Judge: Ronald F. Frank, Case: 23TRCV00970, Date: 2023-08-15 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23TRCV00970 Hearing Date: August 15, 2023 Dept: 8
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HEARING DATE: August 15, 2023¿¿
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CASE NUMBER: 23TRCV00970
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CASE NAME: Graciela Munoz, Roberto Munoz v. Easton Dowe
Jones, et al.
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MOVING PARTY: Defendants, Easton Dowe Jones, as an individual and trustee
of the Easton and Hana Jones Family Trust and Hana Olivia Jones, as an
individual and trustee of the Easton and Hana Jones Family Trust
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RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs, Graciela Munoz and Roberto Munoz
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TRIAL DATE: None
set.¿
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MOTION:¿ (1) Demurrer¿
(2)
Motion to Strike
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Tentative Rulings: (1) Defendants’ Demurrer is SUSTAINED
(2)
Motion to Strike is MOOTED
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A. Factual¿¿
On April 3, 2023, Plaintiffs,
Graciela Munoz and Roberto Munoz (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed a Complaint
against Defendants, Easton Dowe Jones, as an individual and trustee of the
Easton and Hana Jones Family Trust; Hana Olivia Jones, as an individual and
trustee of the Easton and Hana Jones Family Trust, and DOES 1 through 30,
inclusive. On June 20, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint
(“FAC”). The FAC alleges causes of action for: (1) Trespass and Encroachment by
Trespass; (2) Private Nuisance and Encroachment by Private Nuisance; (3) Quiet
Title; and (4) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.
Defendants, Easton Dowe Jones, as an
individual and trustee of the Easton and Hana Jones Family Trust; Hana Olivia
Jones, as an individual and trustee of the Easton and Hana Jones Family Trust
(collectively, “Defendants”) filed a Demurrer and Motion to Strike portions of
the FAC.
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B. Procedural¿¿
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On July 20, 2023, Defendants filed its
Demurrer and Motion to Strike. On August 4, 2023, Plaintiffs filed oppositions.
On August 8, 2023, Defendants filed a reply brief to both.
¿II. MOVING PARTY’S GROUNDS
FOR THE DEMURRER¿& MOTION TO STRIKE¿
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Defendants demur to the Complaint on the grounds they
argue the third (quiet title) and fourth (IIED) causes of action alleged in
Plaintiffs’ Complaint fail to state facts sufficient to constitute causes of
action against Defendant.
Defendants filed a Motion to Strike the following from
Plaintiff’s Complaint:
1. Paragraph
35, page 6:23-24: “blatantly false claims”
2. Paragraph
35, page 6:25: “threatening to take legal action”
3. Paragraph
36, page 6:26: “Defendants’ intentional actions”
4. Paragraph
36, page 6:27-29: “concern, worry and distress”
5. Paragraph
38, page 7:2: “Defendant’s intentional infliction of emotional distress”
6. Paragraph
38, page 7:3: “entitled to punitive damages”
7. Paragraph
3, page 7:9: (Prayer) “For punitive and exemplary damages”
8. Paragraph
6, page 7:17: “For recovery of attorneys’ fees”
III. ANALYSIS¿¿
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As a preliminary
matter, the Court notes that the opposition is untimely filed. However, the
Court finds good cause to consider the opposition and the reply briefs here.
A. Demurrer
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A demurrer can be used only
to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or
from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v.
Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “To survive a demurrer, the complaint
need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary
fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be
alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53
Cal.4th 861, 872.) For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of
action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (Aubry
v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967.) A demurrer “does
not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Daar v.
Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)¿¿¿¿
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A pleading is uncertain if
it is ambiguous or unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).) A
demurrer for uncertainty may lie if the failure to label the parties and claims
renders the complaint so confusing defendant cannot tell what he or she is
supposed to respond to.¿ (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986)
185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.) However, “[a] demurrer for uncertainty is
strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain,
because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury
v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)¿¿¿
Quiet
Title
An action for quiet
title seeks “to establish title against adverse claims to real or personal
property or any interest therein.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 760.020, subd. (a).) In
an action for quiet title, Plaintiff must plead (1) “[a] description of the
property that is the subject of the action,” specifically the location of
tangible personal property and the legal description and street address or
common designation of real property, (2) “[t]he title of the plaintiff as to
which a determination under this chapter is sought and the basis of the title,”
(3) “[t]he adverse claims to the title of the plaintiff against which a
determination is sought,” (4) “[t]he date as of which the determination is
sought,” and (5) “[a] prayer for the determination of the title of the
plaintiff against the adverse claims.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 761.020.)
Plaintiffs’ FAC alleges
that “[b]y virtue of the foregoing facts, Plaintiffs request an order from the
Court, declaring that Plaintiffs are the 100% fee simple owners of the disputed
area between Plaintiffs’ Property and Defendants’ Property and quieting title as
to any and all Defendants.” (FAC, ¶ 29.) Plaintiffs assert that they are
informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that Defendants claim an
interest adverse to Plaintiffs’ title in the disputed area between Plaintiffs’
Property and Defendants’ Property. (FAC, ¶ 30.) Plaintiffs assert that these
claims are without any right, and that Defendants have no right, title, estate,
lien, or interest in the disputed area between Plaintiffs’ Property and
Defendants’ Property. (FAC, ¶ 30.)
