Judge: Ronald F. Frank, Case: 21STCV05381, Date: 2023-10-05 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV05381 Hearing Date: October 5, 2023 Dept: 8
Tentative Ruling¿
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HEARING DATE: October 5, 2023¿
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CASE NUMBER: 21STCV05381
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CASE NAME: Estate of
Manuel Villalpando, et al. v. Yama Seiki USA, Inc., et al.
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MOVING PARTY: Defendant, Yama Seiki USA, Inc.
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RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs,
Estate of Manuel Villalpando, Fabiola Xiomara Nava Villalpando, and Amiee
Villalpando
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TRIAL DATE: July 8, 2024
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MOTION:¿ (1) Motion for Summary Judgment
¿ Tentative Rulings: (1) Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND¿¿
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A. Factual¿¿
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On February 9, 2021, Plaintiffs,
Estate of Manuel Villalpando, Fibiola Xiomara Nava Villalpando, and Aimee
Villalpando (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed a Complaint against Defendant,
Yama Seiki USA, Inc. (“Defendant”), and DOES 1 through 50. On September 20,
2021, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleging causes of
action for: (1) Product Liability – Strict Liability; (2) Product Liability –
Negligence; (3) Product Liability – Breach of Implied Warranty of
Merchantability; (4) Product Liability – Breach of Implied Warranty of Fitness
for a Particular Purpose; and (5) Wrongful Death.
Defendant now files a Motion for
Summary Judgment.
B. Procedural¿¿
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On
July 19, 2023, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. On September 19,
2023, Plaintiffs filed an opposition. On September 28, 2023, Defendant filed a
reply brief.
II. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL
NOTICE
Along with its moving papers,
Defendant requested this Court take Judicial Notice of the following documents:
1.
Exhibit 1: First Amended Complaint
2.
Exhibit 12: Plaintiff’s serious and willful
complaint
The Court GRANTS this request and
takes judicial notice of the above.
III. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS
Plaintiffs’ Evidentiary
Objections to Defendant’s Evidence
Sustain: none.
Overrule: 1-7
Defendant’s Evidentiary
Objections to Plaintiffs’ Evidence on Opposition
Sustain: none.
Overrule: 1-5
IV. ANALYSIS¿
A. Legal Standard
The function of a motion for summary judgment or
adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot
show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of
summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield
Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) CCP Section 437(c) “requires the trial
judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all
inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other
inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”¿ (Adler
v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)¿ “The function
of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of
the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose
whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the
pleadings.”¿ (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67,
citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367,
381-382.)¿
As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant
moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by
presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense.
(CCP § 437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th
1510, 1520. ) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party
opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor
of that party.”¿ (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc.¿(2006) 39 Cal.4th 384,
389.)¿
Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts
to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts
exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.¿¿¿
To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party
opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster
v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)
B. Discussion
Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment asks this Court to summarily adjudicate the causation issue in this
case. Defendant argues that it did not cause this accident, and its machines
have been used at the German Machine Products (“GMP”) facility (Decedent’s employer)
both before and after the accident without incident. Defendant contends the
accident would not have occurred if the Decedent had taken the simple step of turning
the power off to the machine and safely locked the main switch as required by
Cal/OSHA and industry standards following the rules of lockout/tagout. Defendant
also argues that the accident would also have been prevented if Decedent’s
employer had complied with lockout/tagout and used the designed safety features
in the FCV-620. Lastly, Defendant’s motion is based on the argument that the
accident was also caused by GMP personnel overriding the machine’s limit switch
and engaging in serious and willful misconduct.
The Court will analyze the causation
issues below.
Whether the
Actions of GMP were Serious, Willful, or were a Superseding Cause
Here, Defendant argues that the
actions of GMP were serious and willful, and were a superseding cause which cut
off liability to Defendant. Causation is an essential element of a tort
action. Defendant is not liable unless its conduct was a “legal cause” of
the plaintiff’s injury. (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25
Cal.4th 763, 772.) “[A] defendant’s conduct is a cause of a plaintiff’s
injury if: (1) the plaintiff would not have suffered the injury but for the
defendant’s conduct, or (2) the defendant’s conduct was one of multiple causes
sufficient to cause the alleged harm.” (Union Pacific Railroad Co. v.
Ameron Pole Products LLC (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 974, 981 [citing Rutherford
v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 969 and Mitchell v.
Gonzales (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1041, 1049].) Legal causation is generally
a question of fact to be determined by the jury unless, as a matter of law, the
facts admit of only one conclusion. (Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001)
26 Cal.4th 1200, 1205-06.)
“The
intervening act of a negligent third person will cut off a defendant’s
liability (thus ‘supervening’) if the intervening action (or the type of risk
of harm caused by the intervening act) is unforeseeable or
extraordinary.” (Maupin v. Widling (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 568,
571.) It is “well established” that when a defendant’s alleged negligence
is based upon his or her having exposed the plaintiff to an unreasonable risk
of harm from the actions of others, the occurrence of the type of conduct
against which the defendant had a duty to protect the plaintiff cannot properly
constitute a superseding cause that completely relieves the defendant of any
responsibility for the plaintiff’s injuries. (Lugtu v. California
Highway Patrol (2001) 26 Cal.4th 703, 725.)
Defendant
argues that this accident was caused by the serious and willful misconduct of
GMP, and notes that Plaintiffs petitioned for serious and willful misconduct
per Labor Code § 4553 alleging: “It is contended that the actions of Defendant
[GMP], as alleged hereinabove, constituted serious and willful misconduct, and
was in reckless disregard of the probable consequences and safety of MANUEL
VILLALPANDO. As a direct result of the serious and willful misconduct of
Defendant, GERMAN MACHINED PRODUCTS, INC., as described herein, MANUEL
VILLALPANDO sustained serious injury resulting in his death.” Defendant argues
that Plaintiffs’ then counsel was correct.
Next,
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs are judicially estopped from claiming that GMP
did not engage in serious and willful misconduct. Defendant asserts that by
allowing an employee inside of a fully energized industrial machine (whether or
not a door was unlocked or removed, with no lockout tag, and overriding the
limit switch) illustrates that GMP’s actions caused this accident.
Preliminarily,
the Court notes that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment argues in a
conclusory way, and provides almost no fact to case analysis. Further, the
Moving papers rest on conclusory arguments which are almost entirely based on disputed
facts (SSUMF Nos. 29, 34) which are disputed based on the declarations of
opposing experts. The Court is not convinced by Defendant’s arguments, or concurrent
filings, that Defendant has met its burden in showing that there is no issue of
material fact in this case. Moreover, many of the facts that Defendant argues proves
that it was not the cause of Decedent’s death are not listed in its separate
statement of undisputed material facts. Because Defendant failed to meet its
initial burden, the Court DENIES summary judgment. Moreover, even if the Court
were to find that Defendant met its initial burden, the Motion would still be
DENIED as the opposition has raised issues of disputed material fact per their
expert declarations. The evidence raising triable issues of fact includes the
Plaintiff’s expert declaration of Douglas Nix ¶¶ 12, 15-18, and 21-23 and the Deposition
of Decedent’s co-worker Paul Castellanos pp. 14-15, 34-37, 45-46, 49. Courts cannot grant Summary Judgment based
upon a weighing of conflicting expert opinions or depending on which expert
declaration the Court might find to be more convincing. Instead, such evidence
presents a triable issue of fact that must be decided by the fact finder at
trial.
V. CONCLUSION¿¿
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For the foregoing reasons, this
Court’s tentative ruling is to DENY Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
Plaintiff is ordered to give
notice.