Judge: Ronald F. Frank, Case: 23TRCV02816, Date: 2024-09-19 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23TRCV02816 Hearing Date: September 19, 2024 Dept: 8
Tentative Ruling¿
¿¿
HEARING DATE: September 19, 2024
¿¿
CASE NUMBER: 23TRCV02816
¿¿
CASE NAME: Rosa
Sajrapal De Juarez v. General Motors, et al.
¿¿
MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff,
Rosa Sajrapal De Juarez
RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant,
General Motors, LLC
TRIAL DATE: June 2, 2025
¿¿
MOTION:¿ (1) Motion to Compel Further
Responses to Requests for Production of Documents, Set One.
Tentative Rulings: (1) GRANTED in part and DENIED
in part as detailed below. The hearing
on this motion is CONTINUED for approximately a month, to a date to be selected
during the hearing, with the parties being ordered to meet and confer per guidelines
detailed by the Court below and the parties to file a report with the Court on
the outcome of their meet and conferring process not later than 3 court days
before the continued hearing.
¿
I. BACKGROUND¿¿
¿¿
A. Factual¿¿
On August 28, 2023, Plaintiff, Rosa Sajrapal De
Juarez (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendant, General Motors (“GM”)
and DOES 1 through 50. The complaint alleges causes of action for: (1) Violation of Civil Code § 1793.2(d); (2) Violation of
Civil Code § 1793.2(b); (3) Violation of Civil Code §1793.2(a)(3); (4) Breach
of Express Written Warranty – Civil Code §§ 1791.2(a), 1794; and (5) Breach of
the Implied Warranty of Merchantability – Civil Code §§ 1791.1, 1794.
On November 3, 2023,
Plaintiff notes that she propounded her Request for Production of Documents,
Set One, on Defendant seeking documents relating to Defendant’s internal
investigations and analyses of defects, including the electrical defect,
allegedly manifesting in the subject vehicle and establishing that Defendant
knew of such defects despite failing to repurchase the subject vehicle, as well
as documents relating to Defendant’s warranty and vehicle repurchase policies,
procedures, and practices.
On December 5, 2023,
Defendant served its responses. However, Plaintiff argues that notwithstanding
the plain relevance of the requests to Plaintiff’s Song-Beverly Act claims,
Defendant has responded by way of boilerplate objections. On December 27, 2023,
Plaintiff notes that her counsel sent Defendant’s counsel the initial meet and
confer letter regarding Defendant’s deficient responses, which detailed that
the documents requested were not only discoverable, but also relevant to
Plaintiff’s case and discoverable under controlling law. Further, Plaintiff
notes that she addressed Defendant’s deficient responses which consisted mostly
of boilerplate objections. Moreover, Plaintiff notes that she inquired about
Defendant’s ESI search protocol.
Based on the moving
papers, Plaintiff notes that beginning on January 5, 2024, Plaintiff followed
up with Defendant via multiple emails in an effort to follow up on Plaintiff’s
initial meet and confer letter regarding Defendant’s deficiencies. This meeting
and conferring continued through July 23, 2024, when Plaintiff’s counsel called
Defendant’s counsel to meet and confer, whereby Defendant promised to
supplement production as it previously had done via email, although the same
was never received, and as of the filing of Plaintiff’s motion, had still not
been received. To date, Plaintiff argues that Defendant has refused to provide Code-compliant
supplemental responses to the particular Requests at issue in the present
motion. Plaintiff also notes that Defendant has also refused to provide the
full and complete requested document production, nor has Defendant produced any
emails, memos, or investigations that could aid Plaintiff in understanding the
circumstances behind the allegedly repeated problems with the Subject Vehicle.
As such, Plaintiff has
filed this Motion to Compel Further Responses to twenty of the first set of Requests
for Production, i.e., Nos. 7, 10, 16, 18, 19, 20, 33, 59, 61-65, 67, 68,
70, 71, and 73-75.
B. Procedural¿¿
On August 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed this Motion to Compel
Further Responses to Requests for Production of Documents, Set One. On September
6, 2024, GM filed an opposition brief. On September 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed a
reply brief.
II. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS
Plaintiff’s Evidentiary
Objections to the Declaration of Matthew Dobson:
Sustain: 3.
Overrule: 1-2.
III. ANALYSIS
¿
A.
