Judge: Ronald F. Frank, Case: 21STCV33519, Date: 2023-08-31 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV33519 Hearing Date: November 14, 2023 Dept: 8
Tentative Ruling¿
¿¿
HEARING DATE: November 14, 2023¿
¿¿
CASE NUMBER: 21STCV33519
¿¿
CASE NAME: Tony Talbert
v. Marina Adams, et al.
¿¿
MOVING PARTY: Defendant, Marina Adams, DDS and Marina Adams, DDS, a
Professional Dental Corporation dba New Image Dental
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff, Tony Talbert
¿¿
TRIAL DATE: August
26, 2024
¿¿
MOTION:¿ (1) Motion for Summary Judgment,
or in the alternative, Summary Adjudication
¿ Tentative Rulings: (1) DENIED
I. BACKGROUND¿¿
¿¿
A. Factual¿¿
On
September 10, 2021, plaintiff Tony Talbert filed a complaint against
Defendants, Marina Adams, DDA, a Professional Dental Corporation dba New Image
Dental; Marina Adams, DDS, Jay Layson, DDS, Rachal Liverman, DDS, Ahmed
Mataria, DDS, and DOES 1 through 30. On March 23, 2022, Plaintiff filed a First
Amended Complaint (“FAC”) for: (1)
dental malpractice, (2) lack of informed consent, (3) battery, (4) intentional
misrepresentation, (5) negligent misrepresentation, and (6) concealment against
several defendants, including defendant Rachal Liverman, D.D.S..
Defendants,
Marina Adams, DDS and Marina Adams, DDS, a Professional Corporation dba New
Image Dental file a Motion for Summary Judgment. (“Adams Defendants”)
B. Procedural¿¿
On June 16, 2023, Adams Defendants
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. On August 17, 2023, Plaintiff filed an
opposition. On August 25, 2023, Adams Defendants filed a reply brief.
On August 21, 2023, Defendant, Jay
Layson, DDS, filed a stipulation by all parties to continue trial and all
related dates.
II. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS
Plaintiff’s Objections to
Adams Defendants’ Evidence
Sustain: none.
Overrule: 1-5
Defendants’ Objections to
Plaintiff’s Evidence
Sustain: none.
Overrule: 1-21
III. ANALYSIS¿
A. Legal Standard
The function of a motion for summary judgment or
adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot
show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of
summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield
Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) CCP Section 437(c) “requires the trial
judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all
inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other
inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”¿ (Adler
v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)¿ “The function
of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of
the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose
whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the
pleadings.”¿ (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67,
citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367,
381-382.)¿
As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant
moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by
presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense.
(CCP § 437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th
1510, 1520. ) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party
opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor
of that party.”¿ (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc.¿(2006) 39 Cal.4th 384,
389.)¿
Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts
to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts
exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.¿¿¿ Here, the Court finds that the Adams Defendants have carried
their initial burden and shifted the burden to the Plaintiff.
To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party
opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence that is
admissible under the rules of evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68
Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)
B.
Discussion
A defendant
moving for summary judgment in a medical malpractice action must “present
evidence that would preclude a reasonable trier of fact from finding it was
more likely than not that their treatment fell below the standard of
care.” (Johnson v. Superior Court (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 297,
305.) “When a defendant moves for summary judgment and supports his
motion with expert declarations that his conduct fell within the community
standard of care, he is entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff comes
forward with conflicting expert evidence.” (Munro v. Regents of
University of California (1989) 215 Cal.3d 977, 984-985.)
The Court agrees with the
Adams Defendants to the extent that the Opposition relies on apparent contradictions
and conflicts in the Plaintiff’s own declaration and deposition testimony. No triable issue can be or is raised by those
conflicts. But the Court disagrees with
the Adamas Defendants that an expert cannot use conflicting sworn statements of
a party as a foundation for the expert’s opinions. While an expert may be impeached by showing
that his or her reliance on such sworn statements is ill advised or by proof
that certain of those statements are shown by other evidence to be untrue or
self-serving, potential impeachment does not negate the expert’s opinions at the
summary judgment phase.
Here, both parties have
introduced expert declarations. While the Adams Defendants argue that Dr.
Howard’s expert declaration is unsupported by any reasoned explanation of why
the underlying facts lead to the ultimate conclusion, the Court disagrees.
Instead, pursuant to California Evidence Code § 801, the Court finds that the
proper basis for Plaintiff’s expert opinion can be his special knowledge,
skill, experience, training, and education. At the summary judgment phase, the
Court does not act as the trier of fact who can weigh the qualifications and
quality of the opinions provided by competing expert witnesses. A pediatric orthodontist is competent to
opine on orthodontics and dentistry, even if his or her opinion may be less
specialized or less on point than the defense expert or individual defendant
dentists. Here, the Court finds that Dr.
Howard’s expert declaration is not objectionably conclusory simply because his
reasoning is not as extensive or detailed or focused as Dr. Harmatz’. Nor can the Court sustain foundation objections
to the opinions stated in Paragraphs 17-25 of the Howard Declaration merely because
Dr. Howard did not, in his declaration, identify exactly which of the multiple
dentists at the New Age Dental facility on which date violated the standards of
care, or because he contradicts himself as to whether Plaintiff initially presented
to the Defendants with nerve pain. Those
are issues for deposition and for the trier of fact to evaluate under the CACI instructions
for expert opinion testimony. Despite the sufficiency of the Adams
Defendants’ expert to carry a moving party’s initial burden of proof on a
summary judgment motion, the Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED as
Plaintiff’s expert raises
several triable issues of material fact in paragraphs 17-25 of his opposing
declaration.
Plaintiff is ordered to provide notice.