Judge: Ronald F. Frank, Case: 22TRCV01600, Date: 2023-12-06 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22TRCV01600 Hearing Date: December 6, 2023 Dept: 8
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HEARING DATE: December 6, 2023¿¿
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CASE NUMBER: 22TRCV01600
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CASE NAME: Jane
Doe T.B. v. Doe #1, et al
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MOVING PARTY: Defendant, Centinela Valley Union High School District
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff, Jane Doe T.B.
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TRIAL DATE: Not
Set.
MOTION:¿ (1) Demurrer
(2)
Case Management Conference
Tentative Rulings: (1) OVERRULED
(2) The Court will discuss plans for discovery,
investigation, third-party claims, and ADR.
The Court is currently setting cases for trial in May and June of 2025.
I. BACKGROUND¿¿
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A. Factual¿¿
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On December
27, 2022, Plaintiff, Jane Doe T.B. (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against
Defendants, Doe #1, a public entity. The Complaint alleges personal injuries
and damages from Childhood Sexual Abuse. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s
former employee, Doe #2, sexually assaulted and abused Plaintiff in Lawndale,
California while employed at the school Jane Doe T.B. attended when Plaintiff
was approximately 14 to 17 years old.
Defendant
demurs to Plaintiff’s entire complaint on the grounds that they argue Assembly
Bill 218 retroactively strips statutory government immunity from public
entities, violates Article XVI, section 6 of the California Constitution
B. Procedural¿¿
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On September 21, 2023, Defendant filed a Demurrer.
On November 21, 2023, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On November 28, 2023,
Defendant filed a reply brief.
II. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
Plaintiff,
concurrently with her opposition, requested this Court take judicial notice of
the following document:
1.
Exhibit 1: Tentative ruling which was adopted in
the matter of Doe K.D. v. Doe 1, et al., Case No. 22TRCV01592, overruling
Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
2. Exhibit
2: Tentative ruling which was adopted in the matter of Doe J.Y. v. Doe 1, et
al., Case No. 22TRCV00630, denying and mooting Defendant’s Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings.
The court GRANTS this request and takes judicial notice of
the above. However, rulings by trial-level courts rather than published, citable
appellate opinions are of limited value.
III. ANALYSIS
A.
Legal Standard
A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that
appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the
pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39
Cal.3d 311, 318.) “To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts
sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might
eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be
alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53
Cal.4th 861, 872.) For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of
action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (Aubry
v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967.) A demurrer “does
not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Daar v.
Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)¿¿¿
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A pleading is uncertain if it is ambiguous or
unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).) A demurrer for uncertainty may lie if the failure
to label the parties and claims renders the complaint so confusing defendant
cannot tell what he or she is supposed to respond to.¿ (Williams v. Beechnut
Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.) However, “[a]
demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in
some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern
discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14
Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)¿
B.
Discussion
Government Claim Presentation
Per the Government Claims Act, a party
with a claim for damages against a public entity must first file claim directly
with that entity. The party may file a lawsuit only if the public entity denies
or rejects the claim. (Gov. Code §§ 905, 945.4; City of Ontario v. Superior
Court (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 894.) Further, an action against a public
employee is barred if an action against the employing public entity would be
barred by the failure to satisfy the entity claims requirements. (Gov. Code, §
950.2.) The claims presentation requirement provides the public entity with an
opportunity to evaluate the claim and decide whether to pay on the claim. (Roberts
v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 474.) Failure to allege
facts demonstrating compliance with the claims presentation requirement
subjects the complaint to a general demurrer. (State of Cal. v. Superior
Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1239.) However, claims based on childhood
sexual assault are exempt from the claims presentation requirement under the
Government Claims Act. (See Coats v. New Haven Unified School Dist.
(2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 415, 428; Gov. Code, § 905, subd. (m).)
Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not
complied with the Government Claims Act. But Plaintiff alleges that he is a
victim of childhood sexual assault, and thus, the claims presentation
requirement does not apply. The Court is perplexed by the majority of
Defendant’s analysis section. Defendant cites to numerous cases from the 1800s
and early 1900s to argue that the Legislature does not have power to create a
liability against the state for past acts of negligence on the part of its
officers. Defendant also contends that the rules from these cases indicate that
the Legislature cannot pass a law attempting to impose liability on a public
entity for a past occurrence where there was no enforceable claim for decades because
of the bar of the statute of limitations, at least until the Legislature
enacted Code of Civil Procedure § 340.1. Defendant proceeds to argue that prior to the
passage of AB 218, Plaintiff did not have an enforceable claim against the
District. Defendant notes that Plaintiff alleges that the misconduct occurred
between 1988 and 1992 (Complaint, ¶¶ 1, 4, 11, 14), and at the time, the
Government Code expressly provided that “no suit for money damages may
be brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claims is
required to be presented ... until a written claim therefor has been presented
to the public entity.” (Gov. Code § 945.4.) Defendant argues that at the time,
under the existing law, a claim was required to be presented no later than six
(6) months after the accrual of the cause of action. Defendant argues that
because Plaintiff never presented a Government Code claim to the District,
there was never a time in this case prior to 2020 that all of the elements of a
cause of action against the District were satisfied. This argument, amongst
Defendant’s argument that the appropriation of public funds for unenforceable
claims serves no public purpose as a matter of law, concludes Defendant’s
analysis section arguing that the Legislature cannot retroactively impose
liability on a public entity where, prior to passage of the law, the plaintiff
had no enforceable claim.
