Judge: Ronald F. Frank, Case: 23TRCV01129, Date: 2023-09-20 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23TRCV01129 Hearing Date: December 15, 2023 Dept: 8
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HEARING DATE: December 15, 2023¿¿
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CASE NUMBER: 23TRCV01129
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CASE NAME: Latanya Scandrick, et al. v. Orlando Scandrick, et
al. .¿¿¿
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MOVING PARTY: Defendants, Orlando Scandrick, Wanda Scandrick, Trena Scandrick
aka Trena S. Norwood
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiffs, Latanya Scandrick, as Executor of Estate of
Henry Lee Scandrick, Latanya Scandrick, Christopher Scandrick, Pail Scandrick,
and Sherman
TRIAL DATE: None
Set.
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MOTION:¿ (1) Demurrer¿
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Tentative Rulings: (1) Sustained in part with leave
to amend. The Court identifies a number
of issues for oral argument below
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I. BACKGROUND¿¿
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A. Factual¿¿
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On April 11,
2023, Plaintiffs, Latanya Scandrick, as Executor of Estate of Henry Lee
Scandrick, Latanya Scandrick, an individual, Christopher Scandrick, an
individual, Paul Scandrick, an individual, and Sherman Scandrick, an individual
(collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed a Complaint against Defendants, Orlando
Scandrick, Wanda Scandrick, Trena Scandrick aka Trena S. Norwood, and DOES 1
through 50. On August 4, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint. On
November 1, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) alleging
causes of action for: (1) Fraud; (2) Conspiracy to Commit Fraud; (3)
Conversion; (4) Constructive Trust; (5) Intentional Interference with
Expectation of Inheritance; and (6) Unjust Enrichment.
Defendants
now file a Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ SAC.
B. Procedural¿¿
On November 17, 2023, Defendants
filed a Demurrer. On December 4, 2023, Plaintiffs filed an opposition. On December
11, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a reply to the opposition of the Demurrer. The SAC
also references another action pending in Los Angeles Superior Court where
Defendant Orlando Scandrick is the plaintiff, in addition to the no longer
pending action of which he requests the Court to judicially notice.
¿II. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
Defendants
filed a Request for Judicial Notice concurrently with their other moving
papers, requesting this Court take judicial notice of the following documents:
1. The
Court’s Minute Order dated February 7, 2020, regarding the property located at
110003 South Van Ness Avenue, Inglewood, California. (Exhibit A.)
2. The
Court’s Judgment dated July 28, 2020, regarding the property located at 110003
South Van Ness Avenue, Inglewood, California. (Exhibit B.)
3. The
Appeal Court Opinion entered in Case No. YC071173 on September 22, 2022. (Exhibit
C.)
The Court GRANTS
Defendants’ request and takes judicial notice of the above documents.
Additionally, Plaintiffs,
along with their opposing papers, filed a Request for Judicial Notice of the
following document:
1. Order
Granting Letters of Administration with the Will Annexed, from the Alabama
Probate Court, bearing case number PC21-016, dated August 11, 2021. (Exhibit
A.)
The Court also GRANTS
this request and takes judicial notice of the above document.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Legal
Standard
A demurrer can be used only
to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or
from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v.
Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “To survive a demurrer, the complaint
need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary
fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be
alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53
Cal.4th 861, 872.) For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of
action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (Aubry
v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967.) A demurrer “does
not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Daar v.
Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)¿¿¿
A pleading is uncertain if
it is ambiguous or unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).) A demurrer for
uncertainty may lie if the failure to label the parties and claims renders the
complaint so confusing defendant cannot tell what he or she is supposed to
respond to.¿ (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d
135, 139, fn. 2.) However, “[a] demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed,
even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can
be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly's of
California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)¿
B. Discussion
Latanya Scandrick’s Standing
Defendants
argue that Plaintiffs’ First, Second, Third, and Sixth Causes of Action should
be dismissed because Latanya Scandrick, as Executor in Alabama, lacks standing.
Defendants rely on Smith v. Cimmet (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1381 (“Cimmet”),
to argue that as an Alabama representative, she does not have the capacity to
maintain a legal action in California on behalf of the estate because her
authority does not extend outside the state of Alabama.
