Judge: Ronald F. Frank, Case: 23TRCV00381, Date: 2023-11-15 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23TRCV00381 Hearing Date: April 10, 2024 Dept: 8
Tentative Ruling¿
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HEARING DATE: April 10, 2024¿¿
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CASE NUMBER: 23TRCV00381
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CASE NAME: Januita
Cache Pech v. Lucila Parra, et al.
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MOVING PARTY: Antonio Trujillo
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RESPONDING PARTY: Lucila Parra
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TRIAL DATE: May 13, 2024
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MOTION:¿ (1) Motion to Bifurcate
Tentative Rulings: (1) Motion to Bifurcate is
GRANTED
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I. BACKGROUND¿¿
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A. Factual¿¿
On
February 10, 2023, Plaintiff, Juanita Canche Pech (“Plaintiff”) filed a
Complaint against Defendants, Lucila Parra, Antonio Trujillo, and DOES 1
through 20. On June 20, 2023, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint
(“FAC”). On December 21, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint
(“SAC”) alleging causes of action for: (1) Quiet Title; (2) Financial Elder
Abuse; (3) Fraud; (4) Violation of Penal Code § 496; and (5) Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress; and (6) Breach of Contract.
Antonio
Trujillo (“Trujillo”) asserts that in the unlawful detainer aspect of this
action, Plaintiff Juanita Canche Pech (“Pech”) has posted jury fees. Trujillo
further notes that the primary defense to eviction asserted by Pech and her
co-defendant in the UD action, Para, is standing. Trujillo contends that Parra
and Pech claim UD Plaintiff, Antonio Trujillo lacks standing because he does
not hold title to the property that is the subject of this action, commonly
known as 10713 Doty Avenue, Inglewood, CA (“Doty Property”). Trujillo asserts
that in the consolidated civil action, Pech is the Plaintiff and is asserting a
cause of action against Trujillo for Quiet Title as to the Doty Property.
Trujillo notes that the Quiet Title issue is the central, primary and essential
issue in dispute in both of the consolidated UD and civil actions. Because the
Quiet Tile action is an equitable action, which Trujillo argues should be tried
and adjudicated by the Court rather than a jury, Trujillo argues this Court
should order trial of the UD action bifurcated so that the Court can adjudicate
the standing/quiet title issue in advance of jury issues, if any such issues
even remain after the Quiet Title issue has been adjudicated.
B.
Procedural
On March 11, 2024, Antonio
Trujillo filed the Motion to Bifurcate. On March 20, 2024, Lucila Parra filed
an opposition. On April 3, 2024, Antonio Trujillo filed a reply brief.
II. ANALYSIS¿
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A.
Legal Standard
Code of Civil Procedure § 598 provides in
pertinent part that, “[t]he court may, when the convenience of witnesses, the
ends of justice, or the economy and efficiency of handling the litigation would
be promoted thereby, on motion of a party, after notice and hearing, make an
order . . . that the trial of any issue or any part thereof shall precede the
trial of any other issue or any part thereof.” Similarly, Code of Civil
Procedure § 1048(b) provides in pertinent part that, “[t]he court, in
furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will
be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any cause
of action, including a cause of action asserted in a cross-complaint, or of any
separate issue or of any number of causes of action or issues.”
The Court’s discretionary authority to
sever claims and try them separately may also be employed to avoid undue
prejudice to a party. (Stencel Aero Engineering Corp., v. Superior Court
(1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 988.) Courts have inherent power to regulate the order of
trial, and therefore can entertain a motion to bifurcate at any time—even
during the trial itself. (McLellan v. McLellan (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 343,
353.)
The discretion of the trial court to
bifurcate claims and try them separately is broad and will not be disturbed on
appeal, except for abuse. (National Electric Supply Co. v. Mt. Diablo
Unified School Dist. (1960) 187 Cal.App.2d 418; see Buran Equip. Co. v.
H & C Investment Co. (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 338, 343-344 [commending the
trial court for bifurcating the trial and ordering a specific issue be tried
first, “since, if it had been correctly decided, trial would not have been
required of any other issues.”].)
B. Discussion
Preliminarily,
Trujillo argues that where equitable and legal claims are brought in the same
action, “the equitable claims are properly tried first by the court.” (Nwosu
v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1238.)
In
opposition, Defendant Parra argues that denial of the motion to bifurcate is
proper because it will prevent conflicting rulings. Parra notes that the claims
of issues for which Defendant Trujillo seeks to be bifurcated share common
issues of law or fact and will necessarily rely upon the same evidence and
witnesses. As such, Parra argues that the bifurcation of issues or claims in
this case will result in a waste of time and judicial resources since both the
leading case and related case involve the same parties, and the same issues. Parra
contends that one matter cannot be decided without the other, which is the
reason the cases were consolidated, a motion for which Trujillo did not object
to.
