Judge: Ronald F. Frank, Case: 23TRCV01689, Date: 2024-05-15 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23TRCV01689 Hearing Date: May 15, 2024 Dept: 8
HEARING DATE: May 15, 2024
CASE NUMBER: 23TRCV01689
CASE NAME: Fadriko Dillon v. Prime Healthcare Centinela, LLC, et al.
MOVING PARTY: Defendant, Prime Healthcare Centinela, LLC dba Centinela Hospital Medical Center, Prime Healthcare Services, LLC, and Veritas Healthcare Services, Inc.
RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff, Fadirko Dillon
TRIAL DATE: None Set.
MOTION: (1) Demurrer
Tentative Rulings: (1) Defendants’ Demurrer is SUSTAINED with twenty (20) days leave to amend as to the First, Second, and Fourth causes of action, and MOOTED as to the Third and Fifth causes of action.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual
On May 26, 2023, Plaintiff, Fadriko Dillon (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against Defendant, Centinela Hospital Medical Center, Prime Healthcare Services, LLC, and DOES 1 through 50. On June 23, 2023, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). On December 21, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). On March 8, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) against Defendants, Prime Healthcare Centinela, LLC dba, Centinela Hospital Medical Center, Veritas Health Services, Inc., Prime Healthcare Services, LLC, and DOES 1 through 50. The TAC alleges causes of action for: (1) Premises Liability; (2) General Negligence; (3) Gross Negligence; (4) Landlord Liability; and (5) Dereliction of Duty.
Now, Defendants, Prime Healthcare Centinela, LLC dba, Centinela Hospital Medical Center, Veritas Health Services, Inc., Prime Healthcare Services, LLC (collectively, “Defendants”) file a Demurrer to the TAC.
B. Procedural
On April 9, 2024, Defendants filed this demurrer to the TAC. On May 2, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition brief. On May 8, 2024, Defendants filed a reply brief.
II. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
Along with Defendants’ moving papers, Defendants have filed a Request for Judicial Notice, requesting this Court take judicial notice of the following documents:
1. Exhibit “B” is a true and correct copy of the article: Deputy Shoots Suspect in Hospital Emergency Room, published by KCRA.com on October 18, 2012, by KCRA News; and
2. Exhibit “C” is a true and correct copy of the article: Officials Probing Possible Murder-Suicide in Inglewood, published by mynewsla.com on July 25, 2015, by Debbie L. Sklar.
The Court GRANTS this request and takes judicial notice of the articles above, but not for the truth of any matters asserted in those articles.
III. ANALYSIS¿
A. Legal Standard
A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.) For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967.) A demurrer “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.)
A pleading is uncertain if it is ambiguous or unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).) A demurrer for uncertainty may lie if the failure to label the parties and claims renders the complaint so confusing defendant cannot tell what he or she is supposed to respond to. (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.) However, “[a] demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)
B. Discussion
Defendants demur to the TAC on the grounds that Defendants argue the first, second, third, fourth, and fifth causes of action fail to state facts sufficient to constitute causes of action against the Defendants.
Premises Liability
First, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s first cause of action for premises liability fails to sufficiently allege each element required to state a claim for premises liability. The elements of negligence are: (1) a duty to exercise ordinary care; (2) breach of that duty; (3) causation; and (4) damages. (Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917.) Specifically, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not alleged a cognizable duty owed. While those who own, possess, or control property are not insurers of the safety of their patrons, they generally have a duty to exercise reasonable and ordinary care in keeping the premises reasonably safe and in managing the property¿to¿avoid exposing others to an unreasonable risk of harm. (Ortega v. Kmart Corp.¿(2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1205; Annocki¿v. Peterson Enterprises, LLC¿(2014) 232¿Cal.App.4th 32, 37.) The existence and scope of duty are legal questions for the court. (Annocki, 232¿Cal.App.4th.¿at¿36.) “A store owner exercises ordinary care by making reasonable inspections of the portions of the premises open to customers, and the care required is commensurate with the risks involved.”¿ (Ibid.) If a dangerous condition exists, the property owner is “under a duty to exercise ordinary care either to make the condition¿reasonably safe for their¿[customers’]¿use or to give a warning adequate to enable them to avoid the harm.” (Bridgman v. Safeway Stores, Inc.¿(1960) 53 Cal.2d 443, 446.) The party asserting the cause of action has the burden to prove that the owner had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition in sufficient time to correct it. (Ortega, 26 Cal.4th at 1203, 1206.)
