Judge: Ronald F. Frank, Case: 23TRCV02125, Date: 2024-03-26 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23TRCV02125    Hearing Date: March 26, 2024    Dept: 8

Tentative Ruling¿ 

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HEARING DATE:                 March 26, 2024 

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CASE NUMBER:                  23TRCV02125

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CASE NAME:                        Daniel Wei; Natalie Wei v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. 

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MOVING PARTY:                (1) Defendant, American Honda Motor Co., Inc. 

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RESPONDING PARTY:       (1) Plaintiff, Daniel Wei and Natalie Wei

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TRIAL DATE:                        Not Set.   

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MOTION:¿                              (1) Motion to Compel Arbitration 

 

Tentative Rulings:                  (1) American Honda Motor Co., Inc.’s Motion to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED.
(2)  Arbitration status conference set for January 8, 2025, 8:30 a.m.; the April 11, 2024 CMC is advanced and vacated

 

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I. BACKGROUND¿¿ 

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A. Factual¿¿ 

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On September 21, 2023, Plaintiffs, Daniel Wei and Natalie Wei (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed a Complaint against Defendants, American Honda Motor Co., Inc, and DOES 1 through 10. The Complaint alleges causes of action for: ” (1) Violation of Civil Code § 1793.2(d); (2) Violation of Civil Code § 1793.2(b); (3) Violation of Civil Code § 1793.2(a)(3); (4) Breach of the Implied Warranty of Merchantability – Civil Code §§ 1791.1, 1794; 1795.5; and (5) Fraudulent Inducement – Concealment.

 

The Complaint is based on a January 25, 2020 purchase by Plaintiffs of a 2020 Honda Pilot Honda with corresponding identification number VIN: 5FNYF5H34LB011117 (hereafter "Vehicle") from Penske Honda Ontario. Plaintiffs further note that the causes of action contained in his complaint arise out of warranty and repair obligations of Honda. (Complaint, ¶ 10.) Plaintiffs contend that the defects and nonconformities to warranty manifested themselves within the applicable express warranty period, and include, but are not limited to: infotainment defects, electrical defects, among other defects and non-conformities. (Complaint, ¶ 11.)

 

            Defendant, American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (“AHM”) now files a Motion to Compel Binding Arbitration.

 

B. Procedural¿¿ 

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On February 9, 2024, AHM filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration. On March 14, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an opposition. On March 18, 2024, AHM filed a reply brief.

 

III. ANALYSIS

 

A.    Legal Standard

 

The purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) is “to move the parties in an arbitrable dispute out of court and into arbitration as quickly and easily as possible.”¿ (Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp. (1983) 460 U.S. 1, 23.)¿ California Code of Civil Procedure, Section 1281 provides that “[a] written agreement to submit to arbitration an existing controversy or a controversy thereafter arising is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist for the revocation of any contract.”¿ “California law, like federal law, favors enforcement of valid arbitration agreements.”¿ (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 97.)¿ “On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party to the agreement refuses to arbitrate that controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy” unless grounds exist not to compel arbitration.¿ (Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.2.) The Song-Beverly Act also favors arbitration of Lemon Law disputes with a series of “carrot and stick” provisions that immunize a warrantors from a species of civil penalty if, like Defendant Honda, they have a certified lemon arbitration program in place.

 

Here, the analysis is somewhat different because AHM is not a party to the arbitration agreement, although one of its authorized dealers is a party to the agreement upon which AHM’s motion rests, and Plaintiff is a party to that same arbitration agreement.

 

B.     Discussion

 

a.      Existence of Arbitration Agreement

 

Here, the parties agree that there was a written agreement, the Lease Agreement, that included an arbitration agreement. However, as noted in Plaintiffs’ opposition, that agreement is between Plaintiff and Penske Honda Ontario, the dealership. Plaintiffs also note that they brought this case against Honda based on its breach of its statutory obligations under the Song-Beverly Act and the express warranty it gave on the subject vehicle. The portions of the arbitration agreement in the Lease Agreement state, in pertinent part, as follows:

 

15. ARBITRATION. The parties agree that any unresolved disputes shall be submitted to arbitration in accordance with the Arbitration clause (Section 52). By initialing this Section, I am confirming that I have read this Section and the Arbitration clause, including the method of opting out of arbitration. (Id., at p. 3, bold in original.)

