Judge: Ronald F. Frank, Case: 22TRCV01520, Date: 2023-05-09 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22TRCV01520 Hearing Date: May 9, 2023 Dept: 8
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HEARING DATE: May 9, 2023¿¿
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CASE NUMBER: 22TRCV01520
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CASE NAME: Alexandria Black-Davis v. Thomas Blackburn, et al.
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MOVING PARTY: Defendant, LYFT, Inc.
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RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff, Alexandria Black-Davis
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TRIAL DATE: None
Set.
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MOTION:¿ (1) Motion to Dismiss under Forum
Non-Conveniens
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Tentative Rulings: (1) GRANTED.
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I. BACKGROUND¿¿
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A. Factual¿¿
On
December 19, 2022, Plaintiff, Alexandria Black-Davis filed a Complaint against
Defendants, Thomas Blackburn and LYFT, Inc. Since then, Defendant, Thomas
Blackburn has been dismissed. The Complaint alleges causes of action for (1)
Motor Vehicle Negligence; and (2) General Negligence. Plaintiff alleges that on
February 11, 2021, she was a passenger in a vehicle driven by a ride-share
driver connected to Defendant Lyft when that vehicle was involved in a
collision at “Highway 183 at Austin-Bergstrom Int’l airport.” (Request
for Judicial Notice, (“RJN”), Exhibit (“Ex.”) 1, (Complaint), pp. 4-5.) As noted in Lyft’s Motion here, Plaintiff did
not check box 8(c) on her Complaint, which indicates that “injury to person or
damage to personal property occurred in its jurisdictional area,” as grounds
for venue in Los Angeles County. (RJN, Ex. 1 (Complaint), p. 2, ¶ 8(c).) That omission has not been corrected or explained
in plaintiff’s belated opposition.
B. Procedural¿¿
On March 28, 2023, Defendant,
LYFT, Inc. filed a Motion to Dismiss for Forum Non-Conveniens. On April 17,
2023, Defendant filed a notice of Plaintiff’s failure to oppose the motion. On
April 20, 2023, Plaintiff filed a request for Dismissal of Defendant, Thomas
Blackburn.
This Motion
was originally heard on Aril 25, 2023. After the Court heard oral argument, the
Court continued this hearing to May 9, 2023 to allow Defendant to respond to
Plaintiff’s April 25, 2023 opposition which had not been scanned into the Court’s
digital case file and tus the Court was unable to consider that Opposition and
Mr. Awad’s declaration with exhibits before the initial hearing on this Motion.
On April 25,
2023, Plaintiff filed an opposition and counsel Awad’s supporting declaration
with exhibits. On May 2, 2023, Defendant filed a reply brief with its consel’s
supporting declaration and exhibits.
II. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
Defendant, LYFT, Inc. requested that this Court take
judicial notice of the following:
1.
The Court is requested to judicially notice Plaintiff
Alexandria Black-Davis’s Complaint filed with the Court as Case Number
22TRCV01520, attached hereto as Exhibit 1. (Evid. Code 452(d) [judicial notice
may be taken of records of “any court of this state.”]; See Friends of
Shingle Springs Interchange, Inc. v. County of El Dorado (2011) 200 Cal.
App. 4th 1470, 1482 [“[w]hen any ground for objection to a complaint ...
appears on the face thereof, or from any matter of which the court is required
to or may take judicial notice, the objection on that ground may be taken by a
[pleading challenge].”])
2.
The Court is requested to judicially notice the fact
that the location of the Austin Bergstrom International Airport (as alleged in
Plaintiff’s Complaint as the location of the motor vehicle collision and
injury) is not in Los Angeles County, but rather, in Austin, Texas, (Cal. Evid.
Code § 452(h) [judicial notice may be taken of “facts and propositions that are
not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate
determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.”)
The Court GRANTS Defendant’s request and
takes judicial notice of the above.
III. ANALYSIS¿
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A. Legal Standard
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“When a court upon motion of a
party or its own motion finds that in the interest of substantial justice an
action should be heard in a forum outside this state, the court shall stay or
dismiss the action in whole or in part on any conditions that may be just.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 410.30, subd. (a).) “In applying the traditional forum non
conveniens analysis, the trial court must engage in a two-step process, on
which the defendant bears the burden of proof. (Stangvik v. Shiley Inc. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 744, 751; Chong v. Superior Court
(1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1032 1037- 1038; Morris v. AGFA Corp. (2006) 144
Cal.App.4th 1452, 1462.) In the first step, the court must determine whether a
suitable alternative forum exists. (Stangvik, supra, 54 Cal.3d at
p. 751.) "If the court finds that a suitable alternative forum exists, it
must then balance the private interests of the litigants and the interests of
the public in retaining the action in California.” (Animal Film, LLC v.
D.E.J. Productions, Inc. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 466, 472.) The trial
court’s balancing is given substantial deference. (Chong, supra, 58
Cal.App.4th at p. 1038.)