As noted by
Plaintiff in her opposition, all of the precedents cited by Defendant pre-date
the 2019 Legislative amendment to Code of Civil Procedure § 340.1, which
expanded the reach of the statute. Additionally, the Court notes that the
constitutionality of Code of Civil Procedure § 340.1 with respect to the claims
presentation requirement was addressed by the Court of Appeal in Coats v.
New Haven Unified School District (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 415. In Coats,
the appellants sued a school district alleging childhood sexual abuse by one of
the school’s teachers. (Id. at 418.) There, the trial court dismissed
the appellants’ claim because they failed to comply with the school district’s
claim-presentation requirement. (Id. at 418-19.) However, the Court of
Appeal reversed based on the 2019 amendment to Code of Civil Procedure § 340.1,
and found “[i]n the face of a revival provision expressly and unequivocally
encompassing claims of childhood sexual abuse previously barred for failure to
present a timely government claim, it is clear we must reverse the trial
court’s judgment.” (Id. at 430-31.) The Court of Appeal there also noted
the Legislatures consistent work to expand the ability of victims of childhood
sexual abuse to seek compensation. (Id. at 430.)
This Court
notes that it disagrees with Defendant’s arguments on numerous points. First, the
cases Defendant cites in support of the contention that the Gift Clause
invalidates Plaintiff’s claims are inapposite and distinguishable. In Conlin
v. Board of Supervisors (1893) 99 Cal. 17, the plaintiff had waived his
claim, and the effect of the statute would have been to pay him for that which
he had waived. (Id., at p. 23.) In Bourn v. Hart (1892) 93 Cal.
321, the state could not be sued at the time of the plaintiff’s injuries, as the
predecessor statute to the Government Tort Claims Act had not by then been
enacted. (Id., at p. 327.) In Powell v. Phelan (1903) 138 Cal.
271, the law at the time the plaintiff performed juror services did not provide
for the payment of such services. (Id., at p. 276.) In Heron v. Riley
(1930) 209 Cal. 507, the Supreme Court did not consider Article XVI, Section 6
of the California Constitution. (See generally Id.)
Other cases
cited, such as Jordan v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2002) 100
Cal.App.4th 431 and Orange County Foundation v. Irvine Co. (1983) 139
Cal.App.3d 195 are similarly unavailing since they are cited primarily for the
argument that the Legislature may not use public monies to compensate for an
unenforceable claim. With the passage of
AB 218, the plaintiff’s claim here is an enforceable one if proven. Perez v. Roe 1 (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th
171 is inapplicable because it was not decided based on the Gift Clause and
dealt with a prior version of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 which
revived claims where a prior judgment had been entered. The Court also finds
that the statute was enacted for the benefit of both the victims of childhood
sexual assault and for the public at large by facilitating the compensation of
victims of such assaults, which is a legislative determination of public policy. The judiciary branch does not make public
policy but rather effectuates the policies enacted by the legislative
branch. Here, Defendants argue that in
making AB 218 applicable to public entities such as school districts, the Legislature
must have ignored or overlooked the Gift Clause. This Court finds to the contrary, i.e., the
Legislature was at least by inference aware of the Gift Clause and made policy
choices by weighing the benefits to sexual assault victims versus the detriment
to taxpayers and school districts in defending and potentially paying for such
assaults proven to have occurred decades earlier.
Next, the
express language of Government Code section 905, subdivision (m) makes clear
that the claims presentation requirement would no longer be required for
childhood sexual assault claims brought under Code of Civil Procedure section
340.1, which is the basis for Plaintiff’s claims here. (Gov. Code § 905, subd.
(m).) Government Code section 905, subdivision (p) also expressly states that
it applies retroactively to the date the California Government Tort Claims Act
was enacted. (Id., § 905, subd. (p).) Code of Civil Procedure section
340.1, subdivision (q) further makes clear that any prior limitations due to
the claims presentation requirement would not bar claims like Plaintiff’s if
filed within the three-year timeframe provided thereunder. (Code Civ. Proc., §
340.1, subd. (q).) Plaintiff filed this action on December 27, 2022, and is
therefore within the relevant timeframe.
Lastly, Defendant’s
arguments in its reply brief regarding Coats are unpersuasive. While the
Court agrees that Coats does not address the Gift Clause, that is beside
the point. Plaintiff cited to Coats for the proposition that the
Legislature has the power to revive claims previously barred by a claim
presentation requirement. (Id., at p. 428.) Coats is directly on
point since it addresses Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1, subdivision
(q), which, as noted above, expressly provides that the claims presentation
requirement is not required for a childhood sexual assault claim under section
340.1. (Id.; Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1, subd. (q).)
Based on the
above argument, this Court OVERRULES the Demurrer. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice.¿¿¿¿