Judge Ronald F. Frank, Case 22TRCV00549 2023-02-10 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Ronald F. Frank, Case: 22TRCV00549, Date: 2023-02-10 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22TRCV00549 Hearing Date: February 10, 2023 Dept: 8

Tentative Ruling¿

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HEARING DATE: February 10, 2023¿¿

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CASE NUMBER: 22TRCV00549

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CASE NAME: Ellen Rudolph v. General Motors, LLC, et al. .¿¿¿

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MOVING PARTY: Defendant, General Motors, LLC

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RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff, Ellen Rudolph

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TRIAL DATE: December 11, 2023

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MOTION:¿ (1) Demurrer¿

(2) Motion to Strike

Tentative Rulings: (1) Demurrer is overruled

(2) Motion to Strike is denied

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I. BACKGROUND¿¿

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A. Factual¿¿

On July 5, 2022, Plaintiff, Ellen Rudolph (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendant, General Motors, and DOES 1 through 10. On October 24, 2022, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). The FAC alleges causes of action for: (1) Violation of Civil Code section 1793.2(d); (2) Violation of Civil Code section 1793.2(b); (3) Violation of Civil Code section 1793.2(a)(3); (4) Breach of The Implied Warranty of Merchantability; and (5) Fraudulent Inducement – Concealment.

Defendant, General Motors, LLC (“Defendant”) now demurs to the FAC and has filed a motion to strike portions of Plaintiff’s FAC.

B. Procedural¿¿

On November 23, 2022, Defendant filed its demurrer and motion to strike. On January 30, 2023, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the demurrer and motion to strike. On February 3, 2023, Defendant filed its reply briefs.

¿II. MOVING PARTY’S GROUNDS

Defendant demurs to the Fifth Cause of Action of the FAC for Fraudulent Inducement – Concealment on the grounds that it claims that this cause of action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Defendant also claims that the cause of action fails to state facts sufficient to state a cause of action.

Defendant files a Motion to Strike portions of the FAC in regards to the demand for punitive damages.

¿III. ANALYSIS¿

A. Legal Standard

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.) For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967.) A demurrer “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)¿¿¿

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A pleading is uncertain if it is ambiguous or unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).) A demurrer for uncertainty may lie if the failure to label the parties and claims renders the complaint so confusing defendant cannot tell what he or she is supposed to respond to.¿ (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.) However, “[a] demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)¿¿

B. Discussion

Statute of Limitations

“‘A demurrer based on a statute of limitations will not lie where the action may be, but is not necessarily, barred. [Citation.] In order for the bar of the statute of limitations to be raised by demurrer, the defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is not enough that the complaint shows the action may be barred.’ [Citation.]” (Guardian North Bay, Inc. v. Superior Court (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 963, 971-72.) (Emphasis added.)

Fraudulent Inducement – Concealment

“The elements of fraud,” including a cause of action for fraudulent inducement, “are (a) a misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) scienter or knowledge of its falsity; (c) intent to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.” (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Ctr. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.) The facts constituting the alleged fraud must be alleged factually and specifically as to every element of fraud, as the policy of “liberal construction” of the pleadings will not ordinarily be invoked. (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.) To properly allege fraud against a corporation, the plaintiffs must plead the names of the persons allegedly making the false representations, their authority to speak, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when it was said or written. (Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 157.)

Here, the FAC alleges that there is a transactional relationship because Defendant issued the warranty on the Subject Vehicle. (FAC ¶ 7.) Additionally, the claim is based on both superior knowledge and intentional and knowing concealment. (FAC ¶¶ 31, 94, 95.) In fact, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant committed fraud by allowing the vehicle to be sold to Plaintiff without disclosing that the Vehicle and its lithium-ion battery were defective and susceptible to sudden and premature failure. (FAC, ¶ 87.) The FAC further alleges that Plaintiff is informed, believes, and thereon alleges that prior to Plaintiff acquiring the Vehicle, GM was well aware and knew that the lithium-ion battery installed on the Vehicle was defective but failed to disclose this fact to Plaintiff at the time of sale and thereafter. (FAC, ¶ 88.) Plaintiff further contends that Defendant acquired its knowledge of the Battery defect prior to the Plaintiff acquiring the vehicle. (FAC, ¶ 90.) The FAC notes that Defendant knowingly and intentionally concealed material facts and breached its duty not to do so. (FAC, ¶ 95.) Plaintiff asserts that had she known that the vehicle suffered from the battery defect, she would not have purchased the vehicle. (FAC, ¶ 91.) As such, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s concealment of this safety defect was material and Plaintiff relied on Defendant’s advertising materials which did not disclose the defect.

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff failed to plead fraud with specificity (Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 184) and failed to allege (1) the identify he identity of the individuals at GM who purportedly concealed material facts or made untrue representations about her Bolt; (2) their authority to speak and act on behalf of GM, (3) GM’s knowledge about alleged defects in Plaintiff’s Bolt at the time of purchase, (4) any interactions with GM before or during the purchase of her Bolt, or (5) GM’s intent to induce reliance by Plaintiff to buy the specific Bolt at issue.

However, the rule of specifically pleading how, when, where, to whom and by what means, misrepresentations were communicated is intended to apply to affirmative misrepresentations and not to concealment. (Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement System & Planning Assn, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1384.) In a fraud action based on nondisclosure, if the duty to disclose arises from the making of representations that were misleading or false, then those allegations should be described. (Ibid.) Less specificity should be required of fraud claims when it appears from the nature of the allegations that the defendant must necessarily possess full information concerning the facts of the controversy. (Ibid.) However, “mere conclusionary allegation that the omissions were intentional and for the purpose of defrauding and deceiving plaintiffs and bringing about the purchase…and that plaintiffs relied on the omissions in making such purchase are insufficient to show fraud by concealment.” (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 347.) “The requirement of specificity is relaxed when the allegations indicate that ‘the defendant must necessarily possess full information concerning the facts of the controversy.’ ” (Tarmann v. State Farm (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 58.) Plaintiff must allege, and in a trial or in opposition to a defense MSJ prove, that the defendant knew of the alleged defect before the sale or lease of the vehicle, and that Defendant was unable or unwilling to fix it. (Santana v FCA (2020) 56 Cal.App.5^th 334.)

Here, the Court is satisfied that at the pleading stage, Plaintiff has plead facts sufficient to state a cause of action for fraudulent inducement by concealment of specifically alleged pre-sale knowledge. Whether Plaintiff can prove these allegation remains to be seen, but the allegation is sufficient. As such, the Demurrer is overruled.

B. Motion to Strike

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 436(a).)¿ The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.¿ (Id., § 436(b).)¿ The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws.¿ (Id., § 436.)¿ The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice.¿ (Id., § 437.)¿ “When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow leave to amend.”¿ (Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768.)¿

Here, Defendant moves to strike language referencing punitive damages in Plaintiff’s FAC. Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (a) authorizes punitive damages in non-contract cases “where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” “Fraud” is “an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(3).) The Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts which, if proven could entitle Plaintiff to establish the fraud by concealment prong of Civil Code section 3294.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the motion to strike the allegation and prayer for punitive damages.

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