Judge Ronald F. Frank, Case Number: 23TRCV00253, Date: 2023-10-05 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Ronald F. Frank, Case: 23TRCV00253, Date: 2023-10-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23TRCV00253 Hearing Date: October 5, 2023 Dept: 8

Tentative Ruling

HEARING DATE: October 5, 2023¿

CASE NUMBER: 23TRCV00253

CASE NAME: HL Group 2 Limited Partnership v. Pacific Point Fund 1, LP, et al.

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MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff, HL Group 2 Limited Partnership

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant, Pacific Point Fund 1, LP

MOTION:¿ (1) Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatory 15.1

(2) Request for Sanctions

Tentative Rulings: (1) Motion to Compel is GRANTED. Code-compliant verified further responses that separate out the affirmative defenses and state which facts, witnesses, or documents support which defenses, are required within 30 days. For the denials of material allegations, the verified further responses to FROG 15.1 must identify each material allegation Defendant denies or disputes, and for each denial or dispute Defendant must separately identify which facts, witnesses and documents support each such denial or disputed allegation, also within 30 days.

(2) Request for Sanctions is GRANTED in the amount of $2,000, payable by defense counsel to Plaintiff’s counsel within 30 days

I. BACKGROUND¿

A. Factual¿

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On January 27, 2023, Plaintiff, HL Group 2 Limited Partnership (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Pacific Point Fund I, LP (“Defendant”) and DOES 1 through 10. The complaint alleged a cause of action for promissory estoppel. This cause of action is based on the following facts: In September 2020, Borrower LOANCO allegedly took out a business-purpose loan for $1,360,000.00 from Defendant PPF as first lien secured by the Property. In December 2020, Borrower LOANCO apparently entered into an agreement with Plaintiff HGL2 under which Plaintiff would manage the subdivision of the Property into three residential condominium units that, upon development completion, would be sold. Pursuant to this agreement, LOANCO quitclaimed the Property to Plaintiff. Defendant’s loan went into default and it exercised its right to commence a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. The Notice of foreclosure sale was recorded on October 12, 2022 with the sale date scheduled for November 2, 2022.

With the foreclosure sale date pending, Plaintiff contacted Defendant requesting that the foreclosure be stayed. Plaintiff allegedly claimed that it had entered into sales agreements for the three subdivisions, and Defendant agreed to extend the sale. This is where Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s accounts diverge. Plaintiff contends in Paragraph 12 of its Complaint (attached as Exhibit A to the motion) that the parties entered an oral agreement as follows: “In or about October 2022, HLG2 and PPF entered into an oral agreement with PPF which provided that HLG2: (1) would pay the real estate tax arrearages and keep all tax payments on the PROPERTY current; and (2) would, at its own cost and expense, complete the work necessary for the City of Inglewood approve the subdivision of the Property into three condominium parcels; and, (3) would complete all the necessary work to complete the renovation and/or conversion of the property to the three condominium units; and (4) markets and sell the three proposed condominiums to willing buyers.”

Based on Plaintiff’s representation of imminent sales of the subdivisions, Defendant agreed to stay the foreclosure. Defendant extended the sale from November 2, 2022 to November 30, 2022 and then again from November 30 to December 28, 2022. Apparently, on December 16, 2022, agents for LOANCO recorded a deed purporting to quitclaim the Property from Plaintiff back to LOANCO. Plaintiff claims this deed was false and further that it prevented the arranged sales from being completed on the subdivisions. Plaintiff filed suit on December 20, 2022, against LOANCO based thereon with Case No. 22TRCV01540 (the “First Action”).

On May 1, 2023, Plaintiff noted that it served Defendant with Form Interrogatories, Set One. Further, Plaintiff notes that after granting it several extensions of time for defendant to provide responses, Defendant served responses on August 18, 2023. However, Plaintiff indicates that Defendant failed to provide a Code compliant response to Form Interrogatory 15.1, and despite efforts to meet and confer, Defendant has failed to provide either an intent to engage in meet and confer discussions or to provide the requested Code compliant response to this specific interrogatory.

B. Procedural

On September 6, 2023, Plaintiff brought this Motion to Compel Further. On September 26, 2023, Defendant filed an opposition. On September 27, 2023, Plaintiff filed a reply brief.