Legal
Standard
“Unless otherwise limited by order
of the court in accordance with this title, any party may obtain discovery
regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter
involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in
that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code
of Civ. Proc. § 2017.010.) For discovery purposes, information is regarded as
relevant “if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case,
preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement thereof.” (City of Los
Angeles v. Superior Court (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 272, 288.)
A motion to compel further
responses to a demand for inspection or production of documents (“RFP”) may be
brought based on: (1) incomplete statements of compliance; (2) inadequate,
evasive, or incomplete claims of inability to comply; or (3) unmerited or
overly generalized objections. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(c).) A
motion to compel further production must set forth specific facts showing good
cause justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand. (See Code Civ.
Proc., § 2031.310(b)(1).) In Digital Music News LLC v Superior Court
(2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 216 at 224, the Court defined “good cause” as a showing
that there “a disputed fact that is of consequence in the action and the
discovery sought will tend in reason to prove or disprove that fact or lead to
other evidence that will tend to prove or disprove the fact.” If the
moving party has shown good cause for the requests for production, the burden
is on the objecting party to justify the objections. (Kirkland v. Sup.Ct
(2002) 95 Cal. App.4th 92, 98.) ¿
"The court shall limit the
scope of discovery if it determines that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness
of that discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought
will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." (Cal. Code of Civ.
Proc. § 2017.020(a).) Generally, objections on the ground of burden require the
objecting party to produce evidence of (a) the propounding party's subjective
intent to create burden or (b) the amount of time and effort it would take to
respond. (See West Pico Furniture Co. of Los Angeles v. Superior Court In
and For Los Angeles County (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417.) However, no such
evidence is necessary where discovery is obviously overbroad on its face. (See Obregon
v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 431.)
B. Discussion
i.
Meet and
Confer Efforts
In GM’s
opposition brief, it argues that Plaintiff failed to meet and confer in good
faith prior to bringing this motion. GM argues that this Court should not
reward Plaintiff’s attempts to meet and confer, not should it reward
Plaintiff’s unnecessary filing, all of which have unnecessarily burdened GM and
this Court.
Despite GM’s
argument, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s moving papers, and even GM’s
opposition papers indicate to the Court that the parties have attempted to meet
and confer in good faith prior to the filing of this motion. But the parties clearly need focus and direction
for their meet and confer efforts, which the Court will provide below.
ii.
Requests for Production of
Documents
Plaintiff seeks an order from this
Court compelling GM’s further responses to Requests for Production of Documents
Nos. 7, 10, 16, 18, 19, 20, 33, 59, 61-65, 67, 68, 70, 71, and 73-75.
The Court discusses these categories below.
RFP Nos. 7, and 10: These requests seek documents relating to GMs policies and
procedures. For example, RFP No. 7 seeks, “[t]he Warranty Policy and Procedure
Manual published by [GM] and provided to [GM’s] authorized repair facility(ies),
within the state of California, from 2022 to present. [This request will be
understood to include production of any and all versions of such manual as
distributed to YOUR dealerships during the relevant time frame].” Further, RFP
No. 10 seeks, “[a] copy of the Workshop Manual specifying diagnosis and repair
procedures for vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the SUBJECT
VEHICLE.”
The Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the
requests at issue. The Court finds relevant the applicable Warranty Policy and Procedure Manual published by defendant
and provided to its authorized repair facilities, within the State of
California, for the year the lawsuit was filed. If a separate
written policy, procedure, or manual exists regarding repurchases or buy backs
appliable to vehicles sold or leased in California, that will also be required
to be produced for the year the lawsuit was filed and/or the year
Plaintiff contends the vehicle became qualified for repurchase (such as
upon satisfaction of the Presentation Element of a Song-Beverly cause of action
under Section 1793.2(d)(2) or 1793.22). Such documents are ordered to be
produced subject to a protective order.
As to the “workshop manual for repair procedures, the Court
DENIES the motion to compel. There are
thousands of component parts in modern automobiles, and only a handful of those
components are noted in the Plaintiff’s repair requests in this case. Modern motor vehicle manufacturers generally do
not have a single workshop manual like the old Chilton Guide, but rather have repair
instructions, diagnostic procedures, and complaint-oriented technical
literature geared to particular systems, component groups, and other subsets of
those thousands of components. Whether
unwittingly or otherwise, RFP 10 is unreasonably over broad, burdensome, and
seeks matters that are not reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of
admissible evidence in this single-vehicle case. The Court’s denial is without prejudice to a
more specifically focused and targeted request or requests that seek documents pertaining
to the affected components and the reported complaints or symptoms plaintiff reported
as to the same.
