Judge Ronald F. Frank, Case Number: 23TRCV01072, Date: 2024-06-14 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Ronald F. Frank, Case: 23TRCV01072, Date: 2024-06-14 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23TRCV01072 Hearing Date: June 14, 2024 Dept: 8

Tentative Ruling

HEARING DATE: June 14, 2024

CASE NUMBER: 23TRCV01072

CASE NAME: Saul Caudillo-Romo v. General Motors, LLC

MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff, Saul Caudillo-Romo

RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant, General Motors, LLC

TRIAL DATE: November 25, 2024

MOTION: (1) Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production of Documents, Set One.

Tentative Rulings: (1) GRANTED in part and DENIED in part

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual

On April 7, 2023, Plaintiff, Saul Caudillo-Romo (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against Defendant General Motors (“GM”) and DOES 1 through 50. The Complaint alleges causes of action for: (1) Violation of Civil Code § 1793.2(d); (2) Violation of Civil Code § 1793.2(b); (3) Violation of Civil Code §1793.2(a)(3); (4) Breach of Express Written Warranty – Civil Code §§ 1791.2(a), 1794; and (5) Breach of the Implied Warranty of Merchantability – Civil Code §§ 1791.1, 1794.

The moving papers assert that on December 28, 2023, Plaintiff propounded his Request for Production of Documents, Set One, on Defendant seeking documents: (1) relating to Defendant’s internal investigations and analysis of the “Transmission Defect” that became symptomatic in Plaintiff’s vehicle and establishing Defendant previously knew of such Defect but nevertheless refused to repurchase the vehicle (i.e., Nos. 16, 19, 20, and 21), and (2) those relating to Defendant’s warranty and vehicle repurchase policies, procedures, and practices (i.e., Nos. 32 and 42).

On January 25, 2024, Plaintiff notes that Defendant served its initial responses. Plaintiff also notes that the signed verifications for these responses were not provided until February 22, 2024. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant’s responses contained boilerplate objections. Further, they argue that Defendant’s document production did not include any documents concerning Defendant’s investigations and analysis leading up to the issuance of a particular TSB, recall campaign, or warranty adjustment program.

Plaintiff contends that on December 28, 2023, Plaintiff sent his first meet and confer GM’s counsel responded on January 5, 2024, and stated its unsupported position that “there is no

need to discuss ESI or the items outlined in your December 28, 2023 letter.” On February 15, 2024, because the parties were engaged in private mediation, Plaintiff notes his counsel emailed Defendant to request a stay of the discovery proceedings until the Post Mediation Conference on March 14, 2024. On February 16, 2024, Plaintiff notes that Defendant responded to Plaintiff’s email agreeing to the stay of the discovery proceeding.

Plaintiff notes that on February 22, 2024, Defendant made a partial document production that did not include any engineering emails, internal investigation documents, or root cause analysis documents. On March 14, 2024, Plaintiff notes that after the Court had continued the Post Mediation Conference, Plaintiff emailed Defendant to request for the discovery stay to correspond with the continued Post Mediation Conference date of April 22, 2024,. Following no response, Plaintiff notes that on March 15, 2024, Plaintiff sent a meet and confer letter regarding Defendant’s allegedly non-compliant responses to the subject Requests for Production of Documents. Three days later, Defendant agreed to continue the discovery stay until the April PMSC. On April 29, 2024, a week after the discovery stay was lifted, Plaintiff sent a follow up email to Defendant followed by still another on May 6, 2024.

Despite these efforts, Plaintiff contends that Defendant has refused to respond to Plaintiff’s meet and confer attempts, has refused to produce the full and complete document production as requested, and has not provided Code-compliant supplemental responses to the particular request at issue in this Motion. As such, Plaintiff has filed this Motion to Compel Further Responses as to Requests for Production of Documents Nos. 16, 19-21, 32, and 42.

B. Procedural

On May 10, 2024, Plaintiff filed this Motion to Compel Further Responses. On June 3, 2024, Defendant filed an opposition brief. On June 6, 2024, Plaintiff filed a reply brief.

On June 6, 2024, Plaintiff filed a stipulation and protective order for confidential designation only, and Plaintiff also filed a supplemental declaration.

II. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objections to Declarations of Ryan Kay and Huizhen Lu:

Sustain: none.

Overrule: all.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

“Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with this title, any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code of Civ. Proc. § 2017.010.) For discovery purposes, information is regarded as relevant “if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case,

preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement thereof.” (City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 272, 288.)

A motion to compel further responses to a demand for inspection or production of documents (“RFP”) may be brought based on: (1) incomplete statements of compliance; (2) inadequate, evasive, or incomplete claims of inability to comply; or (3) unmerited or overly generalized objections. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(c).) A motion to compel further production must set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(b)(1).) In Digital Music News LLC v Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 216 at 224, the Court defined “good cause” as a showing that there “a disputed fact that is of consequence in the action and the discovery sought will tend in reason to prove or disprove that fact or lead to other evidence that will tend to prove or disprove the fact.” If the moving party has shown good cause for the requests for production, the burden is on the objecting party to justify the objections. (Kirkland v. Sup.Ct (2002) 95 Cal. App.4th 92, 98.) ¿

"The court shall limit the scope of discovery if it determines that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of that discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." (Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. § 2017.020(a).) Generally, objections on the ground of burden require the objecting party to produce evidence of (a) the propounding party's subjective intent to create burden or (b) the amount of time and effort it would take to respond. (See West Pico Furniture Co. of Los Angeles v. Superior Court In and For Los Angeles County (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417.) However, no such evidence is necessary where discovery is obviously overbroad on its face. (See Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 431.)

