Judge: Ronald F. Frank, Case: 22TRCV01562, Date: 2023-10-24 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22TRCV01562    Hearing Date: November 21, 2023    Dept: 8

                                                                        Tentative Ruling

HEARING DATE: November 21, 2023

CASE NUMBER: 22TRCV01562

CASE NAME: Floyd Broadnax v. Lyft, Inc., et al

MOVING PARTY: Defendant, Lyft, Inc.

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff, Floyd Broadnax

TRIAL DATE: Not Set.

MOTION: (1) Motion to Compel Arbitration

Tentative Rulings: (1) Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual

On December 21, 2022, Plaintiff, Floyd Broadnax (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against Defendant, Lyft, Inc., a Delaware corporation; John Doe, and DOES 1 through 100. The Complaint alleges causes of action for: (1) Assault; (2) Battery; (3) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (4) Negligence; and (5) Negligent Hiring, Supervision, and Retention.

Defendant Lyft, Inc. now files a Motion to Compel Arbitration.

B. Procedural

On October 10, 2023, Defendant Lyft filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration. On November 13, 2023, Lyft filed a Notice of Non-Opposition.

II. ANALYSIS 

A. Legal Standard

The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) states that “[a] written provision in any . . . contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” (9 U.S.C. § 2.) California law incorporates many of the basic policy objectives contained in the Federal Arbitration Act, including a presumption in favor of arbitrability. (Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 971-72.)

California law states that “[o]n petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party to the agreement refuses to arbitrate that controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists….” (Code Civ. Proc, § 1281.2.) “The party seeking arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement, and the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving any defense, such as unconscionability.” (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236.)

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §1281.2, generally, on a petition to compel arbitration, the court must grant the petition unless it finds either (1) no written agreement to arbitrate exists; (2)¿the right to compel arbitration has been waived; (3) grounds exist for revocation of the agreement; or (4) litigation is pending that may render the arbitration unnecessary or create conflicting¿rulings on common issues.

When seeking to compel arbitration, the initial burden lies with the moving party to demonstrate the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by preponderance of evidence. (Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 841-42; Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021), 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 164-65.) It is sufficient for the moving party to produce a copy of the arbitration agreement or set forth the agreement’s provisions. (Gamboa, 72 Cal.App.5th at 165.) The burden then shifts to the opposing party to prove by a preponderance of evidence any defense to enforcement of the contract or the arbitration clause. (Ruiz, 232 Cal.App.4th at 842; Gamboa, 72 Cal.App.5th at 165.) Subsequently, the moving party must establish with the preponderance of admissible evidence a valid arbitration agreement between the parties. (Ibid.) The trial court then weighs all the evidence submitted and uses its discretion to make a final determination. (Ibid.) “California law, ‘like [federal law], reflects a strong policy favoring arbitration agreements and requires close judicial scrutiny of waiver claims.’” (Wagner Const. Co. v. Pacific Mechanical Corp. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 19, 31.)

If the court orders arbitration, then the court shall stay the action until arbitration is completed. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.4.)

B. Discussion

As a preliminary matter, this Court notes that in its October 24, 2023, minute order, it granted Plaintiff’s former counsel’s motion to be relieved as counsel. As such, the Court will hear from Plaintiff, if attending the hearing, to note whether Plaintiff has retained or sought out other counsel. If so, this Court will continue the motion to allow Plaintiff and his potential new counsel to respond to this motion.

Defendant notes that Plaintiff has a history of consenting on the Lyft platform Defendant contends that during the account process, on December 16, 2020, Plaintiff accepted Lyft’s then-current Terms of Service on August 26, 2019, and subsequently accepted Lyft’s December 9, 2020 Terms of Service on January 6, 2021. The arbitration provisions contained on the first page of the Lyft Terms of Service (which are discussed in much more detail in the multiple provisions contained in Paragraph 17 of the Lyft Terms of Service) states in pertinent part:

PLEASE BE ADVISED: THIS AGREEMENT CONTAINS PROVISIONS THAT GOVERN HOW CLAIMS BETWEEN YOU AND LYFT CAN BE BROUGHT (SEE SECTION 17 BELOW). THESE PROVISIONS WILL, WITH LIMITED EXCEPTION, REQUIRE YOU TO SUBMIT CLAIMS YOU HAVE AGAINST LYFT TO BINDING AND FINAL ARBITRATION . . .

By entering into this Agreement, and/or by using or accessing the Lyft Platform you expressly acknowledge that you understand this Agreement (including the dispute resolution and arbitration provisions in Section 17) and accept all of its terms. IF YOU DO NOT AGREE TO BE BOUND BY THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT, YOU MAY NOT USE OR ACCESS THE LYFT PLATFORM OR ANY OF THE SERVICES PROVIDED THROUGH THE LYFT PLATFORM.

(Declaration of Alex Sniegowski, Exhibit. 3 at p. 1.) This evidence establishes the existence of an arbitration agreement between the parties.

Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that he suffered physical and psychological injury on January 6, 2021 arising out of his rideshare with Defendant John Doe, alleged to be a Lyft driver, which constituted a physical battery after consuming crystal methamphetamine for the entire duration of Plaintiff’s ride. The Complaint alleges that Lyft negligently hired or retained the services of Defendant John Doe, making Lyst allegedly liable independently because of its screening and hiring practices. Per the moving papers, one cannot commence a Lyft ride without using the Lyft application, and thus continuing the confirm the application of the Lyft Terms of Service because of the rider’s use of the Lyft platform. Consequently, this arbitration agreement would encompass Plaintiff’s injury and alleged causes of action. Based on this, the Court finds that Lyft has met its initial burden of showing that an arbitration agreement exists between the parties.

The Court will allow oral argument from Plaintiff on whether he intends to argue that Lyft waived its right to compel arbitration, or that Plaintiff has a viable legal defense to the enforceability of the Lyft arbitration agreement, or an applicable express exception to its application, or that the agreement was revoked prior to the date of the subject accidence. However, in the absence of any such showing by the Plaintiff, the Court’s tentative ruling is to GRANT the motion to compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s dispute against Lyft, and to stay proceedings in court in this matter against Lyft pending arbitration.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED.

Lyft is ordered to give notice.