Judge Ronald F. Frank, Case Number: 23TRCV01833, Date: 2024-10-15 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Ronald F. Frank, Case: 23TRCV01833, Date: 2024-10-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23TRCV01833 Hearing Date: October 15, 2024 Dept: 8

Tentative Ruling¿

¿¿

HEARING DATE: October 15, 2024

¿¿

CASE NUMBER: 23TRCV01833

¿¿

CASE NAME: Dywidag Systems International USA Inc. v. Fluor Flatiron Balfour Beatty Dragados, et al.

¿¿

MOVING PARTY: Defendants, Fluor Flatiron Balfour Beatty Dragados dba Linxs Constructors, a joint venture; Liberty Mutual Insurance Company and Zurich American Insurance Company

RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff, Dywidag Systems International USA Inc.

TRIAL DATE: September 22, 2025

¿¿

MOTION:¿ (1) Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set 2

(2) Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production of Documents, Set 2.

(3) Requests for Sanctions

Tentative Rulings: (1) GRANTED. Verified further responses are due within 30 days.

(2) GRANTED. Verified further responses and the production of responsible documents are due within 30 days.

(3) GRANTED in a lowered amount.

¿¿

I. BACKGROUND¿¿

¿¿

A. Factual¿¿

On June 7, 2023, Plaintiff, Dywidag Systems International USA Inc., a New York corporation (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendants, Fluor Flatiron Balfour Beatty Dragados dba Linxs Constructors, a joint venture, Los Angeles World Airports, a public entity, and DOES 1 through 50. On October 4, 2023, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against Defendants, Fluor Flatiron Balfour Beatty Dragados dba Linxs Constructors, a joint venture, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, a Massachusetts corporation, Zurich American Insurance Company, a New York corporation, and DOES 1 through 50. The FAC alleges causes of action for: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Unjust Enrichment in Quasi Contract; (3) Open Book Account; (4) Quantum Meruit; (5) Enforcement of Stop Payment Notice Release Bond; and (6) Enforcement of Payment Bond.

On July 3, 2024, Fluor Flatiron Balfour Beatty Dragados dba Linxs Constructors (hereinafter, “Linxs”) propounded Special Interrogatories, Set Two and Requests for Production of Documents, Set Two on Plaintiff. Each propounded discovery relate to Plaintiff’s “A General Engineering Contractor” license and “C-50 Steel, Reinforcing” license. Defendant Linxs asserts that the purpose of what its moving papers characterize as targeted and narrowly tailored discovery was to gather additional relevant and admissible evidence from Plaintiff regarding the circumstances surrounding the suspension of Plaintiff’s licenses. Although Defendant Linxs asserts that Plaintiff responded to both the special interrogatories and requests for production of documents, set two that related to its “C-50 Steel, Reinforcing” license, Plaintiff objected to the special interrogatories and requests for production of documents related to its “A General Engineering Contractors” license.

Thus, Defendant Linxs is moving for a court order ordering Plaintiff to respond to Special Interrogatories, Set Two Nos. 1-4, 13-15, 22, 23, 26-28, 32-39, and 51. Further, Defendant Linx moves for an order ordering Plaintiff to respond to Requests for Production of Documents, Set Two Nos. 2, 4, 6, 11, 13, 15, and 18.

B. Procedural¿¿

On September 13, 2024, Defendants filed these Motions to Compel Further Responses from Plaintiff. On October 2, 2024 Plaintiff filed its opposition briefs. On October 8, 2024, Defendants filed reply briefs.

¿II. ANALYSIS¿

A. Legal Standard

A party must respond to interrogatories within 30 days after service. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.260, subd. (a).) If a party to whom interrogatories are directed does not provide timely responses, the requesting party may move for an order compelling responses to the discovery. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290, subd. (b).) The party also waives the right to make any objections, including one based on privilege or work-product protection. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290, subd. (a).) There is no time limit for a motion to compel responses to interrogatories other than the cut-off on hearing discovery motions 15 days before trial. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2024.020, subd. (a); Code Civ. Proc., 2030.290.) No meet and confer efforts are required before filing a motion to compel responses to the discovery. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290; Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 41

“Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with this title, any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code of Civ. Proc. § 2017.010.) For discovery purposes, information is regarded as relevant “if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement thereof.” (City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 272, 288.)

A motion to compel further responses to a demand for inspection or production of documents (“RFP”) may be brought based on: (1) incomplete statements of compliance; (2) inadequate, evasive, or incomplete claims of inability to comply; or (3) unmerited or overly generalized objections. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(c).) A motion to compel further production must set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(b)(1).) In Digital Music News LLC v Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 216 at 224, the Court defined “good cause” as a showing that there “a disputed fact that is of consequence in the action and the discovery sought will tend in reason to prove or disprove that fact or lead to other evidence that will tend to prove or disprove the fact.” If the moving party has shown good cause for the requests for production, the burden is on the objecting party to justify the objections. (Kirkland v. Sup.Ct (2002) 95 Cal. App.4th 92, 98.) ¿

"The court shall limit the scope of discovery if it determines that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of that discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." (Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. § 2017.020(a).) Generally, objections on the ground of burden require the objecting party to produce evidence of (a) the propounding party's subjective intent to create burden or (b) the amount of time and effort it would take to respond. (See West Pico Furniture Co. of Los Angeles v. Superior Court In and For Los Angeles County (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417.) However, no such evidence is necessary where discovery is obviously overbroad on its face. (See Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 431.)

