Judge: Ronald F. Frank, Case: 23TRCV00913, Date: 2023-12-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23TRCV00913    Hearing Date: December 13, 2023    Dept: 8

Tentative Ruling¿¿ 

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HEARING DATE:                 December 13, 2023¿¿ 

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CASE NUMBER:                  23TRCV00913

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CASE NAME:                        Soledad Meza v. General Motors, LLC, et al. 

MOVING PARTY:                Plaintiff, Soledad Meza

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RESPONDING PARTY:       Defendant, General Motors LLC (No Opposition.)

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TRIAL DATE:                        Not Set

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MOTION:¿                              (1) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production, Set One.

Tentative Rulings:                  (1) DENIED as to RFPS 16-21 and 51; GRANTED as to RFP 49 and 50 as limited below

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I. BACKGROUND¿¿¿ 

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A. Factual¿¿¿ 

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On March 27, 2023, Plaintiff, Soledad Meza (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against Defendant, General Motors, LLC, and DOES 1 through 10. The Complaint alleges the following causes of action: (1) Violation of Civil Code § 1793.2(d); and (2) Violation of Civil Code § 1793.2(b); (3) Violation of Civil Code § 1793.2(a)(3); (4) Violation of Civil Code § 1791.2(a), 1794; and (5) Violation of Civil Code § 1791.1, 1794.

On May 15, 2023, Plaintiff propounded Request for Produce, Set One on Defendant seeking documents relating to Defendant’s internal investigations and analysis of the defects affecting Plaintiff’s vehicle and bearing on whether Defendant previously knew of such defects, but failed to repurchase the vehicle.

Plaintiff notes that on June 16, 2023, Defendant provided unverified responses to Requests for Production, Set One, which contained responses that were not Code-compliant, replete with boilerplate objections, and failed to produce many of the documents requested. (Declaration of Ezra Ryu (“Ryu Decl.”), ¶ 20.) Plaintiff further notes that on July 13, 2023, Defendant subsequently served the verification to the responses.

Plaintiff contends it attempted to meet and confer with Defendant by sending a detailed letter on July 21, 2023. Plaintiff asserts he even offered to stipulate to the LASC Model Protective Order without being asked in order to demonstrate good faith. Plaintiff further asserts his counsel has attempted to meet and confer regarding the pending discovery issues by telephone, including asking for Defendant’s counsel’s availability by email, and after no response, attempting to reach Defendant’s counsel by telephone on at least three (3) occasions. (Ryu Decl., ¶ 23.)

On July 28, 2023, Plaintiff notes that Defendant’s counsel sent a letter to Plaintiff’s counsel stating, in effect, that Defendant would produce further documents, but only upon Plaintiff’s counsel executing the LASC Model Protective order. (Ryu Decl., ¶ 24.) However, Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s counsel neither filed the stipulated protective order, nor produced further documents. To date, Plaintiff contends that Defendant has yet to produce any of the withheld documents which may help Plaintiff understand the circumstances behind the repeated problems with the subject vehicle and help Plaintiff prepare for trial (Ryu Decl., ¶ 29.)

B. Procedural¿¿¿ 

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On August 8, 2023, Plaintiff filed this Motion to Compel Further Responses and a 74-page Separate Statement. On August 22, 2023, Defendant filed an opposition brief and its own Separate Statement.   On August 28, 2023, Plaintiff filed a reply brief.

On September 5, 2023, this Court noted in its minute order that the Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses was off calendar.

On October 26, 2023, Plaintiff filed an Amended Notice of Motion to Compel Further Responses. The Amended Notice makes mention of the previously filed documents such as the Separate Statement and the Ryu declaration in support of the original motion.

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¿II. MEET AND CONFER ¿¿¿ 

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The Court finds that Plaintiff’s meet and confer efforts were sufficient, although fruitless.

¿III. ANALYSIS¿¿ 

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A.    Legal Standard

“Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with this title, any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code of Civ. Proc. § 2017.010.) For discovery purposes, information is regarded as relevant “if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement thereof.” (City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 272, 288.)  