B. Discussion

Meet and Confer Efforts

In GM’s opposition brief, it argues that Plaintiff failed to meet and confer in good faith prior to bringing this motion. GM contends that Plaintiff’s letters cannot be deemed a genuine effort to meet and confer, because the letter did not provide meaningful substantive reasoning or analysis, declared Plaintiff’s requests valid, declared GM’s objections invalid, and demanded that GM produce all manner of documents that had nothing to do with this case. The Court disagrees and finds that Plaintiff satisfied the moving party’s burden of making a good faith attempt to resolve the discovery dispute informally before filing a motion to compel.

Requests for Production of Documents

Plaintiff seeks an order from this Court compelling GM’s further responses to Requests for Production of Documents Nos. 16, 19-21, 32, and 42. The Court discusses each in turn, but first takes the opportunity to warn the parties that in the future, the purpose of a Separate Statement in a discovery motion is to make it easier, not harder, for the Court to rule on motions compelling further responses to propounded discovery categories. Regurgitating arguments, points, authorities, and citations from a moving or opposing brief in a separate statement violates the page limitations of briefs supporting or opposing a motion. For example, this Court notes that

there are only six (6) requests at issue, but Plaintiff has provided a forty-four (44) page separate statement. However, in the interest of efficiency, the Court rules on each of the requests below:

RFP No. 16, and 19-21: DENIED. The defined term “transmission defect” is unreasonably overbroad, and unduly burdensome, resulting in a multiply compound definition and vagueness when the “any other concerns identified in the repair history” language is included as Plaintiff’s definition does. The result is a request for documents so wide-ranging and broad that it, even unintentionally, seeks documents that would not be reasonably calculated to lead to evidence that might be admissible in this trial. The defined term in Plaintiff’s discovery requests incorporates 10 different repair complaints plus the “any other concerns” as a single unitary “defect.” While Plaintiff may well argue that there is a single defect when the case is presented at trial, or allege a constellation of 7 or more symptoms as a single unitary defect in its pleadings, the scope of discovery is different and is judged by different standards. The Court’s finding o here to deny further response to these 4 RFPs is without prejudice to separate RFPs in a future set of discovery requests that contains a narrowed scope, e.g., documents that evidence or discuss GM’s diagnostic or repair instructions for a customer complaint -- of the vehicle jerking when accelerating from a stop -- in a 2017 model year Chevrolet Silverado.

Given that Plaintiff’s discovery requests seek documents that include emails of the approximately 163,000 GM employees worldwide, and ESI relating to vehicles other than Plaintiff’s not only in California but in any other state, this set of requests is unduly burdensome, taking into account the needs of this single-vehicle case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in this litigation. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2019.030(a)(2).)

RFP No. 32: GRANTED. This RFP asks GM to produce all documents relied upon by GM in support of GM’s contention that GM was under no obligation to promptly replace or repurchase the subject vehicle.

GM objected, noting that this request seeks information protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work-product doctrine. However, GM did agree to comply in part, by producing the documents in its possession, custody, or control: the sales or lease agreement that GM may have obtained from the dealership that sold or leased the SUBJECT VEHICLE to the Plaintiff, the New Vehicle Limited Warranty, the Owner's Manual, any Service Request Activity Report(s), the Global Warranty History Report, Repair Order Details, Repair Order Summary, and any incidentally obtained repair orders applicable to the SUBJECT VEHICLE. Discovery is ongoing in this matter. GM also notes that it reserves the right to supplement or amend this response during the course of the proceeding as it has not yet deposed the Plaintiff or inspected the subject vehicle.

The Court is skeptical that the documents identified for production encompass all responsive documents, but the Court is willing fashion an order that provides Plaintiff with its appropriately relevant discovery while considering GM’s concerns. If a non-lawyer made the decision to refuse to replace or repurchase Plaintiff’s vehicle, the Court is willing to enter an order barring GM from offering into evidence at trial any other documents besides those identified at trial bearing on the decision to decline a buyback or replacement vehicle. If a lawyer was the person who made that decision, GM would need to provide a privilege log of the

privileged materials responsive to this RFP. Otherwise, the Court is inclined to GRANT this RFP and compel a further verified production of additional documents. Generally, a manufacturer decision-maker relies on the company’s written policies or procedures for a California Song-Beverly Act buyback claim, communications such as emails with the manufacturer’s technical and/or sales employees, technical literature such as diagnostic or repair procedures pertinent to any recurring symptoms reported by the Plaintiff, and sometimes communications such as emails or notes of such discussions with dealer personnel or a local manager responsible for the servicing dealerships. If the decision maker did not rely on such documents in making a decision, then obviously they need not be identified or produced and Plaintiff will be protected from surprise at trial.

Finally, it is unclear how Defendant’s future deposition of Plaintiff or future inspection of the Vehicle would help Defendant determine what information it relied upon, in the past, to decide not to replace or repurchase the Vehicle. As such, unless Defendant can explain during oral argument why there are no additional responsive documents or why no privilege log has been provided, Plaintiff’s request as to RFP No. 32 will be GRANTED.

RFP No. 42: ARGUE. This RFP asks GM to produce all documents which evidence its organizational charts of people within GM’s customer service call center or prelitigation department.

The Court first would limit the time and scope of this RFP, which could have been accomplished in the meet-and-confer process, to the year in which Plaintiff’s communicated with a customer service call center or pre-litigation department, and to only those employees responsible for customer contacts from Southern California (as distinct from Florida, Texas, Michigan, etc.) Second, the Court invites argument as to whether Plaintiff is simply seeking the identity of the one or handful of people with whom Plaintiff might have communicated such as to notice Defendant’s Person Most Qualified. While there may be discoverability as to organization charts, if Plaintiff did not communicate with the service call center or customer relations department, the balance of discoverability versus reasonable calculation may sway the other way.