B. Discussion

i. Special Interrogatories

Defendant Linxs seeks this Court to order further responses to Special Interrogatories, Set Two Nos. 1-4, 13-15, 22, 23, 26-28, 32-39, and 51. Defendant Linxs argues that these interrogatories are targeted and narrowly tailored interrogatories that are essential in determining whether Plaintiff is barred from bringing this action. The crux of the discoverability issue in this case is the applicability of Business & Professions Code section 7031, subdivision (a), which states:

"(a) Except as provided in subdivision (e), no person engaged in the business or acting in the capacity of a contractor, may bring or maintain any action, or recover in law or equity in any action, in any court of this state for the collection of compensation for the performance of any act or contract where a license is required by this chapter without alleging that they were a duly licensed contractor at all times during the performance of that act or contract regardless of the merits of the cause of action brought by the person..."

(Code Civ. Proc., § 7031, subd. (a).)

Here, Defendant Linxs notes that its fourth affirmative defense in its answer states, "Plaintiff's claim is barred because Plaintiff failed to possess a valid contractor's license, and failed to comply with the applicable provisions of the Business and Professions Code regarding such license, including §7031." (See Answer to First Amended Complaint, ¶ 4.) In furtherance of this defense, Defendant Linxs notes its counsel obtained a “Certification of Records” from the CSLB for Plaintiff, referred to by them as the “CSLB License History,” which indicates that: (1) DSI' s "C-50 Steel, Reinforcing" license was suspended from January 9, 2023 to February 8, 2023; and (2) DSI' s "A General Engineering Contractor" license was suspended on January 9, 2023, and has never been reinstated. Defendant Linxs asserts that Plaintiff was not a duly licensed contractor in the State of California from January 9, 2023 to February 7, 2023, i.e., a period of 29 days during its work on the project. Defendant thus argues Plaintiff was not fully licensed “at all times during the performance” as required by Section 7031.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the factual circumstances surrounding what it characterizes as its “election to not renew” its Class A license are not relevant to this litigation because the Prime Contract does not obligate Plaintiff to have a Class A License, and instead, required Defendant Linxs to maintain such a license, which it expressly recognizes. Further, to the extent Plaintiff was required to issue a document in furtherance of its contractual obligations that includes an engineer stamp, Plaintiff argues that such a requirement is entirely different from maintaining a contractor’s license. Plaintiff contends that a licensed engineer undergoes requirements that are completely different and have zero relation to the processes and purposes of being a licensed contractor. Plaintiff asserts that a C-50 licensed contractor can submit shop drawings with an engineer stamp on a post tensioning scope of work without violating any California laws.

The parties here do not disagree about the relevant case law, or that Plaintiff’s work could have been completed with either a Class A license or a Class C-50 license. However, in its reply brief, Defendant Linxs argues that to gather the necessary evidence for the submission of a motion for summary judgment, it sought the interrogatories and requests for production of documents pertaining to the circumstances related to the suspension of Plaintiff’s Class A and Class C-50 licenses for the very reason that the work performed on the project could have been done under either license. Defendant Linxs notes that to prevail on a motion for summary judgment it would have to demonstrate that Plaintiff allowed both of its licenses to lapse, including Plaintiff’s Class A license, and thus, the inquiries made regarding Plaintiff’s Class A license are not only appropriate, but also comprise an essential part of Defendant Linxs’ anticipated motion for summary judgment.

The Court is not at this time making a determination on the future motion for summary judgment, but rather whether the interrogatories and RFPs seek information reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Discovery need not be of facts or bear on issues that are determinative or dispositive of a claim or a defense. For example, in a personal injury action that the defendant asserts is barred by the statute of limitations, discovery bearing on plaintiff’s medical expenses and treatment status is discoverable even though later in the case that defendant might establish the statute of limitations defense as a matter of law. The Court agrees with the moving party Defendant here that both the subject special interrogatories and the below requests for production of documents are discoverable in the context laid out by Defendant Linxs. Thus, the motion to compel further responses to Special Interrogatories Nos. 1-4, 13-15, 22, 23, 26-28, 32-39, and 51 is GRANTED. Verified further responses are due within 30 days. The Court reserves for a later day whether the licensure status evidence being sought by this discovery are or are not sufficient to carry the moving party’s burden on the future dispositive motion.

ii. Requests for Production of Documents

Defendant Linxs seeks this Court to order further responses to Requests for Production of Documents, Set Two Nos. 2, 4, 6, 11, 13, 15, and 18. The Court will discuss each below. For the same reasons listed above, the Court GRANTS the motion to compel Requests for Production of Documents. Verified further responses and the production of responsible documents are due within 30 days.

iii. Requests for Monetary Sanctions

With the Motion to compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set Two, Defendant Linxs has requested monetary sanctions be imposed against Plaintiff in the amount of $3,150 per motion ($6,300 total). These amounts are based on the declaration of Giorgio A. Sassine (“Sassine Decl.”) which asserts that his billing rate is $350, and that in preparing both motions, he spent a total of 18 billing hours. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s objections to providing the discoverable information and documents to lack substantial justification for the reasons discussed above. The court finds an average of nine (9) hours per motion for an attorney experienced enough to justify a $350 hourly rate to be excessive. As such, the court GRANTS monetary sanctions in the lowered amount of $2,000 per motion for a total of $4,000, payable by Plaintiff and/or counsel for Plaintiff to counsel for defendant within 30 days.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS Defendant Linxs motions to compel further responses to Special Interrogatories, Set Two and Requests for Production of Documents, Set Two. Further, the Request for Monetary sanctions is GRANTED in the lowered amount of $2,000 per motion. The verified further responses, responsive documents, and sanctions payment are all due within 30 days.

Defendant Linxs is ordered to provide notice of this ruling. ¿¿

¿¿