"Neither inconvenience nor the additional expense of
litigation in the selected forum is a factor to be considered. However, a forum
selection clause will not be enforced if to do so would bring about a result
contrary to the public policy of this state." (Intershop, supra, p.
199-200.)
B. Discussion
Here,
Defendant, LYFT, Inc. notes that the subject accident occurred in Austin, Texas.
Defendant also notes that Plaintiff’s counsel admitted in a representation made
to this Court in this case, that Plaintiff currently resides in Texas and
further represented his belief that Blackburn is a Texas resident. Defendant
cites to the Texas Peace Officer’s Crash Report for the crash occurring on
February 11, 2021, in Austin, Texas (“Crash Report”) noting that all of the
persons involved in the 12-vehicle accident were Texas residents, including Blackburn,
with on exception of a single third-party driver, identified in the Crash
Report, as having a Miami, Florida address, and who is not a party to this
lawsuit. Defendant notes that all known prospective witnesses with knowledge of
the accident and injuries reside in Texas, as well as all known records,
documents, and other physical evidence related to this accident.
Further,
Defendant notes that LYFT is a TNC in Texas, and TNCs are governed by the Texas
TNC Statute, which defines a TNC as an “entity that, for compensation, enables
a passenger to prearrange with a driver, exclusively through the entity’s
digital network, a digitally prearranged ride. (Tex. Occ. Code, § 2402.001.)
Texas Occupations Code Section 2402.003(a) states in relevant part, “the
regulation of transportation network companies, drivers logged in to a digital
network, and vehicles used to provide digitally prearranged rides: (1) is an
exclusive power and function of this state…”. Texas has implemented a detailed
insurance structure governing this arrangement. (Tex. Ins. Code §§ 1954.001 et
seq.)
Suitable Alternative
Defendant
argues that Texas is not only a suitable forum, but also the more appropriate
forum. First, Defendant explains that Texas state courts have jurisdiction as
the accident occurred in Texas. Additionally, to address any doubt, Defendant,
without waiving any of its other rights and defenses, is willing to stipulate
to personal jurisdiction in Texas. (MacLeod Decl., ¶ 13.) Defendant notes that
this stipulation satisfies the portion of the “suitable” forum inquiry under Stangvik
v. Shiley, Inc., supra, 54 Cal.3d at 752, fn. 3. Defendant contends that former
defendant and accident-involved driver Blackburn is a Texas resident subject to
personal jurisdiction in Texas. Second, Defendant also asserts that under
California’s “borrowing statute,” under Code of Civil Procedure § 361, the
applicable Texas statute of limitations will apply to Plaintiff’s claims
regardless of whether they were brought in California or in Texas. As such,
Defendant correctly notes that there is no statute of limitations barring
Plaintiff’s action in Texas that would not also apply in California. However,
Defendant also notes that it is willing to alleviate any doubt by being willing
to stipulate to the tolling of the statute of limitations during the pendency
of Plaintiff’s claims before this court, given that it appears that the lawsuit
was filed timely under the Texas statute of limitations for personal injuries.
(MacLeod Decl., ¶ 14.)
In opposition,
Plaintiff contends that Texas is not suitable because no uninsured motorist
coverage is offered. Plaintiff asserts that the second prong of the analysis
fails because Texas, based on its lack of necessary UIM coverage, afforded by
contract between the parties, “provided no remedy at all” and therefore should
remain in Los Angeles. Plaintiff references but incorrectly cites to the Second
District case of Aghaian v. Minassian (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 427, 431. In Aghaian, the Court of Appeal reversed
the trial’s court’s determination that the California lawsuit should be stayed
because Iran was a suitable forum for a suit concerning rights to Iranian real
property claimed by plaintiffs in one of those rare, exceptional cases where
the defendant’s asserted forum was unsuitable because plaintiffs could not
obtain any remedy at all given the hostility of Iranian law to women and non-Muslims. The Court finds this precedent to be highly distinguishable
on the facts.
In
its reply brief, Defendant asserts that the question of whether California law
provides more insurance coverage than Texas law is irrelevant to the forum non conveniens
analysis, as long as Texas is a suitable forum. In response to Plaintiff’s
argument that Texas would not provide any remedy at all because LYFT carries
UIM coverage in California but not in Texas, LYFT asserts that not only does
Texas TNC statutes regulate and require ample insurance coverage, but
additionally, any perceived UIM insurance benefit under California law is
irrelevant to the “suitability” prong of the forum non conveniens analysis. “A
forum is suitable where an action ‘can be brought,’ although not necessarily
won.” (citing Roman v. Liberty Univ. Inc., (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 670,
683 [rejecting plaintiff’s argument that Virginia was not a suitable forum
where California law was more favorable].) Accordingly, LYFT argues that
whether California provides expanded insurance coverage as compared to Texas is
a prohibited inquiry in a suitability analysis. Further, Defendant notes that
even if this case were to proceed in California, Lyft’s operations in Texas are
exclusively governed by Texas statutory law – including its insurance
regulations – regardless of forum.
