Judge: Ronald F. Frank, Case: 22TRCV01219, Date: 2024-06-07 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22TRCV01219 Hearing Date: June 7, 2024 Dept: 8
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HEARING DATE: June 7, 2024
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CASE NUMBER: 22TRCV01219
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CASE NAME: Jane Doe 1, et al v. Defendant Doe School District, et
al.
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MOVING PARTY: Defendant, Palos Verdes Peninsula Unified
School District
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs, Jane Doe 1, Jane Doe 2, Jane
Doe 3, Jane Doe 4, and Jane Doe 5.
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TRIAL DATE: September
23, 2024
MOTION:¿ (1) Motion to Stay Proceedings
Tentative Ruling: (1) Defendant’s Motion to Stay Proceedings is DENIED.
The Court embraces a slippery slope when asked to stay a looming
trial pending the outcome of appeals or writ petitions in the intermediate
appellate courts. When would the stay
period end? If the Court were to stay this
trial until both the First and Second Districts rule on the pending writs
there, and if one or both writs are denied, will not the District seek a further
stay pending the outcome of the District’s certain Petition for Review to the California
Supreme Court? Under such a scenario, the
duration of the requested stay might be for several years.
This being a discretionary motion, the Court elects to exercise
its discretion by moving forward to the upcoming trial. In so ruling, the Court considers that the Legislature
was aware of the California Constitution when it enacted AB 214, it was aware that
some defendants in revived sexual abuse lawsuits would be public agencies including
schools and school districts, and it was aware of the claim presentation requirement
of Gov. Code § 945.4. The Court
considers that instead of creating a trust fund mechanism
for alleged victims of childhood sexual abuse to make claims, the Legislature made
the public policy judgment to allow the civil litigation process to be an
alternative mechanism. The Court aligns
itself with the courts who have rejected the Gift Clause argument in litigation
under CCP section 340.1. This Court considers
in the exercise of its discretion that there is a manifest public purpose in reasonable
compensation for past victims of abuse by private and public actors and to use
the civil litigation process to facilitate payment by parties proven to have responsibility
for causing, enabling or failing to prevent such abuse. The Court also considers in its discretion that
payment of compensation by a public entity – one that is found by a jury
or judge to be legally responsible for causing harm
to an alleged victim of that agency’s past or present employees -- does not constitute
a gift of public funds. Finally, the Court
considers that given the passage of time between alleged abuse and the time of
trial, a further delay of potentially several more years in deciding this case would
prejudice the interests of justice due to the further fading of memories, death
of key witnesses as has occurred in other similar cases, and the loss of other evidence
bearing on both claims and defenses to this matter.
I. BACKGROUND¿¿
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A. Factual¿¿
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On November 14, 2022, Plaintiffs, Jane
Doe 1, Jane Doe 2, Jane Doe 3, Jane Doe 4, and Jane Doe 5 (collectively
“Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint against Defendants, Defendant Doe School
District (“Defendant”), and Defendant DOES 2 through 100. On April 11, 2023,
Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). On July 18, 2023,
Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) alleging causes of action
for: (1) Negligence; (2) Negligent Supervision/Failure to Warn; and (3)
Negligent Retention/Hiring.
Now,
Defendant seeks an order from this Court staying proceedings on this matter
pending resolution of one or both of the pending writs: (1) West
Contra Costa USD v. Superior Court (First District Case No. A16934); and/or
(2) Roe #2 v. Superior Court (Second Appellate District, Div. 6, Case
No. B334707)
B. Procedural¿¿
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On May 2, 2024, Defendant District filed this Motion
to Stay Proceedings Pending Resolution of Writs. On May 24, 2024, Plaintiffs
filed an opposition. On May 31, 2024, Defendant District filed a reply
brief.
II. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
Concurrently
filed with District’s moving papers, it has requested this Court judicially
notice the following:
1.
On December 18, 2023, West Contra Costa Unified
School District filed a Petition for a Writ of Mandate seeking to have the
First District Court of Appeal compel the Superior Court of Contra Costa County
to reverse its decision overruling a demurrer which had been filed predicated
on the fact that AB 218 was an unlawful gift of public funds as applied to
claims against public entities for childhood sexual abuse which had occurred
prior to January 1, 2009.
2.
On December 22, 2023, the First District issued
an Order directing that any Opposition to the Petition be filed before January
26, 2024 and a Reply to any Opposition filed within fifteen days thereafter.
Both the District and the Plaintiff filed the permitted briefs.
3.
