Judge Ronald F. Frank, Case Number: 23TRCV00280, Date: 2024-01-12 Tentative Ruling

On February 1, 2023, Plaintiff, Vathy, LLC (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against Defendants, Ryan Conklin, Karen Conklin, and DOES 1 through 10. The Complaint alleges causes of action for: (1) Breach of Written Contract; (2) Trespass; and (3) Waste.

Defendant, Karen Conklin now files a demurrer to the Complaint.

On December 4, 2023, Defendant, Karen Conklin filed her demurrer. On December 29, 2023, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On January 4, 2024, Karen Conklin filed a reply brief.

II. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

With her moving papers, Defendant, Karen Conklin filed a Request for Judicial Notice, requesting this Court take judicial notice of the following documents:

Complaint-Unlawful Detainer filed February 10, 2022 in Vathy, LLC v. Ryan Conklin, et al., LASC Case No. 22IWUD00125. (Defendant’s Exhibit A.)

Stipulation for Entry of Judgment filed August 17, 2022 in LASC Case No. 22IWUD00125. (Defendant’s Exhibit B.)

Minute Order dated January 30, 2023 in LASC Case No. 22IWUD00125. (Defendant’s Exhibit C)

Judgment for Dissolution filed November 13, 2018 in Karen H. Conklin v. Ryan K. Conklin, LASC Case No. 18TRFL00440. (Defendant’s Exhibit D.)

This Court GRANTS the request and takes judicial notice of the above.

Additionally, Plaintiff, with its opposition, also filed a Request for Judicial Notice of the following document:

Defendant Karen Conklin’s Answer-Unlawful Detainer filed February 10, 2022, in Vathy, LLC v. Ryan Conklin, et al., LASC Case No. 221WUD00125. (Plaintiff’s Exhibit A.)

The Court also takes judicial notice of the above.

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.) For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967.) A demurrer “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)

A pleading is uncertain if it is ambiguous or unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).) A demurrer for uncertainty may lie if the failure to label the parties and claims renders the complaint so confusing defendant cannot tell what he or she is supposed to respond to.¿ (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.) However, “[a] demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)

Here, Defendant, Karen Conklin demurs to Plaintiff’s complaint on the grounds that she argues the all causes of action fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against her and are uncertain.

Breach of Written Contract

Defendant, Karen Conklin, argues that she did not breach any contract and was not a party to the contract, and thus, Plaintiff cannot maintain a cause of action against her.

To state a cause of action for breach of contract, Plaintiff must be able to establish “(1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff.” (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.) If a breach of contract claim “is based on alleged breach of a written contract, the terms must be set out verbatim in the body of the complaint or a copy of the written agreement must be attached and incorporated by reference.” (Harris v. Rudin, Richman & Appel (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 299, 307.) In some circumstances, a plaintiff may also “plead the legal effect of the contract rather than its precise language.” (Construction Protective Services, Inc. v. TIG Specialty Ins. Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189, 198-199.)

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that on March 3, 2014, Plaintiff and Defendants, Karen Conklin and Ryan Conklin entered into a lease. (Complaint, ¶ 15.) As part of the lease, Defendants agreed to pay monthly rents on or before the end of the month to Plaintiff. (Complaint, ¶ 6.) However, Plaintiff notes that Defendants stopped paying rent in or about March 2020. (Complaint, ¶ 6.) Plaintiff contends that once the Covid-19 eviction moratoriums ended, Plaintiff filed an unlawful detainer action against Defendants and obtained a judgment on August 17, 2022, under Case No. 22IWUD00125. (Complaint, ¶ 7.) The judgment requires Defendants to pay rent each month for Sept/Oct/Nov/Dec ’22; that rent is due by the first of the month in the amount of $7,110; that if there are missed payments or Defendants do not vacate by the agreed upon date, Judgment will be entered without notice based on an ex parte application by Plaintiff; and that all back rent would be subject to a separate lawsuit except Defendants shall pay $49,770 for the months of Feb – August 2022 by August 27, 2022. (Complaint, ¶ 8.) Despite the lease and judgment, Plaintiff argues that Defendants have failed to pay the rents since March 2020 and their total rent owed is $150,48.25. (Complaint, ¶ 9.)