Here, Defendants argue
that neither the original complaint, nor the operative FAC are verified.
Further, Defendants point out that there is no legal description of the real
property to be quieted.
In opposition, Plaintiff
argues its Complaint may be pleaded in general terms and that there is no
question raised as to Plaintiffs’ title. Plaintiffs further argue that
Defendants are not raising such a defense. Instead, Plaintiff asserts that they
claim that there is a dispute as to a portion of their real property that is
encroached by the encroachments along the 2-3 feet on the western side of
Plaintiffs’ property. Plaintiffs argue this description is sufficient to plead
a claim for quiet title.
The Court disagrees. Although Plaintiff’s
Complaint provides the street addresses of both their property, as well as
Defendants’ property, they do not provide the legal description of the parcel
of land itself. Because of this, they do not meet the pleading requirements to
state a claim for quiet title. Based on this, as well as the fact that the
Complaint is unverified, this Court SUSTAINS demurrer with twenty (20) days
leave to amend.
Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress
“The elements of a prima facie case for the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) extreme and outrageous
conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard
of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s
suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate
causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.
Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that
usually tolerated in a civilized community.” (Wilson v. Hynek (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 999, 1009, citation and
ellipses omitted.) According to the California
Supreme Court in Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 946-47, a case
in which a supervisor’s use of racial epithets to humiliate a never-before criticized
employee and to recommend the plaintiff’s termination for reasons that were not
true:
“Behavior may be considered outrageous if a defendant (1) abuses a
relation or position which gives him power to damage the plaintiff's interest;
(2) knows the plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through mental distress; or
(3) acts intentionally or unreasonably with the recognition that the acts are
likely to result in illness through mental distress. (Prosser, Law of Torts, supra,
at pp. 57-58; Rest.2d Torts, § 46, coms. e, f; Fletcher v. Western National
Life Ins. Co. [(1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 376,] 397 (insurance agent's threatened and actual
refusals to pay; threatening communication in bad faith to settle nonexistent
dispute); Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. [(1970) 2 Cal.3d 493,] 496
(supervisor shouting insulting epithets; terminating employment; humiliating
plaintiff); Golden v. Dungan [(1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 295,] 305 (process
server knowingly and maliciously banging on door at midnight).)”
Plaintiffs’ FAC alleges that Defendants engaged in
intentional acts that were outrageous with the intent to cause Plaintiffs
emotional distress when they (i) failed to maintain the palm tree that was
creating a significant amount of debris on Plaintiffs’ Property including palm
fronds falling from significant heights that have caused physical damage to the
house located on Plaintiffs’ Property; (ii) endangered the safety and
well-being of Plaintiffs by maintaining the Unpermitted ADU directly next to a
utility pole and fence; (iii) allowed Airbnb guests to create a significant
amount of noise on Defendants’ Property; and (iv) placed over 6 foot tall
hedges on Plaintiff’s Property. (FAC, ¶ 34.) Plaintiffs claim that Defendants
also attempted to intimidate Plaintiffs by sending a letter containing
blatantly false claims about the true owner of the disputed area between Plaintiffs’
Property and Defendants’ Property and threatening to take legal action. (FAC, ¶
35.) Plaintiff further asserts that as a result of Defendants’ intentional
actions, Plaintiffs have suffered severe emotional distress, and can no longer
enjoy their home next to the Defendants as their neighbors and are in a
constant state of concern, worry and distress. (FAC, ¶ 36.) Plaintiff notes
that Defendants’ conduct was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiffs severe
emotional distress. (FAC, ¶ 37.)
While the alleged acts of the Defendants, if proven,
may have caused the Plaintiffs a degree of emotional distress, and to have
suffered some degree of indignity, the nature of this dispute as alleged does not
rise to the level required for an IIED cause of action. Nor does the neighbor
vs neighbor context one that has been recognized by prior appellate decisions as
supporting a conclusion that the particular conduct alleged could prove an IIED
claim. The FAC fails to adequately allege
how the listed actions of Defendant are so extreme and so outrageous that a
reasonable juror could find them to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated
in a civilized community. As such, the Court sustains the demurrer, and invited
Plaintiff’s counsel to represent what new or additional facts could be alleged were
the Court to grant leave to amend.
B. Motion to Strike¿¿
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The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its
discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or
improper matter inserted in any pleading.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 436(a).)¿ The
court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in
conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the
court.¿ (Id., § 436(b).)¿ The grounds for a motion to strike are that
the pleading has irrelevant, false improper matter, or has not been drawn or
filed in conformity with laws.¿ (Id., § 436.)¿ The grounds for moving to
strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice.¿ (Id.,
§ 437.)¿ “When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of
cure, the court should allow leave to amend.”¿ (Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998)
63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768.)¿ ¿
Here, the Motion to Strike is based on the Defendants’
arguments in the demurrer. Since the Court sustained the demurrer in full
above, this effectively moots the motion to strike.
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