Judge: Ronald F. Frank, Case: 22TRCV01449, Date: 2023-10-31 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22TRCV01449 Hearing Date: January 10, 2024 Dept: 8
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HEARING DATE: January 10, 2024¿¿
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CASE NUMBER: 22TRCV01449
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CASE NAME: Sandra Butler v. Hollywood Park Management
Company, LLC, et al. .¿¿¿
MOVING PARTY: Defendants, Hollywood Park Management Company, LLC; Stadco
LA, LLC, Pincay RE, LLC (erroneously sued and served as Hollywood Park
Management Company II, LLC; Stadco LA Manager, LLC, and Pincay RE Member LLC)
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff, Sandra Butler
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TRIAL DATE: None
Set.
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MOTION:¿ (1) Motion to Strike
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Tentative Rulings: (1) GRANTED.
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I. BACKGROUND¿¿
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A. Factual¿¿
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On December 8, 2022, Plaintiff, Sandra
Butler (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against Defendants, Hollywood Park
Management, LLC, Hollywood Park Management Company II, LLC, Stadco LA, LLC,
Stadco LA Manager, LLC, Pincay Re, LLC, Pincay Re Member LLC, APEX Security
Group, Inc., and DOES 1 through 50. On May 10, 2023, Plaintiff filed a First
Amended Complaint (“FAC”). The Court head and granted a different defendant’s motion
to strike punitive damages language from the FAC on October 31, 2023, but gave
Plaintiff leave to amend. On November 14, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Second
Amended Complaint (“SAC”) alleging causes of action for: (1) Negligence; and
(2) Premises Liability.
After Plaintiff amended the previously stricken
allegations, once again Defendants, Hollywood
Park Management Company, LLC (“Hollywood Park”); Stadco LA, LLC (“Stadco”),
Pincay RE, LLC (“Pincay”) (erroneously sued and served as Hollywood Park
Management Company II, LLC; Stadco LA Manager, LLC, and Pincay RE Member LLC), have
filed a Motion to Strike virtually the same portions of Plaintiff’s SAC on
virtually the same grounds as were the subject of the Court’s October 31, 2023
ruling.
B. Procedural¿¿
On December 13, 2023, Defendants,
Hollywood Park, Stadco, and Picany filed a Motion to Strike. On December 27,
2023, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On January 3, 2024, Hollywood Park,
Stadco, and Picany filed a reply brief.
II. GROUNDS FOR MOTION
Apex seeks to strike the
following portions of Plaintiff’s FAC:
1.
Page 7, paragraph 44, lines 14-19: “Defendants’
HOLLYWOOD PARK, STADCO LA, and PINCAY RE conduct constitutes a willful and
deliberate disregard for the safety of Plaintiff and all other invitees and
guests on the SUBJECT PREMISES. Defendants HOLLYWOOD PARK, STADCO LA, and
PINCAY RE knowingly and willfully subjected Plaintiff and others to a risk of
serious harm despite their knowledge not only that the dangerous condition
existed, but that others had already been injured as a result of the dangerous
condition, including at least one person taken away in an ambulance.”
2.
Page 7, paragraph 45, lines 20-24: “Defendants
HOLLYWOOD PARK, STADCO LA, and PINCAY RE willfully and deliberately failed to
avoid other members of the public, including Plaintiff, from suffering the
dangerous consequences posed by their failure to take corrective measures.
Defendants’ HOLLYWOOD PARK, STADCO LA, and PINCAY RE conduct was such so as to
be offensive and unconscionable to a reasonable person of the community.”
3. Page
8, paragraph 3 of the Prayer for Relief, lines 7-8: “For punitive damages
against Defendants HOLLYWOOD PARK, STADCO LA, and PINCAY RE, according to
proof;”
4.
Page 8, paragraph 5 of the Prayer for Relief,
line 10: “including attorneys’ fees” The Motion is based on this Notice, the
attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the attached declaration of Eric
C. Bradley, records on file, any documents of which the Court must or may take
judicial notice, and such other and further evidence as may be presented at the
time of the hearing.
¿III. ANALYSIS¿
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A. Motion to Strike
¿ Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading
may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).) The court may, upon a motion, or at any
time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant,
false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436,
subd. (a); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a
pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are
surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].) The court may also strike
all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with
California law, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., §
436, subd. (b).) An immaterial or irrelevant allegation is one that is not
essential to the statement of a claim or defense; is neither pertinent to nor
supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense; or a demand for judgment
requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 431.10, subd. (b).) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on
the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., §
437.)¿¿
B.