 

52. ARBITRATION: PLEASE READ THIS SECTION CAREFULLY 52. ARBITRATION: PLEASE READ THIS ARBITRATION PROVISION CAREFULLY TO UNDERSTAND YOUR RIGHTS. BY ELECTING ARBITRATION, YOU AGREE THAT ANY CLAIM THAT YOU MAY HAVE IN THE FUTURE MUST BE RESOLVED THROUGH BINDING ARBITRATION. YOU WAIVE THE RIGHT TO HAVE YOUR DISPUTE HEARD IN COURT AND WAIVE THE RIGHT TO BRING CLASS CLAIMS. YOU UNDERSTAND THAT DISCOVERY AND APPEAL RIGHTS ARE MORE LIMITED IN ARBITRATION

 

Defendant, AHM, also notes that the Arbitration Provision then states the following:

 

Arbitration is a method of resolving a claim, dispute or controversy without filing a lawsuit. By agreeing to arbitrate, the right to go to court is waived and instead claims, disputes or controversies are submitted to binding arbitration. This provision sets forth the terms and conditions of our agreement. YOU and HONDA agree and acknowledge that this Lease affects interstate commerce and the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) applies.

 

By signing the Arbitration Consent, YOU elect to have disputes resolved by arbitration. YOU, HONDA, or any involved third party may pursue a Claim. “Claim” means any dispute between YOU, HONDA, or any involved third party relating to your account, this Lease, or our relationship, including any application, the Vehicle, its performance and any representations, omissions or warranties.

 

(Declaration of Sarah Carlson Lambert (“Lambert Decl.”). ¶ 2, Exhibit 1, Lease Contract.)

 

            Here, the Court finds that AHM has met its initial burden in establishing the existence of an arbitration agreement. Under Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1330, Defendant only needs to allege the existence of an arbitration agreement and provide the written agreement or state verbatim the provision that provides for arbitration. (See Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218-19 [“[Cal. Rules Court, Rule 3.1330] does not require the petitioner to introduce the agreement into evidence or provide the court with anything more than a copy or recitation of its terms. Petitioner need only allege the existence of an agreement and support the allegation as provided in [Cal. Rules Court, Rule, Rule 3.1330].”].)  The scope of arbitration under the lease’s terms include disputes concerning “the Vehicle, its performance and any representations, omissions or warranties.”  Unlike other non-signatory cases that have come before the Court in the years since Felisilda was decided, this arbitration agreement specifically includes “warranties” within its ambit, and the instant lawsuit clearly arises out of warranties issues for the subject vehicle. 

 

            Thus, the burden now shifts to Plaintiffs to establish that an arbitration agreement does not exist, to demonstrate that the subject arbitration provision cannot be interpreted to require arbitration of the dispute, or to provide evidence establishing a defense to the arbitration agreement.

 

b.      Third-Party Beneficiary

 

AHM argues that it can compel arbitration as a third-party beneficiary to the arbitration provision. “ ‘A third party beneficiary is someone who may enforce a contract because the contract is made expressly for his benefit.’ ” (Jensen v. U-Haul Co. of California (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 295, 301, 226 Cal.Rptr.3d 797; see also Civ. Code, § 1559 [“[a] contract, made expressly for the benefit of a third person, may be enforced by him ....”].) A person “only incidentally or remotely benefited” from a contract is not a third-party beneficiary. (Lucas v. Hamm (1961) 56 Cal.2d 583, 590, 15 Cal.Rptr. 821, 364 P.2d 685.) Thus, “the ‘mere fact that a contract results in benefits to a third party does not render that party a “third party beneficiary.” (Jensen, at p. 302, 226 Cal.Rptr.3d 797.) Nor does knowledge that the third party may benefit from the contract suffice. (Goonewardene v. ADP, LLC (2019) 6 Cal.5th 817, 830, 243 Cal.Rptr.3d 299, 434 P.3d 124 (Goonewardene).) Rather, the parties to the contract must have intended the third party to benefit.

