Judge: Ronald F. Frank, Case: 22TRCV00257, Date: 2023-08-24 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22TRCV00257    Hearing Date: November 14, 2023    Dept: 8

Tentative Ruling¿ 

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HEARING DATE:                    November 14, 2023¿¿ 

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CASE NUMBER:                   22TRCV00257

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CASE NAME:                        Martorell Law APC v. Ashlen Diaz, et al.

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MOVING PARTY:                Defendant, Austin Richard Post p/k/a Post Malone

 

RESPONDING PARTY:       Plaintiff, Martorell Law APC

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TRIAL DATE:                           Not Set. 

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MOTION:¿                                  (1) Demurer to the 3rd and 4th causes of action

                                               

Tentative Rulings:                     (1)  SUSTAINED, with leave to amend to be argued

 

                                                 

I. BACKGROUND¿¿ 

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A. Factual¿¿ 

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On April 4, 2022, Plaintiff, Martorell Law APC (“Plaintiff”) filed an action against Defendant, Ashlen Diaz, Austin Richard Post, and DOES 1 through 100. On June 30, 2023, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). The FAC alleges causes of action for: (1) Breach of Written Contract; (2) Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (3) Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations; and (4) Inducing Breach of Contract.

 

Defendant Post now files a Demurrer to the third and fourth causes of action.

 

B. Procedural¿¿ 

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On July 31, 2023, Defendant, Austin Richard Post, filed this Demurrer. The Court addressed the notice issue on the last hearing, and Plaintiff filed another opposition which was redacted on October 31, 2023. On November 6, 2023, Defendant Post filed a reply brief.

 

On September 19, 2023, Ashlen Diaz filed a Motion to Strike and/or Seal portions of Plaintiff’s opposition to the demurrer. On October 31, 2023, Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendant Ashlen Diaz’s Motion to Strike and/or seal. On November 6, 2023, Defendant Diaz filed a reply brief. In the Cout’s September 21, 2023 ruling it ordered the documents filed representing alleged communications between defendant Diaz and Plaintiff confidential.  The parties then filed partially redacted papers in the publicly accessible versions of those papers.

 

II. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

 

            Defendant Post requests this Court take judicial notice of the following:

 

1.     This Court’s June 6, 2023 Minute Order granting Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in the above-entitled action, Martorell Law APC v. Ashlen Diaz, et al., Case No. 22TRCV00257. A true and correct copy of the Court’s June 6, 2023 Minute Order is attached as Exhibit 1 to the concurrently filed Declaration of Stanton L. Stein (“Stein Decl.”). (See Stein Decl ¶ 3, Exh. 1.)

2.     The First Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiff on June 30, 2023 in the above entitled action, Martorell Law APC v. Ashlen Diaz, et al., Case No. 22TRCV00257. A true and correct copy of the First Amended Complaint is attached as Exhibit 2 to the concurrently filed Stein Decl. (See Stein Decl ¶ 4, Exh. 2.)

3.     The Declaration of Eduardo Martorell in Support of Plaintiff’s Application for Default Judgment (“Martorell Decl.”) filed by Plaintiff on December 21, 2022 in the above entitled action, Martorell Law APC v. Ashlen Diaz, et al., Case No. 22TRCV00257. A true and correct copy of the Martorell Decl. is attached as Exhibit 4 to the concurrently filed Declaration of Stanton L. Stein. (See Stein Decl. ¶ 7, Exh. 4.)

 

The Court GRANTS Defendant Post’s Request and takes judicial notice of the above.

 

III. ANALYSIS

 

A.    Defendant Post’s Demurrer

 

Legal Standard

 

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.) For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967.) A demurrer “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)¿¿¿¿ 

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A pleading is uncertain if it is ambiguous or unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).) A demurrer for uncertainty may lie if the failure to label the parties and claims renders the complaint so confusing defendant cannot tell what he or she is supposed to respond to.¿ (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.) However, “[a] demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)

 

Discussion

 

            Defendant Post demurs to the FAC on the grounds he argues the Third Cause of Action for Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and that Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action for Inducing Breach of Contract fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

 

 

Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations       

 

            Here, Defendant Post argues that Plaintiff fails to state a cause of action for Intentional Interference because the FAC fails to allege an independently wrongful act. The elements of a cause of action for intentional interference with contractual relations are “(1) a valid contract between plaintiff and a third party; (2) defendant’s knowledge of this contract; (3) defendant's intentional acts designed to induce a breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; (4) actual breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; and (5) resulting damage.” (I-CA Enterprises, Inc. v. Palram Americas, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 257, 289.) Defendant Post also relies on the case of Ixchel Pharma, LLC v. Biogen, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1130, to argue that the California Supreme Court has also required that to allege a cause of action for Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations, Plaintiff needs to allege an independently wrongful act. “[A]n act is independently wrongful if it is unlawful, that is, if it is proscribed by some constitutional, statutory, regulatory, common law, or other determinable legal standard.” (Id. at 1159.)  