In
Plaintiffs’ opposition, Plaintiff notes that she concedes that California
follows the common law rule that a personal representative generally cannot sue
in his or her representative capacity outside the state of appointment, as well
as concedes that Code of Civil Procedure § 1913 states: ““the authority of a
guardian, conservator… or of a personal representative, does not extend beyond
the jurisdiction of government under which that person was invested with
authority, except to the extent expressly authorized by statute.” Instead,
Plaintiffs are requesting this Court apply an exception discussed in Cimmet.
There, a personal representative of an Oregon estate brought a legal
malpractice action against California attorneys. (Cimmet, supra, 199
Cal.App.4th at 1381.) The trial court held that Oregon law controls the rights
of an Oregon estate representative and, under Oregon case law, a successor
representative has no standing to prosecute a legal malpractice claim against
attorneys retained to represent the predecessor representative. (Id.at 1388.) The First District maintained, that “[a]s a
general practice, a foreign representative who wants to sue, collect claims, or
otherwise exercise authority over a decedent’s property situated in California
petitions a California court for ancillary probate administration.” (Id.
at 1391; Prob. Code § 12500, et seq..) The Cimmet Court also noted that
a California court would then appoint a local personal representative
(commonly, the same person appointed by the sister state) who is then vested
with authority to marshal California assets.) (Prob. Code § 12504, 12513.) Moreover,
the Court noted the “rule barring foreign representatives from exercising
authority outside their state of appointment protects the rights of domestic
creditors. (Id. at 1392.)
As
alluded to by Plaintiffs in their opposition, the Cimmet Court
referenced that California recognizes limited exceptions to the rule barring
foreign representatives from exercising authority here on behalf of a
nondomiciliary decedent without a local personal representative. (Ibid.)
The Court noted the Probate Code, for example, provides a summary procedure for
a foreign representative’s collection of a small estate’s personal property
where the amount of the California property does not exceed $100,000. (Ibid;
Prob. Code §§ 12570-12573, 13100, et seq..) The Court noted that there is a
distinction made between a foreign representative acting in the capacity on behalf
of the decedent (which is generally barred) and a foreign representative acting
in another capacity such as trustee, judgment creditor, or intermediary for the
decedent’s survivors in a wrongful death action (which is generally permitted.)”
(Id. at 1392.) The Cimmet Court found that in that case, the
plaintiff was suing in his capacity as a foreign estate representative and, as
such, failed to identify any California statute providing an exception to the
general rule barring foreign representatives from suing here in their
representative capacity. (Id. at 1393.) The Court also noted that the
plaintiff there had also made no “effort to demonstrate that he should be
permitted to maintain his action because it is in the best interest of the
Estate and would not prejudice the interest of local creditors – which is a
broad exception some commentators have endorsed.” (Ibid. Rest.2d. Conf.
of Laws, supra, § 354; 14 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law
(10th ed. 2005) Wills & Probate, § 63, p. 125.) Importantly, the Court
expressed that the exception, however, “is usually reserved for situations
where there is no other forum in which the foreign representative can bring the
claim and the foreign representative cannot obtain ancillary administration
because there are no local assets to provide a basis for ancillary
administration.” (Id. at 1393-94.)
Plaintiffs
argue that unlike the plaintiff in Cimmet, the underlying action by
Latanya Scandrick as the Executor of Henry Lee Scandrick’s Estate has satisfied
the conditions and clearly falls within the exception because they argue the
SAC demonstrates: (1) Maintaining this lawsuit to recover money allegedly
stolen by Defendants Orlando and Wanda Scandrick is in the best interest of
Henry Lee Scandrick’s Estate; (2) the lawsuit will not prejudice the interest
of local creditors because there are no such creditors; (3) there is no other
forum in which Latanya Scandrick as the Executor can bring this lawsuit; and
(4) Latanya Scandrick cannot obtain ancillary administration because there are
no local assets to provide a basis for ancillary administration.
In
the reply brief, Defendants argue that Latanya Scandrick participated in the
probate case appointing Orlando Scandrick as Executory of his father’s estate,
and gave time for Latanya to file a competing petition, but that she chose not
to. Moreover, Defendants contend that an ancillary appointment in California is
not possible, because Orlando Scandrick was already appointed as the executor
of the estate in the state of California.