 

In order for a third party to show that the contracting parties intended to benefit it, under the express terms of the contract at issue and any other relevant circumstances under which the contract was made, “(1) “the third party would in fact benefit from the contract”; (2) “a motivating purpose of the contracting parties was to provide a benefit to the third party”; and (3) permitting the third party to enforce the contract “is consistent with the objectives of the contract and the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties.” (Ochoa, citing Goonewardene, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 830.) Here, AHM argues that it is a member of the class of persons for whose benefit the contract was made. The terms of the lease expressly define “HONDA” to include:

 

HONDA means Lessor, Dealer, Honda Lease Trust, American Honda Finance Corporation (AHFC), American Honda Motor Co., Inc., Honda Finance Exchange, Inc., Acura Financial Services (AFS), Honda Financial Services (HFS), HVT, Inc., their parents, subsidiaries, predecessors, successors, assignees, and officers, employees, representatives and agents. YOU means Lessee and Co-Lessee to this Lease.

 

(Lambert Decl., ¶ 2, Exhibit 1, Least Contract, p. 6.)

 

Here, this Court notes that in circumstances in which the manufacturer is not defined in the arbitration agreement, and the manufacturer has brough a motion claiming they are a third party beneficiary because of language similar to: “[a]ny claim or dispute . . . which arises out of or relates to . . . any resulting transaction or relationship (including any such relationship with third parties who do not sign this contract,” this this Court will not find that the manufacture is manifested as “including any such relationship with third parties who do not sign this contract.” The Second District in Martha Ochoa v. Ford Motor Company (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1324 (review granted July 19, 2023, S279969) noted that that allowing a manufacturer to enforce the arbitration provision as a third party beneficiary would be inconsistent with the “reasonable expectations of the contracting parties” where the contracting parties specifically vested the right of enforcement in the purchaser and the dealer only. Here, unlike Ochoa, Yeh v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 264, 272, Kielar v. Superior Court (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 614, 620, and Montemayor v. Ford Motor Co. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 958, 971, the contracting parties painted with a broader brush and expressly intended to include AHM and warranty claims in the scope of the arbitration agreement. 

 

The Court also notes the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal’s decision of Ngo v. BMW of North America (9th Cir. 2022) 23 F.4th 943, which while not binding on this state court is persuasive nonetheless because it is a federal appellate decision bearing on the interpretation of federal law and the federal legislature’s intent.  The the Ninth Circuit reasoning with respect to the law of arbitration is persuasive because the arbitration provision of the lease contract here expressly states that any arbitration under that contract provision “shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) and not by any state law concerning arbitration.” In Ngo, the Ninth Circuit Court found that BMW could not enforce the arbitration provision because the clause, which while similar to the one at issue, was strictly limited to the dealership and the Plaintiff but did not mention BMW or warranties. (See Ngo, supra, at p. 948.)

 

            However, this contract in this case, did not merely state a clause like: “[a]ny claim or dispute . . . which arises out of or relates to . . . any resulting transaction or relationship (including any such relationship with third parties who do not sign this contract.” Instead, included in the definition of “HONDA” was AHM. As such, this Court finds that Defendant AHM has shown that although it is a nonsignatory of the lease agreement, the inclusion of AHM in the arbitration clause would benefit defendant by allowing these claims to be resolved by arbitration.  AHM is an express third-party beneficiary.  The inclusion of AHM as a party who may pursue a claim in arbitration shows that the parties intended to provide a benefit to AHM, not merely the leasing dealer, as to the ability to seek arbitration of covered claims. Lastly, under the arbitration clause AHM would have also been able to pursue a claim through arbitration. Therefore, despite arguments made in Plaintiffs’ opposition, this Court finds that all three elements are met, and the defendant is a third party beneficiary.