 

            Instead of arguing that the FAC does include allegations of an independently wrongful act, Plaintiff mainly argues that Ixchel does not apply because a contingency fee agreement is not an “at-will” contract. The Court disagrees. As noted in Defendant Post’s reply brief, since Ixchel, the Second District has decided the case of Pech v. Doniger (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 443. There, the Second District applied Ixchel to a case involving a dispute over a contingency fee agreement. Despite Plaintiff’s argument that there are future continuing economic relationships it has with Defendant Diaz, contingency fee agreements generally have been considered at-will agreements, simply meaning either party may terminate the agreement. Presumably, the parties bargained for the terms in the agreement, were aware of the risk that the relationship may be terminated at any time, and are not cemented in the way that a contract not terminable at will is. As such, Plaintiff’s arguments fall short of illustrating to the Court why Defendant Post’s demurrer to the IICR cause of action should be denied.

 

            Plaintiff’s opposition also argues that Defendant Post’s actions alleged in the FAC do amount to an independently wrongful act. Plaintiff argues that the FAC asserts that after it began rendering legal services to Ms. Diaz, Defendant Post “proposed, coerced and pressured Defendant Diaz to discharge Plaintiff so that Defendant Post could settle with Defendant Diaz alone, and gain the benefit of Defendant Diaz not having the assistance of counsel during negotiation.”   (FAC, ¶ 12.) The FAC further alleges that Defendant Post “interfered by, among other things, proposing, pressuring and exhorting Defendant Diaz to discharge Plaintiff so that Defendant Post could settle with Defendant Diaz, to ensure Defendant Diaz did not have the assistance of counsel during settlement negotiations, and to substantially reduce the amount Defendant Post would be forced to pay.” (FAC,  ¶ 40.) Plaintiff further alleges Defendant Post’s wrongful conduct was done to “deny Diaz legal advice, to avoid further adverse publicity over his breakup with Diaz, and to reduce the amount [he] would be required to pay to obtain such settlement.” (FAC, ¶ 40.) Put together, Plaintiff argues the allegations suggest Defendant intended to avoid media attention and pressured Defendant Diaz using his high level of fame. Plaintiff contends that pursuant to California Civil Code § 1708, “[e]very person is bound, without contract, to abstain from injuring the person or property of another, or infringing upon any of his or her rights.”

 

            Despite Plaintiff’s argument, the FAC fails to satisfy the IICR requirements of Ixchel and Pech.   Instead, Plaintiff merely alleges conclusory allegations which state buzz words rather than factual allegations that may rise to the level of the “some constitutional, statutory, regulatory, common law, or other determinable legal standard.” As such, the Court SUSTAINS demurrer as to this cause of action. The Court will allow oral argument as to whether Plaintiff believes it can sufficiently address the issues the Court has with its pleadings. If it does so, the Court will allow twenty days leave to amend.

 

Inducing Breach of Contract

 

            Defendant Post also argues that the cause of action for inducing breach of contract fails because Plaintiff fails to allege an independently wrongful act.  The elements of an inducing breach of contract cause of action are: (1) plaintiff had a valid, existing contract with a third party; (2) defendant had knowledge of the contract; (3) defendant intended to induce its breach; (4) the contract was in fact breached; (5) the breach was caused by defendant’s unjustified or wrongful conduct (including intentionally interfering with an existing contract); and (6) resulting damages. (Shamblin v. Berge (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 118, 122.) Defendant Post relies on Ixchel, as he did above, to argue that there is no independent wrongful act alleged.  The Court agrees, and SUSTAIINS the Demurrer as to this cause of action as well.  Leave to amend will depend on whether Plaintiff believes it can address the requirements of Ixchel and Pech, which tis Court finds also apply to the inducing breach cause of action.