Plaintiff makes reference in the TAC to a shooting at the hospital being a reasonably foreseeable event based on prior allegedly similar incidents. Such a reference refers to the heightened foreseeability test. California law requires landowners to maintain land in their possession and control in a reasonably safe condition. (Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 674 (Ann M.).) The liability of landowners for injuries to people on their property is governed by general negligence principles. (Pineda v. Ennabe (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1407 (Pineda).) A cause of action for negligence requires (1) a legal duty owed to the plaintiff to use due care, (2) breach of that duty, (3) causation, and (4) damage to the plaintiff. (County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 292, 318.) The existence of a legal duty is a question for the court to determine, and “foreseeability is a ‘crucial factor’ in determining the existence and scope of a legal duty.” (Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill (2005) 36 Cal.4th 224, 237, citing Ann M., supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 674, 676 (Delgado).) However, a high degree of foreseeability is required in order to find that the scope of a landlord’s duty of care includes the hiring of security guards. . . . [T]he requisite degree of foreseeability rarely, if ever, can be proven in the absence of prior similar incidents of violent crime on the landowner’s premises. To hold otherwise would be to impose an unfair burden upon landlords and, in effect, would force landlords to become the insurers of public safety, contrary to well established policy in this state.” (Ann M., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 679, footnote omitted.) “Heightened foreseeability is satisfied by a showing of prior similar criminal incidents (or other indications of a reasonably foreseeable risk of violent criminal assaults in that location) and does not require a showing of prior nearly identical criminal incidents. (Delgado, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 245.)
Here, Plaintiff’s TAC contends that while he was at the premises, a patron, employee, agent, customer, or person otherwise present with permission of the owner of the premises, exited the ER and assaulted Plaintiff by grabbing him and inflicting a gunshot wound to Plaintiff’s leg. (TAC, p. 4.) Plaintiff has alleged that Defendants who owned the premises had security, but failed to either check the individual who committed the assault for a weapon or prevent the crime upon their premises. (TAC, p. 4.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants knew or should have known of this dangerous condition and that this type of assault was reasonably foreseeable based on crime in the area and prior similar incidents. (TAC, ¶ 4.) The TAC also alleges that Defendants had a duty to protect invitees, including Plaintiff, from a reasonably foreseeable incident based on crime in the area and prior similar incidents. (TAC, p. 4.) Moreover, Plaintiff contends that there were at least two incidents of prior gun violence occurring on or about July 25, 2015 and October 12, 2012. (TAC, p.5.)
As noted above, a party alleging the need for security, or failure to provide ample security, needs to show prior similar criminal incidents which would lead to this heightened foreseeability. It is not enough for Plaintiff to merely allege, in a conclusory manner, that prior criminal incidents took place in the area and on Defendants’ premises. Plaintiff argues, in his opposition, that this case is to be instructed by Ortega v. Kmart (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200. In Ortega, the California Supreme Court stressed the requirement that an “owner’s actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition is a key to establishing its liability.” (Ortega, 26 Cal.4th 1200.) It appears that Plaintiff attempts to argue that Defendants’ precautionary safety measure of providing security already should create an inference that Defendants had actual or constructive knowledge that the dangerous condition on their property existed prior to Plaintiff’s injury. However, the Court is not persuaded by this argument. Hospitals often have security guards present for a number of reasons, but the scope of the claimed duty is not outlined for the Court here. Does Plaintiff contend that every public building where an act of violence has occurred in the last dozen years owes a duty to install metal detectors at every entrance? Or that every invitee, guest, patient, or family member of an in-patient or outpatient user of the hospital must be subject to a physical search by hospital security staff?
The Opposition contends that Plaintiff plans to introduce evidence at trial of other violent crimes (besides the 2012 and 2015 incidents) that were reported on Defendant’s premises in recent years, none of which are alleged in the TAC. Plaintiff needs to provide more detail and when amending its next pleading. The Court has taken notice of the prior incidents however, and for the reasons explained in Defendants’ moving papers, the Court cannot determine that they ae both “similar” to the subject incident.
Lastly, this Court also notes that the allegation of duty is vague and uncertain. Is Plaintiff arguing that although Defendants employed security guards, they were negligent in protecting individuals at the hospital? Is Plaintiff arguing that because of specific prior incidents occurring on the premises and the location of the premises, that Defendants needed more security? It is unclear based on the allegations.
Thus, this Court SUSTAINS demurrer as to the premise liability cause of action, with twenty (20) days leave to amend.
General Negligence
Next, Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot maintain a cause of action for general negligence as it fails to allege a cognizable duty. In order to state a claim for negligence, Plaintiff must allege the elements of (1) “the existence of a legal duty of care,” (2) “breach of that duty,” and (3) “proximate cause resulting in an injury.” (McIntyre v. Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671.) Namely, Defendants argue that this cause of action should be sustained on demurrer because it is identical to that of the premises liability cause of action. The Court does note that the allegations found in the premises liability cause of action and the general negligence cause of action are essentially identical. However, for the sake of providing the Court’s analysis, the Court completes the analysis below.