On February 27, 2024, the First District issued
an Order to Show Cause which provided in part that the trial court there show
cause why the relief requested in the Petition should not be granted.
4.
The February 27, 2024 Order to Show Cause
required Real party in interest to serve and file a return to the petition on
or before March 28, 2024 and the reply to the return to be served and filed
within fifteen (15) days of the filing of the return. No extensions of time for
briefing are contemplated.
5.
The February 27, 2024 Order to Show Cause
provided in part that any requests for oral argument must be served and filed
on or before March 8, 2024. 6. On March 7, 2024, both parties requested oral
argument. Thereafter, Real Party in interest submitted a Return on March 28,
2024.
6.
On March 7, 2024, both parties requested oral
argument. Thereafter, Real Party in interest submitted a Return on March 28,
2024.
7.
Multiple amicus briefs were submitted in support
of Petitioner’s position by school districts and other Joint Powers Authorities
(JPAs) on April 11, 2024.
8.
On April 12, 2024, Petitioner filed its Reply
and the West Contra Costa USD matter was fully briefed and simply awaiting the
requested oral argument.
9.
On January 25, 2024, a public entity elementary
school district designated as “Roe 2” in an AB 218 Complaint filed a Petition
for a Writ of Mandate seeking to have the Second District Court of Appeal,
Division Six compel the Superior Court of Santa Barbara County reverse its
decision overruling a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings which had been filed
predicated on the fact that AB 218 was an unlawful gift of public funds as
applied to claims against public entities for childhood sexual abuse which had
occurred prior to January 1, 2009.
10.
On March 27, 2024, the Second District, Division
Six requested an informal response to the writ to be filed on or before April
22, 2024 which addressed the question of whether the trial court had conflated
the ‘public policy’ reasons motivating the legislative enactment of AB218 with
the constitutional requirement that the appropriation of public funds serve a
‘public purpose’.
11.
The March 27, 2024 Order of the Second District,
Division Six requested an informal response to be filed on or before April 22,
2024 which addressed the question of whether the retroactive elimination of the
claims presentation requirements for legally invalid claims serve a public
purpose, i.e. does it benefit the state or does it solely benefit the private
individual plaintiffs? In responding to this question, the Court directed the
parties to consider the following authorities “Conlin v. Board of Supervisors
(1893) 99 Cal. 17, 21-22 [“An appropriation of money by the legislature for the
relief of one who has no legal claim therefor must be regarded as a ‘gift,’
within the meaning of that term, as used in [article XVI, section 6, of the
California Constitution], and it is none the less a gift that a sufficient motive
appears for its appropriation, if the motive does not rest upon a valid
consideration”]; Orange County Foundation v. Irvine Co. (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d
195, 201 [where state funds are expended in exchange for relinquishment of an
invalid claim, no public purpose is achieved; such expenditure violates the
gift clause]; County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 745-746 [the
benefit to the state from an expenditure for a public purpose is in the nature
of consideration and the funds expended are therefore not a gift even though
private persons are benefited]; Civ. Code Section 1146 [“A gift is a transfer
of personal property, made voluntarily, without consideration”].”
12.
The March 27, 2024 Order of the Second District,
Division Six provided that the school district could file an informal reply to
the letter response on or before May 17, 2024.
The Court GRANTS this request and takes
judicial notice of the above.
Additionally, filed concurrently with
Plaintiffs’ reply brief, they have requested this Court take judicial notice of
the following:
1.
EXHIBIT 1: Senate Judiciary Report, dated July 2, 2019
2.
EXHIBIT 2: AB 218 Concurrence in Senate Amendments,
dated August 30, 2019
3.
EXHIBIT 3: Assembly Judiciary Report – 3rd Reading,
dated January 16, 2019
4.
EXHIBIT 4: Assembly Judiciary Report, dated March 12,
2019
5.
EXHIBIT 5: AB 218 Senate Committee on
Appropriations, dated August 12, 2019
The Court also GRANTS this request and takes
judicial notice of the above.
III. ANALYSIS
A.
Legal Standard
The Court recognizes that it has
inherent authority to stay proceedings to promote judicial efficiency or if the
ends of justice so require. (Freiberg v. City of Mission Viejo (1995) 33
Cal. App. 4th 1484, 1489.) In determining whether an action should be stayed,
the court should generally consider “the following factors: (1) the interest of
the [party opposing the stay] in proceeding expeditiously with this litigation
or any particular aspect of it, and the potential prejudice to [the party
opposing the stay] of a delay; (2) the burden which any particular aspect of
the proceedings may impose on [the party seeking the stay]; (3) the convenience
of the court in the management of its cases, and the efficient use of judicial
resources; (4) the interests of persons not parties to the civil litigation;
and (5) the interest of the public in the pending civil and criminal
litigation.” (Bains v. Moores (2009) 172 Cal. App. 4th 445, 483.) The Court
has considered each of these factors and the arguments by both sides presented on
this motion.
