Tentative Ruling

 

HEARING DATE: January 19, 2024¿¿¿ 

 

CASE NUMBER: 22TRCV01580 

CASE NAME: M.B. v. Doe Unified School District, et al.  

MOVING PARTY: Defendant, Los Angeles Unified School District  

 

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff, M.B.   

TRIAL DATE: January 13, 2025  

 

MOTION: (1) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings  

 

Tentative Rulings: (1)  Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED as to the first three causes of action but granted on statute of limitations grounds as to the 4th and 5th causes of action under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 because the Court finds Code of Civil Procedure § 335.1 provides the borrowed statute of limitations for Section 1983 actions and this 60-year-old federal civil rights claims are barred under the two-year statute of limitations in section 335.1. 

   

  

I. BACKGROUND 

A. Factual 

On December 23, 2022, Plaintiff, M.B. (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against Defendants, Doe Unified School District, and DOES 1 through 50. On February 22, 2023, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleging causes of action for: (1) Negligence; (2) Negligent Supervision of a Minor; (3) Negligent Hiring/Retention/Supervision of Unfit Employee; (4) Violation of Civil Rights (42 U.S.C. § 1983); and (5) Violation of Civil Rights (Monell Claim).  The FAC alleges personal injuries and damages from Childhood Sexual Abuse. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s former employee during the 1961-1962 school year.  

 

Now, Defendant, Los Angeles Unified School District files a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on the bases Defendant argues Plaintiff’s suit is barred because Assembly Bill 218 violates Article XVI, Section 6 of the California Constitution. The parties also briefed the potential bar of the statute of limitation as to the federal civil rights causes of action contained in the 4th and 5th causes of action. 

 

B. Procedural 

On November 21, 2023, Defendant filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. On January 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On January 11, 2024, Defendant filed a reply brief.   

 

Government Claim Presentation  

 

Per the Government Claims Act, a party with a claim for damages against a public entity must first file a claim directly with that entity. The party may file a lawsuit only if the public entity denies or rejects the claim. (Gov. Code §§ 905, 945.4; City of Ontario v. Superior Court (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 894.) Further, an action against a public employee is barred if an action against the employing public entity would be barred by the failure to satisfy the entity claims requirements. (Gov. Code, § 950.2.) The claims presentation requirement provides the public entity with an opportunity to evaluate the claim and decide whether to pay on the claim. (Roberts v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 474.) Failure to allege facts demonstrating compliance with the claims presentation requirement subjects the complaint to a general demurrer. (State of Cal. v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1239.) However, claims based on childhood sexual assault are exempt from the claims presentation requirement of the Government Claims Act. (See Coats v. New Haven Unified School Dist. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 415, 428; Gov. Code, § 905, subd. (m).) 

 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not complied with the Government Claims Act, which Plaintiff does not dispute. Instead, Plaintiff alleges that she is a victim of childhood sexual assault, and pursuant to AB 218 the claims presentation requirement does not apply. Defendant cites to numerous cases from the 1800s and early 1900s to argue that the Legislature cannot legally impose liability against the State for any past acts of negligence, where plaintiff had no enforceable claim to date. Defendant asserts that prior to the passage of AB 218, Plaintiff did not have an enforceable claim against the District. Defendant notes that Plaintiff alleges that the misconduct occurred between 1961 and 1962 (FAC, ¶ 16), and at the time, the Government Code expressly provided that “no suit for money damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented ... until a written claim therefor has been presented to the public entity.” (Gov. Code § 945.4.) Defendant argues that at the time, under the existing law, a claim was required to be presented no later than six (6) months after the accrual of the cause of action. Defendant uses these prior precedents to point out, as the Court and Plaintiff are aware, that because Plaintiff never presented a government claim to the District, there was never a time in this case prior to 2020 that all of the elements of a cause of action against the District were satisfied.  

 

This Court notes that all of the precedents cited by Defendant pre-date the 2019 Legislative amendment to Code of Civil Procedure § 340.1, which expanded the reach of the statute. Further, the claim presentation requirement of Gov. Code § 945.4 did not exist until the formerly named California Tort Claims Act was passed in 1963, which is after the alleged events asserted in the FAC had already occurred.   Thus, at the time of the alleged tortious acts by The Perpetrator, it was not an element of the alleged victim’s cause of action to satisfy Section 945.4’s claim presentation requirement.   Because this is a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the motion accepts as true the FAC’s allegations as to the dates of the alleged sexual assaults. The Reply raises a new argument that prior to the enactment of the California Tort Claims Act, Civil Code § 22.3 established a moratorium on prosecuting claims against governmental entities that effectively reenacted governmental immunity from tort liability.  Because Plaintiff has not had an opportunity to address this argument in briefing, the Court will invite either oral argument or will consider whether the hearing should be continued to give Plaintiff an opportunity to file a shift sur-reply addressing this new argument, which has not affected the Court’s tentative ruling in Plaintiff’s favor on the first three causes of action.   

