Judge: Ronald F. Frank, Case: 22TRCV00630, Date: 2023-10-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22TRCV00630    Hearing Date: October 5, 2023    Dept: 8

Tentative Ruling¿ 

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HEARING DATE:                 October 5, 2023¿¿ 

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CASE NUMBER:                  22TRCV00630

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CASE NAME:                        John Doe J.Y. v. Doe #1, a public entity, et al.  

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MOVING PARTY:                Defendant, Centinela Valley Union High School District

RESPONDING PARTY:       Plaintiff, John Doe J.Y. 

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TRIAL DATE:                        Not Set.

MOTION:¿                              (1) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Tentative Rulings:                  (1)  Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED in part and MOOTED in part.

I. BACKGROUND¿¿ 

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A. Factual¿¿ 

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On July 28, 2022, Plaintiff, John Doe J.Y. (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against Defendants, Doe #1, a public entity. The Complaint alleges personal injuries and damages from Childhood Sexual Abuse. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s former employee, and now deceased, Catherine Schindler (“Schindler”), abused Plaintiff while Plaintiff was a student in Defendant’s school district.

Defendant’s Motion asserts that the Plaintiff’s entire complaint should be barred for failure to comply with the government claims presentation requirement, and to the second cause of action for Failure to Report Child Abuse in Violation of CANRA as Defendant argues it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the district.

B. Procedural¿¿ 

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On September 12, 2023, Defendant filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. On September 21, 2023, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On September 28, 2023, Defendant filed a reply brief. 

II. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

            Plaintiff, concurrently with his opposition, requested this Court take judicial notice of the following document:

1.      Exhibit 1: Board Policy 5141.4: child Abuse Prevention and Reporting from the Centinela Valley Union High School District’s website.

The court GRANTS this request and takes judicial notice of the above.

III. ANALYSIS  

A.    Legal Standard

The standard for ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as that applicable to a general demurrer, that is, under the state of the pleadings, together with matters that may be judicially noticed, it appears that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  (Bezirdjian v. O'Reilly (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 316, 321-322, citing Schabarum v. California Legislature (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1216.)  Matters which are subject to mandatory judicial notice may be treated as part of the complaint and may be considered without notice to the parties. Matters which are subject to permissive judicial notice must be specified in the notice of motion, the supporting points and authorities, or as the court otherwise permits. (Id.)  The motion may not be supported by extrinsic evidence. (Barker v. Hull (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 221, 236.)  

When the moving party is a defendant, he must demonstrate either of the following exist: 

(i)                 The court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the complaint. 

(ii)              The complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(a)(B)(i)-(ii).)  

Additionally, a motion for judgment on the pleadings must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration demonstrating an attempt to meet and confer in person or by telephone, at least five days before the date a motion for judgment on the pleadings is filed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 439.)

B.     Discussion  

Government Claim Presentation

            Per the Government Claims Act, a party with a claim for damages against a public entity must first file claim directly with that entity. The party may file a lawsuit only if the public entity denies or rejects the claim. (Gov. Code §§ 905, 945.4; City of Ontario v. Superior Court (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 894.) Further, an action against a public employee is barred if an action against the employing public entity would be barred by the failure to satisfy the entity claims requirements. (Gov. Code, § 950.2.) The claims presentation requirement provides the public entity with an opportunity to evaluate the claim and decide whether to pay on the claim. (Roberts v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 474.) Failure to allege facts demonstrating compliance with the claims presentation requirement subjects the complaint to a general demurrer. (State of Cal. v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1239.) However, claims based on childhood sexual assault are exempt from the claims presentation requirement under the Government Claims Act. (See Coats v. New Haven Unified School Dist. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 415, 428; Gov. Code, § 905, subd. (m).)

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not complied with the Government Claims Act. But Plaintiff alleges that he is a victim of childhood sexual assault, and thus, the claims presentation requirement does not apply. The Court is perplexed by the majority of Defendant’s analysis section. Defendant cites to numerous cases from the 1800s and early 1900s to argue that the legislature does not have power to create a liability against the state for any such past act of negligence upon the part of its officers. Defendant also contends that the rules from these cases indicate that the Legislature cannot pass a law attempting to impose liability on a public entity for a past occurrence where there is no enforceable claim. Defendant proceeds to argue that prior to the passage of AB 218, Plaintiff did not have an enforceable claim against the District. Defendant notes that Plaintiff alleges that the misconduct occurred between 1976 and 1978 (Complaint, ¶¶ 1, 11), and at the time, the Government Code expressly provided that “no suit for money damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claims is required to be presented ... until a written claim therefor has been presented to the public entity.” (Gov. Code § 945.4.) Defendant argues that at the time, under the existing law, a claim was required to be presented no later than six (6) months after the accrual of the cause of action. Defendant uses these prior precedents to point out, as the Court and Plaintiff are aware, that because Plaintiff never presented a government claim to the District, there was never a time in this case prior to 2020 that all of the elements of a cause of action against the District were satisfied. This argument, amongst Defendant’s argument that the appropriation of public funs for unenforceable claims serves no public purpose as a matter of law, concludes Defendant’s analysis section arguing that the Legislature cannot retroactively impose liability on a public entity where, prior to passage of the law, the plaintiff had no enforceable claim.

As noted by Plaintiff in his opposition, all of the precedents cited by Defendant pre-date the 2019 Legislative amendment to Code of Civil Procedure § 340.1, which expanded the reach of the statute. Additionally, the Court notes that the constitutionality of Code of Civil Procedure § 340.1 with respect to the claims presentation requirement was addressed by the Court of Appeal in Coats v. New Haven Unified School District (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 415. In Coats, the appellants sued a school district alleging childhood sexual abuse by one of the school’s teachers. (Id. at 418.) There, the trial court dismissed the appellants’ claim because they failed to comply with the school district’s claim-presentation requirement. (Id. at 418-19.) However, the Court of Appeal reversed based on the 2019 amendment to Code of Civil Procedure § 340.1, and found “[i]n the face of a revival provision expressly and unequivocally encompassing claims of childhood sexual abuse previously barred for failure to present a timely government claim, it is clear we must revers the trial court’s judgment.” (Id. at 430-31.) The Court of Appeal there also noted the Legislature’s consistent work to expand the ability of victims of childhood sexual abuse to seek compensation. (Id. at 430.)

It appears to the Court that Defendant is raising similar issues already decided by the Court in Coats, including the “ex post facto” argument. However, the Court noted “that Legislation reviving the statute of limitations on civil law claims does not violate constitutional principles.” (Id. at 425.) This Court is not persuaded by Defendant’s arguments and notes that it is bound by the precedent set by the Court of Appeals which has already decided many of these issues.

The Court finds that Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED.

Second Cause of Action: Failure to Report Child Abuse in Violation of CANRA

            The Court notes that on September 20, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Request for Dismissal without prejudice as to Plaintiff’s Second Cause of Action. As such, the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to this cause of action is mooted. 

IV. CONCLUSION¿¿ 

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For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings generally is DENIED. Further, as to the Second Cause of Action, Defendant’s Motion is mooted by the voluntary dismissal of this cause of action.

Plaintiff is ordered to give notice.¿¿¿¿