Judge: Ronald F. Frank, Case: 23TRCV00253, Date: 2023-04-28 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23TRCV00253 Hearing Date: April 28, 2023 Dept: 8
Tentative
Ruling
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HEARING DATE: April 28, 2023¿
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CASE NUMBER: 23TRCV00253
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CASE NAME: HL Group 2
Limited Partnership v. Pacific Point Fund I, LP, et al
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MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff, HL Group 2 Limited Partnership
RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant,
Pacific Point Fund I, LP (no opposition filed)
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TRIAL DATE: None set.
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MOTION:¿ (1) Demurrer to Answer
Tentative Rulings: (1) OVERRULED.
I. BACKGROUND¿
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A. Factual¿
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On January 27, 2023, Plaintiff,
HL Group 2 Limited Partnership (“Plaintiff”) filed a verified complaint
against Pacific Point Fund I, LP (“Defendant”) and DOES 1 through 10. The verified
complaint alleged a cause of action for promissory estoppel. This cause of
action is based on the following facts: In September 2020, Borrower
LOANCO allegedly took out a business-purpose loan for $1,360,000 from Defendant
PPF as first lien secured by the Property. In December 2020, Borrower LOANCO
apparently entered into an agreement with Plaintiff HGL2 under which Plaintiff
would manage the subdivision of the Property into three residential condominium
units that, upon development completion, would be sold. Pursuant to this
agreement, LOANCO quitclaimed the Property to Plaintiff. Defendant’s loan went
into default and it exercised its right to commence a nonjudicial foreclosure
sale. The Notice of foreclosure sale was recorded on October 12, 2022 with the
sale date scheduled for November 2, 2022.
With
the foreclosure sale date pending, Plaintiff contacted Defendant requesting
that the foreclosure be stayed. Plaintiff allegedly claimed that it had entered
into sales agreements for the three subdivisions, and Defendant agreed to
extend the sale. This is where Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s accounts diverge.
Plaintiff contends in Paragraph 12 of its Complaint (attached as Exhibit A to
the motion) that the parties entered an oral agreement as follows: “In or about
October 2022, HLG2 and PPF entered into an oral agreement with PPF which
provided that HLG2: (1) would pay the real estate tax arrearages and keep all
tax payments on the PROPERTY current; and (2) would, at its own cost and
expense, complete the work necessary for the City of Inglewood approve the
subdivision of the Property into three condominium parcels; and, (3) would
complete all the necessary work to complete the renovation and/or conversion of
the property to the three condominium units; and (4) markets and sell the three
proposed condominiums to willing buyers.”
Based
on Plaintiff’s representation of imminent sales of the subdivisions, Defendant
agreed to stay the foreclosure. Defendant extended the sale from November 2,
2022 to November 30, 2022 and then again from November 30 to December 28, 2022.
Apparently, on December 16, 2022, agents for LOANCO recorded a deed purporting
to quitclaim the Property from Plaintiff back to LOANCO. Plaintiff claims this
deed was false and further that it prevented the arranged sales from being
completed on the subdivisions. Plaintiff filed suit on December 20, 2022,
against LOANCO based thereon with Case No. 22TRCV01540 (the “First Action”).
On
March 24, 2023, Defendant filed an answer. Plaintiff now demurs to Defendant’s
answer arguing that Defendant failed to allege affirmative defenses with
specificity.
B. Procedural
On March 30, 2023, Plaintiff
filed a demurrer to the answer. To date, no opposition has been filed.
¿II. ANALYSIS ¿
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A. Legal Standard
A plaintiff
may demur to a defendant’s answer within 10 days of being served with the
answer (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.40, subd. (b)) on three grounds: (1) failure to
state facts sufficient to constitute a defense; (2) uncertainty; or (3) failure
to state whether a contract alleged in the answer is written or oral. (Id.
at § 430.20). The demurrer may be to the whole answer or to any one or more of
the several defenses set up in the answer. (Code Civ. Proc., §430.50, subd.
(b).) The plaintiff may not demur to part of a defense. Each defense must be
considered separately without regard to any other defense, and one defense does
not become insufficient because it is inconsistent with other parts of the
answer. (South Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725,
733.)
“[W]hether an answer states a defense is
governed by the same principles which are applicable in determining if a
complaint states a cause of action.” (Id. at 732.) “[T]he demurrer to
the answer admits all issuable facts pleaded therein and eliminates all
allegations of the complaint denied by the answer.” (Id. at 733.) But
unlike a demurrer to a complaint, “the defect in question need not appear on
the fact of the answer” as “[t]he determination of the sufficiency of the
answer requires an examination of the complaint because its adequacy is with
reference to the complaint it purports to answer.” (Ibid.)
B.
Discussion
Here, Defendant raises twenty-five affirmative defenses plus one “additional
defense” and an “incorporation of affirmative defenses”. As to the sufficiency
of defenses in general, it is a settled rule of pleading that a plea must
answer all that it professes to answer. (Wallace v. Bear River Water &
Mining Co. (1861) 18 Cal. 461, 464.) That is, defenses should be relevant
to a plaintiff’s legal claims and averred as carefully and with as much detail
as the facts constituting the corresponding causes of action in the complaint.
(See FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 384. Here, in response to a verified Complaint,
Defendant filed a verified Answer, admitting or denying on a paragraph-by-paragraph
basis each charging allegation in the Complaint. FPI Development was a summary judgment case, not a
demurrer case, and the plaintiff there did not demur to the answer. The only affirmative
defenses that the Third District opined in dictum to have been so insufficient
that they would not have survived a demurrer were the defenses of fraud in the
inducement and failure of consideration, neither of which are alleged in this
case. Accordingly, FPI Development
does not support the Demurrer here, although that precedent arguably would support
a demurrer to a fraud defense.
In the case at bar, Plaintiff argues that
Defendant’s affirmative defenses are bare legal conclusions and do not in any
matter provide facts necessary to establish the defense itself. Plaintiff is
correct; the affirmative defenses do not purport to allege any facts
whatsoever, only conclusions. But there
is no authority cited nor has the Court located one which requires specificity
in factual pleading of affirmative defenses in an Answer, other than perhaps a
defense of fraud which is not asserted here.
Demurrers to
Answers and their affirmative defenses are rare. A trial court abuses its discretion if it
sustains such a demurrer without leave to amend when the circumstances and allegations
in the pleadings are such that there may well be a bona fide factual dispute
that could support the defenses. (See Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Minnette (1949) 92 Cal.App.2d 401, 407.) Here, the Demurrer fails to identify the statutory
ground under CCP § 430.20 for demurring, i.e., that the affirmative defenses does
not state sufficient facts to constitute a defense to the complaint, or that
the affirmative defenses are uncertain, ambiguous or unintelligible, or some other
ground. An allegation of ultimate fact is generally sufficient to overcome a
general demurrer. (South Shore,
supra, 226 Cal.App.2d at p. 737.) In
the Court’s view, it is for the discovery phase for parties to ask each other
in interrogatories and other discovery for any facts that support the
allegations, witnesses to those facts, and documents that evidence the same. Indeed, the Judicial Council form interrogatory
15.1 enables a plaintiff to check a box and efficiently require a defendant to
state all facts upon which an affirmative defense is based, raising an inference
that it is not generally expected that affirmative defenses will contain
factual details to support the ultimate facts alleged in an answer.
Accordingly, the demurrer to the Answer is
OVERRULED.