Judge Ronald F. Frank, Case 22STCV05507 2022-12-12 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Ronald F. Frank, Case: 22STCV05507, Date: 2022-12-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV05507 Hearing Date: December 12, 2022 Dept: 8

Tentative Ruling

HEARING DATE: December 12, 2022¿

CASE NUMBER: 22STCV05507

CASE NAME: Manuela Sahagun v. Long Beach Unified School District

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff, Manuela Sahagun

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant, Long Beach Unified School District

TRIAL DATE: 8/14/23

MOTION:¿ (1) “Pitchess” Motion to Direct the Long Beach Unified School District (LBUSD) to Produce Peace Officer Personnel Documents Relating to Eddie Gonzalez Pursuant to California Evidence Code Sections 1043 and 1045

Tentative Rulings: (1) Grant in Part. The Court will conduct an in camera review with the LBUSD’s custodian of records and a court reporter to determine which if any of the requested documents meet the standards for disclosure. The Court requests argument on the timing of the in camera review, whether a representative of the officer can be present, and whether a protective order must be in place before the in camera review

I. BACKGROUND

This case is a wrongful death action by Plaintiff Manuela Sahagun, successor in Interest of Manuela Rodriguez (“Plaintiff”) against Defendant Long Beach Unified School District (LBUSD”), and DOES 1 through 10.

Plaintiffs plead that on September 27, 2021, Eddie Gonzalez, a Safety Officer and former employee of the City of Sierra Madre, was patrolling the area surrounding Millikan High School in his marked Safety vehicle. Plaintiffs allege that as he was making a final lap of the campus, Officer Gonzalez turned south onto Palo Verde Avenue and observed two females in an altercation near the middle of the street roughly 200 yards from the high school. Officer Gonzalez arrived at the scene while Manuela Rodriguez was in an alleged altercation with another female. Plaintiffs allege that Officer Gonzalez made contact with both females and asked the second female to sit on the ground; this is allegedly when Ms. Rodriguez turned and walked to her vehicle to leave the area.

Plaintiffs then allege that Officer Gonzalez approached the vehicle and demanded the occupants disembark the vehicle. When the vehicle began to move forward, Plaintiffs allege that Officer Gonzalez placed himself closer to the vehicle and pointed his service weapon at the driver. As the vehicle proceeded forward, Plaintiff alleges that Officer Gonzalez took a step backward and shot two rounds into the vehicle’s passenger side window and door. Ms. Rodriguez was struck in the head by one of the rounds shot from Officer Gonzalez’s service weapon. Paramedics arrived on the scene and transported Ms. Rodriguez to Long Beach Memorial Medical Center where she was placed on life support until she was ultimately disconnected from life support and died.

Plaintiff alleges in her Complaint that Officer Gonzalez was intentional, reckless, negligent and unjustified in his use of deadly force. Plaintiff has also alleged that LBUSD was negligent in hiring Officer Gonzalez. Plaintiff argues that an LBUSD spokesperson issued a statement that, among other things, disclosed that Officer Gonzalez’s background was checked and that “nothing in those checks was disqualifying.” Plaintiff asserts that she needs to verify that herself in this litigation.

On November 10, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Pitchess motion for discovery regarding Officer Gonzalez. Plaintiff’s motion is accompanied by a declaration of counsel Michael S. Carrillo. On November 15, 2022, Defendant filed its opposition brief. On November 18, 2022, Plaintiff filed her reply brief.

There are two other Pitchess motions pending (on a different hearing date) that involve other law enforcement agencies.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Official police records are subject to a privilege against disclosure that is held by both the officer and the department. Davis v. City of Sacramento (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 393, 401 (Davis).

