Judge: Ronald F. Frank, Case: 23TRCV01277, Date: 2024-02-06 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23TRCV01277 Hearing Date: February 6, 2024 Dept: 8
Tentative Ruling¿
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HEARING DATE: February 6, 2024¿
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CASE NUMBER: 23TRCV01277
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CASE NAME: Ariana Fields
v. LAZ Karp Associates, LLC, et al.
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MOVING PARTY: (1)
Defendant, LAZ Karp Associates, LLC
(2)
Defendant, LAZ Karp Associates, LLC
(3)
Defendant, City of Inglewood
RESPONDING PARTY: (1) Plaintiff,
Ariana Fields
(2)
Plaintiff, Ariana Fields
(3) Plaintiff, Ariana Fields
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TRIAL DATE: Not Set
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MOTION:¿ (1) Defendant, LAZ Karp Associates, LLC’s Demurrer
(2)
Defendant, LAZ Karp
Associates, LLC’s Motion to Strike
(3)
Defendant, City of
Inglewood’s Demurrer
(4) Continued CMC
Tentative Rulings: (1) LAZ Karp Associates, LLC’s Demurrer is SUSTAINED with 20
days leave to amend
(2)
LAZ Karp
Associates, LLC’s Motion to Strike is MOOTED in part, and GRANTED in part and DENIED in part
(3)
City of Inglewood’s
Demurrer is SUSTAINED with 20 days leave to amend
(4)
Continue CMC until pleadings are settled
I. BACKGROUND¿¿
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A. Factual¿¿
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On April 24, 2023, Plaintiff, Ariana Fields
(“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against Defendants, LAZ Karp Associates, LLC,
Serco Group, City of Inglewood, County of Los Angeles, and DOES 1 through 25.
The Complaint alleges causes of action for: (1) Intentional Tort; (2) General
Negligence; and (3) Motor Vehicle Negligence.
Defendant LAZ Karp Associates, LLC (“LAZ”) now brings
a Demurrer and Motion to Strike portions of the Complaint.
Additionally, Defendant, City of Inglewood (“City”)
also filed a Demurrer as to the Complaint
B. Procedural¿¿
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On
November 17, 2023, Defendant LAZ, filed a Demurrer and Motion to Strike. On
January 25, 2024, Plaintiff, filed an opposition to the demurrer. To date, no
opposition has been filed to the Motion to Strike. On January 30, 2024, LAZ
filed reply briefs.
On
November 21, 2023, Defendant City filed a Demurrer. On January 25, 2024,
Plaintiff filed an opposition brief. On January 30, 2024, Defendant City filed
a reply brief.
II. GROUNDS FOR MOTIONS
Defendant
LAZ demurs to Plaintiff’s Complaint on the grounds that it argues Plaintiff’s
Third Cause of Action fails to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of
action against Defendant LAZ. Further, LAZ’s Motion to Compel seeks to strike
the following from Plaintiff’s Complaint
1. Page
3, Paragraph 10.f;
2. Page
4, last paragraph, last sentence to IT-1;
3. Page
5, last paragraph, last two sentences to GN-1;
4. Page
6, MV-2, e; and
5. Page
6, MV-2, f.
Further, Defendant City demurs to Plaintiff’s
Complaint on the grounds that it argues Plaintiff’s entire Complaint fails to
plead sufficient facts to state a cause of action against City and fails to
state every fact material to the existence of the City’s government tort
liability.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Defendant, LAZ’s Demurrer
Legal Standard
A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that
appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the
pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39
Cal.3d 311, 318.) “To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts
sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might
eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be
alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53
Cal.4th 861, 872.) For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of
action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (Aubry
v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967.) A demurrer “does
not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Daar v.
Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)¿¿¿¿
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A pleading is uncertain if it is ambiguous or
unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).) A demurrer for
uncertainty may lie if the failure to label the parties and claims renders the
complaint so confusing defendant cannot tell what he or she is supposed to
respond to.¿ (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d
135, 139, fn. 2.) However, “[a] demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed,
even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can
be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly's of
California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)
Discussion
Here, Defendant LAZ argues that Plaintiff’s Third
Cause of Action for Motor Vehicle Negligence fails to allege sufficient facts
to state a cause against LAZ because there are not allegations that LAZ was the
driver or operator of the vehicle, that it owned the vehicle, or that it was
responsible for entrusting the vehicle. The elements for negligence are: (1) a
legal duty owed to the plaintiff to use due care; (2) breach of duty; (3)
causation; and (4) damage to the plaintiff.¿ (County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic
Richfield Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 292, 318.)
In this case, Plaintiff alleges that Doe 1 was
employed by Serco Group, who has since been acquired by LAZ. It appears that
Plaintiff is pleading ownership and entrustment against Defendant Serco Group,
but notes that LAZ has acquired the liability in its acquisition.
The Complaint alleges that Doe 1 was employed by the
person who operated a motor vehicle in the course of their employment
(Defendants Serco and LAZ); Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Serco owned
the motor vehicle, entrusted the motor vehicle, was the principal to Doe.