 

The Court notes that a constitutional challenge other than the Gift Clause was addressed by the Court of Appeal in Coats, supra.   The First District there reversed the trial court’s granting of a motion for judgment on the pleadings (MJP), rejecting an Ex Post Facto Law challenge to what is now called the Government Claims Act.  In Coats, a former student and her foster parent in sued a school district alleging childhood sexual abuse by one of the school’s teachers in 2014 and filed suit in 2016 without having first presented a claim against the school district. (Id. at 418.) The trial court had granted the defense MJP because the former student and her parent had failed to comply with the school district’s claim-presentation requirement. (Id. at 418-19.)   The Court of Appeal reversed the dismissal of the case on MJP based on the 2019 amendment to Code of Civil Procedure § 340.1 and found “[i]n the face of a revival provision expressly and unequivocally encompassing claims of childhood sexual abuse previously barred for failure to present a timely government claim, it is clear we must reverse the trial court’s judgment.” (Id. at 430-31.) The Court of Appeal there also noted the Legislature’s consistent work to expand the ability of victims of childhood sexual abuse to seek compensation. (Id. at 430.)  Rejecting the ex post facto argument there, the Coates Court noted “that Legislation reviving the statute of limitations on civil law claims does not violate constitutional principles.” (Id. at 425.)  

 

Next, the express language of Government Code section 905, subdivision (m) makes clear that the claims presentation requirement would no longer be required for childhood sexual assault claims brought under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1, which is the basis for Plaintiff’s claims here. (Gov. Code § 905, subd. (m).) Government Code section 905, subdivision (p) also expressly states that it applies retroactively. (Id., § 905, subd. (p).) Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1, subdivision (q) further makes clear that any prior limitations due to the claims presentation requirement would not bar claims like Plaintiff’s if filed within the three-year window the Legislature re-opened to permit previously barred claims to be filed by the end of calendar year 2022. (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1, subd. (q).) Plaintiff filed this action on December 27, 2022, and is therefore within the relevant timeframe.¿ 

 

Lastly, Defendant’s arguments in its reply brief regarding Coats are unpersuasive. While the Court agrees that Coats does not address the Gift Clause, Plaintiff cited to Coats for the proposition that the Legislature has the power to revive claims previously barred by a claim presentation requirement. (Id., at p. 428.) Coats is directly on point since it addresses Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1, subdivision (q), which expressly provides that the claims presentation requirement is not required for a childhood sexual assault claim under section 340.1. (Id.; Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1, subd. (q).)

 

 

The Gift Clause Argument 

The District also raises a constitutional challenge to Section 340.1 under the Gift Clause, Article XVI, section 6 of the California Constitution.  The Court finds there is no violation of the Gift Clause by the Legislature’s expansion of the statute of limitations for alleged victims of childhood sexual assaults years or decades ago.   First, the cases Defendant cites in support of the contention that the Gift Clause invalidates Plaintiff’s claims are inapposite and distinguishable. In Conlin v. Board of Supervisors (1893) 99 Cal. 17, the plaintiff had waived his claim, and the effect of the statute would have been to pay him for that which he had waived. (Id., at p. 23.) In Bourn v. Hart (1892) 93 Cal. 321, the state could not be sued at the time of the plaintiff’s injuries, as the predecessor statute to the Government Tort Claims Act had not by then been enacted. (Id., at p. 327.) In Powell v. Phelan (1903) 138 Cal. 271, the law at the time the plaintiff performed juror services did not provide for the payment of such services. (Id., at p. 276.) In Heron v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 507, the Supreme Court did not consider Article XVI, Section 6 of the California Constitution. (See generally Id.)¿ 

Other cases cited, such as Jordan v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 431 and Orange County Foundation v. Irvine Co. (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 195 are similarly unavailing since they are cited primarily for the argument that the Legislature may not use public monies to compensate for an unenforceable claim.  With the passage of AB 218, the plaintiff’s claim here is an enforceable one if proven.   Perez v. Roe 1 (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 171 is inapplicable because it was not decided based on the Gift Clause and dealt with a prior version of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 which revived claims where a prior judgment had been entered.  

Addressing the defense contention that Section 340.1 was enacted for private rather than public purposes, the Court disagrees.  The Court finds that the statute was enacted for the benefit of both the victims of childhood sexual assault and for the public at large by facilitating the compensation of victims of such assaults, which is a legislative determination of public policy.  The judiciary branch does not make public policy but rather effectuates the policies enacted by the legislative branch.  Here, Defendants argue that in making AB 218 applicable to public entities such as school districts, the Legislature must have ignored or overlooked the Gift Clause.  This Court finds to the contrary, i.e., the Legislature was at least by inference aware of the Gift Clause and made policy choices by weighing the public policy benefits to sexual assault victims and the public at large to deter and impose a compensation mechanism against those who committed the assaults, failed to prevent them, or aided and abetted in covering up the misconduct against minor victims.  The policy-making branches of government weighed competing public policies in deciding to expand the rights of the alleged victims of childhood sexual assaults versus the detriment to taxpayers and school districts in defending and potentially paying for such assaults proven to have occurred decades earlier.  AB 218 did not make an award of public funds or appropriate moneys into a victim compensation fund or direct payments to victims; rather, the Legislature enabled alleged victims to pursue an orderly and due process of litigating in courts of competent jurisdiction to make and potentially prove their cases.  See Heron v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal.507, 517 (rejecting a Gift Clause argument that challenged a statute allowing motor vehicle accident victims to pursue claims against negligent operators of vehicles used in public service.)   