A Pitchess motion provides a discovery procedure by which plaintiffs may compel the discovery of information contained in a police officer’s confidential personnel files if the plaintiff can make "general allegations which establish some cause for discovery" thereof. Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, 536-37 (Pitchess). The so-called Pitchess statutes, however, restrict lawyers and parties in their ability to learn of and disclose certain information regarding law enforcement officers. (Id.; see People v. Superior Court (2015) 61 Cal.4th 696, 712-14.) Most notably, Penal Code section 832.7 renders confidential certain personnel records and records of citizens’ complaints, as well as information “obtained from” those records. (Pen. Code, § 832.7, subd. (a) (section 832.7(a)).) “Upon a motion showing good cause, a litigant may obtain a court's in camera inspection of the confidential information and, possibly, win the information's disclosure. But the less reason there is to believe that an officer has engaged in misconduct, the harder it is to show good cause.” (Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 28, 36.)

As to civil proceedings, this procedure has been codified in Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1046. See also Haggerty v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1085 (statutory scheme for obtaining confidential personnel records applies to civil and criminal cases).

A Pitchess motion shall identify the proceeding in which the discovery is being sought, identify the party seeking discovery, identify the individual whose personnel records are being sought, and identify the governmental agency said to have custody and control of those records. Evidence Code § 1043 (b) (1). The motion must describe the type of records or information sought. Id. at § 1043 (b) (2). And the movant must submit a declaration showing good cause for the discovery of such records, setting forth both the records’ materiality to the subject matter of the pending litigation and the declarant’s reasonable belief that the identified government agency has the type of records which are being pursued. Id. at § 1043 (b) (3).

The statutory good faith requirement is thus a two-pronged inquiry: (1) is the information being sought material to the proceeding; and (2) does the declarant state her or his reasonable belief that the agency has the type of information being sought. Evidence Code § 1043 (b)(3). As to materiality, this prong is satisfied upon a showing that “the evidence sought is admissible or may lead to discovery of admissible evidence.” (Riske v. Superior Court (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 647, 658). Such an inquiry is left to the discretion of the trial court and will only be reversed upon a finding of abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 657.)

As to whether a declarant states a reasonable belief that the government agency has possession of the type of records being sought, it is enough that his or her belief be “premised upon a rational inference from known or reasonably assumed facts.” (Evidence Code § 1043 (b)(3); City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 90.) The statute does not require the declarant to identify the particular records being sought, as it is enough that the declarant describes them by type. (Id. at pp. 90—91.) Nor does the statute require the declarant’s personal knowledge. It is permissible that a movant submits a declaration based on information and belief. (Id. at p. 86.)

Upon the court’s determination that a movant has presented good cause for his Pitchess motion, the Court shall conduct an in camera review of the evidence pursued by said motion, accompanied only by the person authorized to claim privilege on behalf of the government. Evidence Code §§ 1045, 915(b). At the in camera hearing, the custodian of records should bring to court all documents “potentially relevant” to the defendant's motion. (Santa Cruz, sipra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 84.) The trial court “shall examine the information in chambers” (Evid.Code, § 1045, subd. (b)), “out of the presence and hearing of all persons except the person authorized [to possess the records] and such other persons [the custodian of records] is willing to have present” (id., § 915, subd. (b); see id., § 1045, subd. (b) [incorporating id., § 915] ). Subject to statutory exceptions and limitations, discussed below, the trial court should then disclose to the defendant “such information [that] is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation.” (Id., § 1045, subd. (a); see People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1226.) Mooc identified several limitations in disclosure in the Evidence Code, including complaints about the subject officer that occurred more than five years before the event which is the subject of the litigation, a remoteness restriction as to matters the disclosure of which would be of “little or no practical benefit,” (Evid.Code, § 1045, subd. (b)), and an assessment as to whether the information sought may be obtained from other records maintained by the employing agency ... which would not necessitate the disclosure of individual personnel records.” (Id., subd. (c).) Further, any records to be disclosed are to be generally subject to a protective order “to protect the officer or agency from unnecessary annoyance, embarrassment or oppression” (ibid.). The court shall also order that any peace officer records disclosed “not be used for any purpose other than a court proceeding pursuant to applicable law.” (Id., subd. (e).)