A motion to compel further responses to a demand for inspection or production of documents (“RFP”) may be brought based on: (1) incomplete statements of compliance; (2) inadequate, evasive, or incomplete claims of inability to comply; or (3) unmerited or overly generalized objections.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(c).) A motion to compel further production must set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(b)(1).) In Digital Music News LLC v Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 216 at 224, the Court defined “good cause” as a showing that there “a disputed fact that is of consequence in the action and the discovery sought will tend in reason to prove or disprove that fact or lead to other evidence that will tend to prove or disprove the fact.” If the moving party has shown good cause for the requests for production, the burden is on the objecting party to justify the objections. (Kirkland v. Sup.Ct (2002) 95 Cal. App.4th 92, 98.) ¿ 

"The court shall limit the scope of discovery if it determines that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of that discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." (Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. § 2017.020(a).) Generally, objections on the ground of burden require the objecting party to produce evidence of (a) the propounding party's subjective intent to create burden or (b) the amount of time and effort it would take to respond. (See West Pico Furniture Co. of Los Angeles v. Superior Court In and For Los Angeles County (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417.) However, no such evidence is necessary where discovery is obviously overbroad on its face. (See Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 431.)

B.     Discussion

The defined term “Electrical Defect” is unreasonably overly broad, unduly burdensome, and resulting in a multiply compound definition and vagueness, especially when the “and any other concern identified in the repair history for subject 2019 GMC Sierra 1500” language is included.   Asking a responding party to read and respond to each of the 7 pertinent RFPs to find each “concern identified in the repair history” is not a reasonable way to define a discovery request.  If a repair history has 25 separate line items for the symptoms plaintiff reported, Plaintiff’s overly broad definition of “Electrical Defect” would require Defendant to create its own list of those 25 concerns and then undertake the task of a records search for each of those 25 concerns in response to every one of the 7 categories of document demands here in RFPs No. 16-21 and 51.  A lawyer’s or a client’s characterization of something as a singular “electrical defect” when the actual repair symptoms experienced by the Plaintiff may be many separate and discrete things may work as a jury argument but does not work when a defendant, or a judge, is reviewing a discovery request in the crucible of a motion to compel.

The definition in the subject RFPs suggests that there were eight or more discrete symptoms or findings in the subject 2019 GMC Sierra 1500: battery failure, battery malfunction, failure of the vehicle to power down, battery drainage, failure of ECM wires, replacement of ECM wires that was not the result of a failure of the wire, failure of the ECM module, and malfunction of the ECM module.  There also are 6 TSBs listed in the definition, further broadening the definition of “Electrical Defect” even if the TSB was mentioned only a single time in the repair history.  Given that Plaintiff’s requested discovery seeks evidence including emails of GM employees generally and ESI relating to other vehicles besides Plaintiff’s with any of the constellation of possible repair complaints not only in California, but in any other states, this set of Requests is unduly burdensome, taking into account the needs of this single-vehicle case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in this litigation. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2019.030(a)(2).)

To be sure, a Lemon Law plaintiff is entitled to discover if a repair symptom she or he experienced is one that the defendant concedes to be covered by the express warranty, or to have been the subject of multiple repairs, or to have a published repair or diagnostic procedure, or to have an internal root cause analysis report, or to be known as a problem with other similar vehicles sold and/or serviced in California during a relevant time period.  But that is not what RFP 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21 actually seek.  Ofttimes, plaintiffs and defendants in Lemon Law litigation begin with a reasonably tailored discovery request but then make it unreasonable and unfairly burdensome by adding additional phrases or clauses to specially defined terms or to the categories of documents sought.  That is the case here.  A better practice would be to list the specific repair complaints that the plaintiff reported to a repairing or servicing dealership on a repair record – focusing on those symptoms that recurred in the repair history --  and ask for categories of documents relating to each such recurring symptom.  The Court’s order here is without prejudice to Plaintiff serving new discovery requests that follow that better practice, making them more digestible and more reasonably discoverable.  While one-time repair complaints are relevant and information about them is discoverable, the categories in the subject RFPs seek ESI, other customers’ complaints, other warranty claims besides plaintiff’s, and similar discovery without being tethered to what is REASONABLY calculated to lead to discovering evidence that may be admissible at trial.  Other customer complaints or other warranty claims or internal analytic repairs are NOT, in the Court’s view, reasonable requests in a single-vehicle Lemon Law case for a repair complaint or symptom that appeared only one time in a vehicle’s repair history. 

RFP No. 49 – GRANTED, but limited to any policies or procedures as to the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (as distinct from compliance with other state’s laws) applicable during calendar years 2020-2022.

RFP No. 50 – GRANTED, but limited to any training manuals or training materials provided to the persons or person outside of GM’s Legal Department who was or were responsible for determining repurchase or replacement pursuant to the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (as distinct from compliance with other state’s laws) applicable during calendar years 2020-2022.

IV. CONCLUSION¿¿¿ 

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For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motions to Compel Further responses to Requests for Production of Documents, Set One are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part pursuant to the specifications noted above. GM is to provide further responses in line with the Court’s order within 30 days of this order, given the upcoming holidays.