Nonetheless,
a Demurrer tests the sufficiency of a pleading on its face. Here, although
Plaintiffs argue in their opposition that their SAC clearly demonstrates the
requirements of being granted the exception, the Court is unable to find the
following language or allegations on the face of the SAC: (1) best interest of
the estate; (2) that there is no other forum in which Latanya Scandrick can
bring this lawsuit; and (3) that Latanya cannot obtain ancillary administration
because there are no local assets to provide a basis for ancillary
administration.
Here,
the Court requires a few clarifications. First, how is this the only forum in
which Latanya can bring the claim? Is there not a current case open and pending
in Alabama? Next, Defendants claim that Plaintiff cannot obtain ancillary
administration because Orlando Scandrick has been appointed executor of the
estate in California – Doesn’t the exception only apply when the reason the
foreign representative cannot obtain ancillary administration is because there
are no local assets to provide a basis for ancillary administration? Here,
Plaintiff’s case involves a deed for real property located in California. Wouldn’t
this fact render Plaintiffs’ request for this Court to grant an exception to
the general rule as it does not meet the exact parameters set out in Cimmet?
The Court will hear oral arguments as to these questions during the hearing.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction on Alabama
Real Property and Alabama Bank Accounts
Next,
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ First, Second, Third, and Sixth Causes of
Action should be dismissed because Los Angeles Superior Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction on Alabama real property and Alabama bank accounts with Smart
Bank and US First Bank. Defendants argue that this case involves real property
transfers that happened in Alabama, and bank accounts that are banks in Alabama
without breaches outside of Alabama or Tennessee.
In
opposition, Plaintiffs argue that they have alleged Defendants’ tortious acts
took place in both California and in Alabama, that Defendants used proceeds
from the sale of the Alabama property and money they allegedly stole from Henry
Lee Scandrick was transferred to Defendants’ bank accounts in California.
Some
of the allegations made by Plaintiffs are uncertain as to WHERE the tortious
acts took place. For example, paragraph 19 of the SAC states that Latanya
Scandrick “discovered that Defendants Orlando and Wanda Scandrick took money
from Henry Lee Scandrick’s bank account by wire transferring large sums of
money into their own personal account with US Bank in California and/or by
paying their personal bills by using the funds from Henry Lee Scandrick’s bank
accounts. Paragraph 18 of the SAC asserts that the Defendants had been
siphoning money from all of Henry Lee Scandrick’s various bank accounts in
California and Alabama since 2016. Additionally, Plaintiffs have alleged that
Defendants deeded over a certain real property to Orlando Scandrick without any
consideration (property in Inglewood). (SAC, ¶ 20.) Moreover, as to the other
real property in Alabama, the SAC asserts that Defendants sold it and kept the
entire sales proceeds for themselves, purchasing a property in California with
said proceeds. (SAC, ¶ 24.)
As
such, the Court does not believe that Plaintiffs have made clear exactly which
torts occurred in which states, thus rendering the SAC to be uncertain. For
example, do Plaintiffs allege that Defendants siphoned Henry Lee Scandrick’s
Alabama bank accounts while Defendants were in California? The Court will allow
oral argument as to how subject matter – as a whole – impacts each cause of
action.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction when
Plaintiffs Claim Probate Action over the Same Assets is Open in Alabama
Defendants,
without any legal support, state that because a case in Alabama may be open,
this Court would not have Subject Matter Jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ First,
Second, Third, and Fourth causes of action.
Plaintiffs
argue in their opposition that while the Alabama probate case is still open and
pending, there are no actions pending against Defendants in Alabama Probate
Court.
The
Court is confused about Defendants’ argument here, but will allow oral argument
to clarify.
Res Judicata, Claim Preclusion and/or
Collateral Estoppel: Title Transfer by Henry of California Van Ness Property
Previously Litigated
Defendants
argue that the doctrine of Res Judicata, Claim preclusion and/or Collateral
Estoppel bar any cause of action regarding the Title transfer by Henry of the
California Van Ness property. Defendants contend that decedent Henry Scandrick,
on his behalf, filed a complaint to quiet title on the subject property, noting
the issue in the case was to determine Henry Scandrick’s title and what he
transferred to other parties. Defendants argue Plaintiff is attempting to stand
in Henry’s shoes and re-litigate the issue of title on Henry’s behalf to prove
he did not have the capacity to transfer title to Orlando Scandrick.
