Judge Ronald F. Frank, Case 22TRCV01445 2023-03-10 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Ronald F. Frank, Case: 22TRCV01445, Date: 2023-03-10 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22TRCV01445 Hearing Date: March 10, 2023 Dept: 8

Tentative Ruling¿

¿¿

HEARING DATE: March 10, 2023¿¿

¿¿

CASE NUMBER: 22TRCV01445

¿¿

CASE NAME: Maria Arroyo v. Clinton Adam Lewis, Jr., et al. .¿¿¿

¿¿

MOVING PARTY: Defendant, Clinton Adam Lewis, Jr.

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff, Maria Arroyo

¿¿

TRIAL DATE: None Set.

¿¿

MOTION:¿ (1) Motion to Strike

Tentative Rulings: (1) Denied.

I. BACKGROUND¿¿

¿¿

A. Factual¿¿

On December 8, 2022, Plaintiff, Maria Arroyo (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendants, Clinton Adam Lewis, Jr.; Joshua Adrian Preciado; and DOES 1 through 50. This case involves 2 two-car vehicle accidents on the southbound I-405 Freeway in Torrance, California. Specifically, it is alleged that on June 12, 2022, Maria Arroyo (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) was driving a Nissan Pathfinder when she was rear-ended by Defendant Lewis. Shortly thereafter, Joshua Adrian Preciado (hereinafter Defendant “Preciado”) who was driving a Honda Accord also collided with Plaintiff’s vehicle at allegedly highway speeds. Plaintiff alleges that because of this, she sustained a traumatic brain injury.

B. Procedural¿¿

On January 31, 2023, Defendant, Clinton Adam Lewis, Jr. filed a motion to strike. On February 17, 2023, Plaintiff, filed an opposition. On February 27, 2023, Defendant filed a reply brief.

¿II. MOVING PARTY’S GROUNDS

Defendant, Clinton Adam Lewis, Jr., filed his Motion to strike the allegations and prayer for punitive and exemplary damages. Defendant moves to strike the following language from Plaintiff’s Complaint:

1. Paragraph 8, lines 24-26 at page 3 & 4;

2. Paragraph 9 at page 4;

3. Paragraph 14 at page 6; and

4. Prayer for Relief #5 at page 10.

¿III. ANALYSIS¿

A. Motion to Strike

¿ Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).) The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with California law, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).) An immaterial or irrelevant allegation is one that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense; is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense; or a demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subd. (b).) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)¿¿

B. Discussion

Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (a) authorizes punitive damages in non-contract cases “where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.”

“Malice [is defined as] conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard for the rights and safety of others.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) “Oppression” means “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(2).) “Fraud” is “an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(3).) Despicable conduct is “conduct which is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people. Such conduct has been described as ‘having the character of outrage frequently associated with crime.’” (Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1287.)

The “act of operating a vehicle while intoxicated may constitute an act of “malice” under section 3294 if performed under circumstances which disclose a conscious disregard of the probable dangerous consequences.” (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 892.) Two cases, Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890 and Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, illustrate the specificity and gravity required to support a claim of punitive damages against an allegedly intoxicated driver.

While ordinary intoxicated driving may create a risk of injury to others that is foreseeable, that risk is not necessarily probable. (Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, 89.) In Dawes, the Court found that the defendant’s decision to “zig-zag in and out of traffic at 65 miles per hour in a crowded beach recreation area at 1:30 in the afternoon on a Sunday in June” was sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages. (Id.) In Taylor, the allegations that a defendant was an alcoholic who was well-aware of the nature of his alcoholism, had a history of and tendency to drive a motor vehicle while intoxicated, had previously caused an accident while driving while intoxicated, had been arrested and convicted on various other occasions for driving while intoxicated, had recently completed a period of probation for a drunk driving conviction, had his probation conditioned on refraining from driving for at least 6 hours after drinking, and had additional pending criminal charges for driving under the influence were sufficient to support a claim of punitive damages. (Taylor v. Superior Court, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 893.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not plead sufficient and specific facts that support an allegation of “despicable conduct.” Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s complaint at paragraphs 8, 9, and 14, contain only allegations and/or legal conclusion with no specific facts of willful, despicable or intentional conduct. Defendant cites to both Dawes and Taylor and argues that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to meet the pleading standards set but the Courts in those cases. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s complaint merely alleges that Defendant was under the influence of alcohol, and that said influence caused the accident to Plaintiff. Defendant contends Plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory characterizations of Defendant’s conduct as malice, and that specific facts must be alleged to show the requisite conduct. Defendant also argues that Plaintiff does not set out allegations of despicable conduct.

In opposition, Plaintiff first points out that the Complaint alleges facts of “despicable conduct.” Namely, paragraphs 8, 9, and 14, all include allegations of despicable conduct. Additionally, Plaintiff argues that she explicitly and specifically alleged that Defendant Lewis was intoxicated, knew that driving while intoxicated was dangerous to the public, knew that driving while intoxicated would likely cause injury to others, and with such knowledge of the likelihood of causing injury consciously chose to drive his 2020 Hyundai along a public roadway. Plaintiff asserts that such allegations specify the date, time, place, behavior, vehicle involved, Lewis’ intent and knowledge that his behavior would likely cause injury, that Lewis voluntarily placed himself in a state of intoxication and chose to drive, and that such specific behavior was despicable, malicious, and a conscious disregard for the safety of others that resulted in Plaintiff’s injuries.

Here, the Court notes that Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant drove his vehicle along and upon southbound interstate-405, south of Artesia Boulevard, while under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs, in violation of California Vehicle Code section(s), including, but not limited to 23152(a)-(b), 23153(a)-(b), and 22017(a) VC, so as to cause it to violently collide with an damage Plaintiff’s vehicle. (Complaint, ¶ 8.) the Complaint further alleges that Defendant Lewis consciously, intentionally, maliciously, recklessly, despicably, and with a conscious disregard for the safety of others, including Plaintiff, chose to operate his vehicle along a public roadway/highway while fully aware that operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and/or drugs significantly impairs, detrimentally impacts, and reduces one’s motor skills, perceptions as to time and distance, reaction time, and overall judgment. (Complaint, ¶ 9.)

Plaintiff also alleges in her Complaint that Defendant Lewis was fully aware that voluntarily placing himself in the above described physical and mental state would likely cause serious injuries or death, directly and proximately from his impaired/compromised sate while operating a vehicle on a public road or highway. (Complaint, ¶ 9.) Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts that despite knowing the consequences of said actions, Defendant Lewis disregarded the safety of others by continuing to drive under the influence of drugs or alcohol. (Complaint, ¶ 9.) These allegations are similar to the so-called Watson advisement given but judges in criminal cases when a DUI defendant seeks court approval of a plea bargain. In the Court’s view, there are sufficiently pleaded facts in the Complaint to overcome the motion’s arguments regarding the changes in law that heightened the standards of proof for punitive damages. Whether plaintiff will have sufficient proof of these allegations to overcome a motion for summary adjudication of the punitive damages issue remains to be seen. But the specific allegations of the Complaint far exceed the contention that all plaintiff alleged were “mere buzz words” in alleging potential punitive damages liability here.