 

C.    Equitable Estoppel

Here, the Court acknowledges Plaintiff’s argument, although not relied upon in the moving papers, that equitable estoppel does not apply to allow Defendant, a nonsignatory to arbitration agreement, to compel arbitration since Felisilda is distinguishable from this matter, and such position is supported by Ngo and Ochoa, Yeh, Kielar and Montemayor. This Court agrees, but notes that unlike the language in Ochoa, this Court has already found that Defendant AHM may enforce the arbitration agreement as a third-party beneficiary.

D. Unconscionability

Plaintiffs next argue that in their opposition that the contract drafted by AHM unconscionable.  Unconscionability is a valid defense to a petition to compel arbitration. (Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109, 1143.) State law governs the “unconscionability” defense. (Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto (1996) 517 US 681, 687.) The core concern of the unconscionability doctrine is the “absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.” (Sonic-Calabasas, supra, 57 Cal.4th at 1145.) The unconscionability doctrine ensures that contracts—particularly contracts of adhesion—do not impose terms that have been variously described as overly harsh, unduly oppressive, so one-sided as to shock the conscience, or unfairly one-sided. (Id.)  Here, Plaintiffs have not identified any overly harsh or unduly oppressive provisions, other than depriving them of the court system to resolve their dispute without any other option.  The Court finds that such a deprivation, without much more, is no overly harsh, unduly oppressive, nor shocking of the conscience. 

“The procedural element of unconscionability focuses on whether the contract is one of adhesion. (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 113; Mercuro v. Superior Court, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 174.) Procedural unconscionability focuses on whether there is “oppression” arising from an inequality of bargaining power or “surprise” arising from buried terms in a complex printed form. (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 114; Mercuro v. Superior Court, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 174.) The substantive element addresses the existence of overly harsh or one-sided terms. (Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1064, 1071 [130 Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 63 P.3d 979]; Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 114.) An agreement to arbitrate is unenforceable only if both the procedural and substantive elements are satisfied. (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 113; Mercuro v. Superior Court, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 174.) However, Armendariz held, “[T]he more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.” (Armendariz, at p. 114; see also Kinney v. United HealthCare Services, Inc., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 1329.).” McManus v. CIBC World Markets Corp. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 76, 87.)

 

Procedural Unconscionability

 

            Plaintiffs argue that the arbitration agreement are adhesive and therefore procedurally unconscionable. Plaintiffs base their arguments on the fact that contract is presented as a ‘take it or leave it’ without any opportunity to negotiate its harshly one-sided terms. Further, Plaintiffs argue that the full definition of “HONDA” was only later defined what entities comprised the term, and that the arbitration provision itself, is attenuated with small fine print. Here, the Court disagrees. The Arbitration Agreement appears to be on the last page, is in the same size type as the rest of the agreement, and is in fact, bolded more so than other provisions on the page. Further, When there is no other indication of oppression other than the adhesive aspect of an agreement, the degree of procedural unconscionability is low. (Serpa v. California Surety Investigations, Inc. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 695, 704.) 

 

            As such, this Court find that the procedural unconscionability is low. 

 

Substantive Unconscionability

 

            Next, Plaintiffs argue that the arbitration agreement is substantively unconscionable because it is devoid of mutuality as AHM is not bound to arbitrate any claims against Plaintiffs. The Court does not find that this – alone – is enough to find substantive unconscionability. What Plaintiffs fail to acknowledge is that while AHM may not be bound to arbitrating claims against Plaintiffs, the terms of the arbitration, if chosen by the parties, apply equally to both sides. Here, the Court does not find enough unconscionability to find the entire arbitration agreement unconscionable.

 

IV. CONCLUSION¿¿ 

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            For the foregoing reasons, AHM’s Motion to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED. 

 

AHM is ordered to give notice.