Judge Ronald F. Frank, Case 22STUD03649 2022-12-16 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Ronald F. Frank, Case: 22STUD03649, Date: 2022-12-16 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STUD03649 Hearing Date: December 16, 2022 Dept: 8

Tentative Ruling¿

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HEARING DATE: December 16, 2022¿¿

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CASE NUMBER: 22STUD03649

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CASE NAME: JJ Hobart, LLC v. JK Latte, Inc., et al

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MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff, JJ Hobart, LLC

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RESPONDING PARTY: None

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JUDGEMENT ENTERED: October 4, 2022

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MOTION:¿ (1) Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs

Tentative Rulings: (1) Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs is GRANTED, the Court slightly reducing the hourly rate requested

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I. BACKGROUND¿¿

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A. Factual¿¿

This action came on for a jury trial on September 13, 2022. On September 19, 2022, this matter was submitted to the jury. On September 19, 2022, the jury returned a special verdict in Plaintiff’s favor. On October 4, 2022, the Court signed and entered judgment upon the jury’s special verdict. The Judgment reads, in part: Plaintiff, JJ Hobart, LLC shall recover its costs and reasonable attorney’s fees, as set by subsequent noticed motion.”

Plaintiff now brings its Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs. Plaintiff is seeking $580.80 in costs and $22,676.50 in attorney’s fees. To date, no opposition has been filed.

II. ANALYSIS¿

A. Legal Standard

Attorney’s fees are recoverable when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10).)

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (a)(10), attorney fees when authorized by contract, statute or law are allowable as costs and may be awarded upon a noticed motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (c)(5).

Where a contract specifically provides for attorney’s fees and costs incurred to enforce the contract, attorney’s fees and costs must be awarded to the party who is determined to be the prevailing party on the contract. (Civ. Code., § 1717, subd. (a).) “Reasonable attorney’s fees shall be fixed by the court and shall be an element of the costs of suit.” (Ibid.)

A prevailing party is defined as follows:

(4) “Prevailing party” includes the party with a net monetary recovery, a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered, a defendant where neither plaintiff nor defendant obtains any relief, and a defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that defendant. If any party recovers other than monetary relief and in situations other than as specified, the “prevailing party” shall be as determined by the court, and under those circumstances, the court, in its discretion, may allow costs or not and, if allowed, may apportion costs between the parties on the same or adverse sides pursuant to rules adopted under Section 1034.

(Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (a)(4).)

In determining what fees are reasonable, California courts apply the “lodestar” approach. (See, e.g., Holguin v. DISH Network LLC (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1332.) This inquiry “begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (See PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) From there, the “[t]he lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.” (Ibid.) Relevant factors include: “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, [and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)

The party seeking fees has the burden of documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates. (City of Colton v. Singletary (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 751, 784.) This burden requires competent evidence as to the nature and value of the services rendered. (Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559.) A plaintiff’s verified billing invoices are prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses, and services listed were necessarily incurred. (Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682.)

B. Discussion

The Attorneys’ Fees Are Awardable by Contract

A prevailing party is entitled to reasonable attorney fees in addition to other costs.¿ (CCP § 1033.5(a)(10).)¿ “Prevailing party” includes the party with a net monetary recovery, a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered, a defendant where neither plaintiff nor defendant obtains any relief, and a defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that defendant.¿ (CCP § 1032(a)(4).)¿ In all other circumstances, the “prevailing party” shall be as determined by the court.¿ (Id.)¿ Attorney’s fees are an allowable cost when authorized by statute, contract or law. (CCP § 1033.5(a)(10)(A), (B), and (C).) Civil Code section 1717. Civil Code section 1717, subdivision (b), provides,

“In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney's fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in addition to other costs.”

(CCP § 1717(a).)

In determining whether an action is “on the contract,” the proper focus is not on the nature of the remedy but on the basis of the cause of action. (Douglas E. Barnhart, Inc. v. CMC Fabricators, Inc. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 230, 240-241.) Specifically, an action is “on a contract” for purposes of section 1717 if (1) the action (or cause of action) involves an agreement in the sense that the action (or cause of action) arises out of, is based upon, or relates to an agreement by seeking to define or interpret its terms or to determine or enforce a party’s rights or duties under the agreement, and (2) the agreement contains an attorney fees clause. (Id. at 242.)

Here, in the present matter, Plaintiff’s suit was seeking to enforce and interpret a lease agreement between the parties. (Declaration of Miles L. Prince (“Prince Decl., Exhibit 1.) Paragraph 13.2, subpart (a) of the lease provides the right for Plaintiff to recover “reasonable attorneys’ fees” in any action commenced upon Defendant’s breach of a term of the Lease. The current action was commenced because of such a breach. The breach of a lease is contractual in nature. Thus, the action falls within the meaning of “on the contract” for the purposes of section 1717.

Reasonableness of Fees

The determination of what constitutes a reasonable fee generally begins with the lodestar, i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.) “[T]he lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community; it may be adjusted by the court based on factors including, as relevant herein, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Ibid.)

“The verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.” (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.) If the motion is supported by evidence, the opposing party must respond with specific evidence showing that the fees are unreasonable. (Premier Med. Mgmt. Sys. v. California Ins. Guarantee Ass’n (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.)

Here, Defendant seeks a total of $22,676.50 in attorney’s fees. Prince declares that his current hourly billing rate is $385.00. (Prince Decl., ¶ 8.) Prince also acknowledges that he is a 2014 graduate of UC Devis Law School and his history as a trial attorney. (Ibid.) Prince has also included an itemized document of the hours that he incurred for 58.90 hours of legal work. (Id., at ¶ 7, Exhibit 2.) The Court is generally aware of the hourly rates of attorneys who practice in the unlawful detainer arena from the Court’s experience over the last 5 years presiding over a calendar with hundreds of trials and other proceedings under the commercial and residential unlawful detainer laws. The Court observed the performance of counsel before and during the trial and finds the number of hours were reasonable for the work performed applying the usual lodestar factors. The Court reduces the hourly rate requested to $350 in light of the Court’s familiarity with the rates of other counsel in similar litigation with similar experience.

The Court finds that Prince’s hourly rate once adjusted to $350 is reasonable. Accordingly, the Court awards Defendant $20,615 in reasonable attorney’s fees.

Memorandum of Costs

Plaintiff is also entitled to recover reasonable costs for this action. “Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, a prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc. §1032(b).) Here, Plaintiff seeks costs of $464.64 which are set forth in Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Costs filed on November 1, 2022, No motion to tax was filed.

Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to recover costs in the amount of $464.64.

IV. CONCLUSION¿¿

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For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs is GRANTED in the amount of $20,615 plus $464.64 in costs.

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Moving party is ordered to give notice.¿¿¿¿

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