The Court also has considered Cal. Const., art. VI, § 1, which vests
courts with judicial power, and the following authorities: Adams v. Paul
(1995) 11 Cal.4th 583, 593 (court has inherent power to stay related actions); Smith
v. Jones (1900) 128 Cal. 14, 15 (court has right to postpone case); Koch-Ash
v. Superior Ct. (2d Dist.1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 689, 696 (court has inherent
authority to stay trial); see also Walker v. Superior Ct. (1991) 53
Cal.3d 257, 266–67 (California Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized inherent
power of courts, derived from both statute and Constitution, to ensure orderly
administration of justice).
B.
Discussion
Here, Defendant District makes this motion on the grounds that it argues
AB 218 is unconstitutional as applied to governmental entities and that
Plaintiffs did not comply with the claims presentation requirements in effect
at the time, they have no enforceable claim against the District. As noted by
Defendant District, two cases involving the constitutionality of AB 218
currently have pending writs in the Court of Appeals: (1)
West Contra Costa USD v. Superior Court (First District
Case No. A16934); and (2) Roe #2 v. Superior Court (Second Appellate
District, Div. 6, Case No. B334707). Defendant argues that staying the
proceedings in this case pending resolution of one or both of the pending write
is in the interest of: (1) judicial economy and, in the event the appellate
courts disagree with the District’s position regarding the constitutionality of
AB218, (2) the District’s ability to engage in meaningful settlement
negotiations without fear that its boards will be asked to violate the law in
order to authorize the payments called for in any settlement agreement.
Government Claim Presentation
Per the Government Claims Act, a party
with a claim for damages against a public entity must first file claim directly
with that entity. The party may file a lawsuit only if the public entity denies
or rejects the claim. (Gov. Code §§ 905, 945.4; City of Ontario v. Superior
Court (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 894.) Further, an action against a public
employee is barred if an action against the employing public entity would be
barred by the failure to satisfy the entity claims requirements. (Gov. Code, §
950.2.) The claims presentation requirement provides the public entity with an
opportunity to evaluate the claim and decide whether to pay on the claim. (Roberts
v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 474.) Failure to allege
facts demonstrating compliance with the claims presentation requirement
subjects the complaint to a general demurrer. (State of Cal. v. Superior
Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1239.) However, claims based on childhood
sexual assault are exempt from the claims presentation requirement under the
Government Claims Act. (See Coats v. New Haven Unified School Dist.
(2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 415, 428; Gov. Code, § 905, subd. (m).)
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have not
complied with the Government Claims Act. But Plaintiffs allege that they are
victim of childhood sexual assault, and thus, the claims presentation
requirement does not apply. Defendant argues that prior to the passage of AB
218, Plaintiffs did not have an enforceable claim against the District.
Defendant notes that Plaintiffs allege that the misconduct occurred between 1978
and 1989, and at the time, the Government Code expressly provided that “no
suit for money damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of
action for which a claims is required to be presented ... until a written claim
therefor has been presented to the public entity.” (Gov. Code § 945.4.)
Defendant urges that because Plaintiffs never presented government claims to
the District, there was never a time in this case prior to 2020 that all of the
elements of a cause of action against the District were satisfied. Defendant argues also that the appropriation
of public funds for allegedly unenforceable claims serves no public purpose as
a matter of law, concluding that the Legislature cannot retroactively impose
liability on a public entity where, prior to passage of the law, the plaintiffs
had no enforceable claims.
This Court
notes that many of the precedents cited to in the writs pre-date the 2019
Legislative amendment to Code of Civil Procedure § 340.1, which expanded the
reach of the statute. Additionally, the Court notes that the constitutionality
of Code of Civil Procedure § 340.1 with respect to the claims presentation requirement
was addressed by the Court of Appeal in Coats v. New Haven Unified School
District (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 415. In Coats, the appellants sued a
school district alleging childhood sexual abuse by one of the school’s
teachers. (Id. at 418.) There, the trial court dismissed the appellants’
claim because they failed to comply with the school district’s
claim-presentation requirement. (Id. at 418-19.) However, the Court of
Appeal reversed based on the 2019 amendment to Code of Civil Procedure § 340.1,
and found “[i]n the face of a revival provision expressly and unequivocally
encompassing claims of childhood sexual abuse previously barred for failure to
present a timely government claim, it is clear we must revers the trial court’s
judgment.” (Id. at 430-31.) The Court of Appeal there also noted the
Legislatures consistent work to expand the ability of victims of childhood
sexual abuse to seek compensation. (Id. at 430.)