This Court
notes that “Normally,
title disputes cannot be litigated in an unlawful detainer proceeding. (Martin-Bragg
v. Moore (2013) 219 Cal. App.4th 367, 385, (stating “denial of certain
procedural rights enjoyed by litigants in ordinary actions is deemed necessary
in order to prevent frustration of the summary proceedings by the introduction
of delays and extraneous issues.”); Friedman, et al., Cal. Prac. Guide:
Landlord-Tenant (The Rutter Group 2016). “If an unlawful detainer is pending
(generally as a limited civil case) at the same time, the unlimited
jurisdiction trial court may stay the UD until trial of the related civil action;
or, in the alternative, may consolidate the actions. (Martin-Bragg v. Moore,
supra, 219 Cal. App.4th at 385.) Here, on February 22, 2024, this
Court, after hearing the ex parte application on the Motion to Consolidate, the
Court noted this motion was moot as the parties orally stipulated to the
consolidation.
This Court further notes that “[a] case raising
complex title issues and a typical unlawful detainer action involves very
different procedures. If the title issue is tried within the UD summary
procedures, the opportunity for appropriate discovery and the right to a fair
trial may be “unfairly expedited and limited.” If the UD is transformed into an
ordinary civil action, the summary determination of the right to possession is
lost. (Martin-Bragg v. Moore, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at 385-387.) “When
complex issues of title are involved, the parties' constitutional rights to due
process in the litigation of those issues cannot be subordinated to the summary
procedures of unlawful detainer.” The trial court has discretion to fashion
conditions and limitations to protect and preserve the unlawful detainer's
summary procedures yet, in doing so, the court cannot disregard a party's
substantial procedural rights when adjudicating complex title issues or require
that those issues be confined to a UD summary proceeding. (Martin-Bragg v.
Moore, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at 389-391 (holding that a trial court abused its
discretion by denying request to consolidate UD and quiet title actions and
thereby prejudiced party by forcing complex title issue to be litigated under
UD summary procedures”).) As noted in this Court’s February 22, 2024, minute
order, the stipulation of the parties rendered the ex parte proceedings moot,
but this Court noted that the cases were consolidated, and that all future
documents were to be filed under 23TRCV00381, the civil action involving quiet
title. When transferred for adjudication with the unlimited civil case, “the
court may sever or bifurcate the nonjury causes of action, if any, and try
those first.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 397.)
Per the declaration of counsel for Plaintiffs,
Sherry Anne Lear, it appears that the two UD defendants, Parra and Pech, have
raised issues of Trujillo having standing in the UD action. Thus, Trujillo
requests an order from this Court bifurcating the trial of the UD case to hear
and adjudicate the standing/quiet title issue as a bench trial prior to the
submission of further issues, if any, to the jury. Trujillo also argues in his
reply brief that Parra’s argument that bifurcation would not preserve judicial
resources because there will still need to be a trial of the quiet title issues
in the consolidated civil action regardless of the court’s determination of the
standing defense asserted by Parra and Pech in the upcoming UD trial is
groundless for two reason. First, Trujillo contends that it is not clear, at
this time, whether a quiet title issue would exist in the Civil Action by the
time of trial of that action as it appears doubtful Pech would successfully
resurrect her cause of action for quiet title in a Third Amended Complaint, or
whether Parra’s recently filed cross-complaint would survive pleading
challenges. Second, Trujillo contends that a determination of the standing
defenses of Parra and Pech in trial of the UD action would collaterally estop
relitigation of the title issue in the Civil Action.
In the
present case, Trujillo argues that: (1) the title issues would be
identical in the UD Action and the Civil Action; (2) the standing/ownership
issue would be actually litigated in the UD action; (3) the standing/ownership
issue would be necessarily decided in the UD Action, as it is the primary
defense of Pech and Parra to eviction; (4) the decision in the UD Action would
become final on the merits before the civil case gets close to trial; and (5)
the parties against whom collateral estoppel would be asserted in the Civil
Action will be the same parties who litigated that issue in the UD Action.
Here,
the Court agrees with Trujillo that the interests of justice weigh in favor of
bifurcation. Once the Court first
decides the equitable issues raised by the standing defense and quiet title
claim, the Court’s decision would be law of the case concerning a second, later
trial on the UD claims. The UD claims might be mooted depending on the
outcome of the first trial as to the standing defense and quiet title. When the parties stipulated to consolidation,
in the Court’s view the UD plaintiff surrender the right have the UD case
prioritized and given statutory precedence under Code of Civil Procedure
section 1179a. Accordingly, the Court
exercises its discretion to control the process and proceedings so as to conform
to justice. (Id. section 128(a)(3), (8).)
In the Court’s judgment, and in the
exercise of the Court’s statutory discretion under Code of Civil Procedure §§
598 and 1048(b), separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy. This is especially so where as here the trial
of the standing and quiet title issues to the Court will defer and potentially
avoid the need for hearings on motions in limine, jury instructions, and other matters
that are not embraced in a bench trial. Further still, given the number of recent settlements
among the parties before the Court in these consolidated actions, prompt
resolution of the equitable issues may well facilitate settlement of the legal issues
that would be otherwise tried to a jury.
Finally, Trujillo notes that jury fees have not been timely posted so
there may not be a jury trial as to any claim in these cases.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Trujillo’s Motion to Bifurcate is GRANTED.
Trujillo is ordered to give notice. ¿¿
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