Judge: Ronald F. Frank, Case: 23TRCV00974, Date: 2024-01-16 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23TRCV00974 Hearing Date: March 29, 2024 Dept: 8
Tentative Ruling¿
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HEARING DATE: March 29, 2024¿¿
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CASE NUMBER: 23TRCV00974
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CASE NAME: Giuseppe
Sanzone; Caroline Petersen v. FCA US LLC, et al.
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MOVING PARTY: (1) Plaintiffs, Giuseppe Sanzone; Caroline Petersen
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RESPONDING PARTY: (1) Defendants, FCA US LLC
TRIAL DATE: May 27, 2025
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MOTION:¿ (1)
Motion for Terminating Sanctions
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Tentative Rulings: (1) Motion for
Terminating Sanctions is DENIED because although tardy, Defendant did
ultimately comply with the Court-ordered discovery. Monetary Sanctions are
GRANTED in the lowered amount of $2,500, payable by counsel for defendant to
counsel for Plaintiffs on or before April 19.
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I. BACKGROUND¿¿
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A. Factual¿¿
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On April 3, 2023, Plaintiffs, Giuseppe Sanzone and
Caroline Petersen (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed a Complaint against
Defendant, FCA US LLC, and DOES 1 through 10. The Complaint alleges causes of
action for: (1) Violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act – Breach of
Express Warranty; (2) Violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act –
Breach of Implied Warranty; (3) Violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty
Act – Breach of § 1793.2(b); and (4) Violation of Business and Professions Code
§ 17200.
Per the moving papers, on
August 11, 2023, Plaintiffs served on Defendant several discovery sets,
including Requests for Production of Documents, Special Interrogatories,
Requests for Admission, and Form Interrogatories, Set One. Despite this,
Plaintiffs contend that as of the filing of this motion, Plaintiffs had not
received any of Defendant’s responses. Plaintiffs even contend that although
not required prior to filing a motion to compel initial responses, on October
24, 2023, Plaintiffs attempted to meet and confer with defense counsel,
requesting verified substantive responses before filing this motion. However,
Plaintiffs assert that despite multiple follow up attempts, Defendant has
failed to provide any substantive responses to the discovery. As a result,
Plaintiff brought a Motion to Compel Initial Responses to Requests for
Production of Documents, Special Interrogatories, Requests for Admission, and
Form Interrogatories Set One.
On January 16, 2024, the
Court GRANTED the motion, except that the Court DENIED the motion to deem the
requests for admission as admitted. The Court ordered FCA to provide verified
amended or further responses, without objection, including responses to the
RFAs within twenty (20) days. This Court also awarded Plaintiff monetary sanctions
in the amount of $2,500 to be paid by Defendant FCA to Plaintiffs’ counsel,
within 20 days, with the sanctions ordered payable by defense counsel’s office
given counsel’s declaration explaining why the responses were not prepared
until after service of the subject motion. These responses and sanctions were
due to Plaintiff’s counsel no later than February 5, 2024. Plaintiff also
contends that Plaintiff’s counsel attempted to meet and confer with Defendant
to avoid this continuous cycle of motions to no avail, but that as of the date
of Plaintiff’s filing of this motion, no verified discovery responses had been
served by Defendant, and no sanctions paid.
As such, Plaintiff now
brings forth a Motion for Terminating Sanctions.
B. Procedural¿¿
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On March 5, 2024, Plaintiff
filed a Motion for Terminating Sanctions. On March 21, 2024, Defendant filed an
opposition brief, noting the Court-ordered responses had finally been served
although late. On March 22, 2024, Plaintiff filed a reply brief.
¿II. ANALYSIS¿
A.
Legal
Standard
If a party fails to comply
with a court order compelling discovery responses or attendance at a
deposition, the court may impose monetary, issue, evidence, or terminating
sanctions. Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.450, subd. (h) (depositions); § 2030.290,
subd. (c) (interrogatories); § 2031.300, subd. (c) (demands for production of
documents); § 2033.290, subd. (e) (requests for admission). Code of Civil
Procedure section 2023.030 provides that, “[t]o the extent authorized by the
chapter governing any particular discovery method . . . , the court, after
notice to any affected party, person, or attorney, and after opportunity for
hearing, may impose . . . [monetary, issue, evidence, or terminating]
sanctions against anyone engaging in conduct that is a misuse of the discovery
process . . .” Section 2023.010 provides that “[m]isuses of the discovery
process include, but are not limited to, the following: . . . (d) Failing to
respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery. . . (g) Disobeying a
court order to provide discovery. . .”