Discussion
Here, Hollywood Park, Stadco, and Picany argue
this Court should strike the references in the SAC to punitive damages as well
as Plaintiff’s prayer for attorneys’ fees. This is a similar argument since it was the basis
for the Court’s granting of another defendant’s motion to strike portions of paragraphs
44 and 45 of the FAC several months ago.
Punitive
Damages
Code
section 3294, subdivision (a) authorizes punitive damages in non-contract cases
“where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” “Malice
[is defined as] conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to
the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a
willful and conscious disregard for the rights and safety of others.” (Civ.
Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) “Oppression” means “despicable conduct that
subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that
person's rights.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(2).) “Fraud” is “an intentional
misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the
defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving
a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Civ. Code,
§ 3294, subd. (c)(3).) The Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts which, if
proven could entitle Plaintiff to establish the malice prong of Civil Code
section 3294.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s allegations
do not rise to the heightened level of “despicable conduct” necessary for
punitive damages. Instead, Defendants argue that alleging Defendants allowed a
dip in a walkway to exist on a premise is a garden-variety premises liability
allegation. Defendants, Hollywood Park, Stadco, and Picany assert that
Plaintiff fails to identify which of the defendants the security guard worked
for. Further, the Court notes that pursuant to Civil Code § 3294(b), “[w]ith
respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard,
authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on
the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.” Here,
the Court notes that the terms “officer,” “director,” nor “managing agent” are not
present in Plaintiff’s SAC. Instead, the only allegations that appear similar
are as follows: (1) “…Plaintiff alleges that the event staff and security
guards were employees and/or agents of Defendants, and each of them.” (SAC, ¶
17); and (2) “…the persons acting as the managers, event staff, security
personnel and maintainers, were the agents, servants and/or employees of
Defendants, acting within the scope of said agency and employed by Defendants,
and each of them.” (SAC, ¶ 40.)
Plaintiff cannot merely allege such an
allegation in a conclusory way. This Court notes that it previously granted
Apex Securities’ Motion to Strike portions of the FAC as pertaining to punitive
damages and noted similar deficiencies as still remain in the SAC. For example,
Plaintiff still relies on the same paragraphs to argue that she has alleged
sufficient facts to state a claim for punitive damages. For example, Plaintiff
notes again that a security guard told Plaintiff that “someone is always
falling” off the same dip, including at least one other person who had to be
taken away in an ambulance after falling over the dip a couple weeks prior. (SAC,
¶ 41.) Alleging this again, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants knew or had
notice of the dangerous condition on the subject premises posed by the
significant yet unmarked dip in the surface walked on by invitees and guests
the vicinity of the subject incident. (SAC, ¶ 42.)
In the Court’s view, Plaintiff again has failed
to allege her claim for punitive damages with the requisite specificity or with
sufficient facts to justify that the knowledge of a prior accident constitutes “despicable
conduct.” The Court does not believe the
mere notice of knowledge of a prior accident at the same location raises to the
level of punitive damages culpability, although it may be sufficient evidence
if proven to show actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition. Plaintiff fails to note whether she was told
that Defendants were made aware of the prior incidents, whether the security
guard merely saw individuals fall, or whether the guard’s employers were made
aware of the area being prone to falling, whether the prior incident she/he
told Plaintiff about was reported to Defendants, etc.. Given the prevalent use
of private security companies and outsourced guards, it is not clear that
plaintiff has alleged whether the security guard mentioned in paragraph 44 was
even an employee of any of the moving defendants. Without these types of allegations, Plaintiff
cannot allege punitive damages against Defendants for a negligence case.
The Court understands for counsel’s declaration
in opposition to this motion that Plaintiff has attempted to obtain this
information through discovery, but Plaintiff asserts that Defendants have
failed to timely respond to her discovery in December of 2023. As such, the
Court’s tentative ruling is to GRANT this motion, but allow leave to amend at a
time in which Defendants intend to respond to Plaintiff’s discovery. Defendants
will be required to inform the Court of whether and if so why they have failed
to timely respond to Plaintiff’s discovery requests, but have had time to file
a motion to strike.
Attorneys’
Fees
Defendants
also argue that Plaintiff does not allege a basis for attorneys’ fees because
Plaintiff failed to allege a contract or statute entitling her to attorneys’
fees. The Court agrees and notes that Plaintiff does not even discuss this
argument in her opposition. As such, this Court GRANTS the Motion to Strike, and
is not inclined to give leave to amend absence specific representations by
Plaintiff’s counsel as to what additional facts might be alleged to support
such an item.
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Unless notice of ruling is waived, Moving Defendants are
ordered to give notice.