Judge: Ronald F. Frank, Case: 22TRCV01367, Date: 2023-04-25 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22TRCV01367    Hearing Date: April 25, 2023    Dept: 8

Tentative Ruling¿ 

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HEARING DATE:                 April 25, 2022¿¿ 

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CASE NUMBER:                  22TRCV01367

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CASE NAME:                        Sergio Hernandez; Oscar Enriquez v. Jose Carlos Regalado, et al.

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MOVING PARTY:                Plaintiffs, Sergio Hernandez and Oscar Enriquez

RESPONDING PARTY:       Defendant Jose Carlos Regalado (No opposition filed)

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TRIAL DATE:                        Not Set  

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MOTION:¿                              (1) Demurrer to Answer

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Tentative Rulings:                  (1) OVERRULED.  The Court will be prepared to advance the CMC and conduct it immediately after the Demurrer hearing

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I. BACKGROUND¿¿ 

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A. Factual¿¿ 

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On December 1, 2023, Plaintiffs, Sergio Hernandez and Oscar Enriquez filed an unverified Complaint against Defendants, Jose Carlos Regalado, Kenneth M. Frittz, KW International, Inc., and DOES 1 through 25. The Complaint alleges causes of action for: (1) Motor Vehicle; and (2) General Negligence. The Complaint notes that on December 11, 2020, Plaintiffs, Sergio Hernandez and Oscar Enriquez were in a vehicle travelling southbound on the 405 freeway in the City of Lawndale when Defendants, who were driving in the same direction of travel, abruptly and without any warning or caution, collided into the vehicle in which Plaintiffs were traveling. Plaintiffs further notes that during they impact, they were violently jarred and jolted within the interior of their vehicle due to Defendants’ reckless action.

On March 9, 2023, Defendants, KW International, Inc. and Jose Carlos Regalado filed an unverified Answer denying that Plaintiffs have been damaged in any sum, or at all.  The Answer raised a series of affirmative defenses that are the subject of Plaintiff’s Demurrer.

B. Procedural¿¿ 

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On March 20, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Demurrer to Defendants, Jose Carlos Regalado and KW International, Inc.’s Answer to the Complaint. To date, no opposition has been filed.

¿II. MOVING PARTY’S GROUNDS FOR THE DEMURRER¿¿ 

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Plaintiffs demur to Defendants’ Answer on the grounds that they argue Defendants have provided no facts, and only conclusory arguments to support their affirmative defenses.

III. ANALYSIS¿ 

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A. Legal Standard

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A plaintiff may demur to a defendant’s answer within 10 days of being served with the answer (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.40, subd. (b)) on any of three grounds: (1) failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a defense; (2) uncertainty; or (3) failure to state whether a contract alleged in the answer is written or oral. (Id. at § 430.20). The demurrer may be to the whole answer or to any one or more of the several defenses set up in the answer. (Code Civ. Proc., §430.50, subd. (b).) The plaintiff may not demur to part of a defense. Each defense must be considered separately without regard to any other defense, and one defense does not become insufficient because it is inconsistent with other parts of the answer. (South Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 733.) 

“[W]hether an answer states a defense is governed by the same principles which are applicable in determining if a complaint states a cause of action.” (Id. at 732.) “[T]he demurrer to the answer admits all issuable facts pleaded therein and eliminates all allegations of the complaint denied by the answer.” (Id. at 733.) But unlike a demurrer to a complaint, “the defect in question need not appear on the fact of the answer” as “[t]he determination of the sufficiency of the answer requires an examination of the complaint because its adequacy is with reference to the complaint it purports to answer.” (Ibid.) 

B. Discussion

The Demurrer’s supporting brief argues that the answer must aver facts as carefully and with as much detail as the facts which constitute the cause of action and which are alleged in the complaint.  (FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashimi (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 384.)  FPI Development was a summary judgment case, not a demurrer case, and the plaintiff there did not demur to the answer. The only affirmative defenses that the Third District opined to have been so insufficient that they would not have survived a demurrer were the defenses of fraud in the inducement and failure of consideration, neither of which are alleged in this case.  Accordingly, FPI Development does not support the Demurrer here.  The Demurrer also relies on Metropolis Trust & Sav. Bank v. Monnier (1915) 169 Cal. 592, 596, where again no demurrer was filed against the Answer and the appeal was taken from a judgment after a trial.  The Metropolis Trust Court noted that the Answer’s charging allegation of menace, fraud, or duress this answer were wholly insufficient to raise an issue or present a defense at the trial, not for purposes of the pleading stage.  In fact, the Court stated that a general demurrer would not have been sustained.  In both of these cases, the courts were passing on allegations of fraud and similar assertions as to which more specificity is required, whether the fraud is alleged in a complaint or in an answer.  Here, the defendant does not allege fraud, menace, or duress; instead, the Answer in boilerplate fashion contends that there might be comparative fault, or there might be third party responsibility, or that plaintiff might not have mitigated damages in the incident that occurred nearly two years before the form Complaint was filed. 

  Demurrers to Answers and their affirmative defenses are rare, and a trial court abuses its discretion if it sustains such a demurrer without leave to amend when the circumstances and allegations in the pleadings are such that there may well be a bona fide factual dispute that could support the defenses.  (See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Minnette (1949) 92 Cal.App.2d 401, 407.) 

Here, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ answer improperly contains boilerplate affirmative defenses without stating any facts sufficient to constitute a defense. Plaintiffs argue that it is not appropriate for Defendants to make such allegations without providing a single fact, such as the identity of the third party who allegedly caused Plaintiffs’ damages or what actions Plaintiffs have allegedly failed to take to mitigate his damages. However, the Court views the sufficiency of the allegations in an Answer by reference to the complaint it purports to answer.  (South Shore, supra, 226 Cal.App.2d at p. 733.)  In South Shore, the First District overruled the demurrer to the answer (although certainly the allegations in the defendant’s second amended answer in that quiet title action were far more detailed than those here).  But Plaintiff’s Complaint here is but a Judicial Council form and unverified complaint.  Its boilerplate allegations of general negligence are followed by two short paragraphs following form paragraph GN-1 that boil down to a single substantive sentence of when and where a motor vehicle collision occurred.  The Answer similarly alleges what the Demurrer characterizes as “shoveled out . . . boilerplate affirmative defenses” which are typical in a motor vehicle negligence case.

In the Court’s view, it is for the discovery phase for parties to ask each other in interrogatories and other discovery for any facts that support the allegations, witnesses to those facts, and documents that evidence the same. The Complaint does not identify what parts of plaintiff’s bodies were injured, what medical care or treatment was received, what health care providers were consulted, how much money has been incurred for care and treatment, or other details that are typically left for Defendant to learn from discovery.  Similarly, the Answer does not allege specific facts the defense may not know but which sometimes can be learned or developed through discovery.  It is no uncommon for the defense to have no facts about plaintiff’s injuries, care, treatment, pre-existing conditions, mitigation efforts, or other facts that might support typical general negligence defenses.  Contrary to what the Demurrer contends, the law does not require the Court to “force Defendants to provide facts to support its affirmative defenses.”   Nor does the Court view that serving the Judicial Council form interrogatories -- which are specifically crafted for motor vehicle accident cases -- will cause Plaintiff or his counsel to “suffer the great prejudice and expense of being formed to conduct discovery.”   

            For the foregoing reasons, the Demurrer to the Answer is overruled.