RFP Nos. 16-18, 19, 20, 59, 61-65, 67, 68, 70, 71,
and 73-75: These Requests seek documents relating to GM’s internal
analysis, investigations, communications, reports, and design-related documents
of the alleged “ELECTRICAL DEFECT” in both the subject vehicle and other
customers’ vehicles.
The Court GRANTS these requests in
part and DENIES them in part. First, the Court will require production of documents
regarding the symptoms actually experienced by Plaintiff’s
subject vehicle. However, the defined term “ELECTRICAL DEFECTS” is overly broad
and burdensome, resulting in a multiply compound definition and vagueness when
the “other similar concerns” language is included, resulting in a request for
documents that would not be reasonably calculated to lead to evidence that
might be admissible in this trial. Had Plaintiff limited the definition to, for
example, “A/C not blowing cold air,” the scope of discovery requests including
that claimed symptom would be much more reasonably manageable. Such a limitation is the sort of thing counsel
could and should have addressed in the meet and confer process over the last
six months. Since that has not yet
happened, the Court will now order such meeting and conferring to take place as
a predicate to the production of truly discoverable documents.
To assist the parties in their
definition-limiting meet and confer process, the Court provides guidelines
below. But given that Plaintiff’s
discovery requests include emails of GM employees generally and ESI relating to
other consumers and other vehicles besides Plaintiff’s with any of the
constellation of possible repair complaints not only in California, but in any
other state, the Court begins by finding that many of the Requests are unduly
burdensome, taking into account the needs of this single-vehicle case, the
amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in this
litigation. Narrowing the scope of the type of information to be provided to the
actual repair complaints and symptoms plaintiff reported to a GM authorized
service and repair facility in this Plaintiff’s repair history, rather than the
overly broad definition of “Electrical Defects” here, the Court will CONTINUE the
hearing and have the parties return in approximately 30 days with a report on
the outcome of the Court-ordered meet and confer process as to the narrowed
scope of the requested document discovery.
What
this Court does find to be relevant and likely to lead to the production of admissible
evidence, are as follows: (1) Communications between the plaintiff and the
warrantor/manufacturer and/or its servicing dealers, and communications between
Plaintiff and the manufacturer’s factory representative and/or call center
concerning the subject vehicle; (2) Other customers’ complaints as to the same alleged
symptoms reported by Plaintiff to a GM authorized dealer, limited to vehicles
purchased in California for the same year, make and model of the subject
vehicle. The other customer complaints for purposes of a reasonable scope for
GM to search for and produce records of other customers’ complaints must be limited
in scope to the description of the symptom as shown on the dealer repair
records, not the overly broad defined term “ELECTRICAL DEFECTS”, and will only
be ordered as to the repair complaints and symptoms that Plaintiff reported on
a GM dealer repair order more than one time in the subject vehicle’s repair history. In the Court’s judgment, it is not “reasonably”
calculated to lead to admissible evidence for GM to be required to provide other-customer
complaint records for a complaint reported only once by the Plaintiff. The parties’ meet and confer process should include
the phrasing of search terms for GM to find the other customers’ complaints as
limited above.
(3) Recall Notices for vehicles purchased in California for
the same year, make and model of the subject vehicle, whether those bulletins and
notices were mentioned in the repair history of the subject vehicle or not; (4)
Repair orders and invoices in the possession of a GM-authorized service and
repair facility (which the Court finds are within the “control” of GM as the franchisor
of its franchisee dealers) concerning the subject vehicle must be produced,
including the “accounting” copies showing the hours and dates of activity by
dealer personnel; (5) Warranty claims submitted to and/or approved by Defendant
concerning the subject vehicle; (6) Any
internal analysis and/or investigation regarding the primary or other recurring
(i.e., more than one time) repair complaints or symptoms claimed by plaintiff in
the dealer records as to Plaintiff’s vehicle, applicable to the same year, make
and model of the subject vehicle, and (7) Technical Service Bulletins provided
by GM to the NHTSA for vehicles purchased in California for the same year, make
and model of the subject vehicle, relating to the same repair complaints or
symptoms as discussed in category (6).
The Court orders the parties to apply the above
guidelines when meeting and conferring as to what is to be produced as to each
of the Requests for Production of Documents, and to report back to the Court the
parties’ progress or sticking points in a written report to be filed at least 3
court days before the continued hearing date.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the
foregoing, this Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion in part and DENIES it in part
as detailed above.