The two-pronged good cause inquiry acts as a "relatively relaxed" and "relatively low threshold,” serving to ensure that the law enforcement agency involved produces for in camera review “all potentially relevant documents” for review by the trial court which acts as afilter to ensure that only material and relevant information for otherwise protected files will be disclosed. Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, 1016, quoting Santa Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 84.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff identifies types of records sought.

Plaintiffs seek discovery and disclosure of LAPD Officer Gonzalez’s personnel records by way of this Pitchess motion. Plaintiffs allege the records are in the possession of Defendants, LBUSD, and as to the two other pending motions records of the City of Sierra Madre or the City of Los Alamitos. Plaintiffs provide that the records sought can be categorized as follows. (P&A, p. 2:20-3:11.)

1. Application for employment;

2. Background check documents;

3. All investigative reports or documents, pertaining to any LBUSD investigations concerning Officer Gonzalez;

4. All Internal Affairs investigations in which Officer Gonzalez was the subject of, during his employment with the LBUSD;

5. All citizens’ complaints, whether sustained or not, made against Officer Gonzalez while employed by the LBUSD, alleging excessive force, false imprisonment, fabricating probable cause, dishonesty, perjury, false arrest and detention.

6. All writings, supervisor notes, memorandums, letters, commendations, and “Performance Evaluations” of Officer Gonzalez during all of his employment with the LBUSD.

7. All records of the LBUSD regarding discipline imposed against Officer Gonzalez, particularly for excessive force, false statements, perjury, and false or inaccurate police reports, during his employment.

8. All records of the LBUSD regarding any discipline related to the use force while in the employment of the District.

9. All training records for Officer Gonzalez related to the use of force while in the employment of the LBUSD.

10. The complete personnel file of Officer Gonzalez.

Additionally, Plaintiff seeks any records obtained by the LBUSD from either of the other two law enforcement agencies fitting within these 10 categories while Officer Gonzalez at Los Alamitos or Sierra Madre.

B. Plaintiff’s Showing of Good Cause

A party moving for discovery of personnel files must file a motion supported by a declaration showing good cause for the discovery. "Good cause" will be found where (1) the records are material to the subject matter of the pending litigation, and (2) Plaintiffs show their "reasonable belief" that the City of Sierra Madre, the City of Los Alamitos and/or LBUSD have the records sought. (Evidence Code, § 1043 (b) (3); see also City of Santa Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 84.)

1. The Declarant’s Account of the Shooting

Plaintiff submits the declaration of its counsel Michael S. Carrillo, in which Mr. Carrillo states facts of which he has personal knowledge or are stated on information and belief. Mr. Carrillo’s declaration ¶ 3 described the factual scenario outlined above.

2. The Declarant’s Allegations as to Types of Records

In addition to Plaintiff’s version of events leading up to and during the shooting, Mr. Carrillo’s declaration the following testimony regarding his belief as to what types of records the City of Sierra Madre and LBUSD keep in personnel files. (See Evidence Code § 1043 (b) (3).) In paragraph 5 of Mr. Carrillo’s declaration, Mr. Carrillo identifies the ten categories outlined above. The specification of types of documents sought by Plaintiff’s Pitchess motion is sufficient to satisfy the first prong of good cause requirement under Evidence Code section 1043 (b) (3). (See Santa Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pp. 90—91.)

3. Materiality

On a Pitchess motion, the materiality of evidence is supported by showing that it “is admissible or may lead to discovery of admissible evidence.” Riske, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 658. As to the issue of the materiality of, Mr. Carrillo correctly identifies that Officer Gonzalez’s records are material to Plaintiff’s claims where they tend to prove or disprove “that Officer Gonzalez has previously engaged in episodes of dishonestly with regard to prior incidents of the use of force.” (Carrillo Decl. ¶ 17.) The same is true about the categories of evidence sought by Plaintiff in regards to Mr. Carrillo’s allegation that “Long Beach Unified School District was negligent in the hiring, training, supervision, and disciplining of Officer Gonzalez.” (Carrillo Decl. ¶ 19.)