However, Plaintiff’s Third Cause of action does not list any facts of
negligence, and the cause of action does not state that it is incorporating the
other facts into the third cause of action, so even though it states that
Defendant LAZ has acquired the liability on behalf of Serco, it does not state
a negligence cause of action (i.e., duty, breach, causation, or damages) in the
Third Cause of Action against any defendant, even Doe 1. The Court also notes
that there is some level of uncertainty because ownership and entrustment of
the vehicle is listed as with multiple Defendants. As such, the Demurrer to the
Third Cause of Action is SUSTAINED with twenty (20) days leave to amend.
B.
Defendant LAZ’s Motion to Strike
Legal
Standard
The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its
discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or
improper matter inserted in any pleading.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 436(a).)¿ The
court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in
conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the
court.¿ (Id., § 436(b).)¿ The grounds for a motion to strike are that
the pleading has irrelevant, false improper matter, or has not been drawn or
filed in conformity with laws.¿ (Id., § 436.)¿ The grounds for moving to
strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice.¿ (Id.,
§ 437.)¿ “When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of
cure, the court should allow leave to amend.”¿ (Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998)
63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768.)
Discussion
Here, because this Court has
sustained the demurrer as to the Third Cause of Action against LAZ, the motion
to strike portions of the Complaint with respect to the Third Cause of Action
(Page 6, MC – 2(e) and (f)) are Mooted.
With respect to the Motion to Strike
page 3, paragraph 10(f), “other (specify): Assault & Battery)” Plaintiff
seeks to strike this because it argues that it is irrelevant, false, or
improper because the allegations with respect to Assault and Battery does not
appear to be intended to be imputed as to Defendant LAZ. The Court DENIES the
Motion to strike page 3, paragraph 10(f), because alone, there is no issue with
this allegation. However, the Court notes that Defendant LAZ’s argument rests
on the idea that Plaintiff has not shown that she can maintain a cause of
action for punitive damages against LAZ; but Plaintiff clarifies in the
Complaint she is not seeking exemplary damages from LAZ. As such, the other
portions of the Motion to Strike (i.e., to strike portions of the Complaint other
than as to punitive damages against LAZ), are DENIED. The Motion is GRANTED in part as to punitive
damages against LAZ, so Plaintiff should amend the punitive damages allegations
in an amended pleading to clarify as to which defendants punitive damages are
or are not sought.
C.
Defendant City’s Demurrer
Preliminarily, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s
opposition to the City’s Demurrer is untimely. As this does not affect the
Court’s ruling, the Court considers the arguments on the merits as noted below.
Discussion
Here, Defendant City argues that Plaintiff’s Complaint
fails to allege sufficient facts to maintain a cause of action against a public
entity, because Plaintiff’s Complaint is written only as to common law causes
of action. “The California Tort Claims Act provides that ‘a public entity is
not liable for an injury,’ ‘except as otherwise provided by statute.’
(Gov. Code, § 815, subd. (a).) As that language indicates, the intent of
the Tort Claims Act is to confine potential governmental liability, not expand
it.” (Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31
Cal.4th 1175, 1179.) Public entities cannot be liable for common law
theories of general negligence. (Miklosy v. Regents of University of
California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 899 [“section 815 abolishes common law
tort liability for public entities”].) Therefore, liability against a
public entity must be authorized by statute. (Eastburn v. Regional
Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1179; Gov. Code, § 815,
subd. (a) [“A public entity is not liable for an injury . . . except as
otherwise provided by statute”].)
Further, under California Government Code § 815.2, a public
entity is vicariously liable for the torts of their employees committed within
the scope of employment. (Govt. Code § 815.2(a); Chambi
v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 822, 827.) Because all liability under the Government
Claims Act is statutory, “the general rule that statutory causes of action must
be pleaded with particularity is applicable.”¿ (Susman¿v. City of Los
Angeles¿(1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 803, 809.)¿ Thus, “to state a cause of action
every fact essential to the existence of statutory liability must be pleaded
with particularity, including the existence of a statutory duty.” ¿(Searcy
v. Hemet Unified School District¿(1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 792,
802.)
Defendant
City correctly notes that Plaintiff has failed to plead facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action for Government Tort Liability. In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Government Code §
815.2 carves out liability for public entities for injuries caused by their
employees, and has the effect of incorporating general standards of tort
liability as the primary basis for respondeat superior liability of public
entities. The Court disagrees that Plaintiff’s general proposition exempts it
form complying with pleading requirements when the defendant is a public
entity. For example, the Complaint does
not include any allegations as to statutory liability on the part of City
including section 815.2. This deficiency alone would be enough for the Court to
sustain the City’s demurrer. Further, even
if Plaintiff had made mention of Government Code § 815.2, the Complaint would
be uncertain as it does not identify Doe 1 as an employee of Defendant City or
that he or she was acting in the course and scoep of public entity employment.
On numerous occasions, the Complaint references Doe 1 as an employee of Serco
Group. The only mention of City is that Plaintiff alleges City of Inglewood or
City of Los Angeles was in a contractual relationship with Serco Group. That
does not imply employee/employer liability; such a vague allegation could be an
independent contractor relationship or some other alleged connection. As such,
this demurrer may also be sustained for uncertainty as the duty of Defendant
City is not made clear as presently alleged.
As such, the City’s demurrer is also SUSTAINED with twenty
(20) days leave to amend.
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