In
opposition, Plaintiffs argue that they are not relitigating the issue of title
to the Van Ness Property, but are rather contending that Defendants are holding
the Van Ness Property in “trust” for the benefit of Henry Lee Scandrick’s
estate and subsequently for his five other siblings. There is a constructive
trust cause of action in the SAC.
However,
the Court has taken judicial notice of the deed, which does not state the
property was to be held in trust for the benefit of the decedent nor the
benefit of heirs. The Court also notes that although Plaintiffs have argued
this in their opposition, there is no language indicating that the Van Ness
property was deeded to Orlando Scandrick as trustee. Isn’t the language of the deed conclusive as
to whether the title was or was not taken in trust for the Estate? The
Court requests oral argument on whether Henry Lee Scandrick’s capacity to
transfer title to Orlando was an issue raised and resolved in the previous case
filed by him to determine title.
The
Court’s tentative ruling is to sustain the demurrer as to the Van Ness Property,
with leave to amend.
Fraud
Defendants
argue that Plaintiffs fail to plead fraud with the requisite specificity. “The elements of fraud are (a) a misrepresentation (false
representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) scienter or knowledge of
its falsity; (c) intent to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e)
resulting damage.” (Hinesley v. Oakshade
Town Ctr. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.) The facts constituting the
alleged fraud must be alleged factually and specifically as to every element of
fraud, as the policy of “liberal construction” of the pleadings will not
ordinarily be invoked. (Lazar v. Superior
Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.) To properly allege fraud against a
corporation, the plaintiffs must plead the names of the persons allegedly
making the false representations, their authority to speak, to whom they spoke,
what they said or wrote, and when it was said or written. (Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153,
157.)
Here,
it is not noted in the SAC what type of fraud Plaintiffs are alleging
(misrepresentation, concealment, or nondisclosure). However, it appears as
though Plaintiffs are alleging fraud through misrepresentation (SAC, ¶ 30.) This
distinction is important as concealment does not always require the specificity
of names, authority to speak, to whom they spoke, what they said, and when it
was said or written, while the affirmative misrepresentation species of fraud does.
Moving through a misrepresentation analysis, Plaintiffs do indicate the who (Orlando
and Wanda Scandrick), their authority to speak, and to whom they spoke. Although
the dates of the misrepresentations were not included, Plaintiffs do allege
that the misrepresentations occurred before the deeding to Orlando, execution
of a General Power of Attorney. As such, this Court believes that the
allegations in the complaint are quite detailed and meet the requirements of
alleging a cause of action for active fraud. Again, this motion is brought at
the pleading stage, whether Plaintiffs are able to prove their allegations is a
question for an evidentiary hearing or trial.
Thus, the tentative ruling is to overrule the Demurrer to the fraud
cause of action.
Conspiracy to Commit Fraud
Defendants also argue
that Plaintiff’s cause of action for conspiracy to commit fraud fails as it
does not allege sufficient facts. “Civil conspiracy is not an independent tort.
Instead, it is a legal doctrine that imposes liability on persons who, although
not actually committing a tort themselves, share with the immediate tortfeasors
a common plan or design in its perpetration.” (City of Industry v. City of Fillmore (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 191,
211-212, quotation marks omitted.) “The elements of a civil conspiracy are (1)
the formation of a group of two or more persons who agreed to a common plan or
design to commit a tortious act; (2) a wrongful act committed pursuant to the
agreement; and (3) resulting damages.” (Id.
at p. 212.)
Here, Defendants assert
that Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pleaded fraud and thus cannot allege
conspiracy to commit fraud. Defendants further argue that Plaintiffs fail to
plead the required fact that each member of the conspiracy acted in concert and
came to a mutual understanding to accomplish a common and unlawful plan, and
that one or more of them committed an overt act to further it. The Court
disagrees. First the Court notes that it overruled the fraud cause of action as
it believes Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that cause of action. Second,
the SAC alleges that Orlando and Wanda acted in furtherance of an alleged plan to
defraud Henry Lee Scandrick, knew that Henry’s properties would never be
protected or safeguarded from third parties and knew that they would keep Henry
Lee Scandrick’s properties for themselves without sharing a single penny with
his siblings. (SAC, ¶¶ 38-39.) They also contend that both Orlando and Wanda
knew that accepting the deed and power of attorney was part of a scheme to
defraud decedent. (SAC, ¶ 40.) The SAC clearly states the two agreed to and
intended to defraud decedent. (SAC, ¶ 41.) Moreover, Plaintiffs have alleged
both that one person – Orlando – committed a major step in furtherance of that
agreement and that there are resulting damages.