In opposition, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff cannot prove the “materiality” of the officers’ personnel records because the entirety of the incident was recorded, and such recordings were viewed and exchanged by Plaintiff’s counsel. In doing so, Defendant likens the case at bar to that of People v. Mackreth (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 317. In that case, Mackreth was arrested in a 7-Eleven. Mackreth had run into the store following a car accident, and was acting erratically. Mackreth alleged in his defense that the officers used excessive force against him, although he was unarmed and made no attempt to attack the officers. The City opposed plaintiff’s Pitchess motion on the grounds that the entire incident was recorded, and Mackreth did not meet his burden of showing materiality. The court of appeal stated:

Defendant's written motion did not address the fact that the videos comprehensively documented the entire incident, including the actions of all three officers and defendant. Because everything was recorded, there was no dispute about what had occurred, and the defense did not dispute what had occurred but only whether the level of force used was justified and whether the mental state element had been satisfied. At the hearing on the motion, after the court questioned the materiality of the requested discovery in light of the videos, defendant's trial counsel provided no specific explanation of how information about the credibility of the officers and their prior use of force might be relevant and material. He merely claimed that “there's perspective” and that “not every single angle is captured on this video camera.

By failing to address the materiality of the requested discovery in light of the undisputed content of the videos, defendant failed to satisfy his burden. Evidence that any of the officers had lied on prior occasions or used excessive force in the past would not assist defendant in presenting a defense since the undisputed video evidence demonstrated precisely the force the officers had used on defendant and how he had acted. The four videos of the encounter were quite comprehensive and precluded the officers from misleading anyone about the nature of the events. The videos did not leave in question the nature of the force used or conduct of defendant that preceded the use of that force. Under these circumstances, defendant did not and could not justify the requested discovery without plausibly describing how some specific conduct that had not been captured on video might have been misrepresented by one of the officers or might constitute excessive force. The proffered justification for the motion was not “plausible” in light of the videos. We conclude that the trial court did not err in denying defendant's Pitchess motion.

(Id. at pp. 341-342.)

In Plaintiff’s reply brief, Plaintiff asserts that this case is distinguishable from Mackreth because Plaintiff is in possession only of one bystander video that does not depict the entire incident itself and does not have as extensive video coverage as the case of Mackreth. Plaintiff argues that the video in this case does not provide the full picture as to the use of force. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s allegations do not merely address the use of force issue in this case. Plaintiff also alleges negligent and/or reckless hiring of Officer Gonzalez. As such, the recorded footage would not negate the relevance of the evidence sought regarding those causes of action.

Lastly, Defendant’s opposition argues that Plaintiffs request are overbroad and they seek records spanning an indeterminate period of time. However, Plaintiff asserts that Officer Gonzalez stopped working as a police officer in the City of Sierra Madre in July of 2020 and he shot and Killed Manuela Rodriguez in September of 2021. As such, Plaintiff notes that it can be inferred that Officer Gonzalez was working as a Safety Officer at Long Beach Unified School District for a maximum time of thirteen (13) months. Thus, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s claim that such a request is overbroad and will span “an indeterminate period of time” is incorrect.

The Court will consider oral argument as to whether it should review the bystander video to determine whether Mackreth is or is not distinguishable. The Court’s tentative ruling is that the “full picture” of the use of force in the subject incident is not critical to ruling as to the discovery being sought here via in camera review. Assuming the video depicts an officer-involved shooting at or into a vehicle, the discovery sought concerns whether the LBUSD knew or should have known that Officer Gonzalez’ use of force in the subject incident was foreseeable, or that there may be a specific incident of dishonesty regarding his priors use of force, or that the LBUSD had information in its possession from which a reasonable juror could consider as demonstrating negligent hiring training, supervision, and/or disciplining of the officer. The uses to which the discovery sought here are thus distinguishable from the uses sought in Mackreth.

IV. CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED in part, and that the parties should discuss the details of the in camera review as noted in the Court’s summary tentative ruling as well as the mandated protective order. Plaintiffs are ORDERED to give notice of the Court’s ruling.