“The trial court may order a terminating sanction for
discovery abuse ‘after considering the totality of the circumstances: [the]
conduct of the party to determine if the actions were willful; the detriment to
the propounding party; and the number of formal and informal attempts to obtain
the discovery.’” (Los Defensores, Inc. v. Gomez (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th
377, 390, quoting Lang v. Hochman (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1246.)
“Generally, ‘[a] decision to order terminating sanctions should not be made
lightly. But where a violation is willful, preceded by a history of abuse, and
the evidence shows that less severe sanctions would not produce compliance with
the discovery rules, the trial court is justified in imposing the ultimate
sanction.’” (Los Defensores, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 390
[citation omitted].)
“Under this standard, trial courts have properly imposed
terminating sanctions when parties have willfully disobeyed one or more
discovery orders.” (Id., citing Lang, supra, 77 Cal. App.
4th at pp. 1244-1246 [discussing cases]; see, e.g., Collisson &
Kaplan v. Hartunian (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1611, 1617-1622 [terminating
sanctions imposed after defendants failed to comply with one court order to
produce discovery]; Laguna Auto Body v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (1991) 231
Cal.App.3d 481, 491, disapproved on other grounds in Garcia v. McCutchen
(1997) 16 Cal.4th 469, 478, n. 4 [terminating sanctions imposed against
plaintiff for failing to comply with a discovery order and for violating
various discovery statutes].)
Discussion
Here, Plaintiff argues that good
cause exists for terminating sanctions because Defendant has intentionally “ignored”
the Court’s order and its own discovery obligations, and that it would be
appropriate to impose sanctions striking out Defendant’s Answer and rendering
judgment by default against them. Plaintiffs further note in their reply brief,
that not only did Defendant fail to timely serve the Court-ordered discovery
and pay the Court-ordered sanctions, but also the day after the discovery was
due (February 6, 2024), Plaintiffs’ counsel contacted counsel for Defendant,
who stated that they would “look into” the issue. Plaintiffs further note that
they granted an extension for the responses and sanctions to be due by February
16, 2024. However, despite this, Plaintiffs argue that they did not receive any
follow up, resulting in the filing of this motion.
This Court notes that on two
occasions now, FCA has failed to abide by deadlines. While this certainly does
warrant monetary sanctions, the Court does not find that FCA’s abuse of the
discovery process (at this stage), is enough to warrant terminating sanctions
for the violation of a discovery order. The Court will order defense counsel to
calendar NOW the deadline for payment of the monetary sanctions being ordered
here, not just on the law firm’s calendar but also on the handling attorney or
attorneys’ own personal calendars. The
caveat is that if this type of behavior is repeated in the future after a court
order with a deadline, Defendant’s or defense counsel’s action, or lack
thereof, may warrant terminating sanctions in the future.
The opposition to this motion indicates
that Defendant did not willfully violate this Court’s discovery order, but rather
that counsel, not the client, mistakenly believed the February 5, 2024 due date
was calendared but was not. Defendant’s counsel further reassures this Court
that on March 15, 2024, responses were served on Plaintiff, and on March 19,
2024, verifications and document production were subsequently served. As such,
Defendant requests this Court deny terminating and monetary sanctions.
Although this Court is tentatively
inclined to DENY the terminating sanctions, the Court is also tentatively
inclined to GRANT the monetary sanctions. Plaintiff’s moving papers indicate
that Plaintiff has incurred $3,660 in attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses in
connection with this motion and enforcing this discovery. This amount is based
on Plaintiff’s counsel, Chad A. David, Esq., who has indicated his hourly wage
is $450, and that he spent six hours to prepare the instant motion and conduct
legal research, anticipates an additional two (2) hours of work to review any
opposition, prepare a reply, and attend any hearings as needed. This Court
notes that six hours on such a motion seems excessive in the Court’s experience
for an attorney experienced enough to warrant a $450 hourly rate. As such, the
Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Request for Sanctions, but in the lowered amount $2,500
to be paid by Defendant or Defendant’s Counsel to Plaintiff’s counsel on or before
April 19, 2024.
III. CONCLUSION¿¿
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For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s
Motion for Terminating Sanctions is DENIED. However, Defense Counsel is ordered
to pay Plaintiff’s counsel $2,500 on or before April 19, 2024.
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Plaintiff is ordered to give notice.¿¿¿Defendant’s
counsel is ordered to calendar the April 19 deadline on her or his personal
calendar, not just the law firm’s calendar.
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