As such, the demurrer to
this cause of action is overruled.
Conversion and Constructive Trust
Next, Defendants argue
that Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently plead their conversion and
constructive trust. “Conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion over the
property of another. The elements of a conversion claim are: (1) the
plaintiff’s ownership or right to possession of the property; (2) the
defendant’s conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of property rights; and
(3) damages.” (Lee v. Hanley (2015)
61 Cal.4th 1225, 1240.)
Further, “A constructive
trust is an involuntary equitable trust created by operation of law as a remedy
to compel the transfer of property from the person wrongfully holding it to the
rightful owner. The essence of the theory of constructive trust is to prevent unjust
enrichment and to prevent a person from taking advantage of his or her own
wrongdoing.” (Campbell v. Superior Court (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 904,
920, citations omitted.) “[A] constructive trust may only be imposed where the
following three conditions are satisfied: (1) the existence of a res (property
or some interest in property); (2) the right of a complaining party to that
res; and (3) some wrongful acquisition or detention of the res by another party
who is not entitled to it.” (Ibid., italics omitted.)
Defendants
argue that Plaintiff Latanya Scandrick is alleging that Defendants converted
the properties belonging to Henry’s Estate, but that there were not any properties
belonging to the decedent at the date of his death. Here, the Court is confused
by Defendants’ arguments. Plaintiffs need not allege that decedent owned the
property in order to plead conversion or constructive trust. Instead,
Plaintiffs are alleging ownership or a right to property on behalf of the
decedent because Orlando and Wanda obtained ownership or right of the property
through fraudulent means. Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts for both of
these causes of action. As such, the demurrer is overruled.
Intentional Interference with Expectation
of Inheritance
The
elements of a claim for intentional interference with expectation of
inheritance are “(1) an expectancy of an
inheritance, (2) proof amounting to a reasonable degree of certainty that the
bequest or devise would have been in effect at the time of the death of the
testator if there had been no such interference, (3) that the defendant had knowledge
of the plaintiff's expectancy of inheritance and took deliberate action to
interfere with it, (4) that the interference was conducted by independently
tortious means, and (5) that the plaintiff was damaged by the defendant's
interference.” (Buckwith v. Dahl (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1039.)
The
crux of the demurrer to this cause of action is that the interference was
conducted by independently tortious means. Buckwith noted that this
factor meant the underlying conduct must be wrong for some reason other than
the fact of the interference. Plaintiffs do allege such an allegation. For
example, in the SAC, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants’ conduct induced or
caused the decedent to take an action (deeding the home and being appointed
power of attorney) that deprived them of their expected inheritance. Based on
the above arguments of wrongdoings, the Court notes Plaintiffs’ SAC alleges
sufficient facts to state a cause of action.
Unjust Enrichment
“The elements for a claim of unjust enrichment are
receipt of a benefit and unjust retention of the benefit at the expense of
another. The theory of unjust enrichment requires one who acquires a benefit
which may not justly be retained, to return either the thing or its equivalent
to the aggrieved party so as not to be unjustly enriched.” (Lyles v. Sangadeo-Patel (2014) 225
Cal.App.4th 759, 769, quotation marks and citations omitted.) Notably,
“[u]njust enrichment is not a cause of action”; it is simply “a restitution
claim.” (Hill v. Roll International Corp.
(2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1295, 1307; see also Melchior v. New Line Productions, Inc. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 779,
793 [“there is no cause of action in California for unjust enrichment”].)
Defendants
argue there is no cause of action for unjust enrichment in California (Everett
v. Mountains Recreation and Conservancy Authority (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 541,
553.) Plaintiff does not dispute this argument. As such, the demurrer as to
unjust enrichment is sustained.
III. CONCLUSION
Based
on the foregoing, this Court SUSTAINS the demurrer in part and OVERRULES the
demurrer in part.
Defendants
are ordered to give notice.