¿II. MEET AND CONFER EFFORTS

Plaintiff contends that it sent a meet and confer letter on August 18, 2023. Plaintiff further notes that its counsel contended that he called counsel for Defendant on September 5, 2023, and was assured a call would be returned by end of day on September 6, 2023. However, counsel for Defendant asserts he never received this message. Defendant’s counsel seems to suggest that meet and confer efforts were not made in good faith, but also does not give a reason to why they did not respond to the meet and confer letter sent on August 18, 2023. In spite of this, even though Plaintiff had until September 22, 2023 to file this motion, the Court finds Plaintiff’s efforts sufficient enough for the filing of this motion. Defendant not only neglected to respond to the meet and confer letter, but also the defense did not even provide any supplemental responses while the motion was pending which might have mooted the motion.

III. ANALYSIS ¿

A. Legal Standard

“Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with this title, any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code of Civ. Proc. § 2017.010.) For discovery purposes, information is regarded as relevant “if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement thereof.” (City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 272, 288.)

“Any party may obtain discovery . . . by propounding to any other party to the action written interrogatories to be answered under oath.”¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.010, subd. (a).)¿¿ “The party to whom interrogatories have been propounded shall respond in writing under oath separately to each interrogatory by any of the following: (1) An answer containing the information sought to be discovered[;] (2) An exercise of the party's option to produce writings[;] (3) An objection to the particular interrogatory.”¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.210, subd. (a).)¿“On receipt of a response to interrogatories, the propounding party may move for an order compelling a further response if the propounding party deems that any of the following apply: (1) An answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete[;] (2) An exercise of the option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate[;] (3) An objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general.”¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (a).)¿

B. Discussion

Here, Plaintiff asserts that Form Interrogatory 15.1 seeks information related to Plaintiff’s complaint allegations and affirmative defenses. While Defendant did respond to the interrogatory, Plaintiff argues that the response is not Code compliant as it is a general narrative statement that wholly fails to properly respond to this interrogatory and its subparts. Further, Plaintiff notes that Defendant’s answer to the complaint consists of twenty-five (25) affirmative defenses and “additional defenses,” but that their answer does not, in a Code-compliant way, state the factual basis if any for each defense, nor does defendant’s verified response identify witnesses and documents that support the denial of each material fact and asserted affirmative defenses. Plaintiff argues that such discovery is elementary and necessary in the preparation of Plaintiff’s case for trial. The Court agrees.

As part of Defendant’s requirement to provide Code compliant responses, it must do so in the manner in which the Form Interrogatory is laid out. Defendant failed to do so here, and must answer each subpart of Form Interrogatory 15.1. If Defendant cannot respond to the subpart of the Form Interrogatory, it must state why it cannot. If Defendant relies on the option to produce documents to answer a subpart of FROG 15.1, it must identify by Bates number or similar reference the collection of documents containing the response to each allegation that Defendant denies and/or each affirmative defense as to which there are facts, witnesses or documents that support each such defense. Because Defendant’s response did not originally do so, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED. Verified further responses are ordered to be provided within 30 days.

It is not a legitimate objection to this Judicial-Council approved interrogatory that a Code-compliant response would take hours and hours to prepare, nor is it proper grounds for objection that the FROGs were designed only for motor vehicle cases, nor is it a proper objection that a single narrative answer suffices because the same facts are claimed to apply to every affirmative defense or to every denial of a material allegation of the Plaintiff’s lawsuit.

C. Sanctions

Sanctions are mandatory in connection with motions to compel responses to interrogatories and requests for production of documents against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel.¿¿(CCP. §§ 2030.290(c),¿2030.300(d),¿2031.300(c),¿and 2031.310(h).) However, sanctions are not mandatory if the court “finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.”¿¿(Id.)

Here, Plaintiff has requested fees and costs in the amount of $2,119.60. In support of this request, Plaintiff attaches declaration of its counsel, John M. Boyko (“Boyko Decl.”) Plaintiff’s counsel asserts that he has been licensed and a practicing attorney in the state of California since June of 1977. (Boyko Decl., ¶ 14.) He also indicates that his billing rate for this matter is $500/hour and that he spent the following hours in connection with this motion: (1) 0.2 hours to review responses to FROGS; (2) 0.4 hours preparing meet and confer letter; (3) 2 hours preparing the instant motion along with the separate statement of interrogatories and responses; (4) 1 hour estimated time to prepare a reply to the anticipated opposition; and (6) 0.5 hours estimated time to argue the motion. The Court finds the hours spent on this motion to be quite reasonable given the much greater amounts of time often claimed for bringing a similar motion. Mr. Boyko’s hourly rate is also within the realm of reasonableness. But because Defendant provided substantive responses, although not per se Code-compliant, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Request for Sanctions in the lowered and rounded amount of $2,000. Sanctions are payable within 30 days from defense counsel to plaintiff’s counsel.

Plaintiff is ordered to give notice.