Based
on the law, and Defendant’s willingness to stipulate to personal jurisdiction
in Texas in order to alleviate any of the Court’s concerns, the Court believes
that Defendant satisfies its burden in showing that Texas state courts will be
a suitable alternative forum, unlike the Iranian forum in Aghaian.
Weighing of Private and Public Factors
Defendant
notes that private factors weigh in favor of dismissal as all relevant
prospective witnesses are indisputably in Texas, where the accident occurred,
and where Plaintiff resides. Defendant contends that all would be
inconvenienced by a California trial. Additionally, Defendant contends that
California courts cannot compel the attendance of non-party witnesses to
testify in a California courtroom under California law. (Code Civ. Proc. §§
1989, 2026.010(c).) Further, the underlying events of this lawsuit occurred in
Texas, and all records, documents, and other physical evidence all appear to be
located in Texas. The Court agrees that the listed private factors weigh in
favor of dismissal so that Plaintiff may re-file in Texas.
In
opposition, Plaintiff asserts that all witnesses relevant to a UIM claim are in
California. Plaintiff contends that the “phantom” witnesses that Defendant
recites as living in Texas are not at all the witnesses that will actually be
sought in this case. Instead, Plaintiff asserts, through a declaration of her
counsel rather than plaintiff herself, that the witnesses that will actually be
used are her treating doctors who are all (per representations of plaintiff’s
counsel) in Los Angeles. Plaintiff also notes that an extensive amount of
medical treatment exclusively took place in Los Angeles. Plaintiff argues that
it would be prohibitively burdensome to require the doctors to appear in a
Texas court.
Plaintiff
also argues that the only remaining Defendant, LYFT, Inc. has its headquarters
in San Francisco, California, and its Principal Place of Business in Los
Angeles, California. Further, Plaintiff notes that LYFT, Inc.’s agent for
service of process in in Glendale, California.
In
its reply brief, LYFT argues that even if Plaintiffs’ treating doctors are in
Los Angeles, the majority of witnesses to the accident reside in Texas. LYFT
also asserts that Plaintiff’s treating physicians will likely be willing to testify
in a Texas court, and thus the concern is overstated. LYFT also asserts that
Plaintiff does not provide any admissible evidence that she is a current
California resident. The Opposition
attaches a redacted driver’s license for Plaintiff showing a California address,
but it is the declaration of Plaintiff’s counsel rather than Plaintiff herself
who purports to lay the foundation for this asserted fact. The Court sustains Lyft’s objection to the
driver’s license exhibit.
Defendant
also notes that public interest factors weigh in favor of dismissal because
Texas has every interest in this case, whereas California has very little
interest in litigation involving injuries that occurred outside of California
by non-residents. Defendant supports this argument by noting that Texas has passed
specific laws regulating all facets of Plaintiff’s lawsuit, and the insurance
at play is based on Texas regulations. Defendant further notes that dismissal
is warranted because neither the Court nor the jury in California would be
burdened with interpreting and applying Texas law to decide this Texas action
in a heavily-regulated space.
Lastly,
in opposition, Plaintiff argues that California Code of Civil Procedure section
410.40 requires that “any person may maintain an action or proceeding in a court
of this state against a foreign corporation or nonresident person where the
action or proceeding arises out of or relates to any contract, agreement or
undertaking for which a choice of California law has been made in whole or in
part by the parties thereto and which (a) is a contract, agreement, or
undertaking, contingent or otherwise, relating to a transaction involving in
the aggregate not less than one million dollars ($1,000,000), and (b) contains
a provision or provisions under which the foreign corporation or nonresident
agrees to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state.”
In
its reply brief, LYFT, Inc. assert that section 410.40 is inapplicable because
there is no contract claim pending before the court, nor does the pending proposed
First Amended Complaint purport to state a breach of contract claim. In a duel of competing exhibits provided to the
Court as exhibits attached to declarations of counsel rather than an actual
party or witness, Plaintiff asserts that the Terms of Service of the LYFT agreement
plaintiff purportedly entered into in California does, and Defendant asserts
that the Terms of Service do not, contain a California forum selection clause. Further, Defendant notes that Plaintiff has
not even alleged a contract claim against it in the present action. However,
what LYFT does assert to be in the Terms of Service is a mandatory arbitration
clause. As such, Defendant alternatively requests this court compel Plaintiff
to arbitration. The Court will not order
arbitration based on an assertion first raised in a reply brief without
affording plaintiff any opportunity to respond.
But even the truncated Terms of Service exhibit attached to the
Opposition reflects the existence of an arbitration clause. The Court finds no forum selection clause, i.e.,
mandating California as the forum for any disputes, in either counsel’s exhibit
attaching some or all of the Terms of Service “contract.” The Court will entertain oral argument from plaintiff’s
counsel as to whether he mistakenly meant to refer to a choice or law rather
than a choice of forum clause in the contract.
V.
CONCLUSION¿¿
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For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
for Forum Non-Conveniens is GRANTED.
Moving party is ordered to give notice.