 

The Section 1983 Statute of Limitations 

 

The District also argues that it is entitled to dismissal on MJP of the federal civil rights claims under “long-established federal § 1983 jurisprudence” which has held that Section 1983 claims litigated in California state court are governed by the usual 2-year statue of limitations for garden-variety bodily injury claims due to the act or neglect of another.  While research does not reveal any controlling authority on this point in a childhood sexual assault case brought under the revival statute, the Court will look to controlling precedents from the federal court system as to how courts should determine the appropriate state statute to borrow for use with Section 1983 claims.  The commencing point for this Court’s analysis is the SCOTUS decision nearly 40 years ago that determined that the state statute of limitations “for the tort action for the recovery of damages for personal injuries is the best alternative available.”  (Wilson v. Garcia (1985) 471 U.S. 261, 276.)  Wilson noted that “the borrowed period of limitations not discriminate against the federal civil rights remedy.”  (Id.)  The SCOTUS concluded that Section 1983 “is fairly construed as a directive to select, in each State, the one most appropriate statute of limitations for all § 1983 claims. The federal interests in uniformity, certainty, and the minimization of unnecessary litigation all support the conclusion that Congress favored this simple approach.”  (Id at p. 275.)  What this Court understands this to mean is that there is one and only one statute of limitations to be used for all Section 1983 litigation in a given state’s courts or in the federal district courts sitting that state.  And that one statute in California would be Code of Civil Procedure § 335.1.   

 

In 1989, the SCOTUS clarified a point where a stat has many statutes of limitations for different species of types of personal injuries, holding that “where state law provides multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions, courts considering § 1983 claims should borrow the general or residual statute for personal injury actions.”  (Owens v. Okure (1989) 488 U.S. 235, 249–250.)  California has multiple personal injury statutes of limitations, including ones for exposure to asbestos, domestic violence, pre-natal injuries, and several statutes addressing sexual assaults.   According to the rationale of the SCOTUS in Wilson, there should not be discrimination against a federal civil rights remedy for different species of torts committed under color of state law, and in this Court’s view there should not be different statutes of limitations applicable to Section 1983 cause of action for excessive force by law enforcement officers versus sexual assaults committed by teachers.   Section 335.1, not section 340.1, should be the statute of limitations period borrowed for purposes of this case.   

 

Plaintiff’s opposition brief cites to a series of unpublished federal district court decisions that have ruled that Section 340.1 governs the statute of limitations for a section 1983 claim arising out of a childhood sexual assault.  To her credit, plaintiff notes an unpublished Northern District case that held Section 335.1’s two-year statute of limitations should apply, but other (earlier) cases held to the contrary, relying on Section 340.1 .  In¿Dutro v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142920 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2013), the court held that “the two-year statute of limitations in¿Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1¿applies to a¿§ 1983¿claim based on childhood sexual abuse and rejected the argument that § 340.13¿supplies the limitations period.”¿ (Id.¿at *8-*10.)¿  In Van Bradley v. Department of Children and Family Services (C.D. Cal., Feb. 13, 2019, No. CV 17-6556-JFW (AGR)) 2019 WL 587282, Judge Walter in the Central District of California entered an order accepting the recommendation of a Magistrate Judge that relied in part on Dutro and dismissed the Section 1983 claim with leave to amend to alleged tolling of the statute.  The Court has reviewed the two other cases cited in the Opposition and finds them to be unhelpful to Plaintiff.  In one, the Eastern District granted a motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations because the Second Amended Complaint there did not relate back to the original complaint and was timed barred.  (Mistriel v. County of Kern (E.D. Cal., Feb. 7, 2012, No. 1:03-CV-06922-AWI-SK) 2012 WL 395688, at *3.)  In the other, the Eastern District concluded the plaintiff had failed to make out a claim under Section 340.1 and dismissed the Plaintiff’s complaint under the two-year statute of limitations of Section 335.1.  (Warren v. City of Grass Valley (E.D. Cal., Dec. 13, 2010, No. 10-CV-1650-JAM-EFB) 2010 WL 5170317, at *5.)   

 

The Court thus finds that the Fourth and Fifth causes of action for violations of Section 1983 should be dismissed.  If Plaintiff contends that she should be granted leave to amend to allege a basis for tolling of the statute of limitations (Section 335.1), the Court will dismiss with 30-days leave to amend.