While Ms. Conklin concedes that she entered into the original lease which covered the period through March 31, 2019, she argues that she is not bound by the judgment or lease extension because she and Ryan Conklin divorced in 2018, noting that Ryan Conklin was awarded all community interest in the business that was subject to the lease agreement. Although her name and what appears to be her signature is on the extension of the lease, Karen Conklin argues that she did not sign the lease and would not have signed the lease after her divorce was finalized, submitting she believes that Ryan Conklin signed her name to the agreement. Karen also notes that the stipulated judgment in the UD case does not have her signature. Although the Court notes that it can and has taken judicial notice of certain documents, on demurrer the Court is not permitted to make factual findings as to competing contentions of the parties. Summary judgment or trial are phases of litigation where the Court can evaluate facts and determine if there is a genuine factual dispute or as the finder of fact at trial weigh competing evidence. Here, the Court cannot perform a handwriting analysis at the demurrer stage, and because the lawsuit alleged that the lease extension has Karen’s name and signature on it, the Court must accept this allegation as true for purposes of ruling on a demurrer.

The Court notes that Karen Conklin’s name does not appear on the stipulated judgment. However, the Breach of Contract action does not alone allege breach of the stipulated judgment. Instead, Plaintiff alleges that “under the terms of the lease and the judgment, Defendant [both Conklins] [were] obligated to pay rents, pay unpaid rents, and leave the premises in good condition.” (Complaint, ¶ 17.) The breach is alleged by stating Defendant failed to perform these obligations by repeatedly failing to pay rent and committing both willful and negligent acts to damage the condition of the premises (Complaint, ¶ 18.) The Court also notes that while the divorce stipulation may have awarded Ryan Conklin sole interest in the business, this does not – alone – mean that Karen Conklin is not liable for the lease of the premises at which that business sits.

The Court also notes that in opposition, Plaintiff points out that the Divorce Stipulation, paragraph 4.4.4 notes that: “although an obligation based upon contract is assigned to one party as part of the division of the community, in the event that the party to whom the obligation was assigned defaults on the contract, the creditor may have cause of action against the other party. Finally, the Court also takes note of Plaintiff’s argument that Karen Conklin’s answer in the UD action was devoid of any defense that she was divorced or that she had terminated herself from the lease at the premises or that she served termination notices to the Plaintiff’s landlord. The Court agrees. Based on the face of the pleading and judicially noticed material, the Court finds that Plaintiff has stated sufficient facts to state a cause of action for Breach of Contract against Defendant. As such, the demurrer is overruled.

Ms. Conklin bases her demurrer as to the cause of action for trespass on the same general arguments as the cause of action above. To set forth a cause of action for trespass, Defendants must allege (1) Defendants’ lawful possession or right to possession of real property; (2) Plaintiffs’ wrongful, intentional, reckless, or negligent act of trespass on the property; (3) Defendants did not give permission for the entry or scope of permission was exceeded; and (4) damage to Defendants caused by the trespass. (Ralphs Grocery Co. v. Victory Consultants, Inc. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 245, 262.)

Karen argues that she was not a tenant after March 2019, when the original lease expired. But that argument contains facts that are not alleged in the Complaint. As noted above, Karen’s signature and name are alleged to be on the extension of the lease. As such, based on the face of the pleading and documents judicially noticed, the Court again overrules the demurrer. Whether Plaintiff will be able to prove these causes of action against Karen Conklin is an issue meant for a different motion. However, because Karen Conklin has brought a demurrer, the Court cannot at this stage weigh the evidence provided for it by the parties.

Lastly, Defendant, Karen Conklin argues the same reasoning as to why Plaintiff cannot state a cause of action for waste against her. For the same reasons listed above, the Court overrules the demurrer as the face of the pleading establishes sufficient facts to state a cause of action for waste.