Judge: Ronald F. Frank, Case: 22STCV24571, Date: 2023-12-01 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV24571    Hearing Date: December 1, 2023    Dept: 8

Tentative Ruling 

¿ 

HEARING DATE:                 December 1, 2023¿ 

¿ 

CASE NUMBER:                   22STCV24571

CASE NAME:                        Armida Navarro v. CM Laundry LLC, et al. 

¿ ¿ 

MOVING PARTY:                Defendant, CM Laundry LLC

RESPONDING PARTY:       Plaintiff, Armida Navarro (No Opposition)

TRIAL DATE:                       January 26, 2024

MOTION:¿                              (1) Motion to Compel Arbitration 

Tentative Rulings:                  (1) Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED

                                                (2) Arbitration Status Conference is set for June 6, 2024 at 8:30 a.m., Dept. 8

                                                (3) January 2024 FSC and trial dates are vacated

I. BACKGROUND¿ 

¿ 

A. Factual¿ 

¿¿ 

            On July 29, 2022, Plaintiff, Armida Navarro (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against Defendant, CM Laundry LLC, and DOES 1 through 50. The Complaint alleges causes of action for: (1) Breach Of Employment Contract; (2) Breach Of Implied Covenant Of Good Faith And Fair Dealing; (3) Unlawful Discrimination Based On Desperate Treatment; (4) Retaliation In Violation Of California Fair Employment And Housing Act; (5) Discrimination Based Upon DISABILITY In Violation Of The California Fail Employment And Housing Act (“Feha”).Cal. Gov. Code §12940(A), Et Seq.; (6) Harassment Based Upon DISABILITY In Violation Of The California Fair Employment And Housing Act (“Feha”) Cal. Gov Code §12940(J), Et Seq.; (7) Retaliation In Violation Of The California Fair Employment And Housing Act (“Feha”). Cal. Gov. Code §12940(H), Et Seq; (8) Failure To Prevent Discrimination, Harassment And/Or Retaliation In Violation Of The California Fair Employment And Housing Act (“FEHA”), Cal. Gov. Code §12940(K), Et. Seq.; (9) Violation Of Whistleblower Statute, Labor Code §1102.5; (10) Negligent Retention; (11) Wrongful Harassment in Violation of Public Policy; (12) Intentional Infliction Of Emotion Distress.

            In October of 2024, Department 32 at the Spring Street courthouse reassigned this matter to Inglewood, and shortly thereafter the Defendant filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration.

B. Procedural  

On November 2, 2023, Defendant filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration. To date, no opposition has been filed.

II. ANALYSIS ¿ 

¿ 

A.    Legal Standard

The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) states that “[a] written provision in any . . . contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” (9 U.S.C. § 2.) California law incorporates many of the basic policy objectives contained in the Federal Arbitration Act, including a presumption in favor of arbitrability. (Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 971-72.)

California law states that “[o]n petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party to the agreement refuses to arbitrate that controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists….” (Code Civ. Proc, § 1281.2.) “The party seeking arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement, and the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving any defense, such as unconscionability.” (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236.)

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §1281.2, generally, on a petition to compel arbitration, the court must grant the petition unless it finds either (1) no written agreement to arbitrate exists; (2)¿the right to compel arbitration has been waived; (3) grounds exist for revocation of the agreement; or (4) litigation is pending that may render the arbitration unnecessary or create conflicting¿rulings on common issues. 

When seeking to compel arbitration, the initial burden lies with the moving party to demonstrate the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by preponderance of evidence.  (Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 841-42; Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021), 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 164-65.)  It is sufficient for the moving party to produce a copy of the arbitration agreement or set forth the agreement’s provisions.  (Gamboa, 72 Cal.App.5th at 165.)  The burden then shifts to the opposing party to prove by a preponderance of evidence any defense to enforcement of the contract or the arbitration clause.  (Ruiz, 232 Cal.App.4th at 842; Gamboa, 72 Cal.App.5th at 165.)  Subsequently, the moving party must establish with the preponderance of admissible evidence a valid arbitration agreement between the parties.  (Ibid.)  The trial court then weighs all the evidence submitted and uses its discretion to make a final determination.  (Ibid.)  “California law, ‘like [federal law], reflects a strong policy favoring arbitration agreements and requires close judicial scrutiny of waiver claims.’”  (Wagner Const. Co. v. Pacific Mechanical Corp. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 19, 31.) 

If the court orders arbitration, then the court shall stay the action until arbitration is completed.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.4.) 

B.    Discussion

The moving papers indicate that in January 2017, Plaintiff was hired at Defendant’s company. Iin June of 2018, Defendant notes that it offered arbitration agreements to its current employees, including Plaintiff. On June 18, 2018, representatives at Defendant’s company held small group meetings with its current employees to explain the arbitration process and provide the employees with the opportunity to enter into an arbitration agreement. Defendant notes that at these small group meetings, Defendant had available Spanish and English versions of the arbitration agreement and conducted the meetings in English and Spanish depending on employee comfort level. Defendant notes that Plaintiff selected the Spanish version of the arbitration agreement, although the English version was also available to her during the meetings and despite having access to the English version of the arbitration agreement, as a result of her role as assistant to Human Resources. The English translation of the Arbitration Agreement provides in pertinent part:

I and the Company agree to submit all Claims (defined herein) between I and the Company (which for purposes of this agreement includes its employees, agents, representatives, owners, officers, directors, managers, attorneys, related companies, parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, divisions, any related entities, board members, partners, and successors, predecessors, assigns, and all persons acting by and through them) that may arise out of or relate in any way to Employee’s employment with the Company, including but not limited to the termination of Employee’s employment and Employee’s compensation, to FINAL and BINDING arbitration before a single arbitrator in the county in which Employee worked for Company in accordance with the then-effective Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services (“JAMS”) Employment Arbitration Rules and Procedures (available online at http://www.jamsadr.com), as the exclusive remedy for such dispute, and not by a lawsuit or resort to court process. Employee can check for updated rules at the same website address. The Rules are available in both English and Spanish. Company will provide Employee with a printed copy of such English and/or Spanish language Rules, as then in effect, upon request made to Human Resources at any time. Both I and Company agree that the award or decision of the arbitrator shall be nonappealable and may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof as a basis of judgment and of the issuance of execution for its collection.

…

Definition of Claim(s): Included within the scope of this Agreement and covered by this Agreement are all of the following (“Claims”): all claims relating to, arising out of, in connection with, or involving Employee’s employment or termination of employment with the Company, whether based on tort, express or implied contract, any covenant of good faith and fair dealing, any federal or state statute or regulation (including, but not limited to, any claims of discrimination, harassment, retaliation, wage and hour claims, payment of wages and benefits, or employment rights, whether they be based on the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, the California Labor Code, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, or any other state or federal law or regulation), federal or any state constitution and/or any public policy, equitable law, common law, or otherwise. The following Claims are expressly excluded from arbitration and are not covered by this Agreement: (1) claims related to workers’ compensation, state disability insurance benefits or unemployment insurance; (2) any claim for employee benefits governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended, or the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985; (3) any claim that is expressly excluded from arbitration agreements by statute; and (4) claims that would not be actionable in a court of law are not subject to this Arbitration Agreement. Both the Company and Employee may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction for temporary or preliminary injunctive relief in connection with an arbitrable controversy, however, all determinations of final relief will be decided in arbitration, and the pursuit of temporary or preliminary injunctive relief shall not be deemed incompatible with or constitute a waiver of rights under this Agreement. Nothing herein shall prevent Employee from filing and pursuing proceedings before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or similar state agency, the National Labor Relations Board, or any other federal, state or local agency charged with the enforcement of any employment laws; however, if Employee chooses to pursue a Claim after any such administrative agency completes its processing of any Claim, Employee can only pursue that Claim further through arbitration as set forth in this Agreement.

(Declaration of Erika Villaneda (“Villaneda Decl.”), ¶¶ 1, 5, Exhibit B.)

Defendant notes that on June 18, 2018, Plaintiff voluntarily executed the Arbitration Agreement by placing her wet signature and the date on the signature block of the last page of the Arbitration Agreement. Defendant asserts also that Plaintiff expressly confirmed that she had an opportunity to read the Arbitration Agreement prior to signing, understood the Arbitration Agreement prior to signing, and that she agreed to be legally bound to the terms of the Arbitration Agreement. (Villaneda Decl., ¶ 8, Exhibit A.)

Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges numerous causes of action tied to his employment with Defendant’s company. As such, the Court finds that Defendant has met its initial burden of showing that an arbitration agreement exists between the parties. The Court also filed that Defendant has carried its burden in showing that the parties appear to be bound to arbitrate each of Plaintiff’s causes of action in the Complaint.

Finally, this Court finds that Defendant has carried its burden in illustrating to the Court that the Arbitration Agreement satisfies the Armendariz requirements. Pursuant to Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, when an arbitration provision arises out of an employee-employer relationship, Courts must determine if a mandatory arbitration agreement meets these requirements to avoid being deemed unconscionable for curtailing an employee’s rights” (1) neutral arbitrator; (2) more than minimal discovery; (3) a written award; (4) availability of all types of relief that would be available in a court proceeding; and (5) requirement that the employer pay the unique expenses of arbitration.

Here, the Arbitration Agreement notes: (1) that the neutral arbitrator “…shall be a retired judge or licensed attorney with experience serving as an arbitrator, as mutually agreed to by the parties…” (Villaneda Decl., Ex. B, ¶ 3.) Next, the Arbitration Agreement between the parties notes: (2) that the arbitration shall proceed allowing the company and Plaintiff to conduct reasonable discovery as determined by the Arbitrator chosen. (Villaneda Decl., Ex. B,¶ 3.) Third, the Arbitration shall be governed by and interpreted according to the FAA, and that the Arbitrator shall have the authority to award reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs as part of any remedy or award in accordance with applicable law. (Villaneda Decl., Ex. B, ¶¶ 4, 7.) Fourth, the Arbitration Agreement does not limit damages nor statutorily imposed remedies. (Villaneda Decl., Ex. B,¶ 4.)  Finally, Defendant notes that the Plaintiff and the Company shall bear their own costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees in such arbitration, but that the Company would be responsible for paying any filing fee and the fees and costs of the arbitration with the exception that Plaintiff contribute an amount equal to the filing fee to initiate a claim in a court of general jurisdiction in the state in which the Plaintiff is employed. (Villaneda Decl., Ex. B,¶ 4.)

            The Court’s tentative ruling is to GRANT the arbitration agreement, and (other than periodic status conferences) stay proceedings in this litigation against Defendant pending arbitration.

IV.  CONCLUSION¿ 

            Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED.  

            Defendant is ordered to give notice.