Under the Current
law the express language of Government Code section 905, subdivision (m) makes
clear that the claims presentation requirement would no longer be required for
childhood sexual assault claims brought under Code of Civil Procedure section
340.1, which is the basis for Plaintiff’s claims here. (Gov. Code § 905, subd.
(m).) Government Code section 905, subdivision (p) also expressly states that
it applies retroactively to the date the California Government Tort Claims Act
was enacted. (Id., § 905, subd. (p).) Code of Civil Procedure section
340.1, subdivision (q) further makes clear that any prior limitations due to
the claims presentation requirement would not bar claims like Plaintiffs’ if
filed within the three-year timeframe provided thereunder. (Code Civ. Proc., §
340.1, subd. (q).) Plaintiffs filed this action on November 14, 2022, and is
therefore within the relevant timeframe.
While the
Court agrees that Coats does not address the Gift Clause, Coats is
authority for the proposition that the Legislature has the power to
revive claims previously barred by a claim presentation requirement. (46
Cal.App.5th at p. 428.) Coats addresses Code of Civil Procedure section
340.1, subdivision (q), which, as noted above, expressly provides that satisfaction
of the claims presentation requirement is not mandated for a childhood sexual
assault claim under section 340.1. (Id.; Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1, subd.
(q).) Thus, the Court’s tentative ruling is to DENY the Motion.
Defendant moves
to stay this action based on two unrelated cases that are currently pending
before the First and Second Districts of the Court of Appeal, i.e., West
Contra Costa USD v. Superior Court (First District Case No. A16934) and Roe
#2 v. Superior Court (Second Appellate District, Div. 6, Case No. B334707),
respectively. Both of these cases involve the question of whether AB 218
violates the Gift Clause of the California Constitution, an issue underlying
this current litigation. Defendant contends that judicial economy mandates the
Court exercise its inherent power to stay these proceedings pending the
outcomes of these two other cases in the Court of Appeal. The Court considers
and weighs those points in exercising its discretion to deny the stay motion
here.
Defendant contends that if the Gift Clause argument
is embraced in the pending writ petition cases, a hypothetical verdict for the Plaintiffs
here would be reversed on appeal, which would render all work performed before
then wasteful. Defendant also contends it cannot settle this case while those
two cases are before the Court of Appeal. Defendant cites the case of Farmland
Irrigation Co. v. Dopplmaier (1957) 48 Cal.2d 208 (Farmland Irrigation),
as the standard for determining whether to grant a stay.
In opposition, Plaintiffs contend Defendant
has not made any showing it is likely to succeed on the merits. Plaintiffs argue
other trial court decisions regarding the constitutionality of AB 218 are not
binding on this court, but that fifty trial courts across California have overruled
demurrers filed by school districts defendants based on the constitutionality
of AB 218. Plaintiffs assert that although there is no evidence how the Court
of Appeal will rule on the Jane Doe case, the Second District of the Court of
Appeal and the California Supreme Court summarily denied writ petitions on
related issues regarding AB 218. This Court also notes that if the Court of
Appeal provides conflicting rulings, then the trial courts will be in the same
position they are already in and rely on the precedent they choose to follow,
and then the California Supreme Court would have to step in, which could take
years.
Plaintiffs cite the case of Nken v. Holder (2009)
556 U.S. 418 (Nken) regarding the factors for the Court to consider
regarding the requested stay. Plaintiffs assert they will be prejudiced if the
action is stayed, and that the public interest weigh in favor of denying the
stay, given the Legislature’s purpose behind AB 218, which was to provide
victims of childhood sexual abuse a path forward to seek justice against those
who abused them. Plaintiffs assert the public’s interest will not be served by
delay, as the probability of death of witnesses increases with time. Plaintiffs
contends appeals can years to decide, and at that point, this Court notes that
the losing party will likely petition the California Supreme Court for review.
Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES
Defendant’s motion to stay proceedings. Plaintiffs are to serve and file
notice of this ruling. ¿¿¿¿
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