Judge Ronald F. Frank, Case Number: 23TRCV03275, Date: 2024-06-05 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Ronald F. Frank, Case: 23TRCV03275, Date: 2024-06-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23TRCV03275 Hearing Date: June 5, 2024 Dept: 8

Tentative Ruling

HEARING DATE: June 5, 2024¿

CASE NUMBER: 23TRCV03275

CASE NAME: Charisse Evans v. Shawn Tabetha Swanier, et al.

MOVING PARTY: Defendant/Cross-Defendant, Shawn Tabetha Swanier

RESPONDING PARTY: Charisse Evans; Cross-Complainant Michael Alan Levitt (No Opposition from either)

TRIAL DATE: Not Set.

MOTION:¿ (1) Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement

Tentative Rulings: (1) GRANT

I. BACKGROUND¿

A. Factual¿

On October 4, 2023, Plaintiff, Charisse Evans (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against Defendants, Shawn Tabetha Swanier, Michael Alan Levitt, and DOES 1 through 30. The Complaint alleged one cause of action for Negligence.

Further, on November 27, 2023, Defendant, Michael Alan Levitt filed a Cross-Complaint against Cross-Defendants Shawn Tabetha Swanier

February 21, 2020, Plaintiff, Ralph Mendoza and Sonia Mendoza (“Plaintiffs”) filed a Complaint against Defendants, Safety-Kleen Systems, Inc., Kern Oil & Refining Co., JRI Holdings, Inc., and DOES 1 through 100.

Now, Defendant and Cross-Defendant, Shawn Tabetha Swanier has filed a Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement.

B. Procedural

On May 1, 2024, Defendant, Shawn Tabetha Swanier, filed this Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement. To date, no opposition brief has been filed.

¿II. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

California Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6(a)(1), provides, in relevant part, that, on noticed motion, “[a]ny party to an action wherein it is alleged that two or more parties are joint tortfeasors or co-obligors on a contract debt shall be entitled to a hearing on the issue of the good faith of a settlement entered into by the plaintiff . . . and one or more alleged tortfeasors or co-obligors . . . .” “A determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith shall bar any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor or co-obligor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 877.6(c).) Although a determination that a settlement was in good faith does not discharge any other party from liability, “it shall reduce the claims against the others in the amount stipulated” by the settlement. (Code Civ. Proc. § 877(a).)

“The party asserting the lack of good faith shall have the burden of proof on that issue.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 877.6(d).) On Westwood’s application, that places the burden on HH Drywall to show a lack of good faith.

In Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499, the California Supreme Court identified the following nonexclusive factors courts are to consider in determining if a settlement is in good faith under section 877.6: “a rough approximation of plaintiffs' total recovery and the settlor's proportionate liability, the amount paid in settlement, the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs, and a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial. Other relevant considerations include the financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants, as well as the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of nonsettling defendants.”

In City of Grand View Terrace v. Superior Court (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1261, the court provided the following guidance regarding a motion for a good faith settlement determination:

This court notes that of the hundreds of motions for good faith determination presented for trial court approval each year, the overwhelming majority are unopposed and granted summarily by the trial court. At the time of filing in many cases, the moving party does not know if a contest will develop. If each motion required a full recital by declaration or affidavit setting forth a complete factual response to all of the Tech-Bilt factors, literally thousands of attorney hours would be consumed, and inch-thick motions would have to be read and considered by trial courts in an exercise which would waste valuable judicial and legal time and clients’ resources. . . . That is to say, when no one objects, the barebones motion which sets forth the ground of good faith, accompanied by a declaration which sets forth a brief background of the case is sufficient.

If the good faith settlement is contested, section 877.6, subdivision (d), sets forth a workable ground rule for the hearing by placing the burden of proving the lack of good faith on the contesting party. Once there is a showing made by the settlor of the settlement, the burden of proof on the issue of good faith shifts to the nonsettlor who asserts that the settlement was not made in good faith. If contested, declarations by the nonsettlor should be filed which in many cases could require the moving party to file responsive counter declarations to negate the lack of good faith asserted by the nonsettling contesting party.

(192 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1260-61 (citation omitted).)

The evaluation of whether a settlement was made in good faith is required to “be made on the basis of information available at the time of settlement.” (Tech-Bilt, Inc., supra, 38 Cal.3d at 499.) “‘[A] defendant’s settlement figure must not be grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person, at the time of the settlement, would estimate the settling defendant’s liability to be.’ [Citation.]” (Id.)

