the manufacturer and retailer may have underpaid.

Factor 3 is the discount factor a court should apply when judging a pre-trial settlement. Parties are regularly found to have settled in good faith when paying considerably less than their “fair share” when paying earlier in the case rather than after a verdict. Parties are entitled to benefit from settling, implicitly waiving their right to present evidence and pursue a defense verdict. There is no set standard for assigning a value or eight to such a discount factor but the Court, in its discretion, applies over 3 decades of litigation experience including numerous product liability trials and several mediated settlements of construction defect cases in accounting for this factor.

Factor 4 is not implicated in the analysis in this case in the Court’s judgment, since the policy limits or balance sheet of the settlors are not in play on the facts of this case.

Factor 5 is also not in play here in the Court’s view, since the evidence presented to the Court is that the settlement occurred during an all-hands mediation where HH Drywall had the same ability to present its view of the facts and conflicting expert opinions to the mediator, make an offer, contribute to a pooled settlement, or otherwise participate in a potential global resolution that did not crystallize. There is no evidence presented by HH Drywall of any fraud or collusion. There are no collusive terms in the settlement agreement. There is no evidence presented that Plaintiff extracted promises from either of the settlors regarding the use of experts or other evidence should the case proceed to trial.

Factor 6 is an amalgamation of the other factors, in the totality of the circumstances. Is the $50,000 combined amount, or are the $20,000 and $30,000 respective contributions by the settlors, outside the “ballpark” of a reasonable settlement considering all the other factors? The Court finds that HH Drywall has not convinced the Court that the individual or collective settlement amounts are out of the ballpark. HH Drywall may well prevail at trial on its theory that this is a 100% product liability exposure, meaning it will obtain a defense verdict at trial. HH Drywall may well be successful in raising discounting factors, failure to mitigate factors, and impeachment of the plaintiff’s metallurgist and contractor expert. In considering this factor, the Court also takes into account the implicit opinion of plaintiff’s counsel that it negotiated at mediation the most settlement money it could from defendants who potentially could obtain defense verdicts themselves.

The Court cannot forecast exactly what a jury will do with the facts and expert opinions in this case. To be sure, the parties remaining at trial will be educated and informed by the good faith determination presentations on ways to tighten their presentations, sharpen their pencils, and steer clear of some of the shortcomings in their declarations here. But applying the standards of now decades of published wisdom on addressing 877.6 motions, the Court finds that both the Westwood and Clinch-On settlements meet the standards for a determination of good faith here.