Plaintiff, in his TAC and opposition brief, argue that Plaintiff was owed a duty of care under Civil Code section 1714 (mis-labeled the Code of Civil Procedure in the TAC). As framed by the TAC, Plaintiff alleges that what Plaintiff was on the Defendants’ premises, an individual (the “Shooter”) who was a patron, employee, agent, customer, or otherwise present with permission of the owner, lessee, operator, or occupier o the premises, was on the premises and subsequently exited the emergency room and assaulted Plaintiff by grabbing him and inflicting a gunshot wound in Plaintiff’s leg. (TAC, p. 6.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants and their employees either owed Plaintiff a duty of care as a patron, patient, invitee, or visitor, and breached that duty of care when security failed to either check the Shooter for a weapon or prevent the crime upon the Defendants’ premises. (TAC, p. 6.) Plaintiff contends that Defendants failed to provide proper security or care in surveillance of the premises and their actions and inactions resulted in a failure of their general duty of care. (TAC, p. 6.)
In opposition, and in Plaintiff’s TAC, Plaintiff argues that the duty owed was that of Civil Code section 1714. “Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person.” (Civ. Code §1714(a); see Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal. 4th 764, 771 [“The general rule in California is that ‘[e]veryone is responsible . . . for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person.’”].)
The Court is uncertain if Plaintiff is alleging that the security guards were negligent or the hospital, or both. In most instances, a place of business will hire out a security company to provide security for their place of business. When “contracting with the business to provide security services, the security guard creates a special relationship between himself and the business’s customers. This relationship, in and of itself, is sufficient to impose on the guard the obligation to act affirmatively to protect such customers while they are on the business premises.” (Marois, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d at p. 200.) However, “[a] security company hired to protect business premises owes no greater duty toward the patrons of that business than is owed by the business owner under relevant principles of premises liability law.” (Balard v. Bassman Event Security, Inc. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 243, 247.) “[T]he scope of any duty assumed depends upon the nature of the undertaking” and “a defendant’s undertaking will support the finding of a duty to another only if (a) the defendant’s action increased the risk of harm to another, or (b) the other person reasonably relied upon the undertaking to his or her detriment.” (Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill (2005) 36 Cal.4th 224, 249).
As with the premises liability cause of action, the general negligence claim is vague and uncertain. Plaintiff is required to allege how Defendants breached their duty, and whether they need more security, whether it was the contracted security company that breached its duty of care to check individuals, whether this is a negligent hiring cause of action for the Defendants who may have allegedly been negligent when hiring the specific security company. Further, this may raise an issue of heightened foreseeability as discussed above. Again, without more, Plaintiff cannot maintain a cause of action for general negligence.
The demurrer is sustained as to this cause of action. Plaintiff is allowed twenty (20) days leave to amend.
Gross Negligence
Defendants also argue that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to maintain a cause of action for gross negligence. “Gross negligence is pleaded by alleging the traditional elements of negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages. However, to set forth a claim for gross negligence the plaintiff must also allege conduct by the defendant involving either want of even scant care or an extreme departure from the ordinary standard of conduct. Gross negligence connotes such a lack of care as may be presumed to indicate a passive and indifferent attitude toward results.” (Chavez v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 632, 640, citations, quotation marks, and ellipses omitted.) There is no distinct cause of action for gross negligence apart from negligence. (Continental Insurance Co. v. American Protection Industries (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 322, 328-330.)
This Court agrees, as does Plaintiff, per their opposition brief stipulating to strike the third cause of action, that Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to assert a cause of action for gross negligence. The Court accepts Plaintiff’s withdrawal of the gross negligence claim, so in any future amended pleading the Court expects such a claim to be omitted. The demurrer as to this cause of action is moot.
Landlord Liability
Next, Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot maintain his cause of action for landlord liability. The California Supreme Court has unequivocally stated that a duty is owed by the landlord to its tenant, arising out of their special relationship. (Castaneda v. Olsher (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1205, 1213.) This case is relied upon by Plaintiff in his opposition brief, however, the clear issue with this reliance is that Castaneda speaks to a landlord-tenant relationship. Here, Plaintiff was not a tenant of Defendants’ premises. Further, as relied upon by Defendants in their moving papers, “[t]he existence of the landlord’s duty to others to maintain the property in a reasonably safe condition is a question of law for the court.” (Johnson v. Prasad (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 74, 79.) “The question is whether in the management of his property, the possessor of land has acted as a reasonable person under all the circumstances. The likelihood of injury to plaintiff, the probable seriousness of such injury, the burden of reducing or avoiding the risk, the location of the land, and the possessor’s degree of control over the risk-creating condition are among the factors to be considered by the trier of fact in evaluating the reasonableness of a defendant’s conduct.” (Sprecher v. Adamson Companies (1981) 30 Cal.3d 358, 371.)
Here, Plaintiff has conceded that Defendants had security present at the premises. This allegation calls into question what exactly Plaintiff is alleging Defendants to have done, i.e., what duty is alleged to exist and how did defendants breach that duty? Without more, this Court notes that Plaintiff may not allege a cause of action for landlord liability based on the facts as pleaded. The demurrer is SUSTAINED as to this cause of action with twenty (20) days leave to amend.
Dereliction of Duty
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ demurrer is SUSTAINED with leave to amend, and mooted as to the third and fifth causes of action.
Defendants are ordered to give notice.