“The party asserting the lack of good faith, who has the burden of proof on that issue (§ 877.6, subd. (d), should be permitted to demonstrate, if he can, that the settlement is so far ‘out of the ballpark’ in relation to these factors as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of the statute. Such a demonstration would establish that the proposed settlement was not a ‘settlement made in good faith’ within the terms of section 877.6.” (Id. at 499-500.)

“[A] court not only looks at the alleged tortfeasor's potential liability to the plaintiff, but it must also consider the culpability of the tortfeasor vis-à-vis other parties alleged to be responsible for the same injury. Potential liability for indemnity to a nonsettling defendant is an important consideration for the trial court in determining whether to approve a settlement by an alleged tortfeasor. [Citation.]” (TSI Seismic Tenant Space, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 159, 166.)

B. Discussion

This action arose out of a 4-vehicle automobile accident that occurred on April 19, 2022. Defendant Swanier allegedly rear-ended Defendant Levitt’s vehicle pushing him into Plaintiff, Charisse Evans’ vehicle. Defendant Swanier, the moving party here, notes that Plaintiff has allegedly incurred medical specials in the amount of $29,929, and also sustained similar injuries in a subsequent incident which occurred on December 1, 2023, and a prior accident in 2017.

On March 21, 2024, Defendant Swanier noted that Plaintiff’s attorney and her attorney reached a settlement agreement where Swanier agreed to pay the Plaintiff $40,000 in exchange for the dismissal of the complaint against Swanier.

The moving papers state that on April 9, 2024, Swanier’s counsel sent a letter to counsel for cross-complainant, requesting a dismissal of his cross-complaint, otherwise Ms. Swanier would have to file a motion for determination of good faith settlement. On April 10, 2024, Swanier asserts that counsel for cross-complainant responded that he would make a substantive response to Swanier’s meet and confer letter. However, as of the filing of this motion on May 1, 2024, Swanier claims she had not heard back from cross-complainant’s counsel.

Rough Approximation of Plaintiff’s Total Recovery and The Settlor's Proportionate Liability

As noted above, Defendant, Shawn Tabetha Swanier contends that Plaintiff’s rough estimate of a total recovery would be $29,929, without providing the Court with a basis for determining how much of those soft tissue and knee injury bills were or may have been attributable to the other two incidents with Plaintiff. Of course, with medical bills and treatment come non-economic damages such as pain and suffering. Some PI attorneys use a multiplier of 2, 3 or 4 times the medical special damages to attempt to provide a quasi-objective basis for converting medical bills into an amount for pain and suffering. If one third of the medical bills were attributed to each of the 3 incidents, then the bills attributable to this incident would be $10,000. Those parameters would convert, at the high end, to a potential total recovery of up to $150,000 and a low end of $30,000. The moving papers do not give a basis for attributing liability to any other parties nor to the Plaintiff, so it is difficult for the Court to assess whether the settling party should be attributed 100% of a proportionate share for her role in carelessly bending down to pick up her fallen cell phone in the footwell while driving, causing her to fail to maintain a lookout and failing to stop before rear-ending the Plaintiff’s vehicle, or some lesser percentage. But a $40,000 settlement appears to the Court, on the evidence presented to it and in the absence of any opposition, to be within the Tech-Bilt ballpark.

Settlor’s Proportionate Liability

Defendant Swanier concedes that she was negligent, and that all parties were slowed or stopped at a red light when she dropped her phone, and she bent down to pick it up thinking traffic had proceeded, but when it had not, she rear-ended cross-complainant’s vehicle at approximately 10 mph.

The Amount Paid and Allocated

The settlement amount is for $40,000, and Swanier notes she has already paid this amount to Plaintiff.

Insurance Policy Limits

Defendant Swanier notes that she has policy limits of $100,000 per person, so her payment reserves some policy limits for some other incident that may be covered by the same policy. The fact that Plaintiff did not insist on her paying the policy limits demonstrates to the Court that the $40,000 settlement amount is within the ballpark.

No Opposition Brief

This Court finds that based on the motion, it appears that Defendant Swanier and Plaintiff have reached a good faith settlement. The only issue this Court identified was dismissal of Swanier in exchange for this settlement if there were still issues between Swanier and Cross-Complainant, Michael Alan Levitt. The cross-complaint only alleges causes of action for: (1) Equitable Indemnity; (2) Comparative Indemnity; (3) Contribution; and (4) Declaratory Relief. With no opposition brief filed, the Court is tentatively inclined to assume that he does not and GRANTS the motion.

IV. CONCLUSION

¿¿

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant, Shawn Tabetha Swanier’s Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement is GRANTED.

Swanier is ordered to provide notice.